Getting the 50,000 or three times the actual damages
(b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
be liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to
Section 3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.55,
2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that
mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent where the violation was not corrected and remedied prior to the
recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale. If the court finds that
the material violation was intentional or reckless, or resulted from
willful misconduct by a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award the borrower
the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000).
2923.55. (a) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary,
or authorized agent may not record a notice of default pursuant to
Section 2924 until all of the following:
(1) The mortgage servicer has satisfied the requirements of
paragraph (1) of subdivision (b).
(2) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) or 30 days after satisfying the due
diligence requirements as described in subdivision (f).
(3) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (c) of Section
2923.6, if the borrower has provided a complete application as
defined in subdivision (h) of Section 2923.6.
(b) (1) As specified in subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall
send the following information in writing to the borrower:
(A) A statement that if the borrower is a servicemember or a
dependent of a servicemember, he or she may be entitled to certain
protections under the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50
U.S.C. Appen. Sec. 501 et seq.) regarding the servicemember’s
interest rate and the risk of foreclosure, and counseling for covered
servicemembers that is available at agencies such as Military
OneSource and Armed Forces Legal Assistance.
(B) A statement that the borrower may request the following:
(i) A copy of the borrower’s promissory note or other evidence of
indebtedness.
(ii) A copy of the borrower’s deed of trust or mortgage.
(iii) A copy of any assignment, if applicable, of the borrower’s
mortgage or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right of the
mortgage servicer to foreclose.
(iv) A copy of the borrower’s payment history since the borrower
was last less than 60 days past due.
(2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by
telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the
initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that
he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur
within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower’s financial situation
and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at
the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case,
the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
Any meeting may occur telephonically.
(c) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the
borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as
required by this section, or that no contact was required because the
individual did not meet the definition of “borrower” pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.
(d) A mortgage servicer’s loss mitigation personnel may
participate by telephone during any contact required by this section.
(e) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser
to discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower’s behalf, the
borrower’s financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. That contact made at the direction of the borrower shall
satisfy the contact requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision
(b). Any foreclosure prevention alternative offered at the meeting by
the mortgage servicer is subject to approval by the borrower.
(f) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924
when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), provided that the failure to
contact the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the
mortgage servicer. For purposes of this section, “due diligence”
shall require and mean all of the following:
(1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower
by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone
number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer
shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three
times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall
be made to the primary telephone number on file.
(B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an
automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone
call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of
the mortgage servicer.
(C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact
requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting
contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower’s primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file,
if any, have been disconnected.
(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgage servicer shall then send a certified letter, with return
receipt requested, that includes the toll-free telephone number made
available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
(4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower
to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone
number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
(5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the
homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following
information:
(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.
(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
(g) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(i) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
2923.6. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty that
mortgage servicers may have to maximize net present value under their
pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan
pool, or to all investors under a pooling and servicing agreement,
not to any particular party in the loan pool or investor under a
pooling and servicing agreement, and that a mortgage servicer acts in
the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or investors in
the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to or implements a
loan modification or workout plan for which both of the following
apply:
(1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is
reasonably foreseeable.
(2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout
plan exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net
present value basis.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer
offer the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a
modification or plan is consistent with its contractual or other
authority.
(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien
loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage
servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of
sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale, while the complete first lien loan
modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice
of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until any of
the following occurs:
(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the
borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any
appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.
(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan
modification within 14 days of the offer.
(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification,
but defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower’s obligations
under, the first lien loan modification.
(d) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan
modification is denied, the borrower shall have at least 30 days from
the date of the written denial to appeal the denial and to provide
evidence that the mortgage servicer’s determination was in error.
(e) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan
modification is denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default
or, if a notice of default has already been recorded, record a
notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until the later of:
(1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of
the denial.
(2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision
(d), the later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days
after a first lien loan modification is offered after appeal but
declined by the borrower, or, if a first lien loan modification is
offered and accepted after appeal, the date on which the borrower
fails to timely submit the first payment or otherwise breaches the
terms of the offer.
(f) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification
application, the mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the
borrower identifying the reasons for denial, including the
following:
(1) The amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which
the borrower may request an appeal of the denial of the first lien
loan modification and instructions regarding how to appeal the
denial.
(2) If the denial was based on investor disallowance, the specific
reasons for the investor disallowance.
(3) If the denial is the result of a net present value
calculation, the monthly gross income and property value used to
calculate the net present value and a statement that the borrower may
obtain all of the inputs used in the net present value calculation
upon written request to the mortgage servicer.
(4) If applicable, a finding that the borrower was previously
offered a first lien loan modification and failed to successfully
make payments under the terms of the modified loan.
(5) If applicable, a description of other foreclosure prevention
alternatives for which the borrower may be eligible, and a list of
the steps the borrower must take in order to be considered for those
options. If the mortgage servicer has already approved the borrower
for another foreclosure prevention alternative, information necessary
to complete the foreclosure prevention alternative.
(g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple
applications for first lien loan modifications for the purpose of
delay, the mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate
applications from borrowers who have already been evaluated or
afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated for a first lien loan
modification prior to January 1, 2013, or who have been evaluated or
afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated consistent with the
requirements of this section, unless there has been a material change
in the borrower’s financial circumstances since the date of the
borrower’s previous application and that change is documented by the
borrower and submitted to the mortgage servicer.
(h) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed
“complete” when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with
all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable
timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.
(i) Subdivisions (c) to (h), inclusive, shall not apply to
entities described in subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(j) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(k) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
2923.7. (a) Upon request from a borrower who requests a foreclosure
prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall promptly
establish a single point of contact and provide to the borrower one
or more direct means of communication with the single point of
contact.
(b) The single point of contact shall be responsible for doing all
of the following:
(1) Communicating the process by which a borrower may apply for an
available foreclosure prevention alternative and the deadline for
any required submissions to be considered for these options.
(2) Coordinating receipt of all documents associated with
available foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the
borrower of any missing documents necessary to complete the
application.
(3) Having access to current information and personnel sufficient
to timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the
current status of the foreclosure prevention alternative.
(4) Ensuring that a borrower is considered for all foreclosure
prevention alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage
servicer, if any.
(5) Having access to individuals with the ability and authority to
stop foreclosure proceedings when necessary.
(c) The single point of contact shall remain assigned to the
borrower’s account until the mortgage servicer determines that all
loss mitigation options offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer
have been exhausted or the borrower’s account becomes current.
(d) The mortgage servicer shall ensure that a single point of
contact refers and transfers a borrower to an appropriate supervisor
upon request of the borrower, if the single point of contact has a
supervisor.
(e) For purposes of this section, “single point of contact” means
an individual or team of personnel each of whom has the ability and
authority to perform the responsibilities described in subdivisions
(b) to (d), inclusive. The mortgage servicer shall ensure that each
member of the team is knowledgeable about the borrower’s situation
and current status in the alternatives to foreclosure process.
(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(g) (1) This section shall not apply to a depository institution
chartered under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to
Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing
with Section 50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed
pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of
the Business and Professions Code, that, during its immediately
preceding annual reporting period, as established with its primary
regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer residential real properties,
containing no more than four dwelling units, that are located in
California.
(2) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or
annual reporting period as established with its primary regulator
during which an entity or person described in paragraph (1) exceeds
the threshold of 175 specified in paragraph (1), that entity shall
notify its primary regulator, in a manner acceptable to its primary
regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor who is delinquent on a
residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of the date on
which that entity will be subject to this section, which date shall
be the first day of the first month that is six months after the
close of the calendar year or annual reporting period during which
that entity exceeded the threshold.
2924.9. (a) Unless a borrower has previously exhausted the first
lien loan modification process offered by, or through, his or her
mortgage servicer described in Section 2923.6, within five business
days after recording a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924, a
mortgage servicer that offers one or more foreclosure prevention
alternatives shall send a written communication to the borrower that
includes all of the following information:
(1) That the borrower may be evaluated for a foreclosure
prevention alternative or, if applicable, foreclosure prevention
alternatives.
(2) Whether an application is required to be submitted by the
borrower in order to be considered for a foreclosure prevention
alternative.
(3) The means and process by which a borrower may obtain an
application for a foreclosure prevention alternative.
(b) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(c) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(d) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
2924.10. (a) When a borrower submits a complete first lien
modification application or any document in connection with a first
lien modification application, the mortgage servicer shall provide
written acknowledgment of the receipt of the documentation within
five business days of receipt. In its initial acknowledgment of
receipt of the loan modification application, the mortgage servicer
shall include the following information:
(1) A description of the loan modification process, including an
estimate of when a decision on the loan modification will be made
after a complete application has been submitted by the borrower and
the length of time the borrower will have to consider an offer of a
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative.
(2) Any deadlines, including deadlines to submit missing
documentation, that would affect the processing of a first lien loan
modification application.
(3) Any expiration dates for submitted documents.
(4) Any deficiency in the borrower’s first lien loan modification
application.
(b) For purposes of this section, a borrower’s first lien loan
modification application shall be deemed to be “complete” when a
borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents
required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes
specified by the mortgage servicer.
(c) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(d) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(e) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
2924.11. (a) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in
writing prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
not record a notice of default under either of the following
circumstances:
(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.
(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
(b) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
after the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record
a notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale under either of the
following circumstances:
(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.
(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
(c) When a borrower accepts an offered first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, the
mortgage servicer shall provide the borrower with a copy of the fully
executed loan modification agreement or agreement evidencing the
foreclosure prevention alternative following receipt of the executed
copy from the borrower.
(d) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall record a
rescission of a notice of default or cancel a pending trustee’s sale,
if applicable, upon the borrower executing a permanent foreclosure
prevention alternative. In the case of a short sale, the rescission
or cancellation of the pending trustee’s sale shall occur when the
short sale has been approved by all parties and proof of funds or
financing has been provided to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
(e) The mortgage servicer shall not charge any application,
processing, or other fee for a first lien loan modification or other
foreclosure prevention alternative.
(f) The mortgage servicer shall not collect any late fees for
periods during which a complete first lien loan modification
application is under consideration or a denial is being appealed, the
borrower is making timely modification payments, or a foreclosure
prevention alternative is being evaluated or exercised.
(g) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and
the servicing of that borrower’s loan is transferred or sold to
another mortgage servicer, the subsequent mortgage servicer shall
continue to honor any previously approved first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, in
accordance with the provisions of the act that added this section.
(h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(i) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(j) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
2924.17. (a) A declaration recorded pursuant to Section 2923.5 or,
until January 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 2923.55, a notice of
default, notice of sale, assignment of a deed of trust, or
substitution of trustee recorded by or on behalf of a mortgage
servicer in connection with a foreclosure subject to the requirements
of Section 2924, or a declaration or affidavit filed in any court
relative to a foreclosure proceeding shall be accurate and complete
and supported by competent and reliable evidence.
(b) Before recording or filing any of the documents described in
subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has
reviewed competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower’
s default and the right to foreclose, including the borrower’s loan
status and loan information.
(c) Until January 1, 2018, any mortgage servicer that engages in
multiple and repeated uncorrected violations of subdivision (b) in
recording documents or filing documents in any court relative to a
foreclosure proceeding shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to
seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) per mortgage or deed of
trust in an action brought by a government entity identified in
Section 17204 of the Business and Professions Code, or in an
administrative proceeding brought by the Department of Business
Oversight or the Bureau of Real Estate against a respective licensee,
in addition to any other remedies available to these entities. This
subdivision shall be inoperative on January 1, 2018.
This chapter shall apply to every dwelling structure containing one or more units offered to the public for rent or for lease for residential purposes.
(a) Any owner of a dwelling structure specified in Section 1961 or a party signing a rental agreement or lease on behalf of the owner shall do all of the following:
(1) Disclose therein the name, telephone number, and usual street address at which personal service may be effected of each person who is:
(A) Authorized to manage the premises.
(B) An owner of the premises or a person who is authorized to act for and on behalf of the owner for the purpose of service of process and for the purpose of receiving and receipting for all notices and demands.
(2) Disclose therein the name, telephone number, and address of the person or entity to whom rent payments shall be made.
(A) If rent payments may be made personally, the usual days and hours that the person will be available to receive the payments shall also be disclosed.
(B) At the owner’s option, the rental agreement or lease shall instead disclose the number of either:
(i) The account in a financial institution into which rent payments may be made, and the name and street address of the institution; provided that the institution is located within five miles of the rental property.
(ii) The information necessary to establish an electronic funds transfer procedure for paying the rent.
(3) Disclose therein the form or forms in which rent payments are to be made.
(4) Provide a copy of the rental agreement or lease to the tenant within 15 days of its execution by the tenant. Once each calendar year thereafter, upon request by the tenant, the owner or owner’s agent shall provide an additional copy to the tenant within 15 days. If the owner or owner’s agent does not possess the rental agreement or lease or a copy of it, the owner or owner’s agent shall instead furnish the tenant with a written statement stating that fact and containing the information required by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).
(b) In the case of an oral rental agreement, the owner, or a person acting on behalf of the owner for the receipt of rent or otherwise, shall furnish the tenant, within 15 days of the agreement, with a written statement containing the information required by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subdivision (a). Once each calendar year thereafter, upon request by the tenant, the owner or owner’s agent shall provide an additional copy of the statement to the tenant within 15 days.
(c) The information required by this section shall be kept current and this section shall extend to and be enforceable against any successor owner or manager, who shall comply with this section within 15 days of succeeding the previous owner or manager. A successor owner or manager shall not serve a notice pursuant to paragraph (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent that accrued during the period of noncompliance by a successor owner or manager with this subdivision. Nothing in this subdivision shall relieve the tenant of any liability for unpaid rent.
(d) A party who enters into a rental agreement on behalf of the owner who fails to comply with this section is deemed an agent of each person who is an owner:
(1) For the purpose of service of process and receiving and receipting for notices and demands.
(2) For the purpose of performing the obligations of the owner under law and under the rental agreement.
(3) For the purpose of receiving rental payments, which may be made in cash, by check, by money order, or in any form previously accepted by the owner or owner’s agent, unless the form of payment has been specified in the oral or written agreement, or the tenant has been notified by the owner in writing that a particular form of payment is unacceptable.
(e) Nothing in this section limits or excludes the liability of any undisclosed owner.
(f) If the address provided by the owner does not allow for personal delivery, then it shall be conclusively presumed that upon the mailing of any rent or notice to the owner by the tenant to the name and address provided, the notice or rent is deemed receivable by the owner on the date posted, if the tenant can show proof of mailing to the name and address provided by the owner.
(Amended by Stats. 2012, Ch. 695, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 2013.)
(a) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 1962, the information required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1962 to be disclosed to a tenant may, instead of being disclosed in the manner described in subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 1962, be disclosed by the following method:
(1) In each dwelling structure containing an elevator a printed or typewritten notice containing the information required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1962 shall be placed in every elevator and in one other conspicuous place.
(2) In each structure not containing an elevator, a printed or typewritten notice containing the information required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1962 shall be placed in at least two conspicuous places.
(3) In the case of a single unit dwelling structure, the information to be disclosed under this section may be disclosed by complying with either paragraph (1) or (2).
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (a), all the provisions of Section 1962 shall be applicable.
(Amended by Stats. 2001, Ch. 729, Sec. 4. Effective January 1, 2002.)
In the event an owner, successor owner, manager, or agent specified in Section 1961 fails to comply with the requirements of this chapter, service of process by a tenant with respect to a dispute arising out of the tenancy may be made by registered or certified mail sent to the address at which rent is paid, in which case the provisions of Section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply.
(Amended by Stats. 2001, Ch. 729, Sec. 5. Effective January 1, 2002.)
1159. Every person is guilty of a forcible entry who either:
1. By breaking open doors, windows, or other parts of a house, or
by any kind of violence or circumstance of terror enters upon or into
any real property; or,
2. Who, after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by
force, threats, or menacing conduct, the party in possession.
The "party in possession" means any person who hires real property
and includes a boarder or lodger, except those persons whose
occupancy is described in subdivision (b) of Section 1940 of the
Civil Code.
1160. Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either:
1. By force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully
holds and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same
was acquired peaceably or otherwise; or,
2. Who, in the night-time, or during the absence of the occupant
of any lands, unlawfully enters upon real property, and who, after
demand made for the surrender thereof, for the period of five days,
refuses to surrender the same to such former occupant.
The occupant of real property, within the meaning of this
subdivision, is one who, within five days preceding such unlawful
entry, was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands.
1161. A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, or the
executor or administrator of his or her estate heretofore qualified
and now acting or hereafter to be qualified and act, is guilty of
unlawful detainer:
1. When he or she continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, of the property, or any part thereof, after the expiration
of the term for which it is let to him or her; provided the
expiration is of a nondefault nature however brought about without
the permission of his or her landlord, or the successor in estate of
his or her landlord, if applicable; including the case where the
person to be removed became the occupant of the premises as a
servant, employee, agent, or licensee and the relation of master and
servant, or employer and employee, or principal and agent, or
licensor and licensee, has been lawfully terminated or the time fixed
for occupancy by the agreement between the parties has expired; but
nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as preventing the
removal of the occupant in any other lawful manner; but in case of a
tenancy at will, it must first be terminated by notice, as prescribed
in the Civil Code.
2. When he or she continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, without the permission of his or her landlord, or the
successor in estate of his or her landlord, if applicable, after
default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement
under which the property is held, and three days' notice, in writing,
requiring its payment, stating the amount which is due, the name,
telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment
shall be made, and, if payment may be made personally, the usual days
and hours that person will be available to receive the payment
(provided that, if the address does not allow for personal delivery,
then it shall be conclusively presumed that upon the mailing of any
rent or notice to the owner by the tenant to the name and address
provided, the notice or rent is deemed received by the owner on the
date posted, if the tenant can show proof of mailing to the name and
address provided by the owner), or the number of an account in a
financial institution into which the rental payment may be made, and
the name and street address of the institution (provided that the
institution is located within five miles of the rental property), or
if an electronic funds transfer procedure has been previously
established, that payment may be made pursuant to that procedure, or
possession of the property, shall have been served upon him or her
and if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of the premises,
also upon the subtenant.
The notice may be served at any time within one year after the
rent becomes due. In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands,
where the tenant has held over and retained possession for more than
60 days after the expiration of the term without any demand of
possession or notice to quit by the landlord or the successor in
estate of his or her landlord, if applicable, he or she shall be
deemed to be holding by permission of the landlord or successor in
estate of his or her landlord, if applicable, and shall be entitled
to hold under the terms of the lease for another full year, and shall
not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year, and the
holding over for that period shall be taken and construed as a
consent on the part of a tenant to hold for another year.
3. When he or she continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform other conditions or
covenants of the lease or agreement under which the property is held,
including any covenant not to assign or sublet, than the one for the
payment of rent, and three days' notice, in writing, requiring the
performance of such conditions or covenants, or the possession of the
property, shall have been served upon him or her, and if there is a
subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also, upon the
subtenant. Within three days after the service of the notice, the
tenant, or any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, or any
mortgagee of the term, or other person interested in its
continuance, may perform the conditions or covenants of the lease or
pay the stipulated rent, as the case may be, and thereby save the
lease from forfeiture; provided, if the conditions and covenants of
the lease, violated by the lessee, cannot afterward be performed,
then no notice, as last prescribed herein, need be given to the
lessee or his or her subtenant, demanding the performance of the
violated conditions or covenants of the lease.
A tenant may take proceedings, similar to those prescribed in this
chapter, to obtain possession of the premises let to a subtenant or
held by a servant, employee, agent, or licensee, in case of his or
her unlawful detention of the premises underlet to him or her or held
by him or her.
4. Any tenant, subtenant, or executor or administrator of his or
her estate heretofore qualified and now acting, or hereafter to be
qualified and act, assigning or subletting or committing waste upon
the demised premises, contrary to the conditions or covenants of his
or her lease, or maintaining, committing, or permitting the
maintenance or commission of a nuisance upon the demised premises or
using the premises for an unlawful purpose, thereby terminates the
lease, and the landlord, or his or her successor in estate, shall
upon service of three days' notice to quit upon the person or persons
in possession, be entitled to restitution of possession of the
demised premises under this chapter. For purposes of this
subdivision, a person who commits or maintains a public nuisance as
described in Section 3482.8 of the Civil Code, or who commits an
offense described in subdivision (c) of Section 3485 of the Civil
Code, or subdivision (c) of Section 3486 of the Civil Code, or uses
the premises to further the purpose of that offense shall be deemed
to have committed a nuisance upon the premises.
5. When he or she gives written notice as provided in Section 1946
of the Civil Code of his or her intention to terminate the hiring of
the real property, or makes a written offer to surrender which is
accepted in writing by the landlord, but fails to deliver possession
at the time specified in that written notice, without the permission
of his or her landlord, or the successor in estate of the landlord,
if applicable.
As used in this section, tenant includes any person who hires real
property except those persons whose occupancy is described in
subdivision (b) of Section 1940 of the Civil Code.
This section shall become operative on January 1, 2012.
1161.1. With respect to application of Section 1161 in cases of
possession of commercial real property after default in the payment
of rent:
(a) If the amount stated in the notice provided to the tenant
pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 is clearly identified by
the notice as an estimate and the amount claimed is not in fact
correct, but it is determined upon the trial or other judicial
determination that rent was owing, and the amount claimed in the
notice was reasonably estimated, the tenant shall be subject to
judgment for possession and the actual amount of rent and other sums
found to be due. However, if (1) upon receipt of such a notice
claiming an amount identified by the notice as an estimate, the
tenant tenders to the landlord within the time for payment required
by the notice, the amount which the tenant has reasonably estimated
to be due and (2) if at trial it is determined that the amount of
rent then due was the amount tendered by the tenant or a lesser
amount, the tenant shall be deemed the prevailing party for all
purposes. If the court determines that the amount so tendered by the
tenant was less than the amount due, but was reasonably estimated,
the tenant shall retain the right to possession if the tenant pays to
the landlord within five days of the effective date of the judgment
(1) the amount previously tendered if it had not been previously
accepted, (2) the difference between the amount tendered and the
amount determined by the court to be due, and (3) any other sums as
ordered by the court.
(b) If the landlord accepts a partial payment of rent, including
any payment pursuant to subdivision (a), after serving notice
pursuant to Section 1161, the landlord, without any further notice to
the tenant, may commence and pursue an action under this chapter to
recover the difference between the amount demanded in that notice and
the payment actually received, and this shall be specified in the
complaint.
(c) If the landlord accepts a partial payment of rent after filing
the complaint pursuant to Section 1166, the landlord's acceptance of
the partial payment is evidence only of that payment, without waiver
of any rights or defenses of any of the parties. The landlord shall
be entitled to amend the complaint to reflect the partial payment
without creating a necessity for the filing of an additional answer
or other responsive pleading by the tenant, and without prior leave
of court, and such an amendment shall not delay the matter from
proceeding. However, this subdivision shall apply only if the
landlord provides actual notice to the tenant that acceptance of the
partial rent payment does not constitute a waiver of any rights,
including any right the landlord may have to recover possession of
the property.
(d) "Commercial real property" as used in this section, means all
real property in this state except dwelling units made subject to
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1940) of Title 5 of Part 4 of
Division 3 of the Civil Code, mobilehomes as defined in Section 798.3
of the Civil Code, or recreational vehicles as defined in Section
799.24 of the Civil Code.
(e) For the purposes of this section, there is a presumption
affecting the burden of proof that the amount of rent claimed or
tendered is reasonably estimated if, in relation to the amount
determined to be due upon the trial or other judicial determination
of that issue, the amount claimed or tendered was no more than 20
percent more or less than the amount determined to be due. However,
if the rent due is contingent upon information primarily within the
knowledge of the one party to the lease and that information has not
been furnished to, or has not accurately been furnished to, the other
party, the court shall consider that fact in determining the
reasonableness of the amount of rent claimed or tendered pursuant to
subdivision (a).
1161.2. (a) The clerk may allow access to limited civil case
records filed under this chapter, including the court file, index,
and register of actions, only as follows:
(1) To a party to the action, including a party's attorney.
(2) To any person who provides the clerk with the names of at
least one plaintiff and one defendant and the address of the
premises, including the apartment or unit number, if any.
(3) To a resident of the premises who provides the clerk with the
name of one of the parties or the case number and shows proof of
residency.
(4) To any person by order of the court, which may be granted ex
parte, on a showing of good cause.
(5) Except as provided in paragraph (6), to any other person 60
days after the complaint has been filed, unless a defendant prevails
in the action within 60 days of the filing of the complaint, in which
case the clerk may not allow access to any court records in the
action, except as provided in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive.
(6) In the case of a complaint involving residential property
based on Section 1161a as indicated in the caption of the complaint,
as required in subdivision (c) of Section 1166, to any other person,
if 60 days have elapsed since the complaint was filed with the court,
and, as of that date, judgment against all defendants has been
entered for the plaintiff, after a trial. If judgment is not entered
under the conditions described in this paragraph, the clerk shall not
allow access to any court records in the action, except as provided
in paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive.
(b) For purposes of this section, "good cause" includes, but is
not limited to, the gathering of newsworthy facts by a person
described in Section 1070 of the Evidence Code. It is the intent of
the Legislature that a simple procedure be established to request the
ex parte order described in subdivision (a).
(c) Upon the filing of any case so restricted, the court clerk
shall mail notice to each defendant named in the action. The notice
shall be mailed to the address provided in the complaint. The notice
shall contain a statement that an unlawful detainer complaint
(eviction action) has been filed naming that party as a defendant,
and that access to the court file will be delayed for 60 days except
to a party, an attorney for one of the parties, or any other person
who (1) provides to the clerk the names of at least one plaintiff and
one defendant in the action and provides to the clerk the address,
including any applicable apartment, unit, or space number, of the
subject premises, or (2) provides to the clerk the name of one of the
parties in the action or the case number and can establish through
proper identification that he or she lives at the subject premises.
The notice shall also contain a statement that access to the court
index, register of actions, or other records is not permitted until
60 days after the complaint is filed, except pursuant to an order
upon a showing of good cause therefor. The notice shall contain on
its face the following information:
(1) The name and telephone number of the county bar association.
(2) The name and telephone number of any entity that requests
inclusion on the notice and demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
court that it has been certified by the State Bar as a lawyer
referral service and maintains a panel of attorneys qualified in the
practice of landlord-tenant law pursuant to the minimum standards for
a lawyer referral service established by the State Bar and Section
6155 of the Business and Professions Code.
(3) The following statement:
"The State Bar of California certifies lawyer referral services in
California and publishes a list of certified lawyer referral
services organized by county. To locate a lawyer referral service in
your county, go to the State Bar's website at www.calbar.ca.gov or
call 1-866-442-2529."
(4) The name and telephone number of an office or offices funded
by the federal Legal Services Corporation or qualified legal services
projects that receive funds distributed pursuant to Section 6216 of
the Business and Professions Code that provide legal services to
low-income persons in the county in which the action is filed. The
notice shall state that these numbers may be called for legal advice
regarding the case. The notice shall be issued between 24 and 48
hours of the filing of the complaint, excluding weekends and
holidays. One copy of the notice shall be addressed to "all occupants"
and mailed separately to the subject premises. The notice shall not
constitute service of the summons and complaint.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall
charge an additional fee of fifteen dollars ($15) for filing a first
appearance by the plaintiff. This fee shall be added to the uniform
filing fee for actions filed under this chapter.
(e) This section does not apply to a case that seeks to terminate
a mobilehome park tenancy if the statement of the character of the
proceeding in the caption of the complaint clearly indicates that the
complaint seeks termination of a mobilehome park tenancy.
1161.3. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), a landlord shall
not terminate a tenancy or fail to renew a tenancy based upon an act
or acts against a tenant or a tenant's household member that
constitute domestic violence as defined in Section 6211 of the Family
Code, sexual assault as defined in Section 1219, stalking as defined
in Section 1708.7 of the Civil Code or Section 646.9 of the Penal
Code, or abuse of an elder or a dependent adult as defined in Section
15610.07 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, if both of the
following apply:
(1) The act or acts of domestic violence, sexual assault,
stalking, or abuse of an elder or a dependent adult have been
documented by one of the following:
(A) A temporary restraining order, emergency protective order, or
protective order lawfully issued within the last 180 days pursuant to
Section 527.6, Part 3 (commencing with Section 6240), Part 4
(commencing with Section 6300), or Part 5 (commencing with Section
6400) of Division 10 of the Family Code, Section 136.2 of the Penal
Code, or Section 213.5 or 15657.03 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code that protects the tenant or household member from domestic
violence, sexual assault, stalking, or abuse of an elder or a
dependent adult.
(B) A copy of a written report, written within the last 180 days,
by a peace officer employed by a state or local law enforcement
agency acting in his or her official capacity, stating that the
tenant or household member has filed a report alleging that he or she
or the household member is a victim of domestic violence, sexual
assault, stalking, or abuse of an elder or a dependent adult.
(2) The person against whom the protection order has been issued
or who was named in the police report of the act or acts of domestic
violence, sexual assault, stalking, or abuse of an elder or dependent
adult is not a tenant of the same dwelling unit as the tenant or
household member.
(b) A landlord may terminate or decline to renew a tenancy after
the tenant has availed himself or herself of the protections afforded
by subdivision (a) if both of the following apply:
(1) Either of the following:
(A) The tenant allows the person against whom the protection order
has been issued or who was named in the police report of the act or
acts of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, or abuse of an
elder or a dependent adult to visit the property.
(B) The landlord reasonably believes that the presence of the
person against whom the protection order has been issued or who was
named in the police report of the act or acts of domestic violence,
sexual assault, stalking, or abuse of an elder or dependent adult
poses a physical threat to other tenants, guests, invitees, or
licensees, or to a tenant's right to quiet possession pursuant to
Section 1927 of the Civil Code.
(2) The landlord previously gave at least three days' notice to
the tenant to correct a violation of paragraph (1).
(c) Notwithstanding any provision in the lease to the contrary,
the landlord shall not be liable to any other tenants for any action
that arises due to the landlord's compliance with this section.
(d) For the purposes of this section, "tenant" means tenant,
subtenant, lessee, or sublessee.
(e) The Judicial Council shall, on or before January 1, 2014,
develop a new form or revise an existing form that may be used by a
party to assert in the responsive pleading the grounds set forth in
this section as an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer
action.
1161.5. When the notice required by Section 1161 states that the
lessor or the landlord may elect to declare the forfeiture of the
lease or rental agreement, that declaration shall be nullified and
the lease or rental agreement shall remain in effect if the lessee or
tenant performs within three days after service of the notice or if
the breach is waived by the lessor or the landlord after service of
the notice.
1161a. (a) As used in this section:
(1) "Manufactured home" has the same meaning as provided in
Section 18007 of the Health and Safety Code.
(2) "Mobilehome" has the same meaning as provided in Section 18008
of the Health and Safety Code.
(3) "Floating home" has the same meaning as provided in
subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code.
(b) In any of the following cases, a person who holds over and
continues in possession of a manufactured home, mobilehome, floating
home, or real property after a three-day written notice to quit the
property has been served upon the person, or if there is a subtenant
in actual occupation of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as
prescribed in Section 1162, may be removed therefrom as prescribed in
this chapter:
(1) Where the property has been sold pursuant to a writ of
execution against such person, or a person under whom such person
claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.
(2) Where the property has been sold pursuant to a writ of sale,
upon the foreclosure by proceedings taken as prescribed in this code
of a mortgage, or under an express power of sale contained therein,
executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims,
and the title under the foreclosure has been duly perfected.
(3) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section
2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed of
trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such person
claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.
(4) Where the property has been sold by such person, or a person
under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been
duly perfected.
(5) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section
18037.5 of the Health and Safety Code under the default provisions of
a conditional sale contract or security agreement executed by such
person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title
under the sale has been duly perfected.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b), a tenant or
subtenant in possession of a rental housing unit which has been sold
by reason of any of the causes enumerated in subdivision (b), who
rents or leases the rental housing unit either on a periodic basis
from week to week, month to month, or other interval, or for a fixed
period of time, shall be given written notice to quit pursuant to
Section 1162, at least as long as the term of hiring itself but not
exceeding 30 days, before the tenant or subtenant may be removed
therefrom as prescribed in this chapter.
(d) For the purpose of subdivision (c), "rental housing unit"
means any structure or any part thereof which is rented or offered
for rent for residential occupancy in this state.
1161b. (a) Notwithstanding Section 1161a, a tenant or subtenant in
possession of a rental housing unit under a month-to-month lease or
periodic tenancy at the time the property is sold in foreclosure
shall be given 90 days' written notice to quit pursuant to Section
1162 before the tenant or subtenant may be removed from the property
as prescribed in this chapter.
(b) In addition to the rights set forth in subdivision (a),
tenants or subtenants holding possession of a rental housing unit
under a fixed-term residential lease entered into before transfer of
title at the foreclosure sale shall have the right to possession
until the end of the lease term, and all rights and obligations under
the lease shall survive foreclosure, except that the tenancy may be
terminated upon 90 days' written notice to quit pursuant to
subdivision (a) if any of the following conditions apply:
(1) The purchaser or successor in interest will occupy the housing
unit as a primary residence.
(2) The lessee is the mortgagor or the child, spouse, or parent of
the mortgagor.
(3) The lease was not the result of an arms' length transaction.
(4) The lease requires the receipt of rent that is substantially
less than fair market rent for the property, except when rent is
reduced or subsidized due to a federal, state, or local subsidy or
law.
(c) The purchaser or successor in interest shall bear the burden
of proof in establishing that a fixed-term residential lease is not
entitled to protection under subdivision (b).
(d) This section shall not apply if any party to the note remains
in the property as a tenant, subtenant, or occupant.
(e) Nothing in this section is intended to affect any local just
cause eviction ordinance. This section does not, and shall not be
construed to, affect the authority of a public entity that otherwise
exists to regulate or monitor the basis for eviction.
(f) This section shall remain in effect only until December 31,
2019, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before December 31, 2019, deletes or extends
that date.
1161c. (a) In the case of any foreclosure on a residential
property, the immediate successor in interest in the property
pursuant to the foreclosure shall attach a cover sheet, in the form
as set forth in subdivision (b), to any notice of termination of
tenancy served on a tenant of that property within the first year
after the foreclosure sale. This notice shall not be required if any
of the following apply:
(1) The tenancy is terminated pursuant to Section 1161.
(2) The successor in interest and the tenant have executed a
written rental agreement or lease or a written acknowledgment of a
preexisting rental agreement or lease.
(3) The tenant receiving the notice was not a tenant at the time
of the foreclosure.
(b) The cover sheet shall consist of the following notice, in at
least 12-point type:
Notice to Any Renters Living At
[street address of the unit]
The attached notice means that your home was recently sold in
foreclosure and the new owner plans to evict you.
You should talk to a lawyer NOW to see what your rights are. You
may receive court papers in a few days. If your name is on the papers
it may hurt your credit if you do not respond and simply move out.
Also, if you do not respond within five days of receiving the
papers, even if you are not named in the papers, you will likely lose
any rights you may have. In some cases, you can respond without
hurting your credit. You should ask a lawyer about it.
You may have the right to stay in your home for 90 days or longer,
regardless of any deadlines stated on any attached papers. In some
cases and in some cities with a "just cause for eviction law," you
may not have to move at all. But you must take the proper legal steps
in order to protect your rights.
How to Get Legal Help
If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free
legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can
locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services
Internet Web site (www.lawhelpca.org), the California Courts Online
Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting
your local court or county bar association.
(c) If the notice to quit specifies an effective date of at least
90 days after the notice is served, without qualification, no cover
sheet shall be required, provided that the notice incorporates the
text of the cover sheet, as set forth in subdivision (b) in at least
10-point type. The incorporated text shall omit the caption and the
first paragraph of the cover sheet and the fourth paragraph of the
cover sheet shall be replaced by the following language:
You may have the right to stay in your home for longer than 90
days. If you have a lease that ends more than 90 days from now, the
new owner must honor the lease under many circumstances. Also, in
some cases and in some cities with a "just cause for eviction law,"
you may not have to move at all. But you must take the proper legal
steps in order to protect your rights.
(d) This section shall remain in effect only until December 31,
2019, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before December 31, 2019, deletes or extends
that date.
1162. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the notices
required by Sections 1161 and 1161a may be served by any of the
following methods:
(1) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally.
(2) If he or she is absent from his or her place of residence, and
from his or her usual place of business, by leaving a copy with some
person of suitable age and discretion at either place, and sending a
copy through the mail addressed to the tenant at his or her place of
residence.
(3) If such place of residence and business cannot be ascertained,
or a person of suitable age or discretion there can not be found,
then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property, and
also delivering a copy to a person there residing, if such person can
be found; and also sending a copy through the mail addressed to the
tenant at the place where the property is situated. Service upon a
subtenant may be made in the same manner.
(b) The notices required by Section 1161 may be served upon a
commercial tenant by any of the following methods:
(1) By delivering a copy to the tenant personally.
(2) If he or she is absent from the commercial rental property, by
leaving a copy with some person of suitable age and discretion at
the property, and sending a copy through the mail addressed to the
tenant at the address where the property is situated.
(3) If, at the time of attempted service, a person of suitable age
or discretion is not found at the rental property through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, then by affixing a copy in a
conspicuous place on the property, and also sending a copy through
the mail addressed to the tenant at the address where the property is
situated. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.
(c) For purposes of subdivision (b), "commercial tenant" means a
person or entity that hires any real property in this state that is
not a dwelling unit, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1940 of
the Civil Code, or a mobilehome, as defined in Section 798.3 of the
Civil Code.
1162a. In any case in which service or exhibition of a receiver's
or levying officer's deed is required, in lieu thereof service of a
copy or copies of the deed may be made as provided in Section 1162.
1164. No person other than the tenant of the premises and
subtenant, if there be one, in the actual occupation of the premises
when the complaint is filed, need be made parties defendant in the
proceeding, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be
nonsuited for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made
party defendant, but when it appears that any of the parties served
with process, or appearing in the proceeding, are guilty of the
offense charged, judgment must be rendered against him or her. In
case a defendant has become a subtenant of the premises in
controversy, after the service of the notice provided for by
subdivision 2 of Section 1161 of this code, upon the tenant of the
premises, the fact that such notice was not served on each subtenant
shall constitute no defense to the action. All persons who enter the
premises under the tenant, after the commencement of the suit, shall
be bound by the judgment, the same as if he or they had been made
party to the action.
1165. Except as provided in the preceding section, the provisions
of Part II of this Code, relating to parties to civil actions, are
applicable to this proceeding.
1166. (a) The complaint shall:
(1) Be verified and include the typed or printed name of the
person verifying the complaint.
(2) Set forth the facts on which the plaintiff seeks to recover.
(3) Describe the premises with reasonable certainty.
(4) If the action is based on paragraph (2) of Section 1161, state
the amount of rent in default.
(5) State specifically the method used to serve the defendant with
the notice or notices of termination upon which the complaint is
based. This requirement may be satisfied by using and completing all
items relating to service of the notice or notices in an appropriate
Judicial Council form complaint, or by attaching a proof of service
of the notice or notices of termination served on the defendant.
(b) The complaint may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force,
or violence that may have accompanied the alleged forcible entry or
forcible or unlawful detainer, and claim damages therefor.
(c) In an action regarding residential real property based on
Section 1161a, the plaintiff shall state in the caption of the
complaint "Action based on Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161a."
(d) (1) In an action regarding residential property, the plaintiff
shall attach to the complaint the following:
(A) A copy of the notice or notices of termination served on the
defendant upon which the complaint is based.
(B) A copy of any written lease or rental agreement regarding the
premises. Any addenda or attachments to the lease or written
agreement that form the basis of the complaint shall also be
attached. The documents required by this subparagraph are not
required to be attached if the complaint alleges any of the
following:
(i) The lease or rental agreement is oral.
(ii) A written lease or rental agreement regarding the premises is
not in the possession of the landlord or any agent or employee of
the landlord.
(iii) An action based solely on subdivision (2) of Section 1161.
(2) If the plaintiff fails to attach the documents required by
this subdivision, the court shall grant leave to amend the complaint
for a five-day period in order to include the required attachments.
(e) Upon filing the complaint, a summons shall be issued thereon.
1166a. (a) Upon filing the complaint, the plaintiff may, upon
motion, have immediate possession of the premises by a writ of
possession of a manufactured home, mobilehome, or real property
issued by the court and directed to the sheriff of the county or
marshal, for execution, where it appears to the satisfaction of the
court, after a hearing on the motion, from the verified complaint and
from any affidavits filed or oral testimony given by or on behalf of
the parties, that the defendant resides out of state, has departed
from the state, cannot, after due diligence, be found within the
state, or has concealed himself or herself to avoid the service of
summons. The motion shall indicate that the writ applies to all
tenants, subtenants, if any, named claimants, if any, and any other
occupants of the premises.
(b) Written notice of the hearing on the motion shall be served on
the defendant by the plaintiff in accordance with the provisions of
Section 1011, and shall inform the defendant as follows: "You may
file affidavits on your own behalf with the court and may appear and
present testimony on your own behalf. However, if you fail to appear,
the plaintiff will apply to the court for a writ of possession of a
manufactured home, mobilehome, or real property."
(c) The plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum that shall be
fixed and determined by the judge, to the effect that, if the
plaintiff fails to recover judgment against the defendant for the
possession of the premises or if the suit is dismissed, the plaintiff
will pay to the defendant those damages, not to exceed the amount
fixed in the undertaking, as may be sustained by the defendant by
reason of that dispossession under the writ of possession of a
manufactured home, mobilehome, or real property.
(d) If, at the hearing on the motion, the findings of the court
are in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, an order
shall be entered for the immediate possession of the premises.
(e) The order for the immediate possession of the premises may be
enforced as provided in Division 3 (commencing with Section 712.010)
of Title 9 of Part 2.
(f) For the purposes of this section, references in Division 3
(commencing with Section 712.010) of Title 9 of Part 2 and in
subdivisions (e) to (m), inclusive, of Section 1174, to the "judgment
debtor" shall be deemed references to the defendant, to the
"judgment creditor" shall be deemed references to the plaintiff, and
to the "judgment of possession or sale of property" shall be deemed
references to an order for the immediate possession of the premises.
1167. The summons shall be in the form specified in Section 412.20
except that when the defendant is served, the defendant's response
shall be filed within five days, including Saturdays and Sundays but
excluding all other judicial holidays, after the complaint is served
upon him or her. If the last day for filing the response falls on a
Saturday or Sunday, the response period shall be extended to and
including the next court day.
In all other respects the summons shall be issued and served and
returned in the same manner as a summons in a civil action.
1167.3. In any action under this chapter, unless otherwise ordered
by the court for good cause shown, the time allowed the defendant to
answer the complaint, answer the complaint, if amended, or amend the
answer under paragraph (2), (3), (5), (6), or (7) of subdivision (a)
of Section 586 shall not exceed five days.
1167.4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any action
under this chapter:
(a) Where the defendant files a notice of motion as provided for
in subdivision (a) of Section 418.10, the time for making the motion
shall be not less than three days nor more than seven days after the
filing of the notice.
(b) The service and filing of a notice of motion under subdivision
(a) shall extend the defendant's time to plead until five days after
service upon him of the written notice of entry of an order denying
his motion, except that for good cause shown the court may extend the
defendant's time to plead for an additional period not exceeding 15
days.
1167.5. Unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown,
no extension of time allowed in any action under this chapter for
the causes specified in Section 1054 shall exceed 10 days without the
consent of the adverse party.
1169. If, at the time appointed, any defendant served with a
summons does not appear and defend, the clerk, upon written
application of the plaintiff and proof of the service of summons and
complaint, shall enter the default of any defendant so served, and,
if requested by the plaintiff, immediately shall enter judgment for
restitution of the premises and shall issue a writ of execution
thereon. The application for default judgment and the default
judgment shall include a place to indicate that the judgment includes
tenants, subtenants, if any, named claimants, if any, and any other
occupants of the premises. Thereafter, the plaintiff may apply to the
court for any other relief demanded in the complaint, including the
costs, against the defendant, or defendants, or against one or more
of the defendants.
1170. On or before the day fixed for his appearance, the defendant
may appear and answer or demur.
1170.5. (a) If the defendant appears pursuant to Section 1170,
trial of the proceeding shall be held not later than the 20th day
following the date that the request to set the time of the trial is
made. Judgment shall be entered thereon and, if the plaintiff
prevails, a writ of execution shall be issued immediately by the
court upon the request of the plaintiff.
(b) The court may extend the period for trial upon the agreement
of all of the parties. No other extension of the time for trial of an
action under this chapter may be granted unless the court, upon its
own motion or on motion of any party, holds a hearing and renders a
decision thereon as specified in subdivision (c).
(c) If trial is not held within the time specified in this
section, the court, upon finding that there is a reasonable
probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the action, shall
determine the amount of damages, if any, to be suffered by the
plaintiff by reason of the extension, and shall issue an order
requiring the defendant to pay that amount into court as the rent
would have otherwise become due and payable or into an escrow
designated by the court for so long as the defendant remains in
possession pending the termination of the action.
The determination of the amount of the payment shall be based on
the plaintiff's verified statement of the contract rent for rental
payment, any verified objection thereto filed by the defendant, and
the oral or demonstrative evidence presented at the hearing. The
court's determination of the amount of damages shall include
consideration of any evidence, presented by the parties, embracing
the issue of diminution of value or any set off permitted by law.
(d) If the defendant fails to make a payment ordered by the court,
trial of the action shall be held within 15 days of the date payment
was due.
(e) Any cost for administration of an escrow account pursuant to
this section shall be recoverable by the prevailing party as part of
any recoverable cost in the action.
(f) After trial of the action, the court shall determine the
distribution of the payment made into court or the escrow designated
by the court.
(g) Where payments into court or the escrow designated by the
court are made pursuant to this section, the court may order that the
payments be invested in an insured interest-bearing account.
Interest on the account shall be allocated to the parties in the same
proportions as the original funds are allocated.
(h) If any provision of this section or the application thereof to
any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect other provisions or applications of the section which can
be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end the provisions of this section are severable.
(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate or
interfere with the precedence given to the trial of criminal cases
over the trial of civil matters by Section 1050 of the Penal Code.
1170.7. A motion for summary judgment may be made at any time after
the answer is filed upon giving five days notice. Summary judgment
shall be granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under
Section 437c.
1170.8. In any action under this chapter, a discovery motion may be
made at any time upon giving five days' notice.
1170.9. The Judicial Council shall adopt rules, not inconsistent
with statute, prescribing the time for filing and serving opposition
and reply papers, if any, relating to a motion under Section 1167.4,
1170.7, or 1170.8.
1171. Whenever an issue of fact is presented by the pleadings, it
must be tried by a jury, unless such jury be waived as in other
cases. The jury shall be formed in the same manner as other trial
juries in an action of the same jurisdictional classification in the
Court in which the action is pending.
1172. On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or
forcible detainer, the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in
addition to the forcible entry or forcible detainer complained of,
that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time of the
forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the time of the
forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or
his ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims,
have been in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole
year together next before the commencement of the proceedings, and
that his interest therein is not then ended or determined; and such
showing is a bar to the proceedings.
1173. When, upon the trial of any proceeding under this chapter, it
appears from the evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
either a forcible entry or a forcible or unlawful detainer, and other
than the offense charged in the complaint, the Judge must order that
such complaint be forthwith amended to conform to such proofs; such
amendment must be made without any imposition of terms. No
continuance shall be permitted upon account of such amendment unless
the defendant, by affidavit filed, shows to the satisfaction of the
Court good cause therefor.
1174. (a) If upon the trial, the verdict of the jury, or, if the
case be tried without a jury, the findings of the court be in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, judgment shall be entered
for the possession of the premises; and if the proceedings be for an
unlawful detainer after neglect, or failure to perform the
conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which the
property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the
judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of that lease or agreement
if the notice required by Section 1161 states the election of the
landlord to declare the forfeiture thereof, but if that notice does
not so state that election, the lease or agreement shall not be
forfeited.
Except as provided in Section 1166a, in any action for unlawful
detainer brought by a petroleum distributor against a gasoline
dealer, possession shall not be restored to the petroleum distributor
unless the court in the unlawful detainer action determines that the
petroleum distributor had good cause under Section 20999.1 of the
Business and Professions Code to terminate, cancel, or refuse to
renew the franchise of the gasoline dealer.
In any action for unlawful detainer brought by a petroleum
distributor against the gasoline dealer, the court may, at the time
of request of either party, require the tenant to make rental
payments into the court, for the lessor, at the contract rate,
pending the resolution of the action.
(b) The jury or the court, if the proceedings be tried without a
jury, shall also assess the damages occasioned to the plaintiff by
any forcible entry, or by any forcible or unlawful detainer, alleged
in the complaint and proved on the trial, and find the amount of any
rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer be after default in the
payment of rent. If the defendant is found guilty of forcible entry,
or forcible or unlawful detainer, and malice is shown, the plaintiff
may be awarded statutory damages of up to six hundred dollars ($600),
in addition to actual damages, including rent found due. The trier
of fact shall determine whether actual damages, statutory damages, or
both, shall be awarded, and judgment shall be entered accordingly.
(c) When the proceeding is for an unlawful detainer after default
in the payment of rent, and the lease or agreement under which the
rent is payable has not by its terms expired, and the notice required
by Section 1161 has not stated the election of the landlord to
declare the forfeiture thereof, the court may, and, if the lease or
agreement is in writing, is for a term of more than one year, and
does not contain a forfeiture clause, shall order that a writ shall
not be issued to enforce the judgment until the expiration of five
days after the entry of the judgment, within which time the tenant,
or any subtenant, or any mortgagee of the term, or any other party
interested in its continuance, may pay into the court, for the
landlord, the amount found due as rent, with interest thereon, and
the amount of the damages found by the jury or the court for the
unlawful detainer, and the costs of the proceedings, and thereupon
the judgment shall be satisfied and the tenant be restored to the
tenant's estate. If payment as provided in this subdivision is not
made within five days, the judgment may be enforced for its full
amount and for the possession of the premises. In all other cases the
judgment may be enforced immediately.
(d) Subject to subdivision (c), the judgment for possession of the
premises may be enforced as provided in Division 3 (commencing with
Section 712.010) of Title 9 of Part 2.
(e) Personal property remaining on the premises which the landlord
reasonably believes to have been lost shall be disposed of pursuant
to Article 1 (commencing with Section 2080) of Chapter 4 of Title 6
of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code. The landlord is not liable
to the owner of any property which is disposed of in this manner. If
the appropriate police or sheriff's department refuses to accept
that property, it shall be deemed not to have been lost for the
purposes of this subdivision.
(f) The landlord shall give notice pursuant to Section 1983 of the
Civil Code to any person (other than the tenant) reasonably believed
by the landlord to be the owner of personal property remaining on
the premises unless the procedure for surrender of property under
Section 1965 of the Civil Code has been initiated or completed.
(g) The landlord shall store the personal property in a place of
safekeeping until it is either released pursuant to subdivision (h)
or disposed of pursuant to subdivision (i).
(h) The landlord shall release the personal property pursuant to
Section 1965 of the Civil Code or shall release it to the tenant or,
at the landlord's option, to a person reasonably believed by the
landlord to be its owner if the tenant or other person pays the costs
of storage as provided in Section 1990 of the Civil Code and claims
the property not later than the date specified in the writ of
possession before which the tenant must make his or her claim or the
date specified in the notice before which a person other than the
tenant must make his or her claim.
(i) Personal property not released pursuant to subdivision (h)
shall be disposed of pursuant to Section 1988 of the Civil Code.
(j) Where the landlord releases personal property to the tenant
pursuant to subdivision (h), the landlord is not liable with respect
to that property to any person.
(k) Where the landlord releases personal property pursuant to
subdivision (h) to a person (other than the tenant) reasonably
believed by the landlord to be its owner, the landlord is not liable
with respect to that property to:
(1) The tenant or to any person to whom notice was given pursuant
to subdivision (f); or
(2) Any other person, unless that person proves that, prior to
releasing the property, the landlord believed or reasonably should
have believed that the person had an interest in the property and
also that the landlord knew or should have known upon reasonable
investigation the address of that person.
(l) Where personal property is disposed of pursuant to Section
1988 of the Civil Code, the landlord is not liable with respect to
that property to:
(1) The tenant or to any person to whom notice was given pursuant
to subdivision (f); or
(2) Any other person, unless that person proves that, prior to
disposing of the property pursuant to Section 1988 of the Civil Code,
the landlord believed or reasonably should have believed that the
person had an interest in the property and also that the landlord
knew or should have known upon reasonable investigation the address
of that person.
(m) For the purposes of subdivisions (e), (f), (h), (k), and (l),
the terms "owner," "premises," and "reasonable belief" have the same
meaning as provided in Section 1980 of the Civil Code.
1174.2. (a) In an unlawful detainer proceeding involving
residential premises after default in payment of rent and in which
the tenant has raised as an affirmative defense a breach of the
landlord's obligations under Section 1941 of the Civil Code or of any
warranty of habitability, the court shall determine whether a
substantial breach of these obligations has occurred. If the court
finds that a substantial breach has occurred, the court (1) shall
determine the reasonable rental value of the premises in its
untenantable state to the date of trial, (2) shall deny possession to
the landlord and adjudge the tenant to be the prevailing party,
conditioned upon the payment by the tenant of the rent that has
accrued to the date of the trial as adjusted pursuant to this
subdivision within a reasonable period of time not exceeding five
days, from the date of the court's judgment or, if service of the
court's judgment is made by mail, the payment shall be made within
the time set forth in Section 1013, (3) may order the landlord to
make repairs and correct the conditions which constitute a breach of
the landlord's obligations, (4) shall order that the monthly rent be
limited to the reasonable rental value of the premises as determined
pursuant to this subdivision until repairs are completed, and (5)
except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), shall award the
tenant costs and attorneys' fees if provided by, and pursuant to, any
statute or the contract of the parties. If the court orders repairs
or corrections, or both, pursuant to paragraph (3), the court's
jurisdiction continues over the matter for the purpose of ensuring
compliance. The court shall, however, award possession of the
premises to the landlord if the tenant fails to pay all rent accrued
to the date of trial, as determined due in the judgment, within the
period prescribed by the court pursuant to this subdivision. The
tenant shall, however, retain any rights conferred by Section 1174.
(b) If the court determines that there has been no substantial
breach of Section 1941 of the Civil Code or of any warranty of
habitability by the landlord or if the tenant fails to pay all rent
accrued to the date of trial, as required by the court pursuant to
subdivision (a), then judgment shall be entered in favor of the
landlord, and the landlord shall be the prevailing party for the
purposes of awarding costs or attorneys' fees pursuant to any statute
or the contract of the parties.
(c) As used in this section, "substantial breach" means the
failure of the landlord to comply with applicable building and
housing code standards which materially affect health and safety.
(d) Nothing in this section is intended to deny the tenant the
right to a trial by jury. Nothing in this section shall limit or
supersede any provision of Chapter 12.75 (commencing with Section
7060) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code.
1174.21. A landlord who institutes an unlawful detainer proceeding
based upon a tenant's nonpayment of rent, and who is liable for a
violation of Section 1942.4 of the Civil Code, shall be liable to the
tenant or lessee for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the
suit, in an amount to be fixed by the court.
1174.25. (a) Any occupant who is served with a prejudgment claim of
right to possession in accordance with Section 415.46 may file a
claim as prescribed in Section 415.46, with the court within 10 days
of the date of service of the prejudgment claim to right of
possession as shown on the return of service, which period shall
include Saturday and Sunday but excluding all other judicial
holidays. If the last day for filing the claim falls on a Saturday or
Sunday, the filing period shall be extended to and including the
next court day. Filing the prejudgment claim of right to possession
shall constitute a general appearance for which a fee shall be
collected as provided in Section 70614 of the Government Code.
Section 68511.3 of the Government Code applies to the prejudgment
claim of right to possession.
(b) At the time of filing, the claimant shall be added as a
defendant in the action for unlawful detainer and the clerk shall
notify the plaintiff that the claimant has been added as a defendant
in the action by mailing a copy of the claim filed with the court to
the plaintiff with a notation so indicating. The claimant shall
answer or otherwise respond to the summons and complaint within five
days, including Saturdays and Sundays but excluding all other
judicial holidays, after filing the prejudgment claim of possession.
Thereafter, the name of the claimant shall be added to any pleading,
filing or form filed in the action for unlawful detainer.
1174.3. (a) Unless a prejudgment claim of right to possession has
been served upon occupants in accordance with Section 415.46, any
occupant not named in the judgment for possession who occupied the
premises on the date of the filing of the action may object to
enforcement of the judgment against that occupant by filing a claim
of right to possession as prescribed in this section. A claim of
right to possession may be filed at any time after service or posting
of the writ of possession pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of
Section 715.020, up to and including the time at which the levying
officer returns to effect the eviction of those named in the judgment
of possession. Filing the claim of right to possession shall
constitute a general appearance for which a fee shall be collected as
provided in Section 70614 of the Government Code. Section 68511.3 of
the Government Code applies to the claim of right to possession. An
occupant or tenant who is named in the action shall not be required
to file a claim of right to possession to protect that occupant's
right to possession of the premises.
(b) The court issuing the writ of possession of real property
shall set a date or dates when the court will hold a hearing to
determine the validity of objections to enforcement of the judgment
specified in subdivision (a). An occupant of the real property for
which the writ is issued may make an objection to eviction to the
levying officer at the office of the levying officer or at the
premises at the time of the eviction.
If a claim of right to possession is completed and presented to
the sheriff, marshal, or other levying officer, the officer shall
forthwith (1) stop the eviction of occupants at the premises, and (2)
provide a receipt or copy of the completed claim of right of
possession to the claimant indicating the date and time the completed
form was received, and (3) deliver the original completed claim of
right to possession to the court issuing the writ of possession of
real property.
(c) A claim of right to possession is effected by any of the
following:
(1) Presenting a completed claim form in person with
identification to the sheriff, marshal, or other levying officer as
prescribed in this section, and delivering to the court within two
court days after its presentation, an amount equal to 15 days' rent
together with the appropriate fee or form for proceeding in forma
pauperis. Upon receipt of a claim of right to possession, the
sheriff, marshal, or other levying officer shall indicate thereon the
date and time of its receipt and forthwith deliver the original to
the issuing court and a receipt or copy of the claim to the claimant
and notify the plaintiff of that fact. Immediately upon receipt of an
amount equal to 15 days' rent and the appropriate fee or form for
proceeding in forma pauperis, the court shall file the claim of right
to possession and serve an endorsed copy with the notice of the
hearing date on the plaintiff and the claimant by first-class mail.
The court issuing the writ of possession shall set and hold a hearing
on the claim not less than five nor more than 15 days after the
claim is filed with the court.
(2) Presenting a completed claim form in person with
identification to the sheriff, marshal, or other levying officer as
prescribed in this section, and delivering to the court within two
court days after its presentation, the appropriate fee or form for
proceeding in forma pauperis without delivering the amount equivalent
to 15 days' rent. In this case, the court shall immediately set a
hearing on the claim to be held on the fifth day after the filing is
completed. The court shall notify the claimant of the hearing date at
the time the claimant completes the filing by delivering to the
court the appropriate fee or form for proceeding in forma pauperis,
and shall notify the plaintiff of the hearing date by first-class
mail. Upon receipt of a claim of right to possession, the sheriff,
marshal, or other levying officer shall indicate thereon the date and
time of its receipt and forthwith deliver the original to the
issuing court and a receipt or copy of the claim to the claimant and
notify the plaintiff of that fact.
(d) At the hearing, the court shall determine whether there is a
valid claim of possession by the claimant who filed the claim, and
the court shall consider all evidence produced at the hearing,
including, but not limited to, the information set forth in the
claim. The court may determine the claim to be valid or invalid based
upon the evidence presented at the hearing. The court shall
determine the claim to be invalid if the court determines that the
claimant is an invitee, licensee, guest, or trespasser. If the court
determines the claim is invalid, the court shall order the return to
the claimant of the amount of the 15 days' rent paid by the claimant,
if that amount was paid pursuant to paragraph (1) or (3) of
subdivision (c), less a pro rata amount for each day that enforcement
of the judgment was delayed by reason of making the claim of right
to possession, which pro rata amount shall be paid to the landlord.
If the court determines the claim is valid, the amount equal to 15
days' rent paid by the claimant shall be returned immediately to the
claimant.
(e) If, upon hearing, the court determines that the claim is
valid, then the court shall order further proceedings as follows:
(1) If the unlawful detainer is based upon a curable breach, and
the claimant was not previously served with a proper notice, if any
notice is required, then the required notice may at the plaintiff's
discretion be served on the claimant at the hearing or thereafter. If
the claimant does not cure the breach within the required time, then
a supplemental complaint may be filed and served on the claimant as
defendant if the plaintiff proceeds against the claimant in the same
action. For the purposes of this section only, service of the
required notice, if any notice is required, and of the supplemental
complaint may be made by first-class mail addressed to the claimant
at the subject premises or upon his or her attorney of record and, in
either case, Section 1013 shall otherwise apply. Further proceedings
on the merits of the claimant's continued right to possession after
service of the Summons and Supplemental Complaint as prescribed by
this subdivision shall be conducted pursuant to this chapter.
(2) In all other cases, the court shall deem the unlawful detainer
Summons and Complaint to be amended on their faces to include the
claimant as defendant, service of the Summons and Complaint, as thus
amended, may at the plaintiff's discretion be made at the hearing or
thereafter, and the claimant thus named and served as a defendant in
the action shall answer or otherwise respond within five days
thereafter.
(f) If a claim is made without delivery to the court of the
appropriate filing fee or a form for proceeding in forma pauperis, as
prescribed in this section, the claim shall be immediately deemed
denied and the court shall so order. Upon the denial of the claim,
the court shall immediately deliver an endorsed copy of the order to
the levying officer and shall serve an endorsed copy of the order on
the plaintiff and claimant by first-class mail.
(g) If the claim of right to possession is denied pursuant to
subdivision (f), or if the claimant fails to appear at the hearing
or, upon hearing, if the court determines that there are no valid
claims, or if the claimant does not prevail at a trial on the merits
of the unlawful detainer action, the court shall order the levying
officer to proceed with enforcement of the original writ of
possession of real property as deemed amended to include the
claimant, which shall be effected within a reasonable time not to
exceed five days. Upon receipt of the court's order, the levying
officer shall enforce the writ of possession of real property against
any occupant or occupants.
(h) The claim of right to possession shall be made on the
following form:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
NOTICE OF INCOMPLETE TEXT: The Claim of Right to Possession form
appears in the hard-copy publication of the chaptered bill.
See Sec. 43 of Chapter 75, Statutes of 2005.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
1174.5. A judgment in unlawful detainer declaring the forfeiture of
the lease or agreement under which real property is held shall not
relieve the lessee from liability pursuant to Section 1951.2 of the
Civil Code.
1176. (a) An appeal taken by the defendant shall not automatically
stay proceedings upon the judgment. Petition for stay of the judgment
pending appeal shall first be directed to the judge before whom it
was rendered. Stay of judgment shall be granted when the court finds
that the moving party will suffer extreme hardship in the absence of
a stay and that the nonmoving party will not be irreparably injured
by its issuance. If the stay is denied by the trial court, the
defendant may forthwith file a petition for an extraordinary writ
with the appropriate appeals court. If the trial or appellate court
stays enforcement of the judgment, the court may condition the stay
on whatever conditions the court deems just, but in any case it shall
order the payment of the reasonable monthly rental value to the
court monthly in advance as rent would otherwise become due as a
condition of issuing the stay of enforcement. As used in this
subdivision, "reasonable rental value" means the contract rent unless
the rental value has been modified by the trial court in which case
that modified rental value shall be used.
(b) A new cause of action on the same agreement for the rental of
real property shall not be barred because of an appeal by any party.
1177. Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter the provisions
of Part II of this Code are applicable to, and constitute the rules
of practice in the proceedings mentioned in this Chapter.
1178. The provisions of Part 2 of this code, relative to new trials
and appeals, except insofar as they are inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter or with rules adopted by the Judicial
Council, apply to the proceedings mentioned in this chapter.
1179. The court may relieve a tenant against a forfeiture of a
lease or rental agreement, whether written or oral, and whether or
not the tenancy has terminated, and restore him or her to his or her
former estate or tenancy, in case of hardship, as provided in Section
1174. The court has the discretion to relieve any person against
forfeiture on its own motion.
An application for relief against forfeiture may be made at any
time prior to restoration of the premises to the landlord. The
application may be made by a tenant or subtenant, or a mortgagee of
the term, or any person interested in the continuance of the term. It
must be made upon petition, setting forth the facts upon which the
relief is sought, and be verified by the applicant. Notice of the
application, with a copy of the petition, must be served at least
five days prior to the hearing on the plaintiff in the judgment, who
may appear and contest the application. Alternatively, a person
appearing without an attorney may make the application orally, if the
plaintiff either is present and has an opportunity to contest the
application, or has been given ex parte notice of the hearing and the
purpose of the oral application. In no case shall the application or
motion be granted except on condition that full payment of rent due,
or full performance of conditions or covenants stipulated, so far as
the same is practicable, be made.
1179a. In all proceedings brought to recover the possession of real
property pursuant to the provisions of this chapter all courts,
wherein such actions are or may hereafter be pending, shall give such
actions precedence over all other civil actions therein, except
actions to which special precedence is given by law, in the matter of
the setting the same for hearing or trial, and in hearing the same,
to the end that all such actions shall be quickly heard and
determined.
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Plaintiff alleges:
1. [Capacity
and residence. See § 334.58(1}, 9 1.]
2.[Plaintiff s former residence. See §
334.58[1], 9 2. ]
3.[Fictitious name allegation, if
appropriate. See § 334.50(1}, 9 2. \
4.On or about_______ [date], defendant landlord,___________ [name],
with the intent to terminate plaintiffs occupancy of the premises, did
willfully and maliciously, directly and indirectly,__________ [specify
action
proscribed by Civ. Code § 789.3(b), e.g., prevent plaintiff from gaining reasonable
access to the premises by changing the locks on all the doors without giving
plaintiff keys for the new locks].
5. [Specify
length of time during which interference with occupancy of premises continued,
e.g., Plaintiff was prevented reasonable access to the premises for a period of seven days.]
6.As a direct and proximate result of defendant’s actions, plaintiff has suffered and
is suffering general damages in the amount of $_____________________________________________
7.Plaintiff is entitled to statutory punitive damages under Civil Code Section 789.3(c) in
the amount of $100 for each day or part of a day that defendant remains in
violation of Civil Code Section 789.3(b) and in no event is plaintiff entitled
to less than $250 for each cause of action.
8.Plaintiff is entitled to receive from defendant______________
[name]
punitive damages.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Plaintiff alleges:
9.Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of his/her First
Cause of Action.
10.The written tenancy agreement mentioned above created a periodic estate in
plaintiffs favor in [street address and city ], California.
11.On or about_______ [date], defendant landlord,__________ [name],
willfully and maliciously trespassed on plaintiffs estate for the purpose of
________ [specify,
e.g., changing the locks on all the doors and windows
12. As
a direct and proximate result thereof, plaintiff has suffered general
damages in the amount of $———–
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Plaintiff alleges:
13.Plaintiff
hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of his/her First Cause of Action.
14.On or about______ [date ], defendant landlord,__________ [name ],
with
the intent to terminate plaintiffs occupancy of the premises, did
willfully and maliciously, directly and indirectly,_________ [specify action
proscribed by Civ. Code § 789.3(b), e.g., prevent plaintiff from gaining reasonable
access to the premises by changing the locks on all the doors and windows
without giving plaintiff keys for the new locks].
[15. If
the landlord ceased interfering with plaintiffs use and occupancy of the
premises, specify when this occurred, e.g., Plaintiff received keys for
the new locks
from defendant landlord,__________ {name), on or about
______ [date), following a demand letter from plaintiffs attorney.]
[16. Specify
length of time during which interference with occupancy continued, e.g., Plaintiff
was prevented reasonable access to the premises
from_______ [date), to and including__________ [date), or a total of
________ [e.g., seven) days or fraction thereof.]
17.As a further direct and
proximate result of defendant’s actions,
plaintiff_________ [specify
loss or damages, e.g„ was forced to pay fines
for_________ [e.g.,
20) library books which were overdue since he/she
could not gain
access to them to return them on the due date, all to his/her
special damage in the amount of $_______ 1.
18.As a direct and proximate result of
defendant’s actions, plaintiff has suffered and is suffering damages in the
amount of $_________________________________________
19.Plaintiff is entitled to statutory
punitive damages under Civil Code Section 789.3(c) in the amount of $100 for
each day or part of a day that defendant remains in violation of Civil Code
Section 789.3(b) and in no event is plaintiff entitled to less than $250 for
each cause of action.
20.Plaintiff is entitled to receive from
defendant landlord,___________
[name ], punitive damages.
FOURTH CAUSE OF
ACTION Plaintiff
alleges:
21.Plaintiff hereby incorporates Paragraphs
1, 2, and 3 of his/her First Cause of Action; and Paragraphs 14,15,16, and 17
of his/her Third Cause of Action.
22.Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate
injunctive relief during the pendency of this action under Civil Code Section
789.3(c) and without this injunctive relief will suffer irreparable injury in
that [specify
facts that wUl constitute great and irreparable injury, e.g., plaintiff will continue to be without a home and
without access to his/her, personal possessions and will be forced to stay in a
motel and buy new personal possessions such as clothes and cooking utensils).
Plaintiff has no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law because__________ [specify facts in
addition to those
previously alleged that tend to show the inadequacy of any legal remedy that plaintiff might pursue, e.g., it will be
impossible for plaintiff
to determine the precise amount of damage that he/she will suffer if
defendant’s conduct is not restrained].
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as
follows:
1. For
an order requiring defendant to show cause, if any he/she has, why he/she
should not be enjoined as hereinafter set forth, during the pendency of this
action;
2. For a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining defendant and
his/her agents, servants, and employees, and all persons acting under, in
concert with, or for defendant from
[specify, e.g., interfering with plaintiffs reasonable
access to the premises by changing the locks].
3. For
general damages on the First Cause of Action in the amount of $
4. For
punitive damages on the First Cause of Action.
5. For
general damages on the Second Cause of Action in the amount of$
6. For
punitive damages on the Second Cause of Action.
7. For
general damages on the Third Cause of Action in the amount of $
8. For
punitive damages on the Third Cause of Action.
9. For
reasonable attorney’s fees as provided in Civil Code Section 789.3(d).
10. For
costs of suit.
11. For
such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper and
according to equity.
Because an unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding usually limited to the issue of immediate possession of real property, a judgment in such an action usually has [21] limited res judicata effect “and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title.” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255 (Vella).) An exception to this rule is contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, which extends the summary eviction remedy beyond the conventional unlawful detainer suit brought by a landlord to include actions by certain purchasers of property. (Vella, at p. 255.) In these cases, title to the property may be an issue.
In Malkoskie, the court applied the exception to the rule that title cannot be tried in unlawful detainer in circumstances similar to the present case. There, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), after purchasing real property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, brought an unlawful detainer action against the previous homeowners pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3). This subdivision permits an unlawful detainer action against a person who holds over and continues possession of real property after receiving a three-day written notice to quit the property, “[w]here the property has been sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, under [22] a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a, subd. (b)(3), italics added.) In a subsequent action by the previous homeowners seeking to set aside the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the court held that the judgment in the unlawful detainer action “conclusively resolved” the validity of title to the property in Wells Fargo’s favor. (Malkoskie, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.)
Likewise, in the UD action, the complaint alleged that U.S. Bank purchased the property at a foreclosure sale in accordance with Civil Code section 2924, and that it was seeking possession of the property pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) sets forth five circumstances under which an unlawful detainer action may be commenced, all of which require the plaintiff to purchase the property and to duly perfect title. Subdivision (b)(3) appears to be the only circumstance which applies to the facts stated in the complaint. 10 The complaint in the UD action thus raised the issue of title to the property. (Malkoskie, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.)
Although the judgment in the UD action was obtained by default, the issue of title was necessarily and actually decided. By permitting their default in the UD action to be entered, the Sarkisians confessed the truth of all material allegations in the complaint, including U.S. Bank’s allegations that it purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and thereafter perfected its interest in the property. (Fitzgerald v. Herzer (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 127, 131.) The Sarkisians therefore are collaterally estopped from denying that U.S. Bank holds title to the property. (Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 871 [“Even a judgment of default in a civil proceeding is ‘res judicata as to all issues aptly pleaded in the complaint and defendant [24] is estopped from denying in a subsequent action any allegations contained in the former complaint’ “].)
Each of plaintiffs’ causes of action in this case rest on the premise that U.S. Bank did not acquire title to the property. Because U.S. Bank conclusively established in the UD action that it holds title to the property, the trial court correctly sustained the bank defendants’ demurrer to the FAC.
The surprising decision by regulators to scrap a massive and expensive foreclosure review program in favor of a $10 billion settlement with 14 banks — reported by The New York Times Sunday night — came after a year of mounting concerns about the independence and effectiveness of the controversial program.
The program, known as the Independent Foreclosure Review, was supposed to give homeowners who believe that their bank made a mistake in handling their foreclosure an opportunity for a neutral third party to review the claim. It’s not clear what factors led banking regulators to abandon the program in favor of a settlement, but the final straw may have been a pending report by the Government Accountability Office, a nonpartisan investigative arm of Congress, which was investigating the review program.
Rep. Brad Miller, a North Carolina Democrat, told The Huffington Post that the report, which has not been released, was “critical” and that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which administers the review, was aware of its findings. Miller said that that one problem the GAO was likely to highlight was an “unacceptably high” error rate of 11 percent in a sampling of bank loan files.
The sample files were chosen at random by the banks from their broader pool of foreclosed homeowners, who had not necessarily applied for relief. The data suggests that of the 4 million families who lost their homes to foreclosure since the housing crash, more than 400,000 had some bank-caused problem in their loan file. It also suggests that many thousands of those who could have applied for relief didn’t — because they weren’t aware of the review, or weren’t aware that their bank had made a mistake. Some of these mistakes pushed homeowners into foreclosure who otherwise could have afforded to keep their homes.
Miller said the news that a settlement to replace the review was in the works caught him by surprise, and stressed that he had no way of knowing whether the impending GAO report had triggered the decision.
It’s not clear what will happen to the 250,000 homeowners who have already applied to the Independent Foreclosure Review for relief. The Times, citing people familiar with the negotiations, said that a deal between the banks and banking regulators, led by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, could be reached by the end of the week. It wasn’t clear how that money would be distributed or how many current and former homeowners who lost their homes to foreclosure — or who were hit with an unnecessary fee — might qualify.
Bryan Hubbard, a spokesman for the OCC, which administers the program, declined to comment on the Times’ story. Hubbard told HuffPost, “The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is committed to ensuring the Independent Foreclosure Review proceeds efficiently and to ensuring harmed borrowers are compensated as quickly as possible.”
Since the housing market crashed in 2007, thousands of foreclosed homeowners have complained that their mortgage company made a mistake in the management of their home loan, such as foreclosing on someone making payments on a loan modification plan. The Independent Foreclosure Review emerged from a legal agreement in April 2011 between 14 mortgage companies and bank regulators over these abusive “servicing” practices. It was supposed to give homeowners an opportunity to have an unbiased third party review their foreclosure and determine whether they might qualify for a cash payout of up to $125,000.
The initial response was tepid, at best. Homeowners and advocates complained that the application forms were confusing and that information about what type of compensation they might get was missing. Some told HuffPost that they were so disillusioned by the federal government’s anemic response to widely reported bank errors that they weren’t going to bother to apply.
In one instance, Daniel Casper, an Illinois wedding videographer, applied to the program in January after years of combat with Bank of America over his home loan. As The Huffington Post reported in October, he was initially rejected, because, according to the bank, his mortgage was not in the foreclosure process during the eligible review period. Promontory Financial Group, which Bank of America hired to review his loan, apparently did not double check Bank of America’s analysis against the extensive documentation that Chase submitted. That documentation clearly showed that his loan was eligible for review.
In recent months ProPublica, an investigative nonprofit, has issued a series of damning articles about the Independent Foreclosure Review. The most recent found that supposedly independent third-party reviewers looking over Bank of America loan files were given the “correct” answers in advance by the bank. These reviewers could override the answers, but they weren’t starting from a blank slate.
Banks, if they did not find a “compensable error,” did not have to pay anything, giving them a strong incentive to find no flaws with their own work.
“It was flawed from the start,” Miller said of the review program. “There was an inherent conflict of interest by just about everyone involved.”
Also on HuffPost:
Columbine Shooting Survivor Fighting Foreclosure With Occupy LA’s Help
Facing foreclosure, Perry Laspina of Jacksonville, Florida ended up with a home practically for free after his mortgage lender was shut down by parent company Wells Fargo, <a href=”http://realestate.aol.com/blog/2011/04/14/foreclosure-foul-up-wins-man-a-free-home/” target=”_hplink”>AOL Real Estate reports</a>. Laspina got the home “because of the significant decreased value of the property,” a bank spokesman said.
BofA Forecloses On Building With Own Branch Office
A senior couple in Pasco County, Florida faced foreclosure not for missing payments, <a href=”http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/22/senior-florida-couple-faces-foreclosure-mortgage-early_n_933147.html” target=”_hplink”>but for making one too early</a>. According to a Bank of America representative, they made themselves ineligible for a mortgage modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program when they did not make their payment in the “month in which it [was] due.”
Foreclosure In ‘World’s Richest Apartment Building’
Mother, Disabled Daughter Forced Out Of Home Even After BofA Modification
Dirma Rodriguez and her disabled daughter<a href=”https://editorial.huffingtonpost.com/entry/?blog_id=2&entry_id=1423883″ target=”_hplink”> were forced to flee their home in minutes</a> after Bank of America sold it to a flipper at a foreclosure auction, even though the bank had already modified her loan. But not all hope is lost; Rodriguez may get her home back after the Occupy Fights Foreclosure movement intervened.
ProPublica: The Independent Foreclosure Review is the government’s main effort to compensate homeowners for harm they suffered at the hands of banks — and, as…
MODESTO — Nearly 50,000 Northern San Joaquin Valley homeowners potentially may be owed compensation for financial losses they incurred because of errors made during foreclosure…
H. Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees
2013 is going to be a good year
One of the most important provisions of the Act from a lender’s perspective is that it provides borrowers with the right to sue mortgage servicers for injunctive relief before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, or if it has already recorded, to sue for actual economic damages, if the mortgage servicer has not corrected any “material” violation of certain enumerated portions of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale recorded. (Civil Code §2924.12(a).) In an area that will certainly open up a Pandora’s Box of litigation, the Act does not define what constitutes a “material” violation of the Act. If a court finds that the violation was intentional, reckless or willful, the court can award the borrower the greater of treble (triple) damages or $50,000. (Civil Code §2924.12(b).) Furthermore, a violation of the enumerated provisions of the Act is also deemed to be a violation of the licensing laws if committed by a person licensed as a consumer or commercial finance lender or broker, a residential mortgage lender or servicer, or a licensed real estate broker or salesman. (Civil Code §2924.12(d).) Lastly, in a one-sided attorney’s fee provision that only benefits borrowers, the court may award a borrower who obtains an injunction or receives an award of economic damages as a result of the violation of the Act their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party. (Civil Code §2924.12(i).) This provides all the more reason for lenders and mortgage servicers to comply with the terms of the Act. This provision for the recovery by only the borrower of their reasonable attorney’s fees makes it more likely that borrowers will file litigation against mortgage lenders or servicers than they otherwise would. Compliance is the lender’s or mortgage servicer’s best defense to litigation under the Act.
Significantly for lenders, as long as the mortgage servicer remedies the material violation of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, the Act specifically provides that the mortgage servicer shall not be liable under the Act for any violation or damages. (Civil Code §2924.12(b) & (c).) The Act also clarifies that signatories to the National Mortgage Settlement who are in compliance with the terms of that settlement, as they relate to the terms of the Act, will not face liability under the Act. (Civil Code §2924.12(g).
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com] Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 7:06 AM To: Charles Cox Subject: Separation of Note and Deed of Trust
From Attorney Dan Hanecak,
Today I was told by Judge Brown of the Sacramento County Superior Court that Civil Code 2936 does not apply to deeds of trust because the statute states mortgage. I was also told that Carpenter v. Longan did not apply to the statutory framework of Section 2924 and the nonjudicial foreclosure scheme. I pleaded that the security instrument follows the note and is unenforceable if it is separated to no avail.
I do like Judge Brown, so this is by no means an attack on him, but it took me only 10 minutes of research to prove that I was right.
The Editor’s Take: Watching our courts attempt to steer California’s antideficiency rules through the treacherous currents of multiple security contexts is always somewhat painful. Code of Civil Procedure §580d, enacted in 1939, prohibits recovery of a deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial sale, which seems straightforward enough at the start. But 24 years later, the California Supreme Court held that this prohibition did not apply to a creditor suing on its junior note after having been sold out in a senior foreclosure sale (the “sold-out junior exception”). Roseleaf Corp. v Chierighino (1963) 59 C2d 35, 41, 27 CR 873. But then, 30 years after that, a court of appeal held that this sold-out junior exception did not apply to a creditor who held both the senior and junior notes. Simon v Superior Court (1992) 4 CA4th 63, 71, 5 CR2d 428. So from then on, we had a “being your own junior” exception to the “sold-out junior” exception.
A decade after that came two more exceptions to the exception to the exception: The court in Ostayan v Serrano Reconveyance Co. (2000) 77 CA4th 1411, 1422, 92 CR2d 577, , allowed a two-note-holding creditor to foreclose on its junior deed of trust and sell the property subject to its own senior encumbrance (although that is not a §580d issue). More importantly, National Enters., Inc. v Woods (2001) 94 CA4th 1217, 115 CR2d 37, allowed the holder of two notes to judicially foreclose on the first one and to sell the second note to a third party, who then was held able to sue on it as a sold-out junior. This was technically not a §580d issue, since the senior foreclosure was not by power of sale, but the reasoning made it look like we were going to have a “third party transferee” or “unbundling the package” exception to the “being your own junior” exception of Simon. It began to look like Simon would be eaten away with exceptions, especially when the original lender made a timely divestment of one of its notes.
But instead, we now learn from Mitchell that the Simon doctrine will be applied against a third party transferee who took the junior paper from the common lender after that lender had trustee sold the property under its senior deed of trust. Both National Enters. and Mitchell involved a transfer of the junior loan after a sale under the senior security, differing only with regard to whether the senior foreclosure was judicial or nonjudicial, which distinction should perhaps matter more to the selling senior than to the nonselling junior.
So many factors potentially affect the outcomes in these situations that it is really impossible to make any confident predictions. How much does it matter whether the two loans were made at the same or different times? Whether they were for related or entirely different purposes? Whether one of them was transferred (and before or after the other was foreclosed)? Whether the transferred loan was the senior or junior? Whether the one foreclosed was the senior or junior? Whether the foreclosure was judicial or nonjudicial? I can point out these distinctions, but that doesn’t mean I can forecast their effect on the outcome of the next case that comes up. —Roger Bernhardt
204 Cal.App.4th 1199 (2012)
139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 562
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL MITCHELL, Defendant and Respondent.
Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Four.
April 10, 2012.
1202*1202 The Dreyfuss Firm and Bruce Dannemeyer for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Ulric E. J. Usher, Ulric E. J. Usher and Richard Kavonian for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
SUZUKAWA, J.—
Appellant Bank of America’s (Bank) predecessor in interest loaned respondent Michael Mitchell (Mitchell) $315,000 to purchase a home, secured by two notes and first and second deeds of trust. When Mitchell defaulted on the loan, the lender foreclosed and sold the property. The lender then assigned the second deed of trust to the Bank, which initiated the present action to recover the indebtedness evidenced by the note. Mitchell demurred, and the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the Bank’s action was barred by California’s antideficiency law. The Bank appeals from the judgment of dismissal and from the subsequent award of prevailing party attorney fees to Mitchell. We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Bank filed the present action on September 16, 2010, and it filed the operative first amended complaint (complaint), asserting causes of action for 1203*1203 breach of contract, open book account, and money lent, on December 2, 2010. The complaint alleges that Mitchell obtained a loan from GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (GreenPoint), on or about September 14, 2006. The loan was evidenced by a note secured by a deed of trust recorded against real property located at 45245 Kingtree Avenue, Lancaster, California (the property). The security for the loan was eliminated by a senior foreclosure sale in 2009. Because Mitchell defaulted on payments owing on the loan, the complaint alleged that he breached the terms of the contract, resulting in damage to the Bank in the principal sum of $63,000, plus interest at the note rate of 11.625 percent from March 1, 2010, through the date of judgment.
Mitchell demurred. Concurrently with his demurrer, he sought judicial notice of several documents, including two deeds of trust, a notice of trustee’s sale, and a trustee’s deed upon sale. On the basis of these documents, he contended that on September 14, 2006, GreenPoint made him two loans to purchase the property, with a note and deed of trust for each loan recorded against the property. The first note and deed of trust were for $252,000, and the second note and deed of trust were for $63,000. Both deeds of trust were recorded on September 21, 2006. Mitchell defaulted on the notes sometime in 2008. A notice of default was recorded, and the property was sold at trustee sale for $53,955.01 on November 6, 2009. More than a year later, on November 18, 2010, GreenPoint assigned the second deed of trust to Bank of America, which subsequently filed the present action to recover on the second note and deed of trust. Mitchell contended that the action was barred by California’s antideficiency legislation, which bars a deficiency judgment following nonjudicial foreclosure of real property.
The trial court granted Mitchell’s request for judicial notice and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on January 27, 2011, concluding that the Bank’s breach of contract and common counts claims seek recovery of the balance owed on the obligation secured by the second deed of trust and, thus, are barred by the antideficiency statutes as a matter of law. On April 7, 2011, the court awarded Mitchell prevailing party attorney fees of $8,400 and costs of $534.72.
Judgment for Mitchell was entered on July 8, 2011. The Bank appealed from the award of attorney fees on June 17, 2011, and from the judgment on August 8, 2011. We ordered the two appeals consolidated on October 13, 2011.
“If we determine the facts as pleaded do not state a cause of action, we then consider whether the court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint. (McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC [(2008)] 159 Cal.App.4th [784,] 791-792 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 885].) It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles[,supra,] 31 Cal.4th [at p.] 1081. . . .)” (Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 800-801 [130 Cal.Rptr.3d 279].)
I. The Trial Court Properly Sustained the Demurrer Without Leave to Amend
A. Code of Civil Procedure Section 580d
(1) “`In California, as in most states, a creditor’s right to enforce a debt secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real property is restricted by statute. Under California law, “the creditor must rely upon his security before enforcing the debt. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580a, 725a, 726.) If the security is insufficient, his right to a judgment against the debtor for the deficiency may be limited or barred . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Oropallo (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 669].)
Code of Civil Procedure section 580d (section 580d) prohibits a creditor from seeking a judgment for a deficiency on all notes “secured by a deed of 1205*1205 trust or mortgage upon real property . . . in any case in which the real property . . . has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in the mortgage or deed of trust.”[1] The effect of section 580d is that “`the beneficiary of a deed of trust executed after 1939 cannot hold the debtor for a deficiency unless he uses the remedy of judicial foreclosure. . . .'” (Simon v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 63, 71 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 428] (Simon).)
(2) In Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35 [27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97] (Roseleaf), the California Supreme Court held that where two deeds of trust are held against a single property and the senior creditor nonjudicially forecloses on the property, section 580d does not prohibit the holder of the junior lienor “whose security has been rendered valueless by a senior sale” from recovering a deficiency judgment. (59 Cal.2d at p. 39.) There, defendant Chierighino purchased a hotel from plaintiff Roseleaf Corporation. The consideration for the hotel included three notes, each secured by a second trust deed on parcels owned by Chierighino. After the sale of the hotel, the third parties who held the first trust deeds on the three parcels nonjudicially foreclosed on them, rendering Roseleaf’s second trust deeds valueless. Roseleaf then brought an action to recover the full amount unpaid on the three notes secured by the second trust deeds. (Id. at p. 38.)
The trial court entered judgment for Roseleaf. Chierighino appealed, contending that Roseleaf’s action was barred by section 580d, but the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. It explained that the purpose of section 580d was to “put judicial enforcement [of powers of sale] on a parity with private enforcement.” (Roseleaf, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 43.) That purpose, the court said, would not be served by applying section 580d against a nonselling junior lienor: “Even without the section the junior has fewer rights after a senior private sale than after a senior judicial sale. He may redeem from a senior judicial sale (Code Civ. Proc., § 701), or he may obtain a deficiency judgment. [Citations.] After a senior private sale, the junior has no right to redeem. This disparity of rights would be aggravated were he also denied a right to a deficiency judgment by section 580d. There is no purpose in denying the junior his single remedy after a senior private sale while leaving 1206*1206 him with two alternative remedies after a senior judicial sale. The junior’s right to recover should not be controlled by the whim of the senior, and there is no reason to extend the language of section 580d to reach that result.” (59 Cal.2d at p. 44.)
In Simon, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 63, the court held that the rule articulated in Roseleafdid not apply to protect a junior lienor who also held the senior lien. There, Bank of America (Lender) lent the Simons $1,575,000, for which the Simons gave it two separate promissory notes. Each note was secured by a separate deed of trust naming the Bank as beneficiary and describing the same real property (the property). Subsequently, the Simons defaulted on the senior note and the Lender foreclosed. The Lender purchased the property at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale and then filed an action to recover the unpaid balance of the junior note. (Id. at p. 66.)
(3) After detailing the history of the antideficiency legislation and the governing case law, the court held that section 580d barred the Lender’s deficiency causes of action. It noted that in Roseleaf, the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of section 580d was to create parity between judicial and nonjudicial enforcement. Such parity would not be served “if [the Lender] here is permitted to make successive loans secured by a senior and junior deed of trust on the same property; utilize its power of sale to foreclose the senior lien, thereby eliminating the Simons’ right to redeem; and having so terminated that right of redemption, obtain a deficiency judgment against the Simons on the junior obligation whose security [the Lender], thus, made the choice to eliminate.” (Simon, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 77.) The court continued: “Unlike a true third party sold-out junior, [the Lender’s] right to recover as a junior lienor which is also the purchasing senior lienor is obviously not controlled by the `whim of the senior.’ We will not sanction the creation of multiple trust deeds on the same property, securing loans represented by successive promissory notes from the same debtor, as a means of circumventing the provisions of section 580d. [Fn. omitted.] The elevation of the form of such a contrived procedure over its easily perceived substance would deal a mortal blow to the antideficiency legislation of this state. Assuming, arguendo, legitimate reasons do exist to divide a loan to a debtor into multiple notes thus secured, section 580d must nonetheless be viewed as controlling where, as here, the senior and junior lenders and lienors are identical and those liens are placed on the same real property. Otherwise, creditors would be free to structure their loans to a single debtor, and the security therefor, so as to obtain on default the secured property on a trustee’s sale under a senior deed of trust; thereby eliminate the debtor’s right of redemption thereto; and thereafter effect an excessive recovery by obtaining a deficiency judgment against that debtor on an obligation secured by a junior lien the creditor chose to eliminate.” (Id. at pp. 77-78.)
1207*1207 B. Simon and Roseleaf Bar a Deficiency Judgment in the Present Case
(4) Simon is dispositive of the present case. Here, Mitchell executed two promissory notes, for $252,000 and $63,000, secured by the first and second deeds of trust in the property. As in Simon, the first and second deeds of trust were held by a single lender, GreenPoint. GreenPoint, as beneficiary under the first deed of trust, chose to exercise its power of sale by holding a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. GreenPoint thus was not a “sold-out junior” lienor and would not have been permitted to obtain a deficiency judgment against Mitchell under the rule articulated in Simon. The result is no different because GreenPoint, after the trustee sale, assigned the second deed of trust to the Bank. “An assignment transfers the interest of the assignor to the assignee. Thereafter, `”[t]he assignee `stands in the shoes’ of the assignor, taking his rights and remedies, subject to any defenses which the obligor has against the assignor prior to notice of the assignment.”‘ [Citation.]” (Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 49 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 522].) Accordingly, because GreenPoint could not have obtained a deficiency judgment against Mitchell, the Bank also is precluded from doing so.
The Bank urges that Simon is distinguishable because in that case, the lender ultimately purchased the property for a credit bid at its own foreclosure sale, whereas in this case, the property was sold to a third party. The Bank thus contends that “[u]nder Simon if (a) both loans are held by the same lender and (b) that lender acquires the property at the foreclosure sale, the risk of manipulation by the lender is too great, so no deficiency is allowed. But if either is missing, the risk of manipulation is reduced, and a deficiency should be allowed.” Like the trial court, we reject the contention that the lender must have acquired the property at the foreclosure sale forSimon to apply. Although Simon noted the lender’s purchase at the foreclosure sale, that purchase was not material to its holding. Instead, the court’s focus was on the lender’s dual position as holder of the first and second deeds of trust, and its consequent ability to protect its own interest. (Simon, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 [“[The Lender] was not a third party sold-out junior lienholder as was the case inRoseleaf. As the holder of both the first and second liens, [the Lender] was fully able to protect its secured position. It was not required to protect its junior lien from its own foreclosure of the senior lien by the investment of additional funds. Its position of dual lienholder eliminated any possibility that [the Lender], after foreclosure and sale of the liened property under its first lien, might end up with no interest in the secured property, the principal rationale of the court’s decision in Roseleaf.“].)
The Bank further contends that the present case is distinguishable from Simonbecause the presence of a third party purchaser at the foreclosure sale 1208*1208prevented the kind of “manipulation” possible in Simon. According to the Bank, “[w]hen the foreclosure sale results in acquisition by a third party, who competed with the foreclosing lender and all other bidders at the public auction, a low-ball bid is impossible. If the foreclosing lender bids below market, it will be outbid; it will not acquire the property. The lender cannot manipulate the price. The presence of third party bids demonstrates the market is at work to achieve a fair price. Third party bids provide the functional equivalent of a right of redemption. By outbidding the lender, the third party prevents the lender from manipulating the process.” We disagree. Whatever the merits of the Bank’s argument as a matter of policy, it has no support in the statute, and the Bank suggests none. Indeed, nothing in the antideficiency legislation suggests that the presence of a third party bidder at a foreclosure sale excepts the sale from the legislation and permits the lender to seek a deficiency judgment.[2]
For all the foregoing reasons, section 580d bars the deficiency judgment the Bank seeks in the present case and, thus, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer. Because the Bank suggests no way in which the legal defects identified could be cured by amendment, the demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend.
II. The Trial Court Properly Awarded Mitchell Attorney Fees
A. Relevant Facts
Following the trial court’s order sustaining Mitchell’s demurrer without leave to amend, Mitchell filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717. Two days later, on February 10, 2011, the Bank filed a request for dismissal with prejudice. It then filed opposition to the motion for attorney fees, contending that there could be no prevailing party within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717 because it had voluntarily dismissed its action.[3]
On March 8, 2011, the trial court vacated the dismissal and granted Mitchell’s motion for attorney fees. It explained that because it had sustained a demurrer to the Bank’s complaint without leave to amend, the Bank did not have a right pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581 to voluntarily dismiss the action, and the dismissal had been entered in error. It awarded Mitchell attorney fees of $8,400 and costs of $534.72.
1209*1209 B. Analysis
The Bank contends that the trial court lacked authority to award Mitchell attorney fees. It urges that under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, it had an absolute right to dismiss its case voluntarily, so long as it did so with prejudice. Because it did so, there was no prevailing party pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), and thus the trial court lacked authority to award Mitchell contractual attorney fees.
(5) The Bank is correct that under Civil Code section 1717, a defendant in a contract action is not deemed a prevailing party where the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action. (Id., subd. (b)(2) [“Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.”].) Therefore, if the Bank’s dismissal was valid, the Bank is correct that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees. The trial court determined, however, that the Bank’s dismissal was not valid, the issue to which we now turn.
1210*1210 (7) The Supreme Court found such a “determinative adjudication” in Goldtree v. Spreckels (1902) 135 Cal. 666 [67 P. 1091] (Goldtree). There, the defendant’s demurrer to each of the plaintiff’s causes of action was sustained without leave to amend as to the first two. The plaintiff then filed a written request to dismiss the entire case, and the court clerk entered an order of dismissal. The trial court vacated the dismissal, and the plaintiff appealed. (Id. at pp. 667-668.) The Supreme Court affirmed: “In our opinion the subdivision of the section 581 of the Code of Civil Procedure in question cannot be restricted in its meaning to trials of the merits after answer, for there may be such a trial on a general demurrer to the complaint as will effectually dispose of the case where the plaintiff has properly alleged all the facts which constitute his cause of action. If the demurrer is sustained, he stands on his pleading and submits to judgment on the demurrer, and, if not satisfied, has his remedy by appeal. In such a case, we think, there would be a trial within the meaning of the code, and the judgment would cut off the right of dismissal, unless it was first set aside or leave given to amend. [¶] The clerk had no authority, therefore, to enter the dismissal, and being void the court rightly set it aside.” (Id. at pp. 672-673.)
(8) The Supreme Court reached a similar result in Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d 781 (Wells). There, the trial court sustained the defendant’s demurrer with leave to amend. The plaintiff failed to amend within the time provided, but instead sought to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice. The Supreme Court held that the voluntary dismissal was improperly entered: “[O]nce a general demurrer is sustained with leave to amend and plaintiff does not so amend within the time authorized by the court or otherwise extended by stipulation or appropriate order, he can no longer voluntarily dismiss his action pursuant to section 581, subdivision 1, even if the trial court has yet to enter a judgment of dismissal on the sustained demurrer.” (Id. at p. 789.)
In the present case, the trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend on January 27, 2011. Although the trial court had not yet entered a judgment of dismissal when the Bank filed a request for voluntary dismissal on February 10, 2011, as in Goldtree and Wells, the trial court had already made a determinative adjudication on the legal merits of the Bank’s claim. Accordingly, as in those cases, the Bank no longer had the right to voluntarily dismiss under Code of Civil Procedure section 581.
The Bank contends that the present case is distinguishable from Goldtree and Wellsbecause here it sought to dismiss with prejudice, while in those cases the attempted dismissal was without prejudice. We do not agree. The 1211*1211 court rejected a similar contention in Vanderkous v. Conley (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 111 [115 Cal.Rptr.3d 249] (Vanderkous). There, the plaintiff and the defendant formerly had lived together on a multilot parcel owned by the plaintiff. An arbitration award entered after their relationship ended directed the parties to cooperate in a lot line adjustment that would result in the home and a garage on a single lot to be owned by the defendant, with the remainder of the parcel to be owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was also to have access and utility easements over the garage area for the benefit of his parcel. The easements were executed by the defendant and recorded, but the garage and surrounding property were never transferred because the plaintiff never recorded either the lot line adjustment or the grant deed to the defendant for the garage and setback area. When the plaintiff subsequently sought to record a subdivision map, the title company that was to record the map refused to do so because the grants of easement by the defendant created a cloud on the plaintiff’s title. The plaintiff thus filed a complaint for declaratory relief and to quiet title. (Id. at pp. 114-115.)
Following a trial, the court filed a statement of decision that ordered the defendant to execute a quitclaim deed in favor of the plaintiff, and ordered the plaintiff to compensate the defendant in an amount equal to the full market value of the garage area. If the parties could not agree on the amount the plaintiff was to pay the defendant, each party was ordered to submit an appraisal for the court’s final determination. The defendant submitted an appraisal that valued the garage area at $410,000, and the plaintiff submitted an appraisal that valued the property at $75,000, but also requested a continuance and an evidentiary hearing on the value of the property. The day before the evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff filed a request for dismissal with prejudice with the clerk. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s attempt to dismiss was void ab initio and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $199,246 plus attorney fees and costs. (Vanderkous, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.)
(9) The plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside his voluntary dismissal of his action and to award attorney fees. (Vanderkous, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 117.) The court disagreed and affirmed the judgment. It explained: “Section 581, subdivision (d) provides that a complaint may be dismissed with prejudice when the plaintiff abandons it before the final submission of the case.Here, the court’s statement of decision following the three-day court trial, states `[t]he matter was deemed submitted on March 10, 2008, following receipt of closing briefs from both sides.’ The statement of decision resolved Vanderkous’s quiet title cause of action and his claim for declaratory relief, and ordered him to compensate Conley for the fair market value of property she was required to quitclaim to 1212*1212 him. [¶] … [¶] Because Vanderkous has not convinced us that he had an absolute right to dismiss his complaint, we also reject his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside his attempted dismissal. [Citations.] A contrary rule would enable Vanderkous to avoid compliance with the court’s decision and would undermine the trial court’s authority to provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it and compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process. (See § 128, subd. (a).)” (Vanderkous, supra, at pp. 117-118; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) ¶ 11:28, p. 11-16 (rev. # 1, 2011) [“[O]nce the case is finally submitted for decision, there is no further right to dismiss with prejudice. At that point, plaintiffs cannot avoid an adverse ruling by abandoning the case.”].)
The present case is analogous. As in Vanderkous, the Bank sought to dismiss afterthe court made a dispositive ruling against it, not before. To allow the Bank to dismiss at that late stage would permit procedural gamesmanship inconsistent with the trial court’s authority to provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it.
We do not agree with the Bank that its right to dismiss is supported by this division’s decision in Marina Glencoe, L.P. v. Neue Sentimental Film AG (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 874 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 800] (Marina Glencoe). There, after the plaintiff presented its evidence on the single bifurcated issue of alter ego liability, the defendant moved for judgment. The court heard argument on the motion but did not rule; the following day, before a ruling on the pending motion, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action with prejudice. The defendant moved for prevailing party attorney fees, and the court denied the motion, concluding that the defendant was not entitled to such fees under Civil Code section 1717. The defendant appealed. We affirmed, noting that because the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, “[i]ts intent was to end the litigation, not to manipulate the judicial process to avoid its inevitable end. This was entirely proper.” (168 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.)
The present case is distinguishable from Marina Glencoe. In Marina Glencoe, the plaintiff dismissed its action before the trial court ruled on a dispositive motion, and thus judgment in the defendant’s favor was not inevitable. In the present case, in contrast, the trial court had already sustained Mitchell’s demurrer without leave to amend, and thus judgment against the Bank had already “ripened to the point of inevitability.” (Marina Glencoe, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.) Accordingly, unlike in Marina Glencoe, the Bank no longer had the right to voluntarily dismiss its action, either with or without prejudice.
1213*1213 DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of dismissal and award of attorney fees. Mitchell shall recover his appellate costs.
Willhite, Acting P. J., and Manella, J., concurred.
[1] The full text of section 580d is as follows: “No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by a deed of trust or mortgage upon real property or an estate for years therein hereafter executed in any case in which the real property or estate for years therein has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in the mortgage or deed of trust.
“This section does not apply to any deed of trust, mortgage or other lien given to secure the payment of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness authorized or permitted to be issued by the Commissioner of Corporations, or which is made by a public utility subject to the Public Utilities Act (Part 1 (commencing with Section 201) of Division 1 of the Public Utilities Code).”
[2] Although not relevant to our analysis, we note that the property’s foreclosure sale purchase price of $53,955.01 does not convincingly demonstrate, as the Bank asserts, that the presence of a third party bidder made a “low-ball bid . . . impossible.”
[3] In its opposition, the Bank represented to the court as follows: “The litigation is over. There will be no appeal.”
Freddie Mac, the taxpayer-owned mortgage giant, has placed multibillion-dollar bets that pay off if homeowners stay trapped in expensive mortgages with interest rates well above current rates.
Freddie began increasing these bets dramatically in late 2010, the same time that the company was making it harder for homeowners to get out of such high-interest mortgages.
No evidence has emerged that these decisions were coordinated. The company is a key gatekeeper for home loans but says its traders are “walled off” from the officials who have restricted homeowners from taking advantage of historically low interest rates by imposing higher fees and new rules.
Freddie’s charter calls for the company to make home loans more accessible. Its chief executive, Charles Haldeman Jr., recently told Congress that his company is “helping financially strapped families reduce their mortgage costs through refinancing their mortgages.”
But the trades, uncovered for the first time in an investigation by ProPublica and NPR, give Freddie a powerful incentive to do the opposite, highlighting a conflict of interest at the heart of the company. In addition to being an instrument of government policy dedicated to making home loans more accessible, Freddie also has giant investment portfolios and could lose substantial amounts of money if too many borrowers refinance.
“We were actually shocked they did this,” says Scott Simon, who as the head of the giant bond fund PIMCO’s mortgage-backed securities team is one of the world’s biggest mortgage bond traders. “It seemed so out of line with their mission.”
The trades “put them squarely against the homeowner,” he says.
Those homeowners have a lot at stake, too. Many of them could cut their interest payments by thousands of dollars a year.
Freddie Mac, along with its cousin Fannie Mae, was bailed out in 2008 and is now owned by taxpayers. The companies play a pivotal role in the mortgage business because they insure most home loans in the United States, making banks likelier to lend. The companies’ rules determine whether homeowners can get loans and on what terms.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency effectively serves as Freddie’s board of directors and is ultimately responsible for Freddie’s decisions. It is run by acting director Edward DeMarco, who cannot be fired by the president except in extraordinary circumstances.
Freddie and the FHFA repeatedly declined to comment on the specific transactions.
Freddie’s moves to limit refinancing affect not only individual homeowners but the entire economy. An expansive refinancing program could help millions of homeowners, some economists say. Such an effort would “help the economy and put tens of billions of dollars back in consumers’ pockets, the equivalent of a very long-term tax cut,” says real-estate economist Christopher Mayer of the Columbia Business School. “It also is likely to reduce foreclosures and benefit the U.S. government” because Freddie and Fannie, which guarantee most mortgages in the country, would have lower losses over the long run.
Freddie Mac’s trades, while perfectly legal, came during a period when the company was supposed to be reducing its investment portfolio, according to the terms of its government takeover agreement. But these trades escalate the risk of its portfolio, because the securities Freddie has purchased are volatile and hard to sell, mortgage securities experts say.
The financial crisis in 2008 was made worse when Wall Street traders made bets against their customers and the American public. Now, some see similar behavior, only this time by traders at a government-owned company who are using leverage, which increases the potential profits but also the risk of big losses, and other Wall Street stratagems. “More than three years into the government takeover, we have Freddie Mac pursuing highly levered, complicated transactions seemingly with the purpose of trading against homeowners,” says Mayer. “These are the kinds of things that got us into trouble in the first place.”
Freddie Mac is betting against, among others, Jay and Bonnie Silverstein. The Silversteins live in an unfinished development of cul-de-sacs and yellow stucco houses about 20 miles north of Philadelphia, in a house decorated with Bonnie’s orchids and their Rose Bowl parade pin collection. The developer went bankrupt, leaving orange plastic construction fencing around some empty lots. The community clubhouse isn’t complete.
“We’re in financial Jail”
The Silversteins have a 30-year fixed mortgage with an interest rate of 6.875 percent, much higher than the going rate of less than 4 percent. They have borrowed from family members and are living paycheck to paycheck. If they could refinance, they would save about $500 a month. He says the extra money would help them pay back some of their family members and visit their grandchildren more often.
But brokers have told the Silversteins that they cannot refinance, thanks to a Freddie Mac rule.
The Silversteins used to live in a larger house 15 minutes from their current place, in a more upscale development. They had always planned to downsize as they approached retirement. In 2005, they made the mistake of buying their new house before selling the larger one. As the housing market plummeted, they couldn’t sell their old house, so they carried two mortgages for 2½ years, wiping out their savings and 401(k). “It just drained us,” Jay Silverstein says.
Finally, they were advised to try a short sale, in which the house is sold for less than the value of the underlying mortgage. They stopped making payments on the big house for it to go through. The sale was finally completed in 2009.
Such debacles hurt a borrower’s credit rating. But Bonnie has a solid job at a doctor’s office, and Jay has a pension from working for more than two decades for Johnson & Johnson. They say they haven’t missed a payment on their current mortgage.
But the Silversteins haven’t been able to get their refi. Freddie Mac won’t insure a new loan for people who had a short sale in the last two to four years, depending on their financial condition. While the company’s previous rules prohibited some short sales, in October 2010 the company changed its criteria to include all short sales. It is unclear whether the Silverstein mortgage would have been barred from a short sale under the previous Freddie rules.
Short-term, Freddie’s trades benefit from the high-interest mortgage in which the Silversteins are trapped. But in the long run, Freddie could benefit if the Silversteins refinanced to a more affordable loan. Freddie guarantees the Silversteins’ mortgage, so if the couple defaults, Freddie — and the taxpayers who own the company — are on the hook. Getting the Silversteins into a more affordable mortgage would make a default less likely.
If millions of homeowners like the Silversteins default, the economy would be harmed. But if they switch to loans with lower interest rates, they would have more money to spend, which could boost the economy.
“We’re in financial jail,” says Jay, “and we’ve never been there before.”
How Freddie’s investments work
Here’s how Freddie Mac’s trades profit from the Silversteins staying in “financial jail.” The couple’s mortgage is sitting in a big pile of other mortgages, most of which are also guaranteed by Freddie and have high interest rates. Those mortgages underpin securities that get divided into two basic categories.
Anatomy of a Deal
How Freddie Mac structured a deal in which it profited if homeowners stayed trapped in high-interest mortgages.
One portion is backed mainly by principal, pays a low return, and was sold to investors who wanted a safe place to park their money. The other part, the inverse floater, is backed mainly by the interest payments on the mortgages, such as the high rate that the Silversteins pay. So this portion of the security can pay a much higher return, and this is what Freddie retained.
In 2010 and ’11, Freddie purchased $3.4 billion worth of inverse floater portions — their value based mostly on interest payments on $19.5 billion in mortgage-backed securities, according to prospectuses for the deals. They covered tens of thousands of homeowners. Most of the mortgages backing these transactions have high rates of about 6.5 percent to 7 percent, according to the deal documents.
Between late 2010 and early 2011, Freddie Mac’s purchases of inverse floater securities rose dramatically. Freddie purchased inverse floater portions of 29 deals in 2010 and 2011, with 26 bought between October 2010 and April 2011. That compares with seven for all of 2009 and five in 2008.
In these transactions, Freddie has sold off most of the principal, but it hasn’t reduced its risk.
First, if borrowers default, Freddie pays the entire value of the mortgages underpinning the securities, because it insures the loans.
It’s also a big problem if people like the Silversteins refinance their mortgages. That’s because a refi is a new loan; the borrower pays off the first loan early, stopping the interest payments. Since the security Freddie owns is backed mainly by those interest payments, Freddie loses.
And these inverse floaters burden Freddie with entirely new risks. With these deals, Freddie has taken mortgage-backed securities that are easy to sell and traded them for ones that are harder and possibly more expensive to offload, according to mortgage market experts.
The inverse floaters carry another risk. Freddie gets paid the difference between the high mortgages rates, such as the Silversteins are paying, and a key global interest rate that right now is very low. If that rate rises, Freddie’s profits will fall.
It is unclear what kinds of hedging, if any, Freddie has done to offset its risks.
At the end of 2011, Freddie’s portfolio of mortgages was just over $663 billion, down more than 6 percent from the previous year. But that $43 billion drop in the portfolio overstates the risk reduction, because the company retained risk through the inverse floaters. The company is well below the cap of $729 billion required by its government takeover agreement.
How Freddie tightened credit
Restricting credit for people who have done short sales isn’t the only way that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have tightened their lending criteria in the wake of the financial crisis, making it harder for borrowers to get housing loans.
Some tightening is justified because, in the years leading up to the financial crisis, Freddie and Fannie were too willing to insure mortgages taken out by people who couldn’t afford them.
In a statement, Freddie contends it is “actively supporting efforts for borrowers to realize the benefits of refinancing their mortgages to lower rates.”
The company said in a statement: “During the first three quarters of 2011, we refinanced more than $170 billion in mortgages, helping nearly 835,000 borrowers save an average of $2,500 in interest payments during the next year.” As part of that effort, the company is participating in an Obama administration plan, called the Home Affordable Refinance Program, or HARP. But critics say HARP could be reaching millions more people if Fannie and Freddie implemented the program more effectively.
Indeed, just as it was escalating its inverse floater deals, it was also introducing new fees on borrowers, including those wanting to refinance. During Thanksgiving week in 2010, Freddie quietly announced that it was raising charges, called post-settlement delivery fees.
In a recent white paper on remedies for the stalled housing market, the Federal Reserve criticized Fannie and Freddie for the fees they have charged for refinancing. Such fees are “another possible reason for low rates of refinancing” and are “difficult to justify,” the Fed wrote.
A former Freddie employee, who spoke on condition he not be named, was even blunter: “Generally, it makes no sense whatsoever” for Freddie “to restrict refinancing” from expensive loans to ones borrowers can more easily pay, since the company remains on the hook if homeowners default.
In November, the FHFA announced that Fannie and Freddie were eliminating or reducing some fees. The Fed, however, said that “more might be done.”
The regulator as owner
The trades raise questions about the FHFA’s oversight of Fannie and Freddie. But the FHFA is not just a regulator. With the two companies in government conservatorship, the FHFA now plays the role of their board of directors and shareholders, responsible for the companies’ major decisions.
Under acting director DeMarco, the FHFA has emphasized that its main goal is to limit taxpayer losses by managing the two companies’ giant investment portfolios to make profits. To cover their previous losses and ongoing operations, Fannie and Freddie already had received $169 billion from taxpayers through the third quarter of last year.
The FHFA has frustrated the administration because the agency has made preserving the value of the companies’ investment portfolios a priority over helping homeowners in expensive mortgages. In 2010, President Barack Obama nominated a permanent replacement for acting director DeMarco, but Republicans in Congress blocked him. Obama has not nominated anyone else to replace DeMarco.
Even though Freddie is a ward of the state, top executives are highly compensated. Peter Federico, who’s in charge of the company’s investment portfolio, made $2.5 million in 2010, and he had target compensation of $2.6 million for last year, when most of these leveraged investments were made.
One of Federico’s responsibilities — tied to his bonuses — is to “support and provide liquidity and stability in the mortgage market,” according to Freddie’s annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mortgage experts contend that the inverse floater trades don’t further that goal.
ProPublica and NPR made numerous attempts to reach Federico. A woman who answered his home phone said he declined to comment.
The FHFA knew about the trades before ProPublica and NPR approached the regulatory agency about them, according to an FHFA official. The FHFA has the power to approve and disapprove trades, though it doesn’t involve itself in day-to-day decisions. The official declined to comment on whether the FHFA knew about them as Freddie was conducting them or whether the FHFA had explicitly approved them.
Lona v. Citibank Docket
Cal.App. 6th Dist (H036140) 12/21/11TRUSTEE‘S SALES: The court reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action seeking to set aside a trustee’s sale on the basis that the loan was unconscionable. The court held that summary judgment was improper for two reasons:
1. The homeowner presented sufficient evidence of triable issues of material fact regarding unconscionability. Plaintiff asserted that the loan broker ignored his inability to repay the loan (monthly loan payments were four times his monthly income) and, as a person with limited English fluency, little education, and modest income, he did not understand many of the details of the transaction which was conducted entirely in English.
2. Plaintiff did not tender payment of the debt, which is normally a condition precedent to an action by the borrower to set aside the trustee’s sale, but defendants’ motion for summary judgment did not address the exceptions to this rule that defendant relied upon.
The case contains a good discussion of four exceptions to the tender requirement: 1. If the borrower’s action attacks the validity of the underlying debt, a tender is not required since it would constitute an affirmation of the debt. 2. A tender will not be required when the person who seeks to set aside the trustee’s sale has a counter-claim or set-off against the beneficiary. 3. A tender may not be required where it would be inequitable to impose such a condition on the party challenging the sale. 4. No tender will be required when the trustor is not required to rely on equity to attack the deed because the trustee’s deed is void on its face.Pioneer Construction v. Global Investment Corp. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B225685) 12/21/11MECHANICS LIENS: The court held that:
1. A mechanics lien claimant who provided labor and materials prepetition to a debtor in bankruptcy can record a mechanics lien after the property owner files for bankruptcy without violating the automatic stay. (11 U.S.C. §362(b)(3).)
2. A mechanics lienor must, and defendant did, file a notice of lien in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings to inform the debtor and creditors of its intention to enforce the lien. (11 U.S.C. §546(b)(2).)
3. The 90-day period to file an action after recording a mechanics lien is tolled during the pendency of the property owner’s bankruptcy. Accordingly, an action to enforce the lien was timely when filed 79 days after a trustee’s sale by a lender who obtained relief from the automatic stay. (The property ceased to be property of the estate upon completion of the trustee’s sale.)Harbour Vista v. HSBC Mortgage Services Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G044357) 12/19/11QUIET TITLE: Code of Civil Procedure Section 764.010 states that “[t]he court shall not enter judgment by default. . .” The court held that, while default may be entered, Section 764.010 requires that before issuing a default judgment the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing in open court, and that a defendant is entitled to participate in the hearing even when it has not yet answered the complaint and is in default. Normally, a defendant has no right to participate in the case after its default has been entered.Park v. First American Title Insurance Company Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G044118) 11/23/11 (Pub. Order 12/16/11)TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale was delayed due to defendant’s error in preparing the deed of trust. However, the court held that plaintiff could not establish damages because she could not prove that a potential buyer was ready, willing and able to purchase the property when the trustee’s sale was originally scheduled. Such proof would require showing that a prospective buyer made an offer, entered into a contract of sale, obtained a cashier’s check, or took any equivalent step that would have demonstrated she was ready, willing, and able to purchase plaintiff’s property. Also, plaintiff would need to show that the prospective buyer was financially able to purchase the property, such as by showing that the prospective buyer had obtained financing for the sale, preapproval for a loan or had sufficient funds to purchase the property with cash.Bardasian v. Superior Court Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C068488) 12/15/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Civil Code Section 2923.5 requires that before a notice of default can be filed, a lender must attempt to contact the borrower and explore options to prevent foreclosure. Where the trial court ruled on the merits that a lender failed to comply with Section 2923.5, it was proper to enjoin the sale pending compliance with that section, but it was not proper to require plaintiff to post a bond and make rent payments. Also, discussions in connection with a loan modification three years previously did not constitute compliance with the code section.Lang v. Roche Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B222885) 11/29/11SHERIFF’S SALES: Plaintiff sought to set aside a Sheriff’s sale arising from the execution on a judgment rendered in another action. Defendant had obtained that judgment by default after service by publication even though plaintiff was defendant’s next door neighbor and could easily be found. The court set the sale aside, holding that even though C.C.P. 701.780 provides that an execution sale is absolute and cannot be set aside, that statute does not eliminate plaintiff’s right of equitable redemption where the judgment is void due to lack of personal jurisdiction.Promenade at Playa Vista HOA v. Western Pacific Housing Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B225086) 11/8/11CC&R’S: In a construction defect action brought by a condominium homeowners association, the court held that a developer cannot compel binding arbitration of the litigation pursuant to an arbitration provision in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. CC&R’s are not a contract between the developer and the homeowners association. Instead, the provisions in the CC&R’s are equitable servitudes and can be enforced only by the homeowners association or the owner of a condominium, not by a developer who has sold all the units.Alpha and Omega Development v. Whillock Contracting Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D058445) 11/2/11LIS PENDENS: This is a slander of title and malicious prosecution action brought after defendant’s unsuccessful action to foreclose a mechanics lien. Plaintiff’s slander of title allegation is based on defendant’s recordation of a lis pendens in the prior mechanics lien action. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s granting of defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and striking the slander of title cause of action, because recording a lis pendens is privileged under Civil Code Section 47(b)(4).Biancalana v. T.D. Service Company Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 6th Dist. (H035400) 10/31/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. filed 12/9/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Inadequacy of the sale price is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee’s sale of real property in the absence of any procedural errors. The unpaid balance of the loan secured by the subject deed of trust was $219,105. The trustee erroneously told the auctioneer to credit bid the delinquency amount ($21,894.17). Plaintiff was the successful bidder with a bid of $21,896. The court refused to set aside the sale because there were no procedural errors and the mistake was within the discretion and control of the trustee, who was acting as agent for the lender. The court distinguished Millennium Rock Mortgage, Inc. v. T.D. Service Co. because here the mistake was made by defendant in the course and scope of its duty as the beneficiary’s agent, not by the auctioneer as in Millennium Rock.
The case also contains a discussion of the rule that once the trustee’s deed has been delivered, a rebuttable presumption arises that the foreclosure sale has been conducted regularly and properly. But where the deed has not been transferred, the sale may be challenged on the grounds of procedural irregularity.First Bank v. East West Bank Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B226061) 10/17/11 Case complete 12/19/11RECORDING: Where two deeds of trust secured by the same real property were simultaneously time-stamped for recording by the County Recorder’s Office but were indexed at different times, the lenders have equal priority. The recording laws protect subsequent purchasers and neither bank was a subsequent purchaser. The court acknowledged that a subsequent purchaser (or lender) who records his interest before the prior interest is indexed has priority, but this rule does not apply when both deeds of trust were recorded simultaneously.Dollinger DeAnza Assoc. v. Chicago Title Insurance CompanyDocket Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 6th Dist. (H035576) 9/9/11 (Pub. Order 10/6/11 Request for depublication filed 11/4/11TITLE INSURANCE: Plaintiff’s title insurance policy, which was issued in 2004, insured property that originally consisted of seven parcels, but which had been merged into a single parcel pursuant to a Notice of Merger recorded by the City of Cupertino in 1984. The policy did not except the Notice of Merger from coverage. Plaintiff filed this action after Chicago Title denied its claim for damages alleged to result from the inability to sell one of the parcels separately. The court ruled in favor of Chicago, holding:
1. While the notice of merger may impact Plaintiff’s ability to market the separate parcel, it has no affect on Plaintiff’s title to that parcel, so it does not constitute a defect in title. It does not represent a third person’s claim to an interest in the property.
2. Chicago is not barred by principals of waiver or estoppel from denying plaintiff’s claim, after initially accepting the claim, because 1) waiver only applies to insurers that do not reserve rights when accepting a tender of defense and 2) plaintiff failed to show detrimental reliance, which is one of the elements of estoppel.
3. Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be maintained where benefits are not due under plaintiff’s insurance policy.
4. Since the court held that the Notice of Merger was not a defect in title, it did not need to consider Chicago’s contention that the Notice of Merger was void because the County Recorder indexed it under the name of the City, rather than the name of the property owner. [Ed. note: This case must have dealt with an ALTA 1992 policy. The ALTA 2006 policy made changes to the Covered Risks.]Sukut Construction v. Rimrock CA Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D057774) 9/30/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/11MECHANICS LIENS: Plaintiff could not establish a mining lien under Civil Code Section 3060 for removing rocks from a quarry because a quarry is not a mine and the rocks were not minerals. The court did not address whether plaintiff could establish a regular mechanics lien because it held that plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting that position after leading defendant to believe that it was asserting only a mining claim.UNPUBLISHED: First American Title Insurance Company v. Ordin Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B226671) 9/14/11 Case complete 11/17/11TITLE INSURANCE: An arbitrator found that defendants did not lose coverage under their title policy when they conveyed title to their wholly owned corporation, then to themselves as trustees of their family trust and finally to a wholly owned limited liability company. This conflicts with the holding in Kwok v. Transnation Title Insurance Company and this could have been an interesting case, except that whether the ruling was right or wrong was not before the court. The court held only that the arbitrator’s award could not be overturned, even if the the law was applied incorrectly, because there was no misconduct by the arbitrator.Calvo v. HSBC Bank Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 118 – 2nd Dist. (B226494) 9/13/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. filed 10/25/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Notice of the assignment of a deed of trust appeared only in the substitution of trustee, which was recorded on the same date as the notice of trustee’s sale, and which stated that MERS, as nominee for the assignee lender, was the present beneficiary. Plaintiff sought to set aside the trustee’s sale for an alleged violation of Civil Code section 2932.5, which requires the assignee of a mortgagee to record an assignment before exercising a power to sell real property. The court held that the lender did not violate section 2932.5 because that statute does not apply when the power of sale is conferred in a deed of trust rather than a mortgage.Robinson v. Countrywide Home Loans Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 42 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E052011) 9/12/11 Case complete 11/15/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: The trial court properly sustained defendant lender’s demurrer without leave to amend because 1) the statutory scheme does not provide for a preemptive suit challenging MERS authority to initiate a foreclosure and 2) even if such a statutory claim were cognizable, the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to challenge the trustee’s authority to initiate a foreclosure.Hacienda Ranch Homes v. Superior Court (Elissagaray) Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 1122 – 3rd Dist. (C065978) 8/30/11 Case complete 11/1/11ADVERSE POSSESSION: Plaintiffs (real parties in interest) acquired a 24.5% interest in the subject property at a tax sale. The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim of adverse possession under both 1) “color of title” because the tax deed by which they acquired their interest clearly conveyed only a 24.5% interest instead of a 100% interest, and 2) “claim of right” because plaintiffs’ claims of posting for-sale signs and clearing weeds 2 or 3 times a year did not satisfy the requirement of protecting the property with a substantial enclosure or cultivating or improving the property, as required by Code of Civil Procedure Section 325. The court also pointed out that obtaining adverse possession against cotenants requires evidence much stronger than that which would be required against a stranger, and plaintiffs failed to establish such evidence in this case.Gramercy Investment Trust v. Lakemont Homes Nevada, Inc. Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 903 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E051384) 8/24/11 Case complete 10/27/11ANTIDEFICIENCY: After a judicial foreclosure, the lender obtained a deficiency judgment against a guarantor. The court held that the choice of law provision designating the law of New York was unenforceable because there were insufficient contacts with New York. California is where the contract was executed, the debt was created and guaranteed, the default occurred and the real property is located. Also, Nevada law does not apply, even though the guarantor was a Nevada corporation, because Nevada had no connection with the transaction. The court also held that the guarantor was not entitled to the protection of California’s antideficiency statutes because the guaranty specifically waived rights under those statutes in accordance with Civil Code Section 2856.Hill v. San Jose Family Housing PartnersDocket
198 Cal.App.4th 764 – 6th Dist. (H034931) 8/23/11 Case complete 10/25/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiff, who had entered into an easement agreement with defendant’s predecessor to maintain a billboard on a portion of defendant’s property, filed an action to prevent defendant from constructing a multi-unit building that would allegedly block the view of the billboard. Defendant asserted that the easement was unenforceable because it violated city and county building codes. The court held:
1. The easement was enforceable because the property’s use for advertising purposes is not illegal in and of itself. Although the instrumentality of that use, i.e., the billboard, may be illegal, that is not a bar to the enforcement of the agreement.
2. The easement agreement did not specifically state that it included the right to view the billboard from the street, but the parties necessarily intended the easement to include that right since viewing the billboard by passing traffic is the purpose of the easement.
3. Nevertheless, the trial court improperly denied a motion for a retrial to re-determine damages based on new evidence that the city had instituted administrative proceedings to have the billboard removed. The award of damages was based on plaintiff’s expected revenue from the billboard until 2037, and such damages will be overstated if the city forces plaintiff to remove the billboard.Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 256 – 1st Dist. (A130478) 8/11/11 Depublication request DENIED 11/30/11FORECLOSURE / MERS: Plaintiff alleged a foreclosure was unlawful because MERS made an invalid assignment of an interest in the promissory note and because the lender had breached an agreement to forbear from foreclosure. The appellate court held that the trial court properly sustained a demurrer to the fourth amended complaint without leave to amend. The court held that MERS had a right to assign the note even though it was not the beneficiary of the deed of trust because in assigning the note it was acting on behalf of the beneficiary and not on its own behalf. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to allege that the note was not otherwise assigned by an unrecorded document. The court also held that plaintiff failed to properly allege that the lender breached a forbearance agreement because plaintiff did not attach to the complaint a copy of a letter (which the court held was part of the forbearance agreement) that purportedly modified the agreement. Normally, a copy of an agreement does not have to be attached to a complaint, but here the trial court granted a previous demurrer with leave to amend specifically on condition plaintiff attach a copy of the entire forbearance agreement to the amended pleading.Boschma v. Home Loan Center Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 230 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043716) 8/10/11 Case complete 10/11/11LOAN DISCLOSURE: Borrowers stated a cause of action that survived a demurrer where they alleged fraud and a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (B&PC 17200, et seq.) based on disclosures indicating that borrowers’ Option ARM loan may result in negative amortization when, in fact, making the scheduled payments would definitely result in negative amortization. However, the court also pointed out that at trial in order to prove damages plaintiffs will have to present evidence that, because of the structure of the loans, they suffered actual damages beyond their loss of equity. For every dollar by which the loan balances increased, plaintiffs kept a dollar to save or spend as they pleased, so they will not be able to prove damages if their “only injury is the psychological revelation . . . that they were not receiving a free lunch from defendant”.Thorstrom v. Thorstrom Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1406 – 1st Dist. (A127888) 6/29/11 Case complete 8/30/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiffs were not able to preclude defendants’ use of a well on plaintiffs’ property. The historic use of the well by the common owner (the mother of the current owners) indicated an intent for the well to serve both properties, and an implied easement was created in favor of defendants when the mother died and left one parcel to each of her two sons. However, the evidence did not establish that defendants were entitled to exclusive use of the well, so both properties are entitled to reasonable use of the well consistent with the volume of water available at any given time.Herrera v. Deutsche Bank Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1366 – 3rd Dist. (C065630) 5/31/11 (Cert. for pub. 6/28/11) Case complete 8/30/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Plaintiffs sought to set aside a trustee’s sale, claiming that the Bank had not established that it was the assignee of the note, and that the trustee (“CRC”) had not established that it was properly substituted as trustee. To establish that the Bank was the beneficiary and CRC was the trustee, defendants requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the recorded Assignment of Deed of Trust and Substitution of Trustee, and filed a declaration by an employee of CRC referring to the recordation of the assignment and substitution, and stating that they “indicated” that the Bank was the assignee and CRC was the trustee. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the appellate court reversed. The Court acknowledged that California law does not require the original promissory note in order to foreclose. But while a court may take judicial notice of a recorded document, that does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein, so the recorded documents do not prove the truth of their contents. Accordingly, the Bank did not present direct evidence that it held the note.
Ed. notes: 1. It seems that the Bank could have avoided this result if it had its own employee make a declaration directly stating that the Bank is the holder of the note and deed of trust, 2. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court held that if the Bank is successful in asserting its claim to the Property, there is no recognizable legal theory that would require the Bank to pay plaintiffs monies they expended on the property for back taxes, insurance and deferred maintenance.Tashakori v. Lakis Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1003 – 2nd Dist. (B220875) 6/21/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/21/11EASEMENTS: The court granted plaintiffs an “equitable easement” for driveway purposes. Apparently, plaintiffs did not have grounds to establish a prescriptive easement. But a court can award an equitable easement where the court applies the “relative hardship” test and determines, as the court did here, that 1) the use is innocent, which means it was not willful or negligent, 2) the user will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted and 3) there is little harm to the underlying property owner.Conservatorship of Buchenau (Tornel v. Office of the Public Guardian) Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1031 – 2nd Dist. (B222941) 5/31/11 (Pub. order 6/21/11) Case complete 8/24/11CONTRACTS: A purchaser of real property was held liable for damages for refusing to complete the purchase contract, even though the seller deposited the deed into escrow 19 days after the date set for close of escrow. The escrow instructions did not include a “time is of the essence” clause, so a reasonable time is allowed for performance. The purchaser presented no evidence that seller’s delay of 19 days was unreasonable following a two-month escrow. Diamond Heights Village Assn. v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 290 – 1st Dist. (A126145) 6/7/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/21/11HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION LIENS:
1. A homeowner’s association recorded a notice of assessment lien, judicially foreclosed and obtained a judgment against the homeowners. However, it did not record an abstract of judgment, which would have created a judgment lien, nor did it record a writ of execution, which would have created an execution lien. The court held that a subsequently recorded deed of trust had priority because when an assessment lien is enforced through judicial action, the debt secured by the lien is merged into the judgment. The association’s previous rights were merged into the judgment, substituting in their place only such rights as attach to the judgment.
2. After defendant lender prevailed on summary judgment as to the single cause of action naming the lender, trial proceeded as to the owners of the property, including a cause of action for fraudulent conveyance of a 1/2 interest in the property pertaining to a transfer from the original owner to himself and his mother. The trial court ruled in favor of the Association on the fraudulent conveyance cause of action AND held that defendant lender’s deed of trust was set aside as to that 1/2 interest. The appellate court held that trial of those remaining claims was proper, including trial of the Association’s cause of action against the homeowners for fraudulent conveyance of their condominium unit. It was not proper, however, to void the lender’s security interest in the property (in whole or part) when the lender had not been joined as a party to the fraudulent conveyance cause of action, and final judgment had already been entered in its favor.Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVIModification Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 1602 – 2nd Dist. (B224896) 6/1/11 Case complete 8/17/11TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Plaintiff/borrower’s failure to disclose, in earlier bankruptcy proceedings, the existence of his breach of contract and fraud claims against the lender bars the borrower from litigating those claims now. The court distinguished several cases that permitted a debtor in bankruptcy from subsequently pursuing a cause of action that was not disclosed in the bankruptcy pleadings on the basis that in those cases the defendant was not a creditor in the bankruptcy and because the schedules specifically asked the debtor to disclose any offsets against the debts that were listed. This action against the lender amounts to an offset against the loan, so by listing the loan and failing to list this claim, the borrower’s bankruptcy schedules were inaccurate.
2. The borrower’s causes of action for breach of contract and fraud fail in any event because the borrower did not allege the essential fact of payment of sums due from the borrower (i.e. performance by the borrower) or set forth an excuse for performance.
3. The borrower cannot state a cause of action for violations of Civil Code Section 2923.5, which requires lenders to contact borrowers to explore options to avoid foreclosure, because the only remedy for such violations is postponement of the foreclosure sale, and borrower’s house has been sold.***DECERTIFIED*** Ferguson v. Avelo MortgageModification Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B223447) 6/1/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED & DECERTIFIED 9/14/11FORECLOSURE / MERS:
1. A Notice of Default was defective because it was signed by a trustee before recordation of the substitution of trustee substituting it in place of the original trustee. But the Notice of Sale was properly given because it recorded at the same time as the substitution and included the statutorily required affidavit attesting to the mailing of a copy of the substitution to all persons to whom an NOD must be mailed. Since the NOS was valid, the court held that the sale was merely voidable and not void. Therefore, unlike a void sale (such as where a substitution of trustee is not recorded until after the trustee’s sale is completed), where the sale is merely voidable the plaintiff must tender full payment of the debt in order to bring an action setting aside the sale. The plaintiff did not make such a tender, so the trial court properly refused to set aside the sale.
2. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as nominee of the original lender had the authority to assign the note and deed of trust to defendant, even if MERS does not possess the original note.Creative Ventures, LLC v. Jim Ward & Associates Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 1430 – 6th Dist. (H034883) 5/31/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/10/11USURY:
1. The real estate broker arranged loan exception to the Usury Law does not apply were a corporation was not licensed as a broker, even though the officer who negotiated the loan was licensed, where the officer was acting on behalf of the corporation and not on his own behalf.
2. The payee of the note assigned the note to multiple investors. In order to take free of the borrower’s defenses against the original payee, the assignees would have had to be holders in due course. They were not holders in due course because a) the original payee did not endorse the note and transfer possession of the note to the assignees, both of which are requirements for holder in due course status, and b) each investor was assigned a partial interest and partial assignees cannot be holders in due course.
3. The individual investors did not receive usurious interest because the interest rate itself was not usurious. But since the overall interest was usurious when the payee’s brokerage fee was included, the investors must refund the illegal interest each received.
4. The fact that the investors did not intend to violate the Usury Law is irrelevant because the only intent required is the intent to receive payment of interest.
5. An award of treble damages is within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion not to award treble damages because the conduct of defendants was not intentional.Ribeiro v. County of El Dorado Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 354 – 3rd Dist. (C065505) 5/10/111 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/24/11TAX SALES: “Caveat emptor” applies to tax sales. Accordingly, plaintiff/tax sale purchaser could not rescind the tax sale and obtain his deposit back where he was unaware of the amount of 1915 Act bond arrearages and where the County did not mislead him.The Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 1044 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043569) 4/27/11 Case complete 6/27/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiff sought to establish a prescriptive easement for parking and access. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff because it had not paid taxes on the easement. The appellate court reversed because, while payment of property taxes is an element of a cause of action for adverse possession, payment of taxes is not necessary for an easement by prescription, unless the easement has been separately assessed. A railway easement over the same area was separately assessed, but that is irrelevant because the railway easement and the prescriptive easement were not coextensive in use.Liberty National Enterprises v. Chicago Title Insurance Company Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 839 – 2nd Dist. (B222455) 4/6/11 (pub. order 4/26/11) Case complete 6/28/11NOTE: This case is not summarized because it deals with disqualification of a party’s attorney, and not with issues related to title insurance. It is included here only to point out that fact.Barry v. OC Residential Properties Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 861 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043073) 4/26/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/13/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Under C.C.P. 729.035 a trustee’s sale to enforce a homeowners association lien is subject to a right of redemption for 90 days after the sale, and under C.C.P. 729.060 the redemption price includes reasonable amounts paid for maintenance, upkeep and repair. Defendant purchased plaintiff’s interest in a common interest development at a foreclosure sale of a homeowners association lien. Plaintiff sought to redeem the property and defendant included certain repair costs in the redemption amount. Plaintiff asserted that the costs were not for reasonable maintenance, upkeep and repair. The court held that the costs were properly included because the person seeking to redeem has the burden of proof, and plaintiff failed to carry that burden in this case. Plaintiff also asserted that she should not have to pay the repair costs because the work was performed by an unlicensed contractor. The court held that the cost of the repair work was properly included because plaintiff would receive a windfall if she did not have to reimburse those costs and because this is not an action in which a contractor is seeking compensation.McMackin v. Ehrheart Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 128 – 2nd Dist. (B224723) 4/8/11 Case complete 6/9/11CONTRACTS / PROBATE: This case involves a “Marvin” agreement, which is an express or implied contract between nonmarital partners. Plaintiff sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement with a decedent to leave plaintiff a life estate in real property. The court held that since the agreement was for distribution from an estate, it is governed by C.C.P. Section 366.3, which requires the action to be commenced within one year after the date of death. But the court further concluded that, depending on the circumstances of each case, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to preclude a party from asserting the statute of limitations set forth in section 366.3 as a defense to an untimely action where the party’s wrongdoing has induced another to forbear filing suit.Ferwerda v. Bordon Docket
193 Cal. App. 4th 1178 – 3rd Dist. (C062389) 3/25/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/11CC&R’s
In the published portion of the opinion, the court held:
1. The following language in the CC&R’s gave the Homeowners Association the authority to adopt new design standards pertaining to development of lots in the subdivision: “in the event of a conflict between the standards required by [the Planning] Committee and those contained herein, the standards of said Committee shall govern”; and
2. The Planning Committee could not adopt a rule that allowed for attorney’s fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit because such a provision was not contained in the CC&R’s. Adopting the rule was an attempt by the committee to insert a new provision that binds homeowners without their approval.
In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court held that the Planning Committee acted properly in denying the plaintiff’s building plans. (The details are not summarized here because that part of the opinion is not certified for publication.)Capon v. Monopoly Game LLC Docket
193 Cal. App. 4th 344 – 1st Dist. (A124964) 3/4/11 Case complete 5/5/11HOME EQUITY SALES CONTRACT ACT: In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to damages under the Home Equity Sales Contract Act because the purchaser was subject to the Act and the purchase contract did not comply with it. There is an exception in the Act for a purchaser who intends to live in the property. The principal member of the LLC purchase asserted that he intended to live in the property, but the court held the exception does not apply because the purchaser was the LLC rather than the member, so his intent was irrelevant.Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans Docket Cal. Sup.Ct. Docket U.S. Supreme Ct. Docket
192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D057005) 2/18/11 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/18/11, Petition for a writ of certiorari DENIED 10/11/11FORECLOSURE / MERS: A borrower brought an action to restrain a foreclosure of a deed of trust held by MERS as nominee for the original lender. A Notice of Default had been recorded by the trustee, which identified itself as an agent for MERS. The court held that 1) There is no legal basis to bring an action in order to determine whether the person electing to sell the property is duly authorized to do so by the lender, unless the plaintiff can specify a specific factual basis for alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party; and 2) MERS has a right to foreclose because the deed of trust specifically provided that MERS as nominee has the right to foreclose.Schuman v. Ignatin Docket
191 Cal. App. 4th 255 – 2nd Dist. (B215059) 12/23/10 Case complete 2/23/11CC&R’s: The applicable CC&R’s would have expired, but an amendment was recorded extending them. Plaintiff filed this action alleging that defendant’s proposed house violated the CC&R’s. The trial court held that the amendment was invalid because it was not signed by all of the lot owners in the subdivision. Since the CC&R’s had expired, it did not determine whether the proposed construction would have violated them. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the defect in the amendment rendered it voidable, not void, and it could no longer be challenged because the four-year statute of limitations contained in C.C.P. 343 had run.Schelb v. Stein Docket
190 Cal. App. 4th 1440 – 2nd Dist. (B213929) 12/17/10 Case complete 2/16/11MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: In a previous divorce action, in order to equalize a division of community property, the husband was ordered to give the wife a note secured by a deed of trust on property awarded to the husband. In this case (many years later), the court held that under the Marketable Record Title Act, the deed of trust had expired. (Civil Code Section 882.020.) However, under Family Code Section 291, the underlying family law judgment does not expire until paid, so it is enforceable as an unsecured judgment.Vuki v. Superior Court Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 791 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043544) 10/29/10 Case complete 1/3/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Unlike section 2923.5 as construed by this court in Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208, neither Section 2923.52 or Section 2923.53 provides any private right of action, even a very limited one as this court found in Mabry. Civil Code section 2923.52 imposes a 90-day delay in the normal foreclosure process. But Civil Code section 2923.53 allows for an exemption to that delay if lenders have loan modification programs that meet certain criteria. The only enforcement mechanism is that a violation is deemed to be a violation of lenders license laws. Section 2923.54 provides that a violation of Sections 2923.52 or 2923.53 does not invalidate a trustee’s sale, and plaintiff also argued that a lender is not entitled to a bona fide purchaser protection. The court rejected that argument because any noncompliance is entirely a regulatory matter, and cannot be remedied in a private action.Abers v. RounsavellMod Opinion Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 348 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040486) 10/18/10 Case complete 12/20/10LEASES: Leases of residential condominium units required a re-calculation of rent after 30 years based on a percentage of the appraised value of the “leased land”. The term “leased land” was defined to consist of the condominium unit and an undivided interest in the common area of Parcel 1, and did not include the recreational area (Parcel 2), which was leased to the Homeowners Association. The Court held that the language of the leases was clear. The appraisals were to be based only on the value of the lessees’ interest in Parcel 1 and not on the value of the recreational parcel.UNPUBLISHED: Residential Mortgage Capital v. Chicago Title Ins. Company Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A125695) 9/20/10 Case complete 11/23/10ESCROW: An escrow holder released loan documents to a mortgage broker at the broker’s request in order to have the borrowers sign the documents at home. They were improperly backdated and the broker failed to provide duplicate copies of the notice of right to rescind. Due these discrepancies, the lender complied with the borrower’s demand for a rescission of the loan, and filed this action against the escrow holder for amounts reimbursed to the borrower for finance charges and attorney’s fees. The Court held that the escrow holder did not breach a duty to the lender because it properly followed the escrow instructions, and it is common for escrow to release documents to persons associated with the transaction in order for them to be signed elsewhere.Starr v. Starr Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 277 – 2nd Dist. (B219539) 9/30/10 Case complete 12/16/10COMMUNITY PROPERTY: In a divorce action the Court ordered the husband to convey title to himself and his former wife. Title had been taken in the husband’s name and the wife executed a quitclaim deed. But Family Code Section 721 creates a presumption that a transaction that benefits one spouse was the result of undue influence. The husband failed to overcome this presumption where the evidence showed that the wife executed the deed in reliance on the husband’s representation that he would subsequently add her to title. The husband was, nevertheless, entitled to reimbursement for his separate property contribution in purchasing the property.Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp. Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 968 – 2nd Dist. (B221470) 9/23/10 Case complete 11/23/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: After plaintiff stipulated to a judgment in an unlawful detainer action, she could not challenge the validity of the trustee’s sale in a subsequent action because the subsequent action is barred by collateral estoppel. Because the action was barred, the court did not reach the question of the validity of the trustee’s sale based on the substitution of trustee being recorded after trustee’s sale proceedings had commenced and based on assignments of the deed of trust into the foreclosing beneficiary being recorded after the trustee’s deed.Lee v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 583 – 1st Dist. (A124730) 9/16/10 Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/1/10TITLE INSURANCE:
1. The insureds could have reasonably expected that they were buying a title insurance policy on APN 22, and not just APN 9, where both the preliminary report and policy included a reference to APN 22, listed exclusions from coverage that were specific to APN 22, and attached an assessor’s parcel map with an arrow pointing to both APN 9 and 22.
2. A preliminary report is merely an offer to issue a title policy, but an insured has the right to expect that the policy will be consistent with the terms of the offer.
3. There was a triable issue of fact as to whether a neighbor’s construction of improvements on APN 22 was sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations, where the insureds testified that they did not know the precise location of APN 22 and assumed that the neighbors constructed the improvements on their own property.
4. There was a triable issue of fact as to whether Fidelity National Title Insurance Company acted as escrow holder or whether the escrow was conducted by its affiliate, Fidelity National Title Company (only the insurance company was named as a defendant).Chicago Title Insurance Company v. AMZ Insurance Services Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 401 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041188) 9/9/10 Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/15/10ESCROW: A document entitled “Evidence of Property Insurance” (“EOI”) constitutes a binder under Insurance Code Section 382.5(a). In this case an EOI was effective to obligate the insurer to issue a homeowner’s policy even though the escrow failed to send the premium check. In order to cancel the EOI the insured has to be given notice pursuant to Insurance Code Section 481.1, which the insurer did not do. The escrow holder paid the insured’s loss and obtained an assignment of rights. The court held that the escrow holder did not act as a volunteer in paying the amount of the loss, and is entitled to be reimbursed by the insurance company under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.Vanderkous v. Conley Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 111 – 1st Dist (A125352) 9/2/10 Case complete 11/3/10QUIET TITLE: 1) In a quiet title action the court has equitable powers to award compensation as necessary to do complete justice, even though neither party’s pleadings specifically requested compensation. 2) Realizing that the court was going to require plaintiff to compensate defendant in exchange for quieting title in plaintiff’s favor, plaintiff dismissed the lawsuit. However, the dismissal was invalid because it was filed following trial after the case had been submitted to the court.Purdum v. Holmes Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 916 – 2nd Dist. (B216493) 7/29/10 Case complete 10/22/10NOTARIES: A notary was sued for notarizing a forged deed. He admitted that he knew the grantor had not signed the deed, but the lawsuit was filed more than six years after the deed was signed and notarized. The court held that the action was barred by the six-year limitation period in C.C.P. 338(f)(3) even though plaintiff did not discover the wrongful conduct until well within the six year period.Perlas v. GMAC Mortgage Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 429 – 1st Dist. (A125212) 8/11/10 Case complete 10/10/10DEEDS OF TRUST: Borrowers filed an action against a lender to set aside a deed of trust, setting forth numerous causes of action. Borrowers’ loan application (apparently prepared by a loan broker) falsely inflated the borrowers’ income. In the published portion of the opinion. The court held in favor of the lender, explaining that a lender is not in a fiduciary relationship with borrowers and owes them no duty of care in approving their loan. A lender’s determination that the borrowers qualified for the loan is not a representation that they could afford the loan. One interesting issue in the unpublished portion of the opinion was the court’s rejection of the borrowers’ argument that naming MERS as nominee invalidated the deed of trust because, as borrower argued, the deed of trust was a contract with MERS and the note was a separate contract with the lender.Soifer v. Chicago Title CompanyModification Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 365 – 2nd Dist. (B217956) 8/10/10 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/27/10TITLE INSURANCE: A person cannot recover for errors in a title company’s informal communications regarding the condition of title to property in the absence of a policy of title insurance or the purchase of an abstract of title. There are two ways in which an interested party can obtain title information upon which reliance may be placed: an abstract of title or a policy of title insurance. Having purchased neither, plaintiff cannot recover for title company’s incorrect statement that a deed of trust in foreclosure was a first lien.In re: Hastie (Weinkauf v. Florez) Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 1285 – 1st Dist. (A127069) 7/22/10 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. filed late and DENIED 9/21/10DEEDS: An administrator of decedent’s estate sought to set aside two deeds on the basis that the grantees were the grandson and granddaughter of decedent’s caregiver. Defendant did not dispute that the transfers violated Probate Code Section 21350, which prohibits conveyances to a fiduciary, including a caregiver, or the fiduciary’s relatives, unless specified conditions are met. Instead, defendant asserted only that the 3-year statute of limitations had expired. The court held that the action was timely because there was no evidence indicating that the heirs had or should have had knowledge of the transfer, which would have commenced the running of the statute of limitations.Bank of America v. Stonehaven Manor, LLC Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 719 – 3rd Dist. (C060089) 7/12/10 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/20/10ATTACHMENT: The property of a guarantor of a debt–a debt which is secured by the real property of the principal debtor and also that of a joint and several co-guarantor–is subject to attachment where the guarantor has contractually waived the benefit of that security (i.e. waived the benefit of Civil Code Section 2849).Jackson v. County of Amador Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 514 – 3rd Dist. (C060845) 7/7/10 Depublication request DENIED 9/15/10RECORDING LAW: An owner of two rental houses sued the county recorder for recording a durable power of attorney and two quitclaim deeds that were fraudulently executed by the owner’s brother. The superior court sustained the recorder’s demurrer without leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the legal insufficiency of the power of attorney did not provide a basis for the recorder to refuse to record the power of attorney under Government Code Section 27201(a) and the recorder did not owe the owner a duty to determine whether the instruments were fraudulently executed because the instruments were notarized.Luna v. Brownell Docket
185 Cal. App. 4th 668 – 2nd Dist. (B212757) 6/11/10 Case complete 8/17/10DEEDS: A deed transferring property to the trustee of a trust is not void as between the grantor and grantee merely because the trust had not been created at the time the deed was executed, if (1) the deed was executed in anticipation of the creation of the trust and (2) the trust is in fact created thereafter. The deed was deemed legally delivered when the Trust was established.Mabry v. Superior Court Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
185 Cal. App. 4th 208 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G042911) 6/2/10 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/18/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: The court answered, and provided thorough explanations for, a laundry list of questions regarding Civil Code Section 2923.5, which requires a lender to explore options for modifying a loan with a borrower prior to commencing foreclosure proceedings.
1. May section 2923.5 be enforced by a private right of action? Yes.
2. Must a borrower tender the full amount of the mortgage indebtedness due as a prerequisite to bringing an action under section 2923.5? No.
3. Is section 2923.5 preempted by federal law? No.
4. What is the extent of a private right of action under section 2923.5? It is limited to obtaining a postponement of a foreclosure to permit the lender to comply with section 2923.5.
5. Must the declaration required of the lender by section 2923.5, subdivision (b) be under penalty of perjury? No.
6. Does a declaration in a notice of default that tracks the language of section 2923.5(b) comply with the statute, even though such language does not on its face delineate precisely which one of three categories applies to the particular case at hand? Yes.
7. If a lender forecloses without complying with section 2923.5, does that noncompliance affect the title acquired by a third party purchaser at the foreclosure sale? No.
8. Did the lender comply with section 2923.5? Remanded to the trial court to determine which of the two sides is telling the truth.
9. Can section 2923.5 be enforced in a class action in this case? Not under these facts, which are highly fact-specific.
10. Does section 2923.5 require a lender to rewrite or modify the loan? No.612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership Docket
184 Cal. App. 4th 1270 – Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D056646) 5/25/10 Case complete 7/26/10ASSESSMENT BOND FORECLOSURE:
1. Recordation of a Notice of Assessment under the Improvement Act of 1911 imparted constructive notice even though the notice did not name the owner of the subject property and was not indexed under the owner’s name. There is no statutory requirement that the notice of assessment be indexed under the name of the property owner.
2. A Preliminary Report also gave constructive notice where it stated: “The lien of special tax for the following municipal improvement bond, which tax is collected with the county taxes. . .”
3. A property owner is not liable for a deficiency judgment after a bond foreclosure because a property owner does not have personal liability for either delinquent amounts due on the bond or for attorney fees incurred in prosecuting the action.Tarlesson v. Broadway Foreclosure InvestmentsDocket
184 Cal. App. 4th 931 – 1st Dist. (A125445) 5/17/10 Case complete 7/20/10HOMESTEADS: A judgment debtor is entitled to a homestead exemption where she continuously resided in property, even though at one point she conveyed title to her cousin in order to obtain financing and the cousin subsequently conveyed title back to the debtor. The amount of the exemption was $150,000 (later statutorily changed to $175,000) based on debtor’s declaration that she was over 55 years old and earned less than $15,000 per year, because there was no conflicting evidence in the record.UNPUBLISHED: MBK Celamonte v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041605) 4/28/10 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/21/10TITLE INSURANCE / ENCUMBRANCES: A recorded authorization for a Mello Roos Assessment constitutes an “encumbrance” covered by a title policy, even where actual assessments are conditioned on the future development of the property.Plaza Home Mortgage v. North American Title Company Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
184 Cal. App. 4th 130 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D054685) 4/27/10 Depublication request DENIED 8/11/10ESCROW / LOAN FRAUD: The buyer obtained 100% financing and managed to walk away with cash ($54,000) at close of escrow. (Actually, the buyer’s attorney-in-fact received the money.) The lender sued the title company that acted as escrow holder, asserting that it should have notified the lender when it received the instruction to send the payment to the buyer’s attorney-in-fact after escrow had closed. The court reversed a grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the escrow, pointing out that its decision is narrow, and holding only that the trial court erred when it determined the escrow did not breach the closing instructions contract merely because escrow had closed. The case was remanded in order to determine whether the escrow breached the closing instructions contract and if so, whether that breach proximately caused the lender’s damages.Garcia v. World Savings Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
183 Cal. App. 4th 1031 – 2nd (B214822) 4/9/10 Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/23/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A lender told plaintiffs/owners that it would postpone a trustee’s sale by a week to give plaintiffs time to obtain another loan secured by other property in order to bring the subject loan current. Plaintiffs obtained a loan the following week, but the lender had conducted the trustee’s sale on the scheduled date and the property was sold to a third party bidder. Plaintiffs dismissed causes of action pertaining to setting aside the sale and pursued causes of action for breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure and promissory estoppel. The court held that there was no consideration that would support the breach of contract claim because plaintiffs promised nothing more than was due under the original agreement. Plaintiffs also could not prove a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure because that cause of action requires that the borrower tender funds to pay off the loan prior to the trustee’s sale. However, plaintiffs could recover based on promissory estoppel because procuring a high cost, high interest loan by using other property as security is sufficient to constitute detrimental reliance.LEG Investments v. Boxler Docket
183 Cal. App. 4th 484 – 3rd Dist. (C058743) 4/1/10 Certified for Partial Publication Case complete 6/2/10PARTITION: A right of first refusal in a tenancy in common agreement does not absolutely waive the right of partition. Instead, the right of first refusal merely modifies the right of partition to require the selling cotenant to first offer to sell to the nonselling cotenant before seeking partition. [Ed. note: I expect that the result would have been different if the right of partition had been specifically waived in the tenancy in common agreement.]Steiner v. Thexton Docket
48 Cal. 4th 411 – Cal. Supreme Court (S164928) 3/18/10OPTIONS: A contract to sell real property where the buyer’s performance was entirely conditioned on the buyer obtaining regulatory approval to subdivide the property is an option. Although plaintiffs’ promise was initially illusory because no consideration was given at the outset, plaintiffs’ part performance of their bargained-for promise to seek a parcel split cured the initially illusory nature of the promise and thereby constituted sufficient consideration to render the option irrevocable.Grotenhuis v. County of Santa Barbara Docket
182 Cal. App. 4th 1158 – 2nd Dist. (B212264) 3/15/10 Case complete 5/18/10PROPERTY TAXES: Subject to certain conditions, a homeowner over the age of 55 may sell a principle residence, purchase a replacement dwelling of equal or lesser value in the same county, and transfer the property tax basis of the principal residence to the replacement dwelling. The court held that this favorable tax treatment is not available where title to both properties was held by an individual’s wholly owned corporation. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the corporation was their alter ego because that concept is used to pierce the corporate veil of an opponent, and not to enable a person “to weave in and out of corporate status when it suits the business objective of the day.”Clear Lake Riviera Community Assn. v. Cramer Docket
182 Cal.App. 4th 459 – 1st Dist. (A122205) 2/26/10 Case complete 4/29/10HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Defendant homeowners were ordered to bring their newly built house into compliance with the homeowners association’s guidelines where the house exceed the guidelines’ height restriction by nine feet. Even though the cost to the defendants will be great, they built the house with knowledge of the restriction and their hardship will not be grossly disproportionate to the loss the neighbors would suffer if the violation were not abated, caused by loss in property values and loss of enjoyment of their properties caused by blocked views. The height restriction was contained in the associations guidelines and not in the CC&R’s, and the association did not have records proving the official adoption of the guidelines. Nevertheless, the court held that proper adoption was inferred from the circumstantial evidence of long enforcement of the guidelines by the association.Forsgren Associates v. Pacific Golf Community Development Docket Sup. Ct. Docket
182 Cal.App. 4th 135 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E045940) 2/23/10 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/17/10MECHANIC’S LIENS: 1. Owners of land are subject to mechanic’s liens where they were aware of the work being done by the lien claimant and where they failed to record a notice of non-responsibility.
2. Civil Code Section 3128 provides that a mechanic’s lien attaches to land on which the improvement is situated “together with a convenient space about the same or so much as may be required for the convenient use and occupation thereof”. Accordingly, defendant’s land adjacent to a golf course on which the lien claimant performed work is subject to a mechanic’s lien, but only as to the limited portions where a tee box was located and where an irrigation system was installed.
3. The fact that adjacent property incidentally benefits from being adjacent to a golf course does not support extending a mechanic’s lien to that property.
4. The owners of the adjacent property were liable for interest, but only as to their proportionate share of the amount of the entire mechanic’s lien.Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles Docket
47 Cal.4th 1298 – Cal. Supreme Court (S158007) 2/4/10PROPERTY TAXES: A “change in ownership”, requiring a property tax reassessment, occurs upon the death of a trust settlor who transferred property to a revocable trust, and which became irrevocable upon the settlor’s death. The fact that one trust beneficiary was entitled to live in the property for her life, and the remaining beneficiaries received the property upon her death, did not alter the fact that a change in ownership of the entire title had occurred.Kuish v. Smith Docket
181 Cal.App.4th 1419 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040743) 2/3/10 Case complete 4/12/10CONTRACTS: 1. Defendants’ retention of a $600,000 deposit designated as “non-refundable” constituted an invalid forfeiture because a) the contract did not contain a valid liquidated damages clause, and b) plaintiff re-sold the property for a higher price, so there were no out-of-pocket damages. 2. The deposit did not constitute additional consideration for extending the escrow because it was labeled “non-refundable” in the original contract.Kendall v. Walker (Modification attached)Docket
181 Cal.App.4th 584 – 1st Dist. (A105981) 12/30/09 Case complete 3/29/10WATER RIGHTS: An owner of land adjoining a navigable waterway has rights in the foreshore adjacent to his property separate from that of the general public. The court held that the boundary in the waterway between adjacent parcels of land is not fixed by extending the boundary lines into the water in the direction of the last course ending at the shore line. Instead, it is fixed by a line drawn into the water perpendicular to the shore line. Accordingly, the court enjoined defendants from allowing their houseboat from being moored in a manner that crossed onto plaintiffs’ side of that perpendicular boundary line.Junkin v. Golden West Foreclosure Service Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 1150 – 1st Dist. (A124374) 1/5/10 Case complete 3/12/10USURY: The joint venture exception to the Usury Law, which has been developed by case law, provides that where the relationship between the parties is a bona fide joint venture or partnership, an advance by a joint venturer is an investment and not a loan, making the Usury Law inapplicable. The court applied the exception to a loan by one partner to the other because instead of looking at the loan in isolation, it looked at the entire transaction which it determined to be a joint venture. The case contains a good discussion of the various factors that should be weighed in determining whether the transaction is a bona fide joint venture. The presence or absence of any one factor is not, alone, determinative. The factors include whether or not: 1) there is an absolute obligation of repayment, 2) the investor may suffer a loss, 3) the investor has a right to participate in management, 4) the subject property was purchased from a third party and 5) the parties considered themselves to be partners.Banc of America Leasing & Capital v. 3 Arch Trustee Services Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 1090 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041480) 12/11/09 Case complete 3/8/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A judgment lien creditor is not entitled to receive a notice of default, notice of trustee’s sale or notice of surplus sale proceeds unless the creditor records a statutory request for notice. The trustee is required to disburse surplus proceeds only to persons who have provided the trustee with a proof of claim. The burden rests with the judgment creditor to keep a careful watch over the debtor, make requests for notice of default and sales, and to submit claims in the event of surplus sale proceeds.Park 100 Investment Group v. Ryan Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 795 – 2nd Dist. (B208189) 12/23/09 Case complete 2/26/10LIS PENDENS: 1. A lis pendens may be filed against a dominant tenement when the litigation involves an easement dispute. Although title to the dominant tenement would not be directly affected if an easement right was shown to exist, the owner’s right to possession clearly is affected
2.A recorded lis pendens is a privileged publication only if it identifies an action previously filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right of possession of real property. If the complaint does not allege a real property claim, or the alleged claim lacks evidentiary merit, the lis pendens, in addition to being subject to expungement, is not privileged.Millennium Rock Mortgage v. T.D. Service CompanyModification Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 804 – 3rd Dist. (C059875) 11/24/09 Case complete 1/26/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale auctioneer erroneously read from a script for a different foreclosure, although the correct street address was used. The auctioneer opened the bidding with the credit bid from the other foreclosure that was substantially less than the correct credit bid. The errors were discovered after the close of bidding but prior to the issuance of a trustee’s deed. The court held that the errors constituted an “irregularity” sufficient to give the trustee the right to rescind the sale.
The court distinguished 6 Angels v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, in which the court held that a beneficiary’s negligent miscalculation of the amount of its credit bid was not sufficient to rescind the sale. In 6 Angelsthe error was totally extrinsic to the proper conduct of the sale itself. Here there was inherent inconsistency in the auctioneer’s description of the property being offered for sale, creating a fatal ambiguity in determining which property was being auctioned.Fidelity National Title Insurance Company v. Schroeder Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 834 – 5th Dist. (F056339) 11/24/09 Case complete 1/25/10JUDGMENTS: A judgment debtor transferred his 1/2 interest in real property to the other cotenant prior to the judgment creditor recording an abstract of judgment. The court held that if the trial court on remand finds that the transfer was intended to shield the debtor’s property from creditors, then the transferee holds the debtor’s 1/2 interest as a resulting trust for the benefit of the debtor, and the creditor’s judgment lien will attach to that interest. The court also held that the transfer cannot be set aside under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because no recoverable value remained in the real property after deducting existing encumbrances and Gordon’s homestead exemption.
The case contains a good explanation of the difference between a resulting (“intention enforcing”) and constructive (“fraud-rectifying”) trust. A resulting trust carries out the inferred intent of the parties; a constructive trust defeats or prevents the wrongful act of one of them.Zhang v. Superior Court Docket Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E047207) 10/29/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. GRANTED 2/10/10INSURANCE / BAD FAITH: Fraudulent conduct by an insurer does not give rise to a private right of action under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (Insurance Code section 790.03 et seq.), but it can give rise to a private cause of action under the Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.).Presta v. Tepper Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 909 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040427) 10/28/09 Case complete 1/25/10TRUSTS: An ordinary express trust is not an entity separate from its trustee, like a corporation is. Instead, a trust is merely a relationship by which one person or entity holds property for the benefit of some other person or entity. Consequently, where two men entered into partnership agreements as trustees of their trusts, the provision of the partnership agreement, which required that upon the death of a partner the partnership shall purchase his interest in the partnership, was triggered by the death of one of the two men.Wells Fargo Bank v. NeilsenModificationDocket Sup.Ct. Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 602 – 1st Dist. (A122626) 10/22/09 (Mod. filed 11/10/09) Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/10/10CIRCUITY OF PRIORITY: The Court follows the rule in Bratcher v. Buckner, even though Bratcher involved a judgment lien and two deeds of trust and this case involves three deeds of trust. The situation is that A, B & C have liens on the subject property, and A then subordinates his lien to C’s lien. The problem with this is that C appears to be senior to A, which is senior to B, which is senior to C, so that each lien is senior and junior to one of the other liens.
The Court held that the lien holders have the following priority: (1) C is paid up to the amount of A’s lien, (2) if the amount of A’s lien exceeds C’s lien, A is paid the amount of his lien, less the amount paid so far to C, (3) B is then paid in full, (4) C is then paid any balance still owing to C, (5) A is then paid any balance still owing to A.
This is entirely fair because A loses priority as to the amount of C’s lien, which conforms to the intent of the subordination agreement. B remains in the same position he would be in without the subordination agreement since his lien remains junior only to the amount of A’s lien. C steps into A’s shoes only up to the amount of A’s lien.
NOTE: The odd thing about circuity of priority cases is that they result in surplus proceeds after a foreclosure sale being paid to senior lienholders. Normally, only junior lienholders and the foreclosed out owner are entitled to share in surplus proceeds, and the purchaser takes title subject to the senior liens.Schmidli v. Pearce Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 305 – 3rd Dist. (C058270) 10/13/09 Case complete 12/15/09MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: This case was decided under the pre-2007 version of Civil Code Section 882.020, which provided that a deed of trust expires after 10 years if the maturity date is “ascertainable from the record”. The court held that this provision was not triggered by a Notice of Default, which set forth the maturity date and which was recorded prior to expiration of the 10-year period. NOTE: In 2007, C.C. Section 882.020 was amended to make it clear that the 10-year period applies only where the maturity date is shown in the deed of trust itself.Nielsen v. Gibson Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 318 – 3rd Dist. (C059291) 10/13/09 Case complete 12/15/09ADVERSE POSSESSION: 1. The “open and notorious” element of adverse possession was satisfied where plaintiff possessed the subject property by actual possession under such circumstances as to constitute reasonable notice to the owner. Defendant was charged with constructive knowledge of plaintiff’s possession, even though defendant was out of the country the entire time and did not have actual knowledge.
2. The 5-year adverse possession period is tolled under C.C.P. Section 328 for up to 20 years if the defendant is “under the age of majority or insane”. In the unpublishedportion of the opinion the court held that although the defendant had been ruled incompetent by a court in Ireland, there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s condition met the legal definition of “insane”.Ricketts v. McCormackDocket Sup.Ct. Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 1324 – 2nd Dist. (B210123) 9/27/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/17/09RECORDING LAW: Civil Code Section 2941(c) provides in part, “Within two business days from the day of receipt, if received in recordable form together with all required fees, the county recorder shall stamp and record the full reconveyance or certificate of discharge.” In this class action lawsuit against the County recorder, the court held that indexing is a distinct function, separate from recording a document, and is not part of section 2941(c)’s stamp-and-record requirement.
The court distinguished indexing, stamping and recording: Stamping: The “stamping” requirement of Section 2941(c) is satisfied when the Recorder endorses on a reconveyance the order of receipt, the day and time of receipt and the amount of fees paid. Recording: The reconveyance is “recorded” once the Recorder has confirmed the document meets all recording requirements, created an entry for the document in the “Enterprise Recording Archive” system, calculated the required fees and confirmed payment of the correct amount and, finally, generated a lead sheet containing, among other things, a bar code, a permanent recording number and the words “Recorded/Filed in Official Records.” Indexing: Government Code Section 27324 requires all instruments “presented for recordation” to “have a title or titles indicating the kind or kinds of documents contained therein,” and the recorder is “required to index only that title or titles captioned on the first page of a document.Starlight Ridge South Homeowner’s Assn. v. Hunter-BloorDocket
177 Cal.App.4th 440 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E046457) 8/14/09 (Pub. Order 9/3/09) Case complete 10/19/09CC&R’s: Under Code Civ. Proc. Section 1859, where two provisions appear to cover the same matter, and are inconsistent, the more specific provision controls over the general provision. Here the provision of CC&R’s requiring each homeowner to maintain a drainage ditch where it crossed the homeowners’ properties was a specific provision that controlled over a general provision requiring the homeowner’s association to maintain landscape maintenance areas.First American Title Insurance Co. v. XWarehouse Lending Corp.Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 106 – 1st Dist. (A119931) 8/28/09 Case complete 10/30/09TITLE INSURANCE: A loan policy provides that “the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage” becomes an insured under the loan policy. Normally, this means that an assignee becomes an insured. However, where the insured lender failed to disburse loan proceeds for the benefit of the named borrower, an indebtedness never existed, and the warehouse lender/assignee who disbursed money to the lender did not become an insured. The court pointed out that the policy insures against defects in the mortgage itself, but not against problems related to the underlying debt.
NOTE: In Footnote 8 the court distinguishes cases upholding the right of a named insured or its assignee to recover from a title insurer for a loss due to a forged note or forged mortgage because in those cases, and unlike this case, moneys had been actually disbursed or credited to the named borrower by either the lender or its assignee.Wells Fargo v. D & M CabinetsDocket
177 Cal.App.4th 59 – 3rd Dist. (C058486) 8/28/09 Case complete 10/28/09JUDGMENTS: A judgment creditor, seeking to sell an occupied dwelling to collect on a money judgment, may not bypass the stringent requirements of C.C.P. Section 704.740 et seq. when the sale is conducted by a receiver appointed under C.C.P Section 708.620. The judgment creditor must comply with Section 704.740, regardless of whether the property is to be sold by a sheriff or a receiver.Sequoia Park Associates v. County of SonomaDocketSup.Ct. Docket
176 Cal.App.4th 1270 – 1st Dist. (A120049) 8/21/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/2/09PREEMPTION: A County ordinance professing to implement the state mobilehome conversion statutes was preempted for the following reasons: (1) Gov. Code Section 66427.5 expressly preempts the power of local authorities to inject other factors when considering an application to convert an existing mobilehome park from a rental to a resident-owner basis, (2) the ordinance is impliedly preempted because the Legislature has established a dominant role for the state in regulating mobilehomes, and has indicated its intent to forestall local intrusion into the particular terrain of mobilehome conversions and (3) the County’s ordinance duplicates several features of state law, a redundancy that is an established litmus test for preemption.Citizens for Planning Responsibly v. County of San Luis ObispoDocketSup.Ct. Docket
176 Cal.App.4th 357 – 2nd Dist (B206957) 8/4/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/14/09PREEMPTION: The court held that the State Aeronautics Act, which regulates the development and expansion of airports, did not preempt an initiative measure adopted by the voters because none of the following three factors necessary to establish preemption was present: (1) The Legislature may so completely occupy the field in a matter of statewide concern that all, or conflicting, local legislation is precluded, (2) the Legislature may delegate exclusive authority to a city council or board of supervisors to exercise a particular power over matters of statewide concern, or (3) the exercise of the initiative power would impermissibly interfere with an essential governmental function.Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto Club of So. Cal.Docket
47 Cal.4th 302 – Cal. Supreme Court (S155129) 8/3/09INSURANCE / BAD FAITH: The case is not as relevant to title insurance as the lower court case, which held that an insurance company acted in bad faith as a matter of law where a potential for coverage was apparent from the face of the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on the meaning of “accident” in a homeowner’s policy, and holding that an insured’s unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense does not turn the resulting intentional act of assault and battery into “an accident” within the policy’s coverage clause. Therefore, the insurance company had no duty to defend its insured in the lawsuit brought against him by the injured party.1538 Cahuenga Partners v. Turmeko PropertiesDocket
176 Cal.App.4th 139 – 2nd Dist. (B209548) 7/31/09 Case complete 10/7/09RECONVEYANCE: [This is actually a civil procedure case that it not of much interest to title insurance business, but it is included here because the underlying action sought to cancel a reconveyance.] The court ordered that a reconveyance of a deed of trust be cancelled pursuant to a settlement agreement. The main holding was that a trial court may enforce a settlement agreement against a party to the settlement that has interest in the subject matter of the action even if the party is not named in the action, where the non-party appears in court and consents to the settlement.Lee v. LeeDocket
175 Cal.App.4th 1553 – 5th Dist. (F056107) 7/29/09 Case complete 9/28/09DEEDS / STATUTE OF FRAUDS:
1. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to an executed contract, and a deed that is executed by the grantor and delivered to the grantee is an executed contract. The court rejected defendants’ argument that the deed did not reflect the terms of sale under a verbal agreement.
2. While the alteration of an undelivered deed renders the conveyance void, the alteration of a deed after it has been delivered to the grantee does not invalidate the instrument as to the grantee. The deed is void only as to the individuals who were added as grantees after delivery.White v. CridlebaughDocket
178 Cal.App.4th 506 – 5th Dist. (F053843) 7/29/09 (Mod. 10/20/09) Case complete 12/21/09MECHANIC’S LIENS: Under Business and Professions Code Section 7031, a property owner may recover all compensation paid to an unlicensed contractor, in addition to not being liable for unpaid amounts. Furthermore, this recovery may not be offset or reduced by the unlicensed contractor’s claim for materials or other services.Linthicum v. ButterfieldDocketSup.Ct. Docket
175 Cal.App.4th 259 – 2nd Dist. (B199645) 6/24/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/9/09NOTE: This is a new opinion following a rehearing. The only significant changes from the original opinion filed 4/2/09 (modified 4/8/09) involve the issue of a C.C.P. 998 offer, which is not a significant title insurance or escrow issue.
EASEMENTS: The court quieted title to an easement for access based on the doctrine of “balancing conveniences ” or “relative hardship”. Prohibiting the continued use of the roadway would cause catastrophic loss to the defendants and insignificant loss to the plaintiffs. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine the width of the easement, which should be the minimal width necessary. The court reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded a utility easement to the defendants because they did not seek to quiet title to an easement for utilities, even though they denied the material allegations of that cause of action.United Rentals Northwest v. United Lumber ProductsDocket
174 Cal.App.4th 1479 – 5th Dist. (F055855) 6/18/09 Case complete 8/18/09MECHANIC’S LIENS: Under Civil Code Section 3106, a “work of improvement” includes the demolition and/or removal of buildings. The court held that lumber drying kilns are “buildings” so the contractor who dismantled and removed them was entitled to a mechanic’s lien.People v. ShettyDocketSup.Ct. Docket
174 Cal.App.4th 1488 – 2nd Dist. (B205061) 6/18/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/30/09HOME EQUITY SALES CONTRACT ACT: This case is not significant from a title insurance standpoint, but it is interesting because it is an example of a successful prosecution under the Home Equity Sales Contract Act (Civil Code Section 1695 et seq.).Strauss v. HortonModification Docket
46 Cal.4th 364 – Cal. Supreme Court (S168047) 5/26/09SAME SEX MARRIAGE: The California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8, which amended the California State Constitution to provide that: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” Proposition 8 thereby overrode portions of the ruling of In re Marriage Cases, which allowed same-sex marriages. But the Court upheld the marriages that were performed in the brief time same-sex marriage was legal between June 17, 2008 (In re Marriage Cases) through November 5, 2008 (Proposition 8).In re Marriage of LundDocket
174 Cal.App.4th 40 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040863) 5/21/09 Case complete 7/27/09COMMUNITY PROPERTY: An agreement accomplished a transmutation of separate property to community property even though it stated that the transfer was “for estate planning purposes”. A transmutation either occurs for all purposes or it doesn’t occur at all.St. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park, etc.Docket
46 Cal.4th 282 – Cal. Supreme Court (S159319) 5/14/09OPEN SPACE DEDICATION: Property granted to a Regional Park District is not “actually dedicated” under Public Resources Code Section 5540 for open space purposes until the district’s Board of Directors adopts a resolution dedicating the property for park or open space purposes. Therefore, until the Board of Directors adopts such a resolution, the property may be sold by the District without voter or legislative approval.Manhattan Loft v. Mercury LiquorsDocketSup.Ct. Docket
173 Cal.App.4th 1040 – 2nd Dist. (B211070) 5/6/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/12/09LIS PENDENS: An arbitration proceeding is not an “action” that supports the recordation of a notice of pendency of action. The proper procedure is for a party to an arbitration agreement to file an action in court to support the recording of a lis pendens, and simultaneously file an application to stay the litigation pending arbitration.Murphy v. BurchDocket
46 Cal.4th 157 – Cal. Supreme Court (S159489) 4/27/09EASEMENT BY NECESSITY: This case contains a good discussion of the law of easements by necessity, which the court held did not apply in this case to provide access to plaintiff’s property. This means plaintiff’s property is completely landlocked because the parties had already stipulated that a prescriptive easement could not be established.
An easement by necessity arises by operation of law when 1) there is a strict necessity as when a property is landlocked and 2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity. The second requirement, while not categorically barred when the federal government is the common grantor, requires a high burden of proof to show 1) the intent of Congress to establish the easement under federal statutes authorizing the patent and 2) the government’s lack of power to condemn the easement. Normally, a reservation of an easement in favor of the government would not be necessary because the government can obtain the easement by condemnation.
The court pointed out that there is a distinction between an implied grant and implied reservation, and favorably quotes a treatise that observes: “an easement of necessity may be created against the government, but the government agency cannot establish an easement by necessity over land it has conveyed because its power of eminent domain removes the strict necessity required for the creation of an easement by necessity.”Abernathy Valley, Inc. v. County of SolanoDocket
173 Cal.App.4th 42 – 1st Dist. (A121817) 4/17/09 Case complete 6/22/09SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: This case contains a very good history of California’s Subdivision Map Act statutes. The court held that parcels shown on a 1909 map recorded pursuant to the 1907 subdivision map law are not entitled to recognition under the Subdivision Map Act’s grandfather clause (Government Code Section 66499.30) because the 1907 act did not regulate the “design and improvement of subdivisions”. The court also held that a local agency may deny an application for a certificate of compliance that seeks a determination that a particular subdivision lot complies with the Act, where the effect of issuing a certificate would be to effectively subdivide the property without complying with the Act.Linthicum v. ButterfieldModificationDocketSup.Ct. Docket
172 Cal.App.4th 1112 – 2nd Dist. (B199645) 4/2/09 SEE NEW OPINION FILED 6/24/09
EASEMENTS: The court quieted title to an easement for access based on the doctrine of “balancing conveniences ” or “relative hardship”. Prohibiting the continued use of the roadway would cause catastrophic loss to the defendants and insignificant loss to the plaintiffs. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine the width of the easement, which should be the minimal width necessary. The court reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded a utility easement to the defendants because they did not seek to quiet title to an easement for utilities, even though they denied the material allegations of that cause of action.McAvoy v. HilbertDocket
172 Cal.App.4th 707 – 4th Dist., Div 1 (D052802) 3/24/09 Case complete 5/27/09ARBITRATION: C.C.P. Section 1298 requires that an arbitration provision in a real estate contract be accompanied by a statutory notice and that the parties indicate their assent by placing their initials on an adjacent space or line. The court held that a listing agreement that is part of a larger transaction for the sale of both a business and real estate is still subject to Section 1298, and refused to enforce an arbitration clause that did not comply with that statute.Peak-Las Positas Partners v. BollagModificationDocket
172 Cal.App.4th 101 – 2nd Dist. (B205091) 3/16/09 Case complete 5/27/09ESCROW: Amended escrow instructions provided for extending the escrow upon mutual consent which “shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed”. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the seller’s refusal to extend escrow was unreasonable. The court pointed out the rule that equity abhors a forfeiture and that plaintiff had paid a non-refundable deposit of $465,000 and spent $5 million in project costs to obtain a lot line adjustment that was necessary in order for the property to be sold.Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning AssnModificationDocketSup.Ct. Docket
171 Cal.App.4th 1356 6th Dist. (H031127) 2/19/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/13/09CC&R’s: The court upheld the validity of recorded CC&R’s containing an affordable housing restriction that required property to remain affordable to buyers with low to moderate income. The court reached several conclusions:
1. Constructive notice of recorded CC&R’s is imparted even if they are not referenced in a subsequent deed,
2. CC&R’s may describe an entire tract, and do not need to describe individual lots in the tract,
3. An affordable housing restriction is a reasonable restraint on alienation even if it is of indefinite duration,
4. Defendants had a duty as sellers to disclose the existence of the CC&R’s. Such disclosure was made if plaintiffs were given, prior to close of escrow, preliminary reports that disclosed the CC&R’s.
5. The fact that a victim had constructive notice of a matter from public records is no defense to fraud. The existence of such public records may be relevant to whether the victim’s reliance was justifiable, but it is not, by itself, conclusive.
6. In the absence of a claim that defendants somehow prevented plaintiffs from reading the preliminary reports or deeds, or misled them about their contents, plaintiffs cannot blame defendants for their own neglect in reading the reports or deeds. Therefore, the date of discovery of alleged fraud for failing to disclose the affordable housing restriction would be the date plaintiffs received their preliminary reports or if they did not receive a preliminary report, the date they received their deeds.Kwok v. Transnation Title Insurance Company DocketSup.Ct. Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 1562 – 2nd Dist. (B207421) 2/10/09 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/29/09TITLE INSURANCE: Plaintiffs did not succeed as insureds “by operation of law” under the terms of the title insurance policy after transfer of the property from a wholly owned limited liability company, of which appellants were the only members, to appellants as trustees of a revocable family trust. This case highlights the importance of obtaining a 107.9 endorsement, which adds the grantee as an additional insured under the policy.Pro Value Properties v. Quality Loan Service Corp.Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 579 – 2nd Dist. (B204853) 1/23/09 Case complete 3/27/09TRUSTEE’S SALES: A Trustee’s Deed was void because the trustee failed to record a substitution of trustee. The purchaser at the sale was entitled to a return of the money paid plus interest. The interest rate is the prejudgment interest rate of seven percent set forth in Cal. Const., Art. XV, Section 1. A trustee’s obligations to a purchaser are based on statute and not on a contract. Therefore, Civil Code Section 3289 does not apply, since it only applies to a breach of a contract that does not stipulate an interest rate.Sixells v. Cannery Business ParkDocketSup.Ct. Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 648 – 3rd Dist. (C056267) 12/29/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/25/09CONTRACTS: The Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, Section 66410 et seq.) prohibits the sale of a parcel of real property until a final subdivision map or parcel map has been filed unless the contract to sell the property is “expressly conditioned” upon the approval and filing of a final map (66499.30(e)). Here, the contract satisfied neither requirement because it allowed the purchaser to complete the purchase if, at its election, the subject property was made into a legal parcel by recording a final map or if the purchaser “waived” the recording of a final map. Therefore the contract was void.Patel v. LiebermenschDocket 45 Cal.4th 344 – Cal. Supreme Court (S156797) 12/22/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: The material factors required for a written contract are the seller, the buyer, the price to be paid, the time and manner of payment, and the property to be transferred, describing it so it may be identified. Here, specific performance of an option was granted even though it was not precise as to the time and manner of payment because where a contract for the sale of real property specifies no time of payment, a reasonable time is allowed. The manner of payment is also a term that may be supplied by implication.In re Marriage of Brooks and RobinsonDocketSup.Ct. Docket
169 Cal.App.4th 176 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E043770) 12/16/08 Request for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/25/09COMMUNITY PROPERTY: The act of taking title to property in the name of one spouse during marriage with the consent of the other spouse effectively removes that property from the general presumption that the property is community property. Instead, there is a presumption that the parties intended title to be held as stated in the deed. This presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of a contrary agreement, and not solely by tracing the funds used to purchase the property or by testimony of an intention not disclosed at the time of the execution of the conveyance. Because the court found that there was no agreement to hold title other than as the separate property of the spouse who acquired title in her own name, it did not reach the issue of whether a purchaser from that spouse was a BFP or would be charged with knowledge of that the seller’s spouse had a community property interest in the property.The Formula, Inc. v. Superior CourtDocket
168 Cal.App.4th 1455 – 3rd Dist. (C058894) 12/10/09 Case complete 2/10/09LIS PENDENS: A notice of litigation filed in another state is not authorized for recording under California’s lis pendens statutes. An improperly filed notice of an action in another state is subject to expungement by a California court, but not under the authority of C.C.P. Section 405.30, and an order of expungement is given effect by being recorded in the chain of title to overcome the effect of the earlier filing.Ekstrom v. Marquesa at Monarch Beach HOADocketSup.Ct. Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 1111 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038537) 12/1/08 Depublication request DENIED 3/11/09CC&R’s: A provision in CC&R’s requiring all trees on a lot to be trimmed so as to not exceed the roof of the house on the lot, unless the tree does not obstruct views from other lots, applies to palm trees even though topping a palm tree will kill it. All trees means “all trees”, so palm trees are not exempt from the requirement that offending trees be trimmed, topped, or removed.Spencer v. MarshallDocket
168 Cal.App.4th 783 – 1st Dist. (A119437) 11/24/08 Case complete 1/26/09HOME EQUITY SALES: The Home Equity Sales Contract Act applies even where the seller is in bankruptcy and even where the seller’s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plan allows the seller to sell or refinance the subject property without further order of the court.Kachlon v. MarkowitzDocket
168 Cal.App.4th 316 – 2nd Dist. (B182816) 11/17/08 Case complete 1/27/09TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. The statutorily required mailing, publication, and delivery of notices in nonjudicial foreclosure, and the performance of statutory nonjudicial foreclosure procedures, are privileged communications under the qualified, common-interest privilege, which means that the privilege applies as long as there is no malice. The absolute privilege for communications made in a judicial proceeding (the “litigation privilege”) does not apply.
2. Actions seeking to enjoin nonjudicial foreclosure and clear title based on the provisions of a deed of trust are actions on a contract, so an award of attorney fees under Civil Code Section 1717 and provisions in the deed of trust is proper.
3. An owner is entitled to attorney fees against the trustee who conducted trustee’s sale proceedings where the trustee did not merely act as a neutral stakeholder but rather aligned itself with the lender by denying that the trustor was entitled to relief.Hines v. LukesDocket
167 Cal.App.4th 1174 – 2nd Dist. (B199971) 10/27/08 Case complete 12/31/08EASEMENTS: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The underlying dispute concerns an easement but the case involves only civil procedure issues pertaining to the enforcement of a settlement agreement.Satchmed Plaza Owners Association v. UWMC Hospital Corp.Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 1034 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038119) 10/23/08 Case complete 12/23/08RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The underlying dispute concerns a right of first refusal but the case involves only civil procedure issues pertaining to a party’s waiver of its right to appeal where it has accepted the benefits of the favorable portion of judgment.Gray v. McCormickDocketSup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 1019 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G039738) 10/23/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/14/09EASEMENTS: Exclusive easements are permitted under California law, but the use by the owner of the dominant tenement is limited to the purposes specified in the grant of easement, not all conceivable uses of the property.In re Estate of FelderDocket
167 Cal.App.4th 518 – 2nd Dist. (B205027) 10/9/08 Case complete 12/11/08CONTRACTS: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The case held that an estate had the right to retain the entire deposit upon a purchaser’s breach of a sales contract even though the estate had only a 1/2 interest in the subject property.Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan TrustOrder Modifying Opinion DocketSup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 544 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G039065) 10/9/08, Modified 11/3/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/17/08LOAN MODIFICATION: Because a note and deed of trust come within the statute of frauds, a Forbearance Agreement also comes within the statute of frauds pursuant to Civil Code section 1698. Making the downpayment required by the Forbearance Agreement was not sufficient part performance to estop Defendants from asserting the statute of frauds because payment of money alone is not enough as a matter of law to take an agreement out of the statute, and the Plaintiffs have legal means to recover the downpayment if they are entitled to its return. In addition to part performance, the party seeking to enforce the contract must have changed position in reliance on the oral contract to such an extent that application of the statute of frauds would result in an unjust or unconscionable loss, amounting in effect to a fraud.FDIC v. DintinoDocket
167 Cal.App.4th 333 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D051447) 9/9/08 (Pub. Order 10/2/08) Case complete 12/2/08TRUST DEEDS: A lender who mistakenly reconveyed a deed of trust could not sue under the note because it would violate the one action rule. However, the lender prevailed on its unjust enrichment cause of action. The applicable statute of limitations was the 3-year statute for actions based on fraud or mistake, and not the 4-year statute for actions based on contract. Nevertheless, the action was timely because the statute did not begin to run until the lender reasonably discovered its mistake, and not from the date of recordation of the reconveyance. Finally, the court awarded defendant attorney’s fees attributable to defending the contract cause of action because defendant prevailed on that particular cause of action even though he lost the lawsuit.California Coastal Commission v. AllenDocketSup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 322 – 2nd Dist. (B197974) 10/1/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/14/09HOMESTEADS:
1. The assignees of a judgment properly established their rights as assignees by filing with the clerk of the court an acknowledgement of assignment of judgment.
2. The subject property was not subject to a homestead exemption because the debtor transferred the property to a corporation of which he was the sole shareholder. The homestead exemption only applies to the interest of a natural person in a dwelling.
3. The debtor could not claim that he was only temporarily absent from a dwelling in order to establish it as his homestead where he leased it for two years. This is true even though the debtor retained the right to occupy a single car section of the garage and the attic.In re Marriage of HoltemannDocketSup.Ct. Docket
162 Cal.App.4th 1175 – 2nd Dist. (B203089) 9/15/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/10/08COMMUNITY PROPERTY: Transmutation of separate property to community property requires language which expressly states that the characterization or ownership of the property is being changed. Here, an effective transmutation occurred because the transmutation agreement clearly specified that a transmutation was occurring and was not negated by arguably confusing language in a trust regarding the parties’ rights to terminate the trust. The court also stated that it was not aware of any authority for the proposition that a transmutation can be conditional or temporary. However, while questioning whether a transmutation can be conditional or temporary, the court did not specifically make that holding because the language used by the parties was not conditional.Mission Shores Association v. PheilDocket
166 Cal.App.4th 789 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E043932) 9/5/08 Case complete 11/7/08CC&R’s: Civil Code Section 1356 allows a court to reduce a super-majority voting requirement to amend CC&R’s where the court finds that the amendment is reasonable. Here the court reduced the 2/3 majority requirement to a simple majority for an amendment to limit rentals of homes to 30 days or more.Zanelli v. McGrath Docket
166 Cal.App.4th 615 – 1st Dist. (A117111) 9/2/08 Case complete 11/4/08EASEMENTS:
1. The doctrine of merger codified in Civil Code Sections 805 and 811 applies when “the right to the servitude,” and “the right to the servient tenement” are not vested in a single individual, but in the same persons;
2. The doctrine of merger applies regardless of whether the owners held title as joint tenants or tenants in common. Also, the fact that one owner held his interest in one of the properties as trustee for his inter vivos revocable trust does not preclude merger because California law recognizes that when property is held in this type of trust the settlor has the equivalent of full ownership of the property. (If he had held title only in a representative capacity as a trustee for other beneficiaries under the terms of an irrevocable trust, then his ownership might not result in extinguishment by merger because he would only hold the legal title for the benefit of others.) The court cites Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331, stating that a revocable inter vivos trust is recognized as simply a probate avoidance device, but does not prevent creditors of the settlers from reaching trust property.
(3) After being extinguished by merger, an easement is not revived upon severance of the formerly dominant and servient parcels unless it is validly created once again.Ritter & Ritter v. The Churchill Condominium Assn. Docket
166 Cal.App.4th 103 – 2nd Dist. (B187840) 7/22/08 (pub. order 8/21/08) Case complete 10/21/08HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS: A member of a condominium homeowners’ association can recover damages from the association which result from a dangerous condition negligently maintained by the association in the common area. However, the court found in favor of the individual directors because a greater degree of fault is necessary to hold unpaid individual board members liable, and such greater degree of fault was not present here.Kempton v. City of Los AngelesDocketSup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 1344 – 2nd Dist. (B201128) 8/13/08 Request for Depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/12/08NUISANCE: A private individual may bring an action against a municipality to abate a public nuisance when the individual suffers harm that is specially injurious to himself, or where the nuisance is a public nuisance per se, such as blocking a public sidewalk or road. The court held that plaintiff’s assertions that neighbors’ fences were erected upon city property, prevent access to plaintiff’s sidewalk area, and block the sightlines upon entering and exiting their garage were sufficient to support both a public nuisance per se and specific injury.Claudino v. PereiraDocketSup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 1282 – 3rd Dist. (C054808) 8/12/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/12//08SURVEYS: Determining the location of a boundary line shown on a plat recorded pursuant to the 1867 Townsite Acts requires an examination of both the plat and the surveyor’s field notes. Here, the plat showed the boundary as a straight line, but the court held that the boundary followed the center line of a gulch because the field notes stated that the boundary was “down said gulch”.Zack’s, Inc. v. City of SausalitoDocket
165 Cal.App.4th 1163 – 1st Dist. (A118244) 8/11/08 Case complete 10/14/08TIDELANDS / PUBLIC STREETS: A statute authorizing the City’s lease of tidelands does not supersede other state laws establishing procedures for the abandonment of public streets. Because the City failed to follow the normal procedure for abandonment of the portion of the street upon which it granted a lease, the leasehold was not authorized and can therefore be deemed a nuisance.Gehr v. Baker Hughes Oil Field OperationsDocketSup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 660 – 2nd Dist. (B201195) 7/30/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/16/08NUISANCE: Plaintiff purchased from Defendant real property that was contaminated, and Defendant had begun the remediation process. The 3-year statute of limitations for suing under a permanent nuisance theory had expired. So Plaintiff sued for nuisance damages under a continuing nuisance theory, seeking interest rate differential damages based on the difference in the interest rate between an existing loan and a loan that plaintiff could have obtained if not for the contamination.
The court held that plaintiff’s claim for interest rate differential damages is actually a claim for diminution in value, which may not be recovered under a continuing nuisance theory. Damages for diminution in value may only be recovered for permanent, not continuing, nuisances. When suing for a continuing nuisance, future or prospective damages are not allowed, such as damages for diminution in the value of the subject property. A nuisance can only be considered “continuing” if it can be abated, and therefore a plaintiff suing under this theory may only recover the costs of abating the nuisance.
If the nuisance has inflicted a permanent injury on the land, the plaintiff generally must bring a single lawsuit for all past, present, and future damages within three years of the creation of the nuisance. But if the nuisance is one which may be discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing in character and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for damages until the nuisance is abated. Recovery is limited, however, to actual injury suffered prior to commencement of each action.Witt Home Ranch v. County of SonomaDocketSup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 543 – 1st Dist. (A118911) 7/29/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/28/08SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: This case contains a good history of California’s Subdivision Map Act statutes. The court held that the laws governing subdivision maps in 1915 did not regulate the “design and improvement of subdivisions,” as required by the grandfather clause of Government Code Section 66499.30. The subdivision map in this case was recorded in 1915 and no lots were subsequently conveyed, so the map does not create a valid subdivision.T.O. IX v. Superior CourtDocketSup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 140 – 2nd Dist. (B203794) 7/24/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/10/08MECHANIC’S LIENS: A mechanic’s lien claimant recorded a mechanic’s lien against each of the nine parcels in a project, each lien for the full amount due under the contract. The court held that defendant could record a single release bond under Civil Code Section 3143 to release all of the liens.Kassir v. Zahabi Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 1352 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038449) 3/5/08 (Pub. Order 4/3/08, Received 7/16/08) Case complete 5/9/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: The trial court ordered Defendant to specifically perform his contract to sell real property to Plaintiff, and further issued a judgment ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff for rents accruing during the time Defendant was able to perform the agreement but refused to do so. The court held that because the property was overencumbered, Defendant would have received nothing under the agreement and no offset was required.
The court explained that because execution of the judgment in a specific performance action will occur later than the date of performance provided by the contract, financial adjustments must be made to relate their performance back to the contract date, namely: 1) when a buyer is deprived of possession of the property pending resolution of the dispute and the seller receives rents and profits, the buyer is entitled to a credit against the purchase price for the rents and profits from the time the property should have been conveyed to him, 2) a seller also must be treated as if he had performed in a timely fashion and is entitled to receive the value of his lost use of the purchase money during the period performance was delayed, 3) if any part of the purchase price has been set aside by the buyer with notice to the seller, the seller may not receive credit for his lost use of those funds and 4) any award to the seller representing the value of his lost use of the purchase money cannot exceed the rents and profits awarded to the buyer, for otherwise the breaching seller would profit from his wrong.Grant v. RatliffDocketSup.Ct. Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 1304 – 2nd Dist. (B194368) 7/16/08 Request for depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/1/08PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: The plaintiff/owner of Parcel A sought to establish a prescriptive easement to a road over Parcel B. In order to establish the requisite 5-year period of open and notorious possession, the plaintiff needed to include the time that the son of the owner of Parcel B spent living in a mobile home on Parcel A. The court held that the son’s use of Parcel A was not adverse but was instead a matter of “family accommodation” and, therefore, a prescriptive easement was not established. The court also discussed: 1) a party seeking to establish a prescriptive easement has the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence and 2) once the owner of the dominant tenement shows that use of an easement has been continuous over a long period of time, the burden shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to show that the use was permissive, but the servient tenement owner’s burden is a burden of producing evidence, and not a burden of proof.SBAM Partners v. WangDocket
164 Cal.App.4th 903 – 2nd Dist. (B204191) 7/9/08 Case complete 9/10/08HOMESTEADS: Under C.C.P. Section 704.710, a homestead exemption is not allowed on property acquired by the debtor after the judgment has been recorded unless it was purchased with exempt proceeds from the sale, damage or destruction of a homestead within the six-month safe harbor period.Christian v. FloraDocket
164 Cal.App.4th 539 – 3rd Dist. (C054523) 6/30/08 Case complete 9/2/08EASEMENTS: Where parcels in a subdivision are resubdivided by a subsequent parcel map, the new parcel map amends the provisions of any previously recorded parcel map made in compliance with the Map Act. Here, although the deeds to plaintiffs referred to the original parcel map, since the intent of the parties was that the easement shown on the amended parcel map would be conveyed, the grantees acquired title to the easement shown on the amended map.Lange v. SchillingDocket
163 Cal.App.4th 1412 – 3rd Dist. (C055471) 5/28/08; pub. order 6/16/08 Case Complete 8/18/08REAL ESTATE AGENTS: The clear language of the standard California real estate purchase agreement precludes an award of attorney’s fees if a party does not attempt mediation before commencing litigation. Because plaintiff filed his lawsuit before offering mediation, there was no basis to award attorney’s fees.Talbott v. HustwitDocketSup.Ct. Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 148 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037424) 6/20/08 Petition for review and depublication DENIED by Cal Supreme Ct. 9/24/08GUARANTEES:
1. C.C.P. 580a, which requires an appraisal of the real property security before the court may issue a deficiency judgment, does not apply to an action against a guarantor.
2. A lender cannot recover under a guaranty where there the debtor and guarantor already have identical liability, such as with general partners or trustees of a revocable trust in which the debtor is the settlor, trustee and primary beneficiary. Here, however, a guarantee signed by the trustees of the debtors’ trust is enforceable as a “true guarantee” because, although the debtors were the settlors, they were a) secondary, not primary, beneficiaries and b) were not the trustees.Mayer v. L & B Real EstateSup.Ct. Docket
43 Cal.4th 1231 – Cal. Supreme Court (S142211) 6/16/08TAX SALES: The one-year statute of limitations for attacking a tax sale does not begin to run against a property owner who is in “undisturbed possession” of the subject property until that owner has actual notice of the tax sale. Ordinarily, a property owner who has failed to pay property taxes has sufficient knowledge to put him on notice that a tax sale might result. However, in this case the property owners did not have notice because they purchased a single piece of commercial property and received a single yearly tax bill. They had no reason to suspect that due to errors committed by the tax assessor, a small portion of their property was being assessed separately and the tax bills were being sent to a previous owner.
NOTE: This creates a hazard for title companies insuring after a tax sale in reliance on the one-year statute of limitations in Revenue and Taxation Code Section 3725.California Golf v. CooperDocketSup.Ct. Docket
163 Cal.App.4th 1053 – 2nd Dist. (B195211) 6/9/08 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/17/08TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. A bidder at a trustee’s sale may not challenge the sale on the basis that the lender previously obtained a decree of judicial foreclosure because the doctrine of election of remedies benefits only the trustor or debtor.
2. A lender’s remedies against a bidder who causes a bank to stop payment on cashier’s checks based on a false affidavit asserting that the checks were lost is not limited to the remedies set forth in CC Section 2924h, and may pursue a cause of action for fraud against the bidder.
(The case contains a good discussion (at pp. 25 – 26) of the procedure for stopping payment on a cashier’s check by submitting an affidavit to the issuing bank.)Biagini v. BeckhamDocket
163 Cal.App.4th 1000 – 3rd Dist. (C054915) 6/9/08 Case complete 8/11/08DEDICATION:
1. Acceptance of a dedication may be actual or implied. It is actual when formal acceptance is made by the proper authorities, and implied when a use has been made of the property by the public 1) of an intensity that is reasonable for the nature of the road and 2) for such a length of time as will evidence an intention to accept the dedication. BUT the use in this case was not sufficient because the use was by neighbors whose use did not exceed what was permitted pursuant to a private easement over the same area.
2. A statutory offer of dedication can be revoked as to the public at large by use of the area that is inconsistent with the dedication, but the offer remains open for formal acceptance by the public entity to which the offer was made. Steiner v. ThextonDocketSup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C054605) 5/28/08 REVERSED by Cal. Supreme Ct.OPTIONS: A contract to sell real property where the buyer’s performance was entirely conditioned on the buyer obtaining regulatory approval to subdivide the property is an option. An option must be supported by consideration, but was not here, where the buyer could back out at any time. Buyer’s promise to deliver to seller copies “of all information, reports, tests, studies and other documentation” was not sufficient consideration to support the option.In re Marriage CasesDocket
43 Cal.4th 757 – Cal. Supreme Court (S147999) 5/15/08MARRIAGE: The language of Family Code Section 300 limiting the designation of marriage to a union “between a man and a woman” is unconstitutional and must be stricken from the statute, and the remaining statutory language must be understood as making the designation of marriage available both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.Harvey v. The Landing Homeowners AssociationDocket
162 Cal.App.4th 809 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D050263) 4/4/08 (Cert. for Pub. 4/30/08) Case complete 6/30/08HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS: The Board of Directors of an HOA has the authority to allow owners to exclusively use common area accessible only to those owners where the following provision of the CC&R’s applied: “The Board shall have the right to allow an Owner to exclusively use portions of the otherwise nonexclusive Common Area, provided that such portions . . . are nominal in area and adjacent to the Owner’s Exclusive Use Area(s) or Living Unit, and, provided further, that such use does not unreasonably interfere with any other Owner’s use . . .” Also, this is allowed under Civil Code Section 1363.07(a)(3)(E).Salma v. CaponDocket
161 Cal.App.4th 1275 – 1st Dist. (A115057) 4/9/08 Case complete 6/11/08HOME EQUITY SALES: A seller claimed he sold his house for far less than it was worth “due to the duress of an impending trustee’s sale and the deceit of the purchasers”. The case involves procedural issues that are not relevant to this web site. However, it is included here because it demonstrates the kind of mess that can occur when you are dealing with property that is in foreclosure. Be careful, folks.Aviel v. NgDocket
161 Cal.App.4th 809 – 1st Dist. (A114930) 2/28/08; pub. order 4/1/08 Case complete 5/6/08LEASES / SUBORDINATION: A lease provision subordinating the lease to “mortgages” also applied to deeds of trust because the two instruments are functionally and legally the same. Therefore a foreclosure of a deed of trust wiped out the lease.People v. MartinezDocket
161 Cal.App.4th 754 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E042427) 4/1/08 Case complete 6/2/08FORGERY: This criminal case involves a conviction for forgery of a deed of trust. [NOTE: The crime of forgery can occur even if the owner actually signed the deed of trust. The court pointed out that “forgery is committed when a defendant, by fraud or trickery, causes another to execute a document where the signer is unaware, by reason of such trickery, that he is executing a document of that nature.”Pacific Hills Homeowners Association v. PrunDocket
160 Cal.App.4th 1557 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038244) 3/20/08 Case complete 5/27/08CC&R’s: Defendants built a gate and fence within the setback required by the CC&R’s. 1) The court held that the 5-year statute of limitations of C.C.P. 336(b) applies to unrecorded as well as recorded restrictions, so that the shorter 4-year statute of limitations of C.C.P. 337 is inapplicable. 2) The court upheld the trial court’s equitable remedy of requiring the HOA to pay 2/3 of the cost of relocation defendant’s gate based upon the HOA’s sloppiness in not pursuing its case more promptly.Nicoll v. RudnickDocket
160 Cal.App.4th 550 – 5th Dist. (F052948) 2/27/08 Case complete 4/28/08WATER RIGHTS: An appropriative water right established in a 1902 judgment applied to the entire 300 acre parcel so that when part of the parcel was foreclosed and subsequently re-sold, the water rights must be apportioned according to the acreage of each parcel, not according to the prior actual water usage attributable to each parcel. NOTE: This case contains a good explanation of California water rights law.Real Estate Analytics v. VallasDocket
160 Cal.App.4th 463 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049161) 2/26/08 Case complete 5/29/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance is appropriate even where the buyer’s sole purpose and entire intent in buying the property was to earn money for its investors and turn a profit as quickly as possible. The fact that plaintiff was motivated solely to make a profit from the purchase of the property does not overcome the strong statutory presumption that all land is unique and therefore damages were inadequate to make plaintiff whole for the defendant’s breach.Fourth La Costa Condominium Owners Assn. v. SeithDocket
159 Cal.App.4th 563 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049276) 1/30/08 Case complete 4/1/08CC&R’s/HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: The court applied CC 1356(c)(2) and Corp. Code 7515, which allow a court to reduce the supermajority vote requirement for amending CC&R’s and bylaw because the amendments were reasonable and the balloting requirements of the statutes were met.02 Development, LLC v. 607 South Park, LLCDocket
159 Cal.App.4th 609 – 2nd Dist. (B200226) 1/30/08 Case complete 4/3/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: 1) An assignment of a purchaser’s rights under a purchase agreement prior to creation of the assignee as an LLC is valid because an organization can enforce pre-organization contracts if the organization adopts or ratifies them. 2) A purchaser does not need to prove that it already had the necessary funds, or already had binding commitments from third parties to provide the funds, when the other party anticipatorily repudiates the contract. All that plaintiff needed to prove was that it would have been able to obtain the necessary funding (or funding commitments) in order to close the transaction on time.Richeson v. HelalDocketSup.Ct. Docket
158 Cal.App.4th 268 – 2nd Dist. (B187273) 11/29/07; Pub. & mod. order 12/21/07 (see end of opinion)Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/20/08CC&R’s / MUNICIPALITIES: An Agreement Imposing Restrictions (“AIR”) and CC&R’s did not properly lend themselves to an interpretation that would prohibit the City from changing the permitted use or zoning and, were they so construed, the AIR and CC&R’s would be invalid as an attempt by the City to surrender its future right to exercise its police power respecting the property. Here, the AIR and CC&R’s did not prohibit the City from issuing a new conditional use permit allowing the continued use of the subject property as a neighborhood market.Bill Signs Trucking v. Signs Family Ltd. PartnershipDocketSup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 1515 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D047861) 12/18/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/9/08LEASES / RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: A tenant’s right of first refusal under a commercial lease is not triggered by the conveyance of an interest in the property between co-partners in a family limited partnership that owns the property and is the landlord.Schweitzer v. Westminster InvestmentsDocketSup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 1195 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049589) 12/13/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/26/08EQUITY PURCHASERS:
1) The bonding requirement of the Home Equity Sales Contracts Act (Civil Code Section 1695.17) is void for vagueness under the due process clause and may not be enforced. Section 1695.17 is vague because it provides no guidance on the amount, the obligee, the beneficiaries, the terms or conditions of the bond, the delivery and acceptance requirements, or the enforcement mechanisms of the required bond.
2) Although the bond requirement may not be enforced, the remainder of the statutory scheme remains valid because the bond provisions are severable from the balance of the enactment.
3) The court refused to set aside the deed in favor of the equity purchaser because, first, the notice requirements of Civil Code Section 1695.5 appear to have been met and, second, the seller’s right to rescind applies before the deed is recorded but the statute “does not specify that a violation of section 1695.5 provides grounds for rescinding a transaction after recordation of the deed”.Crestmar Owners Association v. StapakisDocket
157 Cal.App.4th 1223 – 2nd Dist. (B191049) 12/13/07 Case complete 2/15/07CC&R’s: Where a developer failed to convey title to two parking spaces as required by the CC&R’s, the homeowner’s association was able to quiet title even though more than 20 years had passed since the parking spaces should have been conveyed. The statute of limitations does not run against someone, such as the homeowner’s association here, who is in exclusive and undisputed possession of the property.Washington Mutual Bank v. BlechmanDocketSup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 662 – 2nd Dist. (B191125) 12/4/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/19/08TRUSTEE’S SALES: The foreclosing lender and trustee are indispensable parties to a lawsuit which seeks to set aside a trustee’s sale. Therefore, a default judgment against only the purchaser at the trustee’s sale is subject to collateral attack.Garretson v. PostDocketSup.Ct. Docket
156 Cal.App.4th 1508 – 4th Dist., Div.2 (E041858) 11/20/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/27/08TRUSTEE’S SALES: A cause of action for wrongful foreclosure does not fall within the protection of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuit against public participation).Murphy v. BurchDocketSup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A117051) 11/19/07 AFFIRMED by Cal Supreme Ct. 4/27/09EASEMENT BY NECESSITY: An easement by necessity arises by operation of law when 1) there is a strict necessity as when a property is landlocked and 2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity. However, the second requirement is not met when the properties were owned by the federal government because the Government has the power of eminent domain, rendering it unnecessary to resort to the easement by necessity doctrine in order to acquire easements.
The court attempts to distinguish Kellogg v. Garcia, 102 Cal.App.4th 796, by pointing out that in that case the issue of eminent domain did not arise because the dominant tenement was owned by a private party and the servient tenements by the federal government. [Ed. Note: the court does not adequately address the fact that the government does not always have the power of eminent domain. It only has that power if a public purpose is involved. Also, I do not think the court adequately distinguishes Kellogg, which seems to hold that common ownership by the federal government satisfies the requirement of common ownership.]Elias Real Estate v. TsengDocketSup.Ct. Docket
156 Cal.App.4th 425 – 2nd Dist. (B192857) 10/25/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/13/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Acts of a partner falling within Corp. Code 16301(1) (acts in ordinary course of business) are not subject to the statute of frauds. Acts of a partner falling within Corp. Code 16301(2) (acts not in the ordinary course of business) are subject to the statute of frauds. In this case, a sale of the partnership’s real property was not in the ordinary course of business, so it fell within Corp. Code 16301(2) and plaintiff could not enforce a contract of sale signed by only one partner.Strong v. State Board of EqualizationDocketSup.Ct. Docket
155 Cal.App.4th 1182 – 3rd Dist. (C052818) 10/2/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/3/08CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP: The statute that excludes transfers between domestic partners from property tax reassessment is constitutional.County of Solano v. HandleryDocketSup.Ct. Docket
155 Cal.App.4th 566 – 1st Dist. (A114120) 9/21/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/12/07DEEDS: The County brought an action against grantors’ heirs to invalidate restrictions in a deed limiting the subject property to use as a county fair or similar public purposes. The court refused to apply the Marketable Record Title Act to eliminate the power of termination in favor of the grantors because the restrictions are enforceable under the public trust doctrine.Baccouche v. BlankenshipDocket
154 Cal.App.4th 1551 – 2nd Dist (B192291) 9/11/07 Case complete 11/16/07EASEMENTS: An easement that permits a use that is prohibited by a zoning ordinance is not void. It is a valid easement, but cannot be enforced unless the dominant owner obtains a variance. As is true with virtually all land use, whether a grantee can actually use the property for the purposes stated in the easement is subject to compliance with any applicable laws and ordinances, including zoning restrictions.WRI Opportunity Loans II LLC v. CooperDocket
154 Cal.App.4th 525 – 2nd Dist. (B191590) 8/23/07 Case complete 10/26/07USURY: The trial court improperly granted a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the loan was exempt from the usury law.
1. The common law exception to the usury law known as the “interest contingency rule” provides that interest that exceeds the legal maximum is not usurious when its payment is subject to a contingency so that the lender’s profit is wholly or partially put in hazard. The hazard in question must be something over and above the risk which exists with all loans – that the borrower will be unable to pay.
2. The court held that the interest contingency rule did not apply to additional interest based on a percentage of the sale price of completed condominium units because the lender was guaranteed additional interest regardless of whether the project generated rents or profits.
3. The loan did not qualify as a shared appreciation loan, permitted under Civil Code Sections 1917-1917.006, because the note guaranteed the additional interest regardless of whether the property appreciated in value or whether the project generated profits.
4. The usury defense may not be waived by guarantor of a loan. (No other published case has addressed this issue.)Archdale v. American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co.Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 449 – 2nd Dist. (B188432) 8/22/07 Case complete 10/26/07INSURANCE: The case contains good discussions of 1) an insurer’s liability for a judgment in excess of policy limits where it fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer within policy limits and 2) the applicable statutes of limitation.REVERSED by Cal. Supreme Court 12/22/08
Patel v. LiebermenschDocketSup.Ct. Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 373 – 4th, Div. 1 (D048582) 8/21/07REVERSED: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance of an option was denied where the parties never reached agreement on the amount of the deposit, the length of time of the escrow or payment of escrow expenses if there were a delay. One judge dissented on the basis that the option contract was sufficiently clear to be specifically enforced and the court should insert reasonable terms in place of the uncertain terms.In Re Marriage of RuelasDocket
154 Cal.App.4th 339 – 2nd Dist. (B191655) 8/20/07 Case complete 10/26/07RESULTING TRUST: A resulting trust was created where a daughter acquired property in her own name and the evidence showed that she was acquiring the property for her parents who had poor credit.Stoneridge Parkway Partners v. MW Housing PartnersDocketSup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 1373 – 3rd Dist. (C052082) 8/3/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/14/07USURY: The exemption to the usury law for loans made or arranged by real estate brokers applies to a loan in which the broker who negotiated the loan was an employee of an affiliate of the lender, but nevertheless acted as a third party intermediary in negotiating the loan. Kinney v. OvertonDocketSup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 482 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037146) 7/18/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/10/07EASEMENTS: Former Civil Code Section 812 provided that
“[t]he vacation . . . of streets and highways shall extinguish all private easements therein claimed by reason of the purchase of any lot by reference to a map or plat upon which such streets or highways are shown, other than a private easement necessary for the purpose of ingress and egress to any such lot from or to a public street or highway, except as to any person claiming such easement who, within two years from the effective date of such vacation or abandonment . . . shall have recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which such vacated or abandoned streets or highways are located a verified notice of his claim to such easement . . .” [Emphasis added.]
The court held that cross-complainant could not maintain an action against the person occupying the disputed abandoned parcel because it was not necessary for access and he did not record the notice required by C.C. Section 812. The court specifically did not address the state of title to the disputed parcel or what interest, if any, cross-defendant may have in the parcel.Hartzheim v. Valley Land & Cattle CompanyDocketSup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 383 – 6th Dist. (H030053) 7/17/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/10/07LEASES / RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: A right of first refusal in a lease was not triggered by a partnership’s conveyance of property to the children and grandchildren of its partners for tax and estate planning purposes because it did not constitute a bona fide offer from any third party. The court considered three factors: 1) the contract terms must be reviewed closely to determine the conditions necessary to invoke the right, 2) where a right of first refusal is conditioned upon receipt of a bona fide third party offer to purchase the property, the right is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property to a third party and 3) the formalities of the transaction must be reviewed to determine its true nature.Berryman v. Merit Property Mgmt.DocketSup.Ct. Docket
152 Cal.App.4th 1544 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037156) 5/31/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme DENIED 10/10/07HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Fees charged by a homeowner’s association upon a transfer of title by a homeowner are limited by Civil Code Section 1368 to the association’s actual costs. The court held that this limitation does not apply to fees charged by a management company hired by the association.Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. v. ReedDocket
152 Cal.App.4th 1308 – 2nd Dist. (B193014) 6/29/07 Case complete 8/29/07TRUSTEE’S SALES: After a trustee’s sale, the trustee deposited the surplus proceeds into court under CC 2924j in order to determine who was entitled to the excess proceeds. The court held that:
(1) The distribution of surplus proceeds to satisfy child and spousal support arrearages was proper because the County had properly recorded an abstract of support judgment,
(2) The trial court erred in distributing proceeds to the debtor’s former wife to satisfy her claims for a community property equalization payment and for attorney fees ordered in the dissolution proceeding, because no recorded lien or encumbrance secured those claims, which in any event were discharged in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding (because child and spousal support obligations are not dischargeable, but property settlement payments are dischargeable), and
(3) The trial court erred in distributing proceeds to the debtor’s former lawyer, who was retained to assist the debtor in the collection of proceeds from the trustee’s sale, because an attorney’s lien on the prospective recovery of a client must be enforced in a separate action.
(4) The debtor failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his claim that he was entitled to the $150,000 homestead exemption applicable when a debtor is physically disabled and unable to engage in substantial gainful employment (so he was entitled to only the standard $50,000 homestead exemption).Poseidon Development v. Woodland Lane EstatesOrder Modifying OpinionDocket
152 Cal.App.4th 1106 – 3rd Dist. (C052573) 6/28/07 Case complete 8/31/07PROMISSORY NOTES: A penalty that applied to late payments of installments did not apply to a late payment of the final balloon payment of principal. The penalty was 10% of the amount due, which made sense for regular installments, but bore no reasonable relationship to actual damages if applied to the balloon payment.Carr v. KaminsDocket
151 Cal.App.4th 929 – 2nd Dist. (B191247) 5/31/07 Case complete 8/1/07QUIET TITLE: A quiet title judgment was set aside by defendant’s heir four years after being entered because the heir was not named and served. The plaintiff believed the defendant to be deceased, but made no effort to locate and serve the defendant’s heirs. [Even though this case contains some unique facts, the fact that a default judgment can be set aside four years after being entered demonstrates the danger of relying on default judgments and the need to closely examine the court file and surrounding circumstances before doing so.]Estate of YoolDocket
151 Cal.App.4th 867 – 1st Dist. (A114787) 5/31/07 Case complete 7/31/07RESULTING TRUST: A decedent held title with her daughter for the purpose of facilitating financing and did not intend to acquire beneficial title. A probate court properly ordered the Special Administrator to convey title to the daughter based on the Resulting Trust Doctrine. It held that the four-year statute of limitations under C.C.P. 343 applied and not C.C.P. 366.2, which limits actions to collect on debts of the decedent to one year after the date of death.Kalway v. City of BerkeleyDocket
151 Cal.App.4th 827 – 1st Dist. (A112569) 5/31/07 Case complete 8/1/07SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: Plaintiff husband transferred title of a parcel to his wife in order to avoid merger under the Subdivision Map Act of a substandard parcel into their adjoining lot. The court held that plaintiffs could not evade the Map Act in this manner. It also held that the City had no authority to obtain an order canceling the deed, but that the wife also had no right to further transfer title to the substandard lot except back to her husband.Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto Club of So. Cal.DocketSup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B191272) 6/25/07 REVERSED BY CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURTBAD FAITH: An insurance company acted in bad faith as a matter of law where a potential for coverage was apparent from the face of the complaint. The insured allegedly assaulted plaintiff and there was a potential for coverage because the insured may have acted in self defense. The case contains a thorough analysis of the duties of defense and indemnity.Blackmore v. PowellDocketSup.Ct. Docket
150 Cal.App.4th 1593 – 2nd Dist. (B185326) 5/22/07 Request for depublication DENIED 8/29/07EASEMENTS: An easement “for parking and garage purposes” includes the exclusive right to build and use a garage. Granting an exclusive easement may constitute a violation under the Subdivision Map act, but here there is no violation because the exclusive use of the garage covers only a small portion of the easement and is restricted to the uses described in the easement deed. Amalgamated Bank v. Superior CourtDocketSup.Ct. Docket
149 Cal.App.4th 1003 – 3rd Dist. (C052156, C052395) 4/16/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/8/07LIS PENDENS:
1. In deciding a writ petition from an order granting or denying a motion to expunge a lis pendens after judgment and pending appeal, an appellate court must assess whether the underlying real property claim has “probable validity”. This is the same test that is used before judgment. “Probable validity” post-judgment means that it is more likely than not the real property claim will prevail at the end of the appellate process.
2. A judicial foreclosure sale to a third party is absolute, subject only to the right of redemption, and may not be set aside, except that under C.C.P. Section 701.680(c)(1) the judgment debtor may commence an action to set aside the sale within 90 days only if the purchaser at the sale was the judgment creditor. Here, a potential bidder who was stuck in traffic and arrived too late to the sale could not set it aside because only the judgment debtor can do that and because a third party purchased at the sale. L&B Real Estate v. Housing Authority of Los AngelesDocket
149 Cal.App.4th 950 – 2nd Dist. (B189740) 4/13/07 Case complete 6/13/07TAX DEEDS: Because public property is exempt from taxation, tax deeds purporting to convey such property for nonpayment of taxes are void. Two parcels were inadvertently not included in a deed to the State (subsequently conveyed to the Housing Authority of Los Angeles). Accordingly, the tax collector thought that those parcels were still owned by the seller and sold them at a tax sale after real estate taxes were not paid on them. The court also points out that plaintiff was not a good faith purchaser because it had constructive and actual knowledge of the fact that the Housing Authority’s low income housing was partially located on the two parcels sold at the tax sale.Ulloa v. McMillin Real EstateDocket
149 Cal.App.4th 333 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D048066) 3/7/07 (Cert. for pub. 4/4/07) Case complete 6/4/07STATUTE OF FRAUDS: The Statute of Frauds requires the authority of an agent who signs a sales agreement to be in writing if the agent signs on behalf of the party to be charged. However, a plaintiff purchaser whose agent signed her name with only verbal authorization is not precluded by the Statute of Frauds from bringing the action because the defendant is the party to be charged.Jordan v. Allstate Insurance CompanyDocketSup.Ct. Docket
148 Cal.App.4th 1062 – 2nd Dist. (B187706) 3/22/07 Petition for review and depublication DENIED 6/27/07BAD FAITH: Where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability under the policy, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute. However, there can be bad faith liability where an insurer denies coverage but a reasonable investigation would have disclosed facts showing the claim was covered under other provisions of the policy. The court clarified that an insurer’s failure to investigate can result in bad faith liability only if there is coverage. If there is no coverage, then any failure to properly investigate cannot cause the insured any damage.Shah v. McMcMahonDocket
148 Cal.App.4th 526 – 2nd Dist. (B188972) 3/12/07 Case complete 5/16/07LIS PENDENS: Plaintiffs could not appeal an order for attorney’s fees awarded in a hearing of a motion to expunge a lis pendens. The only remedy is to challenge the award by way of a petition for writ of mandate.Sterling v. TaylorDocket
40 Cal.4th 757 – Cal. Supreme Court (S121676) 3/1/07STATUTE OF FRAUDS: If a memorandum signed by the seller includes the essential terms of the parties’ agreement (i.e. the buyer, seller, price, property and the time and manner of payment), but the meaning of those terms is unclear, the memorandum is sufficient under the statute of frauds if extrinsic evidence clarifies the terms with reasonable certainty. Because the memorandum itself must include the essential contractual terms, extrinsic evidence cannot supply those required terms, however, it can be used to explain essential terms that were understood by the parties but would otherwise be unintelligible to others. In this case, the memorandum did not set forth the price with sufficient clarity because it was uncertain whether it was to be determined by a multiplier applied to the actual rent role or whether the price specified was the agreed price even though it was based on the parties’ incorrect estimate of the rent role.Jet Source Charter v. DohertyDocket
148 Cal.App.4th 1 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D044779) 1/30/07 (Pub. order and modification filed 2/28/07 – see end of opinion) Case complete 5/1/07PUNITIVE DAMAGES: Parts I, II, III and IV NOT certified for publication: Where the defendant’s conduct only involves economic damage to a single plaintiff who is not particularly vulnerable, an award which exceeds the compensatory damages awarded is not consistent with due process.Dyer v. MartinezDocketSup.Ct. Docket
147 Cal.App.4th 1240 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037423) 2/23/07 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/13/07RECORDING: A lis pendens that was recorded but not indexed does not impart constructive notice, so a bona fide purchaser for value takes free of the lis pendens. The party seeking recordation must ensure that all the statutory requirements are met and the recorder is deemed to be an agent of the recording party for this purpose.Behniwal v. MixDocket
147 Cal.App.4th 621 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037200) 2/7/07 Case complete 4/13/07SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: In a specific performance action, a judgment for plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees cannot be offset against the purchase price that the successful plaintiff must pay defendant for the property. A judgment for attorneys’ fees is not an incidental cost that can be included as part of the specific performance judgment, and it is not a lien that relates back to the filing of the lis pendens. Instead, it is an ordinary money judgment that does not relate back to the lis pendens. So, while plaintiff’s title will be superior to defendant’s liens that recorded subsequent to the lis pendens, those liens are nevertheless entitled to be paid to the extent of available proceeds from the full purchase price.Castillo v. Express EscrowDocket
146 Cal.App.4th 1301 – 2nd Dist. (B186306) 1/18/07 Case complete 3/20/07MOBILEHOME ESCROWS:
1) Health and Safety Code Section 18035(f) requires the escrow agent for a mobile home sale to hold funds in escrow upon receiving written notice of a dispute between the parties, even though the statute specifically states “unless otherwise specified in the escrow instructions” and even though the escrow instructions provided that escrow was to close unless “a written demand shall have been made upon you not to complete it”.
2) Section 18035(f) does not require the written notice of dispute to cite the code section, or to be in any particular form, or that the notice be addressed directly to the escrow holder, or that the notice contain an express request not to close escrow. The subdivision requires nothing more than that the escrow agent receive notice in writing of a dispute between the parties. So receiving a copy of the buyer’s attorney’s letter to the seller was sufficient to notify the escrow agent that a dispute existed.Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance ExchangeDocket
146 Cal.App.4th 831 – 2nd Dist (B184917) 1/11/07 Case complete 3/14/07INSURANCE: An insurer’s duty to accept reasonable settlement offers within policy limits applies only to third party actions and not to settlement offers from an insured. An insurer has a duty not to unreasonable withhold payments due under a policy. But withholding benefits under a policy is not unreasonable if there is a genuine dispute between the insurer and the insured as to coverage or the amount of payment due, which is what occurred in this case.In re: Rabin
BAP 9th Circuit 12/8/06BANKRUPTCY/HOMESTEADS: Under California law, the homestead exemption rights of registered domestic partners are identical to those of people who are married. Therefore, domestic partners are limited to a single combined exemption, in the same manner as people who are married. In the absence of a domestic partnership or marriage, each cotenant is entitled to the full homestead exemption.Wachovia Bank v. Lifetime IndustriesDocket
145 Cal.App.4th 1039 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E037560) 12/15/06 Case complete 2/16/07OPTIONS:
1. When the holder of an option to purchase real property exercises the option and thereby obtains title to the property, the optionee’s title relates back to the date the option was given, as long as the optionee has the right to compel specific performance of the option. But where the optionee acquires title in a transaction unconnected with the option, such as where there has been a breach of the option agreement so that the optionee did not have the right to specific performance, the optionee takes subject to intervening interests just like any other purchaser.
2. Civil Code Section 2906 provides a safe harbor for a lender to avoid the rule against “clogging” the equity of redemption as long as the option is not dependent on the borrower’s default. But even if the lender falls outside the safe harbor because the exercise of the option is dependent upon borrower’s default, it does not automatically follow that the option is void. Instead, the court will analyze the circumstances surrounding the transaction and the intent of the parties to determine whether the option is either void or a disguised mortgage. Also, even if the transaction is a disguised mortgage the optionee (now mortgagee) has a right to judicially foreclose, which will wipe out intervening interests.Wright v. City of Morro BayDocketSup.Ct. Docket
144 Cal.App.4th 767, 145 Cal.App.4th 309a – 2nd Dist (B176929) 11/7/06 Modification of Opinion 12/6/06Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/21/07DEDICATION/ABANDONMENT: C.C.P. 771.010, which provides for termination of an offer of dedication if not accepted within 25 years, did not apply because 1) the statute cannot be applied retroactively to the City’s acceptance occurring more than 25 years after the offer of dedication and 2) the area covered by the dedicated road has never been used by anyone, so the requirement that the property be “used as if free of the dedication” was not met.State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Wells Fargo BankDocket
143 Cal.App.4th 1098 – 1st Dist. (A111643) 10/10/06 Case complete 12/11/06The “superior equities rule” prevents an insurer, who is subrogated to the rights of the insured after paying a claim, from recovering against a party whose equities are equal or superior to those of the insurer. Thus, an insurer may not recover from an alleged tortfeasor where the tortfeasor’s alleged negligence did not directly cause the insured’s loss. The court questioned the continued vitality of the superior equities rule in California, but felt compelled to follow a 1938 Supreme Court case that applied the rule. The court suggests that the Supreme Court should re-address the issue in light of modern day fault principles.Corona Fruits & Veggies v. Frozsun FoodsDocketSup.Ct. Docket
143 Cal.App.4th 319 – 2nd Dist. (B184507) 9/25/06 Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/20/06UCC: A UCC-1 financing statement filed in the name of Armando Munoz is not effective where the debtor’s true name was Armando Munoz Juarez.Warren v. MerrillDocket
143 Cal.App.4th 96 – 2nd Dist. (B186698) 9/21/06 Case complete 11/21/06QUIET TITLE: The Court quieted title in plaintiff where title was taken in the real estate agent’s daughter’s name as part of a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the agent. This is not a significant title insurance case, but I posted it for reference since it involves quiet title.McKell v. Washington MutualDocketSup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 1457 – 2nd Dist. (B176377) 9/18/06 Request for depublication DENIED 1/17/07RESPA: Washington Mutual (i) charged hundreds of dollars in “underwriting fees” when the underwriting fee charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to WAMU was only $20 and (ii) marked up the charges for real estate tax verifications and wire transfer fees. The court followed Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2d Cir. 2004) 383 F.3d 49, holding that marking up costs, for which no additional services are performed, is a violation of RESPA. Such a violation of federal law constitutes an unlawful business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and a breach of contract. Plaintiffs also stated a cause of action for an unfair business practice under the UCL based on the allegation that WAMU led them to believe they were being charged the actual cost of third-party services.Reilly v. City and County of San FranciscoDocketSup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 480 – 1st Dist. (A109062) 8/29/06 Request for depublication DENIED 12/13/06PROPERTY TAX: A change in ownership of real property held by a testamentary trust occurs when an income beneficiary of the trust dies and is succeeded by another income beneficiary. Also, for purposes of determining change in ownership, a life estate either in income from the property or in the property itself is an interest equivalent in value to the fee interest.Markowitz v. FidelityDocketSup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 508 – 2nd Dist. (B179923) 5/31/06 Publication ordered by Cal. Supreme Court 8/30/06ESCROW: Civil Code Section 2941, which permits a title insurance company to record a release of a deed of trust if the lender fails to do so, does not impose an obligation on an escrow holder/title company to record the reconveyance on behalf of the trustee. Citing other authority, the Court states that an escrow holder has no general duty to police the affairs of its depositors; rather, an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to faithful compliance with the parties’ instructions, and absent clear evidence of fraud, an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to compliance with the parties’ instructions. The fact that the borrower had an interest in the loan escrow does not mean that he was a party to the escrow, or to the escrow instructions.Cebular v. Cooper Arms Homeowners AssociationDocketSup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 106 – 2nd Dist. (B182555) 8/21/06 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/15/06; Request to publish Part III, Sec. B filed 10/24/06COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS: It is not unreasonable for CC&R’s to allocate dues obligations differently for each unit, along with the same allocation of voting rights, even though each unit uses the common areas equally. Although the allocation does not make much sense, courts are disinclined to question the wisdom of agreed-to restrictions.Bernard v. FoleyDocket
39 Cal.4th 794 – Cal. Supreme Court (S136070) (8/21/06)TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS: Under Probate Code Section 21350, “care custodians” are presumptively disqualified from receiving testamentary transfers from dependent adults to whom they provide personal care, including health services. The Court held that the term “care custodian” includes unrelated persons, even where the service relationship arises out of a preexisting personal friendship rather than a professional or occupational connection. Accordingly, the Court set aside amendments to decedent’s will that were made shortly before decedent’s death, which would have given most of the estate to the care providers.Regency Outdoor Advertising v. City of Los AngelesDocket
39 Cal.4th 507 – Cal. Supreme Court (S132619) 8/7/06 Modification of Opinion 10/11/06ABUTTER’S RIGHTS: There is no right to be seen from a public way, so the city is not liable for damages resulting from the view of plaintiff’s billboard caused by planting trees along a city street. The court pointed out that a private party who blocks the view of someone’s property by obstructing a public way would be liable to someone in plaintiff’s position.Kleveland v. Chicago Title Insurance CompanyDocketSup.Ct. Docket
141 Cal.App.4th 761 – 2nd Dist. (B187427) 7/24/06 Case complete 10/5/06 Request for depublication DENIED 10/25/06TITLE INSURANCE: An arbitration clause in a title policy is not enforceable where the preliminary report did not contain an arbitration clause and did not incorporate by reference the arbitration clause in the CLTA policy actually issued. (The preliminary report incorporated by reference the provisions of a Homeowner’s Policy of Title Insurance with a somewhat different arbitration clause, but a CLTA policy was actually issued.)Essex Insurance Company v. Five Star Dye HouseDocket
38 Cal.4th 1252 – Cal. Supreme Court (S131992) 7/6/06INSURANCE: When an insured assigns a claim for bad faith against the insurer, the assignee may recover Brandt (attorney) fees. Although purely personal causes of action are not assignable, such as claims for emotional distress or punitive damages, Brandt fees constitute an economic loss and are not personal in nature.Peak Investments v. South Peak Homeowners AssociationDocket
140 Cal.App.4th 1363 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035851) 6/28/06 Case complete 8/31/06HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Where CC&R’s require approval by more than 50 percent of owners in order to amend the Declaration, Civil Code Section 1356(a) allows a court, if certain conditions are met, to reduce the percentage of votes required, if it was approved by “owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in the association”. The Court held that the quoted phrase means a majority of the total votes in the HOA, not merely a majority of those votes that are cast.CTC Real Estate Services v. LepeDocket
140 Cal.App.4th 856 – 2nd Dist. (B185320) 6/21/06 Case complete 8/23/06TRUSTEE’S SALES: The victim of an identity theft, whose name was used to obtain a loan secured by a purchase money deed of trust to acquire real property, may, as the only claimant, recover undistributed surplus proceeds that remained after a trustee sale of the property and the satisfaction of creditors. The Court pointed out that a victim of theft is entitled to recover the assets stolen or anything acquired with the stolen assets, even if the value of those assets exceeds the value of that which was stolen.Slintak v. Buckeye Retirement Co.DocketSup.Ct. Docket
139 Cal.App.4th 575 – 2nd Dist. (B182875) 5/16/06 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/13/06MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
1) Under Civil Code Section 882.020(a)(1), a deed of trust expires after 10 years where “the final maturity date or the last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation is ascertainable from the record”. Here, the October 1992 Notice of Default was recorded and contained the due date of the subject note; thus, the due date is “ascertainable from the record” and the 10-year limitations period of section 882.020(a)(1) applies.
2) Under C.C. Section 880.260, if an action is commenced and a lis pendens filed by the owner to quiet or clear title, the running of the 10-year limitations period is reset and a new 10-year limitations period commences on the date of the recording of the lis pendens. After the expiration of the recommenced 10-year period, the power of sale in the trust deed expires. Preciado v. WildeDocketSup.Ct. Docket
139 Cal.App.4th 321 – 2nd Dist. (B182257) 5/9/06 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/16/06ADVERSE POSSESSION: Plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession against defendant, with whom they held title as tenants in common. Before title may be acquired by adverse possession as between cotenants, the occupying tenant must impart notice to the tenant out of possession, by acts of ownership of the most open, notorious and unequivocal character, that he intends to oust the latter of his interest in the common property. Such evidence must be stronger than that which would be required to establish title by adverse possession in a stranger.UNPUBLISHEDHarbor Pipe v. Stevens
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035530) 4/4/06 Case complete 6/6/06JUDGMENTS: A judgment lien against the settlor of a revocable trust attached to trust property where the identity of the settlor is reflected in the chain of title, so a purchaser takes subject to the judgment lien. NOTE: In other words, title companies need to check the names of the settlors in the General Index when title is held in trust.Aaron v. DunhamDocketSup.Ct. Docket
137 Cal.App.4th 1244 – 1st Dist. (A109488) 3/15/06 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/21/06PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: 1) Permission granted to an owner does not constitute permission to a successor. 2) Under Civil Code Section 1008, signs preventing prescriptive rights must be posted by an owner or his agent, so signs posted by a lessee without the knowledge of the owner, do not qualify.***DECERTIFIED*** Newmyer v. Parklands RanchDocketSup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B180461) 3/23/06 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED; CA opinion DECERTIFIED 6/14/06EASEMENTS: The owner of the dominant tenement possessing over the servient tenement an access easement that includes the right to grant other easements for “like purposes” may convey to an owner of property adjoining the dominant tenement an enforceable easement for access over the servient tenement.Marion Drive LLC v. SaladinoDocketSup.Ct. Docket
136 Cal.App.4th 1432 – 2nd Dist. (B182727) 2/27/06 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/24/06ASSESSMENT LIEN: After a tax sale, the holder of a bond secured by a 1911 Act assessment lien has priority as to surplus tax sale proceeds over a subsequently recorded deed of trust. This is true even though the bond holder purchased the property from the tax sale purchaser. The Court rejected defendant’s argument that fee title had merged with the assessment lien.Barnes v. HussaDocket
136 Cal.App.4th 1358 – 3rd Dist. (C049163) 2/24/06 Case complete 4/26/06LICENSES / WATER RIGHTS: The Plaintiff did not overburden a license to run water in a pipeline across defendant’s property where he extended the pipeline to other property he owned because there was no increase in the burden on the servient tenement and no harm to defendants. A couple of interesting things pointed out by the Court are: 1) A person entitled to use water may use it elsewhere as long as others are not injured by the change, and 2) “An irrevocable license . . . is for all intents and purposes the equivalent of an easement.”***REVERSED***
Mayer v. L & B Real EstateDocketSup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B180540) 2/14/06 REVERSED by Cal Supreme Ct. 6/16/08TAX SALES: The one-year statute of limitations for attacking a tax sale applies to preclude an action by a property owner who had actual notice of the tax sale, even where the tax collector’s conduct was egregious. The Court did not reach the question of whether the tax collector satisfied its due process obligations, but refers to a Supreme Court case which held that the limitations period is enforceable even if the defect is constitutional in nature. That case recognized a limited exception where an owner is in “undisturbed possession” such that the owner lacked any reasonable means of alerting himself to the tax sale proceedings.Wright Construction Co. v. BBIC InvestorsDocketSup.Ct. Docket
136 Cal.App.4th 228 – 1st Dist. (A109876) 1/31/06 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/26/06MECHANICS’ LIENS: A mechanic’s lien is premature and invalid under Civil Code Section 3115 if it is recorded before the contractor “completes his contract”. A contract is complete for purposes of commencing the recordation period under section 3115 when all work under the contract has been performed, excused, or otherwise discharged. Here, because of the tenant’s anticipatory breach of the contract, plaintiff had “complete[d] [its] contract” within the meaning of section 3115 the day before the claim of lien was recorded, so the claim of lien was not premature. In a previous writ proceeding, the Court held that the landlord’s notice of nonresponsibility was invalid under the “participating owner doctrine” because the landlord caused the work of improvement to be performed by requiring the lessee to make improvements.Torres v. TorresDocketSup.Ct. Docket
135 Cal.App.4th 870 – 2nd Dist. (B179146) 1/17/06 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/12/06POWER OF ATTORNEY: 1) A statutory form power of attorney is not properly completed where the principal marks the lines specifying the powers with an “X” instead of initials, as required by the form. However, the form is not the exclusive means of creating a power of attorney, so even though it is not valid as a statutory form, it is valid as regular power of attorney. 2) Under Probate Code Section 4264, an attorney in fact may not make a gift of the principal’s property unless specifically authorized to do so in the power of attorney. Here, the principal quitclaimed the property to himself, the other attorney in fact and the principal as joint tenants. However, the court refused to invalidate the conveyance because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the conveyance was not supported by consideration.Ung v. KoehlerOrder Modifying OpinionDocketSup.Ct. Docket
135 Cal.App.4th 186 – 1st Dist. (A109532) 12/28/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/12/06TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Expiration of the underlying obligation does not preclude enforcement of the power of sale under a deed of trust.
2. A power of sale expires after 60 years or, if the last date fixed for payment of the debt is ascertainable from the record, 10 years after that date.
3. In order to avoid a statutory absurdity, a notice of default that is recorded more than 10 years after “the last date fixed for payment of the debt” does not constitute a part of the “record” for purposes of Civil Code Section 882.020(a).Trust One Mortgage v. Invest America MortgageDocket
134 Cal.App.4th 1302 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035111) 12/15/05 Case complete 2/21/06TRUSTEE’S SALES/ANTI-DEFICIENCY: An indemnification agreement is enforceable after a non-judicial foreclosure where the indemnitor is not the same person as the obligor. If the indemnitor and obligor were the same, the indemnity would be void as an attempt to circumvent antideficiency protections.UNPUBLISHED OPINION Citifinancial Mortgage Company v. Missionary FoundationDocket
Cal.App. 2nd (B178664) 12/14/05 Case complete 2/16/06MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: (UNPUBLISHED OPINION) Under Civil Code Section 882.020(a)(1), a deed of trust becomes unenforceable 10 years after the final maturity date, or the last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation, if that date is ascertainable from the record. Here, the record showed via an Order Confirming Sale of Real Property that the obligation was due five years after close of escrow. The Court held that since “close of escrow” is an event, and not a date certain, Section 882.020(a)(1) did not apply in spite of the fact that escrow must have closed in order for the deed of trust to have been recorded.McElroy v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.Docket
134 Cal.App. 4th 388 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034588) 11/1/05 Case complete 2/1/06TRUSTEE’S SALES: The Court refused to set aside a trustee’s sale where the lender foreclosed after the trustors tendered payment in the form of a “Bonded Bill of Exchange Order”. The Court determined that “the Bill is a worthless piece of paper, consisting of nothing more than a string of words that sound as though they belong in a legal document, but which, in reality, are incomprehensible, signifying nothing.”***DECERTIFIED*** The Santa Anita Companies v. Westfield CorporationDocketSup.Ct. Docket
134 Cal.App.4th 77 – 2nd Dist. (B175820) 11/17/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED and DECERTIFIED 01/25/06DEEDS: The 3-year statute of limitations under C.C.P. 338(d) to seek relief on the ground of mistake does not begin to run until discovery of the mistake or receiving facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of the mistake. The fact that carefully reading the deed would have revealed the mistake is not sufficient to charge the plaintiff with notice, so the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff actually became aware of the error, and this action was therefore timely.Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior CourtDocket
133 Cal.App.4th 1185 – 1st Dist. (A108615) 11/1/05 Case complete 1/4/06INDIANS: An employment agreement with an Indian tribe contained the following clause: “Any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to any provisions of this Agreement, or breach thereof, shall . . . be resolved by arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association in San Francisco, California, and judgment on any award by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having such jurisdiction”. The court held that the effect of the arbitration clause as limited to a consent to arbitrate and enforce any award in state court. But this clause was insufficient to waive the tribe’s immunity from a breach of contract action brought in state court. So plaintiffs are apparently free to bring the same breach of contract claims in an arbitration proceeding.Behniwal v. MixDocket
133 Cal.App.4th 1027 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034074) 9/30/05 Case complete 1/3/06STATUTE OF FRAUDS: A sales contract signed on the sellers’ behalf by their real estate agent did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds because the agent did not have written authority to sign for the sellers. However, a contract which must be in writing can be ratified if the ratification is also in writing. Here the sellers ratified the contract by a sufficient written ratification where they subsequently signed disclosure documents that specifically referred to the contract signed by the real estate agent.Behniwal v. Superior Court Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1048 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035299) 9/30/05 Case complete 1/3/06LIS PENDENS: (Related to Mix v. Superior Court, several cases below.) Having determined that the plaintiffs have at least a “probably valid” real property claim, the Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens. The lis pendens will therefore protect plaintiff’s claim until the time for appeal to the Supreme Court expires or unless the Supreme Court issues its own writ directing that the lis pendens be expunged.Zipperer v. County of Santa ClaraDocket
133 Cal.App.4th 1013 – 6th Dist. (H028455) 9/30/05 (Mod. 10/28/05) Case complete 12/28/05EASEMENTS:
PUBLISHED PORTION: The Solar Shade Control Act provides that “. . . no person owning, or in control of a property shall allow a tree or shrub to be placed, or, if placed, to grow on such property, subsequent to the installation of a solar collector on the property of another so as to cast a shadow greater than 10 percent of the collector absorption area”. The County is exempt from the Act because it adopted an ordinance pursuant to a statute allowing cities and counties to exempt themselves from the Act. The Court did not address the issue of whether the act applies where a tree is not “placed” by a property owner.
UNPUBLISHED PORTION: A common law easement for light and air generally may be created only by express written instrument. A statutory “solar easement” under Civil Code Section 801.5 may be created only by an instrument containing specified terms. The Court held that the County did not have an obligation to trim trees to avoid shading plaintiff’s solar panels, rejecting several theories asserted by plaintiff.Fishback v. County of VenturaDocket
133 Cal.App.4th 896 – 2nd Dist. (B177462) 10/26/05 Case complete 1/9/06SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: Under the 1937 and 1943 Subdivision Map Acts, “subdivision” was defined as “any land or portion thereof shown on the last preceding tax roll as a unit or as contiguous units which is divided for the purpose of sale . . . into five or more parcels within any one year period.” The Court makes numerous points interpreting those statutes, some of the most significant being: 1) Once the fifth parcel is created within a one-year period, all the parcels created within that year constitute a subdivision; 2) Even though a unit of land is defined as a unit as shown on the last tax roll preceding the division, that does not mean the unit shown on the last preceding tax roll is a legal parcel, and legal parcels cannot be created by dividing that illegal parcel; and 3) If land is divided for the purpose of sale, it is irrelevant that the retained parcel is not held for the purpose of sale. Thus, for example, if the owner of a unit of land divides it in half, the unit is divided for the purpose of sale even if the owner intends to sell only one half and keep the other.Attorney General Opinion No. 04-1105
10/3/05ASSESSOR’S RECORDS: County Assessors maintain parcel boundary map data, which is detailed geographic information used to describe and define the precise geographic boundaries of assessor’s parcels. When maintained in electronic format, Assessors must make copies in electronic format available to the public. The fee charged for producing the copy is limited to the direct cost of producing the copy in electronic format, and may not include expenses associated with the county’s initial gathering of the information, with initial conversion of the information into electronic format, or with maintaining the information.Villacreses v. MolinariDocketSup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 1223 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034719) 9/26/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/05ARBITRATION: Section 1298 requires that an arbitration provision in a real estate contract be accompanied by a statutory notice and that the parties indicate their assent by placing their initials on an adjacent space or line. The arbitration notice, standing alone, does not constitute an arbitration provision. So the Defendants could not compel arbitration where the contract contained only the notice, but did not contain a separate arbitration provision.
The Court has a good sense of humor. The opinion contains the following memorable quotes:
1. “If the first rule of medicine is ‘Do no harm,’ the first rule of contracting should be ‘Read the documents’.”
2. “. . . to paraphrase the immortal words of a former President of the United States, the applicability of this purported arbitration agreement to the instant dispute ‘depends upon what the meaning of the word “it” is.'”Campbell v. Superior Court (La Barrie)DocketSup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 904 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D046064) 9/14/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/05LIS PENDENS: A cause of action for a constructive trust or an equitable lien does not support a lis pendens where it is merely for the purpose of securing a judgment for money damages. [Ed. Note: The Court in this and similar cases make the absolute statement that “an equitable lien does not support a lis pendens”, and explain that the lien is sought merely to secure a money judgment. But it is unclear whether the Court would reach the same conclusion in a pure equitable lien case. For example, where a loan is paid off with the proceeds of a new loan, but the new mortgage accidentally fails to be recorded, an action to impose an equitable lien seeks more than a mere money judgment. It seeks to allow the new lender to step into the shoes of the old lender and, in my opinion, a lis pendens should be allowed.]Fripp v. Walters DocketDocketSup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 656 – 3rd Dist. (C046733) 9/7/05 (ONLY PART I CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION)Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/16/05BOUNDARIES / SURVEYS: A conveyance referring to a parcel map cannot convey more property than the creator of the parcel map owned. The Court rejected Defendant’s claim that the recorded parcel map was a “government sanctioned survey” which precludes a showing that the boundaries established by the parcel map are erroneous. The court explained that the rule cited by Defendants applies only to official survey maps that create boundaries. Boundary lines cannot be questioned after the conveyance of public land to a private party, even if they are inaccurate.Title Trust Deed Service Co. v. PearsonDocket
132 Cal.App.4th 168 – 2nd Dist (B175067) 8/25/05 Case complete 10/28/05HOMESTEADS: A declared homestead exemption applies to surplus proceeds from a trustee’s sale. [Comment: Applying the declared homestead exemption to trustee’s sales is fine. But the Court also seems to want to pay surplus proceeds to the debtor up to the amount of the exemption before paying the holder of a junior trust deed. This should be wrong since the homestead exemption does not apply to voluntary liens. I think the Court does not adequately address what appears to me to be a circuity of priority problem: The homestead exemption is senior to the judgment lien, which in this case happens to be senior to a junior TD, which is senior to the homestead exemption.]In re Marriage of BensonDocket
36 Cal.4th 1096 – Cal. Supreme Court (S122254) 8/11/05COMMUNITY PROPERTY: The doctrine of partial performance, which is an exception to the Statute of Frauds, is not an exception to the requirement of Family Code Section 852 that an agreement to transmute property be in writing. The concurring opinion points out that the Court does not decide what statutory or equitable remedy would be available to make whole a spouse who has been disadvantaged by an illusory oral promise to transmute property, or what sanction may be employed against a spouse who has used section 852(a) as a means of breaching his or her fiduciary duty and gaining unjust enrichment.First Federal Bank v. FegenDocket
131 Cal.App.4th 798 – 2nd Dist. (B174252) 7/29/05 Case complete 9/29/05JUDGMENTS: The Court dismissed an appeal as being moot where the debtor did not post a bond after a sheriff’s sale of real property. C.C.P. Section 917.4 provides that an appeal of an order directing the sale of real property does not stay enforcement of the order. A sheriff’s sale is final, except that the debtor can commence an action within 90 days to set aside the sale if the judgment creditor is the successful bidder. Here, the debtor failed to file an action within 90 days so the sale is final.Bear Creek Master Association v. EdwardsDocketSup.Ct. Docket
130 Cal.App.4th 1470 – 4th Dist. Div. 2 (E034859) 7/13/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/19/05CONDOMINIUMS: The definition of “condominium” in Civil Code Section 1351(f) does not require that an actual structure has been built; rather it only requires that it be described in a recorded condominium plan. (Note, however, that under CC 1352 the condominium does not come into existence until a condominium unit has been conveyed.) The case also contains an extensive discussion of the procedural requirements for foreclosing on an assessment lien recorded by the homeowner’s association.Woodridge Escondido Property Owners Assn. v. NielsenDocketSup.Ct. Docket
130 Cal.App.4th 559 – 4th Dist. Div. 1 (D044294) 5/25/05 (pub. order 6/16/05) Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/31/05CC&R’s: A provision in CC&R’s that prohibited construction of a permanent structure in an easement area applied to a deck because it was attached to the house and had supporting posts that were buried in the ground, such that it was designed to continue indefinitely without change and was constructed to last or endure.Beyer v. Tahoe Sands ResortDocket
129 Cal.App.4th 1458 – 3rd Dist. (C045691) 6/8/05 Case complete 8/8/05EASEMENTS: California Civil Code Section 805 provides that a servitude cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement. The Court held that the term “owner” under Section 805 means the owner of the full fee title, both legal and equitable, such that a property owner who owns less than full title may validly create easements in his own favor on his land. Here, the Court held that the grantor could reserve an easement over property conveyed to a time-share trustee where the grantor held all beneficial interest in the trust and the grantee held just bare legal title.Bank of America v. La Jolla GroupDocketSup.Ct. Docket
129 Cal.App.4th 706 – 5th Dist. (F045318) 5/19/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/7/05TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale, which was accidentally held after the owner and lender agreed to reinstate the loan, is invalid. The conclusive presumptions in Civil Code Section 2924 pertain only to notice requirements, not to every defect or inadequacy. The Court points out that the advantages of being a bona fide purchaser are not limited to the presumptions set forth in Section 2924, but does not discuss it further because the defendant did not argue that its bona fide purchaser status supports its position in any way other than the statutory presumptions.Zabrucky v. McAdamsDocket
129 Cal.App.4th 618 – 2nd Dist. (B167590) 5/18/05 Case complete 7/20/05COVENANTS, CONDITIONS & RESTRICTIONS: The Court interpreted a provision in CC&R’s to prohibit an addition to a house which would unreasonably obstruct a neighbor’s view. The Court painstakingly nit-picked through the provisions of the CC&R’s and compared the provisions and the facts to other cases where courts have done the same. The main conclusion I draw is that these cases are each unique and it is very difficult to determine in advance what a court will do. In fact, one judge dissented in this case. This means it can be very dangerous to issue endorsements such as CLTA Endorsement No. 100.6 or 100.28, insuring against this kind of provision in CC&R’s.Anolik v. EMC Mortgage Corp.DocketSup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C044201) 4/29/05 (Mod. 5/26/05) Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED and DECERTIFIED 8/10/05***DECERTIFIED*** TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. To be valid, a notice of default must contain at least one correct statement of a breach, and it must be substantial enough to authorize use of the drastic remedy of nonjudicial foreclosure.
2. An assertion in a notice of default of one or more breaches qualified with the words “if any” does not satisfy the requirements of section 2924 because it indicates that the lender has no clue as to the truth or falsity of the assertion.
3. It is not proper to declare a payment in default when the time for imposing a late fee on that payment has not expired because the default is not sufficiently substantial at that point.
4. Under Civil Code Section 2954, a lender cannot force impound payments for property taxes until the borrower has failed to pay two consecutive tax installments.Kangarlou v. Progressive Title CompanyDocket
128 Cal.App.4th 1174 – 2nd Dist. (B177400) 4/28/05 Case complete 6/29/05ESCROW: 1. Under Civil Code Section 1717, plaintiff can recover attorney’s fees after prevailing in an action against the escrow holder, even though the escrow instructions limited attorney’s fees to actions to collect escrow fees.
2. Under Business and Professions Code Section 10138, an escrow holder has a duty to obtain evidence that a real estate broker was regularly licensed before delivering compensation.Paul v. SchoellkopfDocketSup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 147 – 2nd Dist. (B170379) 4/5/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/15/05ESCROW: A provision for attorneys’ fees in escrow instructions limited to fees incurred by the escrow company in collecting for escrow services does not apply to other disputes between the buyer and seller.Knight v. Superior CourtDocketSup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 14 – 3rd Dist. (C048378) 4/4/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/29/05DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS: Family Code Section 308.5, enacted by Proposition 22, 3/7/00, states: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” This statute did not prohibit the legislature from enacting California’s Domestic Partnership Law, Family Code Section 297, et seq., because Section 308.5 pertains only to marriages, not to other relationships.Estate of SeifertDocketSup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 64 – 3rd Dist. (C046456) 4/4/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/22/05ADVERSE POSSESSION: A fiduciary, including an executor, may not acquire title by adverse possession against the heirs. Once the executor was appointed, the statutory period for his adverse possession of the subject property ceased to run.Melendrez v. D & I InvestmentDocketSup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 1238 – 6th Dist. (H027098) 3/29/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/22/05 TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale cannot be set aside where the purchaser at the sale is a bona fide purchaser (“BFP”). The elements of being a BFP are that the buyer 1) purchase the property in good faith for value, and 2) have no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of another. The value paid may be substantially below fair market value. Also, the buyer’s sophistication and experience in purchasing at trustee’s sales does not disqualify him from being a BFP, although in evaluating whether the buyer is a BFP, the buyer’s foreclosure sale experience may be considered in making the factual determination of whether he had knowledge or notice of the conflicting claim.Radian Guaranty v. GaramendiDocketSup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 1280 – 1st Dist. (A105789) 3/29/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/20/05TITLE INSURANCE: Radian’s Lien Protection Policy constitutes title insurance pursuant to Insurance Code Section 12340.1. Because Radian does not possess a certificate of authority to transact title insurance, it is not authorized to sell the policy in California or anywhere else in the United States, pursuant to California’s monoline statutes: Ins. Code Section 12360 (title insurance) and Ins. Code Section 12640.10 (mortgage guaranty insurance).Gardenhire v. Superior CourtDocketSup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 426a – 6th Dist. (H026601) 3/22/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/05TRUSTS: A trust can be revoked by a will where the trust provided for revocation by “any writing” and the will expressed a present intent to revoke the trust. The Court pointed out that a will, which is inoperative during the testator’s life, can nevertheless have a present and immediate effect upon delivery, such as notice of intent to revoke.Jones v. Union Bank of CaliforniaDocketSup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 542 – 2nd Dist. (B173302) 3/11/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/05When a lender successfully defends an action to set aside or enjoin a foreclosure sale, the antideficiency provisions of C.C.P. Section 580d do not prohibit an award of attorney fees. In addition, Civil Code sections 2924c and 2924d do not limit the amount of fees the court may award.O’Toole Company v. Kingsbury Court HOADocket
126 Cal.App.4th 549 – 2nd Dist. (B172607) 2/3/05 Case complete 4/8/05HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: In a suit to enforce a judgment, the trial court properly appointed a receiver and levied a special emergency assessment when defendant-homeowners association failed to pay. The Court pointed out that regular assessments are exempt from execution, but not special assessments.State of California ex rel. Bowen v. Bank of AmericaDocketSup.Ct. Docket
126 Cal.App.4th 225 – 2nd Dist. (B172190) 1/31/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/18/05ESCHEAT: This is a qui tam action filed on behalf of the State Controller. The court held that unused reconveyance fees do not need to be escheated because the obligation to return a specific sum of money is neither certain nor liquidated under Civil Code Section 2941 or under the provisions of the deeds of trust. This case was against lenders and I believe it would not apply in the context of escrow and title insurance.Van Klompenburg v. BergholdDocketSup.Ct. Docket
126 Cal.App.4th 345 – 3rd Dist. (C045417) 1/31/05 Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/11/05EASEMENTS: Where the grant of easement states that the right of way shall be “kept open” and “wholly unobstructed”, the normal rule does not apply, which would otherwise allow the owner of the servient estate to erect a locked gate as long as the owner of the dominant estate is given a key and the gate does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement.State of California v. Old Republic Title CompanyDocketSup.Ct. Docket
125 Cal.App.4th 1219 – 1st Dist. (A095918) 1/20/05 NOTE: request for order directing republication of court of appeal opinion DENIED 8/16/06.
Overruled in part on issue not significant to title insurance – SEE BELOW.TITLE INSURANCE: Old Republic was found liable for 1) failing to escheat unclaimed funds in escrow accounts, 2) failing to return fees collected for reconveyances which were not used and 3) failing to pay interest collected on escrow funds to the depositing party.
Of particular interest, the Court stated:
“Insurance Code Section 12413.5 provides that interest on escrow funds must be paid to the depositing party ‘unless the escrow is otherwise instructed by the depositing party . . . .’ Any title company is free to draft escrow instructions that, with full disclosure to and agreement from the depositing party, direct that the arbitrage interest differential be paid to the company. It is a matter of disclosing the pertinent costs and benefits to the customer.”
FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A political subdivision may not bring an action under Government Code section 12652, subdivision (c), to recover funds on behalf of the state or another political subdivision.Frei v. DaveyDocket
124 Cal.App.4th 1506 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G033682) 12/17/04 Case complete 2/22/05CONTRACTS: Under the most recent version of the CAR purchase contract, the prevailing party is barred from recovering attorney fees if he refused a request to mediate.Mix v. Superior Court DocketSup.Ct. Docket
124 Cal.App.4th 987 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 12/7/04 (G033875) Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/16/05LIS PENDENS: (Related to Behniwal v. Superior Court, several cases above.) After the claimant loses at trial, the trial court must expunge a lis pendens pending appeal unless claimant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. Claimants will rarely be able to do this because it requires a trial court to determine that its own decision will probably be reversed on appeal. The court points out that this strict result is tempered by claimant’s ability to petition the appellate court for a writ of mandate, so that the appellate court can make its own determination of the probability of the trial court’s decision being reversed on appeal.D’Orsay International Partners v. Superior CourtDocketSup.Ct. Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 836 – 2nd Dist. 10/29/04 (B174411) Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/26/05MECHANIC’S LIENS: The court ordered the release of a mechanic’s lien because there was no actual visible work on the land or the delivery of construction materials. The criteria applicable to a design professional’s lien do not apply where the claimant filed a mechanic’s lien. The court specifically did not address the question of whether a contractor performing design services or employing design professionals may assert a design professionals’ lien.Gibbo v. BergerDocketSup.Ct. Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 396 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 10/22/04 (E035201) Case complete 12/27/04 Req. for Depublication by Cal. Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/16/05USURY: The usury exemption for loans arranged by real estate brokers does not apply where the broker functioned as an escrow whose involvement was limited to preparing loan documents on the terms provided by the parties, ordering title insurance, and dispersing funds, all in accordance with the parties’ instructions. In order to “arrange a loan” the broker must act as a third party intermediary who causes a loan to be obtained or procured. Such conduct includes structuring the loan as the agent for the lender, setting the interest rate and points to be paid, drafting the terms of the loan, reviewing the loan documents, or conducting a title search.Knapp v. DohertyDocket
123 Cal.App.4th 76 – 6th Dist. 9/20/04 (H026670) Case complete 12/21/04TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Civil Code Section 2924 requires the trustee to give notice of sale only “after the lapse of the three months” following recordation of the notice of default. The Notice of Sale technically violated this requirement because it was served by mail on the property owner several days prior to the end of three months. However, this did not invalidate the sale because the owner did not suffer prejudice from the early notice.
2. Incorrectly stating the date of the default in the Notice of Default did not invalidate the sale because the discrepancy was not material.Royal Thrift and Loan v. County EscrowDocket
123 Cal.App.4th 24 – 2nd Dist. 10/15/04 (B165006) Case complete 12/16/04TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Postponements of a trustee’s sale during an appeal were reasonable, so they do not count toward the 3-postponement limit of Civil Code Section 2924g(c)(1). The postponements fall under the “stayed by operation of law” exception. However, the Court recognized that the better course would have been to re-notice the trustee’s sale after the appeal.
2. The court indicated that an appeal from an action to quiet title against a deed of trust should stay the trustee’s sale proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure Section 916 pending the appeal. However, the court did not formally make that holding because the owner did not appeal and the issues involving the appellants (escrow holder and bonding company) did not require a holding on that issue.Tesco Controls v. Monterey Mechanical Co.Docket
124 Cal.App.4th 780 – 3rd Dist. 12/6/04 (C042184) (Opinion on rehearing) Case complete 2/7/05MECHANIC’S LIENS: A mechanic’s lien release that waives lien rights up to the date stated in the release is effective to waive lien rights up to that date, even if the progress payments did not fully compensate the lien claimant.Gale v. Superior CourtDocket
122 Cal.App.4th 1388 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 10/6/04 (G033968) (Mod. 10/22/04) Rehearing Denied 10/22/04; Case Complete 12/10/04LIS PENDENS / DIVORCE
1. The automatic stay contained in a divorce summons does not apply to the sale by the husband, as managing member of a family-owned management company, of real property vested in the management company.
2. A petition for dissolution of marriage which does not allege a community interest in specific real property does not support the filing of a lis pendens.Nwosu v. UbaDocket
122 Cal.App.4th 1229 – 6th Dist. 10/1/04 (H026182) Case complete 12/01/04The court held that a transaction was a bona fide sale and not an equitable mortgage. The complicated facts provide little of interest to the title insurance business, other than to note the fact that a deed can be held to be a mortgage if the deed was given to secure a debt. The case contains a good discussion of the distinction between legal claims, for which there is a right to a jury trial, and equitable claims, for which there is no right to a jury trial.Moores v. County of MendocinoDocket
122 Cal.App.4th 883 – 1st Dist. 9/24/04 (A105446) Case complete 11/24/04SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: The enactment of an ordinance requiring the County to record notices of merger did not result in the unmerger of parcels that had previously merged under the County’s previous automatic merger ordinance. The County properly sent a subsequent notice under Gov. Code Section 66451.302 notifying property owners of the possibility of a merger. Accordingly, plaintiff’s parcels remain merged.Larsson v. GrabachDocketSup.Ct. Docket
121 Cal.App.4th 1147 – 5th Dist. 8/25/04 (F042675) Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/15/04EASEMENTS: An easement by implication can be created when an owner of real property dies intestate and the property is then divided and distributed to the intestate’s heirs by court decree.Felgenhauer v. SoniDocket
121 Cal.App.4th 445 – 2nd Dist. 8/5/04 (B157490) Case complete 10/8/04PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: To establish a claim of right, which is one of the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant does not need to believe he is entitled to use of the easement. The phrase “claim of right” has caused confusion because it suggests the need for an intent or state of mind. But it does not require a belief that the use is legally justified; it simply means that the property was used without permission of the owner of the land.Jonathan Neil & Assoc. v. JonesDocket
33 Cal.4th 917 – Cal. Supreme Court (S107855) 8/5/04 (Mod. 10/20/04)INSURANCE: A tort action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists only in regard to the issues of bad faith payment of claims and unreasonable failure to settle. It does not pertain to the general administration of an insurance policy or to other contract settings. In this case, a tort cause of action does not lie for the insurer’s bad faith conduct in setting an unfairly high insurance premium.Bello v. ABA Energy CorporationDocket
121 Cal.App.4th 301 – 1st Dist. 8/2/04 (A102287) Case complete 10/6/04RIGHTS OF WAY: A grant of a public right of way includes uses made possible by future development or technology, which are not in existence at the time of the grant. Here, the Court held that a right of way included the right to install a pipeline to transport natural gas.California National Bank v. HavisDocket
120 Cal.App.4th 1122 – 2nd Dist. 7/23/04 (B167152) Case complete 9/22/04DEEDS OF TRUST: A bank holding a deed of trust holder was paid outside of escrow with a check. The bank sent a letter to escrow stating that it had “received payoff funds . . . it is our policy to issue the Full Reconveyance 10 days after receipt of the payoff check. Therefore, a Full Reconveyance will be sent to the County Recorder on or about August 5, 2002”. The escrow relied on the letter and closed escrow without paying off the lender. The check bounced and the lender began foreclosure.
The Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the letter did not constitute a payoff demand statement binding on the bank under CC 2943. The Court determined that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the parties could reasonably have relied on the letter. [Ed. note: The Court exhibited a scary lack of understanding of real estate transactions, and could not come to grips with the fact that reconveyances from institutional lenders never record at close of escrow.]Kirkeby v. Sup. Ct. (Fascenelli)Docket
33 Cal.4th 642 – Cal. Supreme Court 7/22/04 (S117640)LIS PENDENS: An action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance supports the recording of a lis pendens. The court stated that “[b]y definition, the voiding of a transfer of real property will affect title to or possession of real property”. (Ed. note: Several appellate court decisions have held that actions to impose equitable liens and constructive trusts do not support a lis pendens. The Supreme Court did not deal with those issues but it seems that, using the court’s language, it could similarly be said that “by definition imposing an equitable lien or constructive trust will affect title to or possession of real property.”)Tom v. City and County of San FranciscoDocketSup.Ct. Docket
120 Cal.App.4th 674 – 1st Dist. 6/22/04 (A101950) Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/13/04TENANCY IN COMMON AGREEMENTS: In order to evade burdensome regulations for converting apartments to condominiums, it has become a common practice in San Francisco for a group of people to acquire a multi-unit residential building and enter into a tenancy in common agreement establishing an exclusive right of occupancy for each dwelling unit. Seeking to end this practice, the People’s Republic of San Francisco enacted an ordinance prohibiting exclusive right of occupancy agreements. The Court held that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the right of privacy set forth in Article I, section I of the California Constitution.California Attorney General Opinion No. 03-1108
6/9/04RECORDING: A memorandum of lease is a recordable instrument.Yeung v. SoosDocket
119 Cal.App.4th 576 – 2nd Dist. 6/16/04 (B165939) (Mod. 7/2/04) Case complete 9/10/04QUIET TITLE: A default judgment after service by publication is permissible in a quiet title action. However, the judgment may not be entered by the normal default prove-up methods; the court must require evidence of the plaintiff’s title, including live witnesses and complete authentication of the underlying real property records. Nevertheless, the judgment is not rendered void because the default prove-up method was used rather than an evidentiary hearing.Villa de Las Palmas HOA v. TerifajDocket
33 Cal.4th 73 – Cal. Supreme Court 6/14/04 (S109123)RESTRICTIONS: Use restrictions in amended declarations are binding on owners who purchased prior to recordation of the amendment. They are also subject to the same presumption of validity as the original declaration.In re Marriage of GioiaDocket
119 Cal.App.4th 272 – 2nd Dist. 6/9/04 (B166803) Case complete 8/11/04BANKRUPTCY: A bankruptcy trustee’s notice of abandonment of property was effective even though it was ambiguous because it did not specifically state that the trustee will be deemed to have abandoned the property 15 days from the date of mailing of the notice. The court also states that an abandonment is irrevocable even if the property later becomes more valuable.Dieckmeyer v. Redevelopment Agency of Huntington BeachDocketSup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 248 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 2/28/05 (G031869) (2nd Opinion) Case complete 5/5/05DEEDS OF TRUST: Where a deed of trust secures both payment of a promissory note and performance of contractual obligations (CC&R’s in this case), the trustor is not entitled to reconveyance of the deed of trust after the note is paid off, but before the contractual obligations are satisfied.Textron Financial v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.DocketSup.Ct. Docket
118 Cal.App.4th 1061 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 5/20/04 (G020323) (Mod. 6/18/04) Req. for rev. and depub. by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/15/04INSURANCE / PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
1. The amount of attorney’s fees incurred by an insured in obtaining policy benefits and recoverable under Brandt v. Sup. Ct. are limited to the fees under the contingency fee agreement between the insured and its counsel, and not a higher figure based on the reasonable value of the attorney’s services.
2. Punitive damages must be based on compensatory damages awarded for tortious conduct, including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, excluding the sum recovered on the breach of contract claim.
3. When compensatory damages are neither exceptionally high nor low, and the defendant’s conduct is neither exceptionally extreme nor trivial, the outer constitutional limit on the amount of punitive damages is approximately four times the amount of compensatory damages.
4. The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.Blackburn v. CharnleyDocketSup.Ct. Docket
117 Cal.App.4th 758 – 2nd Dist. 4/8/04 (B166080) Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/21/04SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance is available even though the contract referred to lots which had not yet been subdivided. This violation of the Subdivision Map Act made the contract voidable at the option of the buyer, who chose to enforce the contract instead. The requirement in the standard CAR contract to mediate in order to collect attorney’s fees does not apply where an action is filed in order to record a lis pendens and where mediation was conducted pursuant to the court’s own practices.Hedges v. CarriganDocket
117 Cal.App.4th 578 – 2nd Dist. 4/6/04 (B166248) Case complete 6/11/04ARBITRATION: The Federal Arbitration Act preempts C.C.P. Section 1298, which requires that an arbitration clause in a real estate contract contain a specified notice and be in a specified type size. Preemption requires that the transaction affect interstate commerce, which the court found existed because the anticipated financing involved an FHA loan, and the purchase agreement was on a copyrighted form that stated it could only be used by members of the National Association of Realtors. [Ed. note: the form does not say that!] However, in the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court held that the arbitration clause could not be enforced because it required that the parties initial it in order to acknowledge their agreement to arbitration, and they did not all do so. [Ed. note: the concurring opinion makes much more sense than the majority opinion!]Kapner v. Meadowlark Ranch Assn.Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 1182 – 2nd Dist. 3/17/04 (B163525) Case complete 5/25/04ADVERSE POSSESSION / PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: A prescriptive easement cannot be established where the encroacher’s use is exclusive. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order requiring the property owner to sign an encroachment agreement or remove the encroachment.Harrison v. WelchDocketSup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 1084 – 3rd Dist. 3/12/04 (C044320) Request for depublication DENIED 6/23/04ADVERSE POSSESSION / PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS:
1) In the uncertified Part I of the opinion, the court rejected Defendant’s claim of adverse possession because real property taxes were not paid on any area outside of Defendant’s lot. The court rejected defendant’s creative argument that real property taxes were paid on all land within the setback area where defendant’s house was 3-1/2 feet from the property line, and a zoning ordinance required a 5-foot setback.
2) A prescriptive easement cannot be established where the encroacher’s use is exclusive. The opinion contains an excellent discussion of the case law on this issue.
3) The 5-year statute of limitations in C.C.P. Sections 318 and 321, within which a plaintiff must bring an action to recover real property, does not commence until the encroacher’s use of the property has ripened into adverse possession.Brizuela v. CalFarm Insurance CompanyDocketSup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 578 – 2nd Dist. 3/3/04 (B160875) Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/9/04INSURANCE: Where an insurance policy requires an insured who has filed a claim to submit to an examination under oath, that obligation is a condition precedent to obtaining benefits under the policy. The insurer is entitled to deny the claim without showing it was prejudiced by the insured’s refusal.Hanshaw v. Long Valley Road Assn.DocketSup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 471 – 3rd Dist. 3/2/04 (C041796) Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/19/04PUBLIC STREETS: An offer of dedication of a public street that is not formally accepted may, nevertheless, be accepted by subsequent public use. This is known as common law dedication. However, counties have a duty to maintain only those roads that are “county roads”, and a public road does not become a county road unless specifically accepted as such by the appropriate resolution of the Board of Supervisors.Miner v. Tustin Avenue InvestorsDocket
116 Cal.App.4th 264 – 4th Dist., Div.3 2/27/04 (G031703) Case complete 5/4/04LEASES / ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATES: A lease contained an option to renew for 5 years, but the tenant signed an estoppel certificate stating that the lease was in full force and effect, and that the tenant had no options except the following: (blank lines that followed were left blank). The Court held that the tenant was not bound by the estoppel certificate because it was ambiguous as to whether it referred only to options outside of the lease or whether the tenant had somehow given up his option rights.Tremper v. QuinonesDocket
115 Cal.App.4th 944 – 2nd Dist. 2/17/04 (B165218) Case complete 5/3/04GOOD FAITH IMPROVER: Attorney’s fees and costs may be included in the calculation of damages awarded against a person bringing an action as a good faith improver under C.C.P. Section 871.3, regardless of whether the costs and fees were incurred in prosecuting a complaint or defending against a cross complaint, and even where the good faith improver issues are part of a quiet title action which would not ordinarily support an award of attorney’s fees and costs.Kertesz v. OstrovskyDocket
115 Cal.App.4th 369 – 4th Dist., Div.3 1/28/04 (G030640) Case complete 4/2/04JUDGMENTS / BANKRUPTCY: The time for renewing a judgment was 10 years from entry of the judgment, plus the amount of time between the debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy petition and the date of the Bankruptcy Court’s order of nondischargeability, plus an additional 30 days under Bankruptcy Code Section 108(c). The court reached this conclusion even though the judgment was entered before the bankruptcy petition was filed, and the 10-year period for renewing the judgment expired long after the bankruptcy was closed.
NOTE: I believe the judge misunderstood the automatic stay and Bankruptcy Code Section 108(c). I do not believe the automatic stay applies when a period of time for taking an action commences prior to bankruptcy, and expires after the bankruptcy case is closed.Rancho Santa Fe Association v. Dolan-KingDocketSup.Ct. Docket
115 Cal.App.4th 28 – 4th Dist., Div.1 1/7/04 (D040637/D041486) Pet. for Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/28/04HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Regulations adopted and interpreted by a Homeowner’s Association must be reasonable from the perspective of the entire development, not by determining on a case-by-case basis the effect on individual homeowners.Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich v. Vigilant Insurance Co.Docket
114 Cal.App.4th 1185 – 4th Dist., Div.1 1/12/04 (D041811) Case complete 3/15/04INSURANCE: Civil Code Section 2860(c) provides for the arbitration of disputes over the amount of legal fees or the hourly billing rate of Cumis counsel, but does not apply to other defense expenses.
Bank of America, N.A. v. La Jolla Group II, 129 Cal. App. 4th 706, 15 710,717 (5th Dist. 2005) (void foreclosure sale required rescission of trustee’s deed returning title to the status quo prior to the foreclosure sale); Dimock v. Emerald Properties, 81 Cal. App. 4th 868, 874 (4th Dist. 2000) (sale under deed of trust by former trustee void, and tender of the amount due is unnecessary).
THE COURT MUST STRICTLY ENFORCE
THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A FORECLOSURE.
The harshness of non-judicial foreclosure has been recognized. “The exercise of the power of sale is a harsh method of foreclosing the rights of the grantor.” Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 6 215, citing to System Inv. Corporation v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 153. The statutory requirements are intended to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of his property Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; accord, Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 503; Lo Nguyen v. Calhoun (6th District 2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 440, and a valid foreclosure by the private power of sale requires strict compliance with the requirements of the statute. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.179; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211 (3d Dist. 1989), reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Bisno v. Sax (2d Dist. 1959) 175 Cal. App. 2d 714, 720.
It has been a cornerstone of foreclosure law that the statutory requirements, intending to protect the Trustor and or Grantor from a wrongful or unfair loss of the property, must be complied with strictly. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182. “Close” compliance does not count. As a result, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Default is invalid (emphasis added). Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3dDist. 1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash, Door & Mill Co.(3d Dist. 1931) 118 Cal. App. 379.
Additionally, any Trustee’s Sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Trustee Sale is invalid. Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3d Dist. 1989) 11 208 Cal.App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989). The California Sixth District Court of Appeal observed, “Pursuing that policy [of judicial interpretation], the courts have fashioned rules to protect the debtor, one of them being that the notice of default will be strictly construed and must correctly set forth the amounts required to cure the default.” Sweatt v. The Foreclosure Co., Inc. (1985 – 6th District) 166 Cal.App.3d 273 at 278, citing to Miller v. Cote (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 888, 894 and SystemInv. Corp. v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-153.
The same reasoning applies even to a Notice of Trustee’s Sale. Courts will set aside a foreclosure sale when there has been fraud, when the sale has been improperly, unfairly, or unlawfully conducted, or when there has been such a mistake that it would be inequitable to let it stand. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Reidy (1940) 15 Cal. 2d 243, 248; Whitman v. Transtate Title Co.(4th Dist. 1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 312, 322-323; In re Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1228. See also Smith v. Williams (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 617, 621; Stirton v. Pastor (4th Dist. 1960) 177 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234; Brown v. Busch (3d Dist. 1957) 152 Cal.App. 2d 200, 203-204.
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My name is Timothy McCandless, and I’m here to tell you what most banks and mortgage loan servicers don’t want you to know: More than 65 million homes in the US may not be subject to foreclosure after all, and your home is very likely one of the “safe” homes. The reason these homes are not technically subject to foreclosure is because the lenders, mortgage companies, mortgage servicers, and title companies broke the law throughout the process of managing your loan, both at the inception of your loan and throughout the life of the loan. Because of their fraudulent actions, they are unable to produce a title for, or show ownership of, your property. This causes what we call a “defect of title”, and legally prohibits your lender or servicer from foreclosing, regardless of whether or not your loan is current.
This situation is all over the news, and now, starting today, you can learn how to protect yourself from unlawful foreclosure.
WE CAN TRAIN YOU HOW TO CHALLENGE YOUR LENDER
Most Mortgage Assignments are Illegal
In a major ruling in the Massachusetts Supreme Court today, US Bank National Association and Wells Fargo lost the “Ibanez case”, meaning that they don’t have standing to foreclose due to improper mortgage assignment. The ruling is likely to send shock waves through the entire judicial system, and seriously raise the stakes on foreclosure fraud. Bank stocks plummeted after this ruling. These assignments are what people need to challenge in their own mortgages.
I am prepared to show you the most amazing information on how you can actually Challenge Your Lender. Once you opt in for our free ebook (just enter your email address above and to the right), you’ll get immediate access to our first, very informative webinar, as well as to our free ebook. You’ll learn more about the Challenge Your Lender program, and more importantly, how the US mortgage system is rigged to take advantage of you and how to can fight back. My program will show you exactly how to get a copy of your loan documents that your lender or loan servicer currently has in their possession, and then how to begin examining these documents to learn more about how your lender, as well as other parties involved, has used your name and credit to make millions of dollars. Analyzing your loan documents is a crucial first step in beginning the Challenge Your Lender process.
Save your home from foreclosure
The information that you will be receiving in my free material and webinar will further your knowledge on what most lenders are doing to homeowners, and how you can save yourself from foreclosure. You will have the opportunity to acquire a free copy of my Challenge Your Lender workbook and learn how to begin building the paper trail that you will need to defend yourself and to prove the wrongdoings of your lender and loan servicer. Once you go through the workbook and listen in on the free webinar, you will be on top of your Challenge and ready to begin the program.
The Challenge Your Lender program will help put you in a position of power and control over your loan, and will allow you to decide what you would like to do with your property. This leverage will be advantageous when you begin negotiating your foreclosure. Most importantly, your lender or loan servicer should not be able to foreclose on you once you notify them that you have identified fraudulent activity. My program is your first step in saving your property from foreclosure.
Don’t wait – opt in today. Every day counts in the battle against your lender.
and How Newt Gingrich Abetted the Theft of Average Joe’s Home – by Bill ButlerThe untold story in the foreclosure crisis unfolding across America is that, following a foreclosure perpetrated by one of the October 2008 Bailout Banks (e.g. Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo) Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac suddenly appear as the record owner of Average Joe’s home. These federal government sponsored entities then go into local housing court and get a court order authorizing them to evict Joe. If Joe resists, these supposedly charitable institutions obtain a writ ordering the local sheriff to forcibly remove Joe from his home.
Newt Gingrich recently admitted to accepting $1.8 million from Freddie Mac ($25,0000 to $30,000 a month during one span of time) for advising this proto-fascist entity. Gingrich claims that he supports Fannie and Freddie because he believes the federal government “should have programs to help low income people acquire the ability to buy homes.” But Fannie and Freddie don’t do this and never have. When government “helps” someone by subsidizing the purchase of something (through easy credit or lower-than-market rates), it makes that something more expensive. Helping someone buy something that is overpriced because of your help is not help. Fannie/Freddie subsidies not only hurt the low income people they intend to help, they hurt everyone by subsidizing, and therefore distorting, the entire housing market. Fannie/Freddie’s charity has now taken a dark turn. Like their Depression-era New Deal predecessor the Regional Agricultural Credit Corp., Fannie/Freddie are now repossessing homes at an increasing and alarming rate.
Mr. Gingrich either does not understand economics – government subsidies make things more expensive, not less expensive, and therefore hurt their intended beneficiaries – or he is a vain, selfish, and cynical man with no interest in actually helping his neighbor.
You decide.
THE OCTOBER 2008 BAILOUT PAID OFF THE HOLDERS OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITES AND DERIVATIVE INSUREDS
The facts indicate that the Federal Reserve “printed” at least 16 trillion dollars as part of the 2008 bailouts. The bigger questions, however, who got it, why and what did the Fed get in return? The Fed doesn’t just print money. It prints money to buy stuff. Most often this is U.S. Treasuries. That changed in October of 2008. In and after October 2008 the Fed printed new money to buy mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that were defaulting at a rapid rate. Want proof? Here is a link to the Federal Reserve balance sheet which shows that the Fed is holding over a trillion dollars in mortgage backed securities that it began acquiring in 2008.
Why is the Federal Reserve holding all these MBS? Because when “the market” collapsed in September of 2008, what really collapsed is the Fannie/Freddie/Wall Street mortgage “daisy chain” securitization scheme. As increasing numbers of MBS went into default, the purchasers of derivatives (naked insurance contracts betting on MBS default) began filing claims against the insurance writers (e.g. AIG) demanding payment. This started in February 2007 when HSBC Bank announced billions in MBS losses, gained momentum in June of 2007 when Bear Stearns announced $3.8 billion in MBS exposure in just one Bear Stearns fund, and further momentum with the actual collapse of Bear Stears in July and August of 2007. By September of 2008, the Bear Stearns collapse proved to be the canary in the coal mine as the claims on off-balance sheet derivatives became the cascading cross defaults that Alan Greenspan warned could collapse the entire Western financial system.
Part of what happened in October 2008 is that the Federal Reserve paid AIG’s and others’ derivative obligations to the insureds (pension funds, hedge funds, major banks, foreign banks) who held the naked insurance contracts guaranteeing Average Joe’s payments. To understand this, imagine that a cataclysmic event occurred in the U.S. that destroyed nearly every car in the U.S. and further that Allstate insured all of these cars. That is what happened to AIG. When the housing market collapsed and borrowers began defaulting on their securitized loans, AIG’s derivative obligations exceeded its ability (or willingness) to pay. So the Fed stepped in as the insurer of last resort and bailed out AIG (and probably others). When an insurer pays on a personal property claim, it has “subrogation” rights. This means when it pays it has the right to demand possession of the personal property it insured or seek recovery from those responsible for the loss. In Allstate’s case this is wrecked cars. In the case of AIG and the Fed, it is MBS. That is what the trillions of MBS on the Fed’s balance sheet represent: wrecked cars that Fannie and Freddie are now liquidating for scrap value.
Thank you Mr. Gingrich. Great advice.
BUT FANNIE/FREDDIE WASN’T MY LENDER AND WASN’T MY MORTGAGEE, SO HOW CAN THEY TAKE MY HOUSE?
To understand how it came to be that the Fed has paid Average Joe’s original actual lender (the MBS purchaser) and now Fannie and Freddie are trying to take Joe’s home, you first have to understand some mortgage law and securitization basics.
The Difference Between Notes and Mortgages
When you close on the purchase of your home, you sign two important documents. You sign a promissory note that represents your legal obligation to pay. You sign ONE promissory note. You sign ONE promissory note because it is a negotiable instrument, payable “to the order of” the “lender” identified in the promissory note. If you signed two promissory notes on a $300,000 loan from Countrywide, you could end up paying Countrywide (or one of its successors) $600,000.
At closing you also sign a Mortgage (or a Deed of Trust in Deed of Trust States). You may sign more than one Mortgage. You may sign more than one Mortgage because it does not represent a legal obligation to pay anything. You could sign 50 Mortgages relating to your $300,000 Countrywide loan and it would not change your obligation. A Mortgage is a security instrument. It is security and security only. Without a promissory note, a mortgage is nothing. Nothing.
You “give” or “grant” a mortgage to your original lender as security for the promise to pay as represented by the promissory note. In real estate law parlance, you “give/grant” the “mortgage” to the “holder” of your “promissory note.”
If you question my bona fides in commenting on the important distinction between notes and mortgages, I know what I am talking about. I tried and won perhaps the first securitized mortgage lawsuit ever in the country in First National Bank of Elk River v. Independent Mortgage Services, 1996 WL 229236 (Minn. Ct. App. No. DX-95-1919).
In FNBER v. IMS a mortgage assignee (IMS) claimed the ownership of two mortgages relating to loans (promissory notes) held by my client, the First National Bank of Elk River (FNBER). After a three-day trial where IMS was capably represented by a former partner of the international law firm Dorsey & Whitney, my client prevailed and the Court voided the recorded mortgage assignments to IMS. My client prevailed not because of my great skill but because it had actual, physical custody of the original promissory notes (payable to the order of my client) and had been “servicing” (receiving payments on) the loans for years notwithstanding the recorded assignment of mortgage. The facts at trial showed that IMS rejected the loans because they did not conform to their securitization parameters. In short, IMS, as the “record owner” of the mortgages without any provable connection to the underlying notes, had nothing. FNBER, on the other hand, had promissory notes payable to the order of FNBER but did not have “record title” to the mortgages. FNBER was the winner because its possession of and entitlement to enforce the notes made it the “legal owner” of the mortgages.
The lesson: if you have record title to a mortgage but cannot show that you have possession of and/or entitlement to enforce the promissory notes that the mortgage secures, you lose.
This is true for 62 million securitized loans.
Securitization – The Car That Doesn’t Go In Reverse
There is nothing per se illegitimate about securitization. The law has for a long time recognized the rights of a noteholder to sell off pro-rata interests in the note. So long as the noteholder remains the noteholder he has the right to exercise rights in a mortgage (take the house) when there is a default on the note. Securitization does not run afoul of traditional real estate and foreclosure law when the mortgage holder can prove his connection to the noteholder.
But modern securitization doesn’t work this way.
The “securitization” of a “mortgage loan” today involves multiple parties but the most important parties and documents necessary for evaluating whether a bank has a right to foreclose on a mortgage are:
(1) the Borrower (Average Joe);
(2) the Original Lender (Mike’s Baitshop and Mortgages or Bailey Savings & Loan – whoever is across the closing table from Joe);
(3) the Original Mortgagee (could be Mike’s B&M, but could be anyone, including Fannie’s Creature From the Black Lagoon, the mortgagee “nominee” MERS);
(4) the “Servicer” of the loan as identified in the PSA (usually a Bank or anyone with “servicer” in its name, the entity to whom Joe makes his payments);
(5) the mortgage loan “pooling and servicing agreement” (PSA) and the PSA Trust created by the PSA;
(6) the “PSA Trust” is the “special purpose entity” created by the PSA. The PSA Trust is the heart of the PSA. It holds all securitized notes and mortgages and also sells MBS securities to investors; and
(7) the “Trustee” of the PSA Trust is the entity responsible for safekeeping of Joe’s promissory note and mortgage and the issuer of MBS.
The PSA Servicer is essentially the Chief Operating Officer and driver of the PSA. Without the Servicer, the securitization car does not go. The Servicer is the entity to which Joe pays his “mortgage” (really his note, but you get it) every month. When Joe’s loan gets “sold” multiple times, the loan is not actually being sold, the servicing rights are. The Servicer has no right, title or interest in either the promissory note or the mortgage. Any right that the Servicer has to receive money is derived from the PSA. The PSA, not Joe’s Note or Joe’s Mortgage, gives the Servicer the right to take droplets of cash out of Joe’s monthly payments before distributing the remainder to MBS purchasers.
The PSA Trustee and the sanctity of the PSA Trust are vitally important to the validity of the PSA. The PSA promoters (the usual suspects, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Bros., Merrill, Deutchebank, Barclays, etc.) persuaded MBS purchasers to part with trillions of dollars based on the idea that they would ensure that Joe’s Note would be properly endorsed by every person or entity that touched it after Joe signed it, that they would place Joe’s Note and Joe’s Mortgage in the vault-like PSA Trust and the note and mortgage would remain in the PSA Trust with a green-eyeshade, PSA Trustee diligently safekeeping them for 30 years. Further, the PSA promoters hired law firms to persuade the MBS purchasers that the PSA Trust, which is more than100 percent funded (that is, oversold) by the MBS purchasers, was the real owner of Joe’s Note and Joe’s Mortgage and that the PSA Trust, using other people’s money, had purchased or soon would purchase thousands of similar notes and mortgages in a “true sale” in accordance with FASB 140.
The PSA does not distribute pool proceeds that can be tracked pro rata to identifiable loans. In this respect, in the wrong hands (e.g. Countrywide’s Angelo Mozilo) PSAs have the potential to operate like a modern “daisy chain” fraud whereby the PSA oversells the loans in the PSA Trust, thus defrauding the MBS investors. The PSA organizers also do not inform Joe at the other end of the chain that they have sold his $300,000 loan for $600,000 and that the payout to the MBS purchasers (and other derivative side-bettors) when Joe defaults is potentially multiples of $300,000.
The PSA organizers can cover the PSA’s obligations to MBS purchasers through derivatives. Derivatives are like homeowners’ fire insurance that anyone can buy. If everyone in the world can bet that Joe’s home is going to burn down and has no interest in preventing it, odds are that Joe’s home will burn down. This is part of the reason Warren Buffet called derivatives a “financial weapon of mass destruction.” They are an off-balance sheet fiat money multiplier (the Fed stopped reporting the explosive expansion of M3 in 2006 most likely because of derivatives and mortgage loan securitization fraud), and create incentive for fraud. On the other end of the chain, Joe has no idea that the “Lender” across the table from him has no skin in the game and is more than likely receiving a commission for dragging Joe to the table.
A serious problem with modern securitization is that it destroys “privity.” Privity of contract is the traditional notion that there are two parties to a contract and that only a party to the contract can enforce or renegotiate that contract. Put simply, if A and B have a contract, C cannot enforce B’s rights against A (unless A expressly agrees or C otherwise shows a lawful agency relationship with B). The frustration for Joe is that he cannot find the other party to his transaction. When Joe talks to his “bank” (really his Servicer) and tries to renegotiate his loan, his bank tells him that a mysterious “investor” will not approve. He can’t do this because they don’t exist, have been paid or don’t have the authority to negotiate Joe’s loan.
Joe’s ultimate “investor” is the Fed, as evidenced by the trillion of MBSs on its balance sheet. Although Fannie/Freddie purportedly now “own” 80 percent of all U.S. “mortgage loans,” Fannie/Freddie are really just the Fed’s repo agents. Joe has no privity relationship with Fannie/Freddie. Fannie, Freddie and the Fed know this. So they are using the Bailout Banks to frontrun the process – the Bailout Bank (who also have no cognizable connection to the note and therefore no privity relationship with Joe) conducts a fraudulent foreclosure by creating a “record title” right to foreclose and, when the fraudulent process is over, hands the bag of stolen loot (Joe’s home) to Fannie and Freddie.
Record Title and Legal Title
Virtually all 62 million securitized notes define the “Noteholder” as “anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payment under this Note…” Very few of the holders of securitized mortgages can establish that they both hold (have physical possession of) the note AND are entitled to receive payments on the notes. For whatever reason, if a Bailout Bank has possession of an original note, it is usually endorsed payable to the order of some other (often bankrupt) entity.
If you are a Bailout Bank and you have physical possession of an original securitized note, proving that you are “entitled to receive payment” on the note is nearly impossible. First, you have to explain how you obtained the note when it should be in the hands of a PSA Trustee and it is not endorsed by the PSA Trustee. Second, even if you can show how you obtained the note, explaining why you are entitled to receive payments when you paid nothing for it and when the Fed may have satisfied your original creditors is a very difficult proposition. Third, because a mortgage is security for payments due to the noteholder and only the noteholder, if you cannot establish legal right to receive payments on the note but have a recorded mortgage all you have is “record” title to the mortgage. You have the “power” to foreclose (because courts trust recorded documents) but not necessarily the legal “right” to foreclose. Think FNBER v. IMS.
The “robosigner” controversy, reported by 60 Minutes months ago, is a symptom of the banks’ problem with “legal title” versus “record title.” The 60 Minutes reports shows that Bailout Banks are hiring 16 year old, independent contractors from Backwater, Georgia to pose as vice presidents and sign mortgage assignments which they “record” with local county recorders. This is effective in establishing the Bailout Banks’ “record title” to the “mortgage.” Unlike real bank vice presidents subject to Sarbanes-Oxley, Backwater 16-year olds have no reason to ask: “Where is the note?”; “Is my bank the noteholder?”; or “Is my Bank entitled to receive payments on the note?”
The Federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision agree with this analysis. In April of 2011 the OCC and OTS reprimanded the Bailout Banks for fraudulently foreclosing on millions of Average Joe’s:
…without always ensuring that the either the promissory note or the mortgage document were properly endorsed or assigned and, if necessary, in the possession of the appropriate party at the appropriate time…
The OCC and OTS further found that the Bailout Banks “failed to sufficiently oversee outside counsel and other third-party providers handling foreclosure-related services.”
Finally, Bailout Banks consented to the OCC and OTS spanking by admitting that they have engaged in “unsafe and unsound banking practices.”
In these “Order and Consent Decrees,” the OCC and the OTS reprimanded all of the usual suspects: Bank of America, Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, MetLife, MERSCorp, PNC Bank, US Bank, Wells Fargo, Aurora Bank, Everbank, OneWest Bank, IMB HoldCo LLC, and Sovereign Bank.
Although the OCC and OTS Orders are essentially wrist slaps for what is a massive fraud, these orders at least expose some truth. In response to the OCC Order, the Fannie/Freddie-created Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), changed its rules (see Rule 8) to demand that foreclosing lawyers identify the “noteowner” prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings.
NEWT’S FANNIE/FREDDIE ENDGAME: PLANTATION USA
Those of us fighting the banks began to see a disturbing trend starting about a year ago. Fannie and Freddie began showing up claiming title and seeking to evict homeowners from their homes.
The process works like this, using Bank of America as an example. Average Joe had a securitized loan with Countrywide. Countrywide, which might as well have been run by the Gambino family with expertise in “daisy chain” fraud, never followed the PSA, did not care for the original notes and almost never deposited the original notes in the PSA Trust. Countrywide goes belly up. Bank of America (BOA) takes over Countrywide in perhaps the worst deal in the history of corporate America, acquiring more liabilities than assets. Bank of America realizes that it has acquired a big bag of dung (no notes = no mortgages = big problem) and so sets up an entity called “BAC Home Loans LLP” whose general partner is another BOA entity.
The purpose of these BOA entities is to execute the liquidation the Countrywide portfolio as quickly as possible and, at the same time, isolate the liability to two small BOA subsidiaries. BOA uses BAC Home Loans LLP to conduct the foreclosure on Joe’s home. BAC Home Loans LLP feeds local foreclosure lawyers phony, robosigned documents that establish an “of record” transfer of the Countrywide mortgage to BAC Home Loans LLP. BAC Home Loans LLP, “purchases” Joe’s home at a Sheriff’s sale by bidding Joe’s debt owed to Countrywide. BAC Home Loans LLP does not have and cannot prove any connection to Joe’s note so BAC Home Loans LLP quickly deeds Joe’s property to Fannie and Freddie.
When it is time to kick Joe out of his home, Fannie Mae shows up in the eviction action. When compelled to show its cards, Fannie will claim title to Joe’s house via a “quit claim deed” or an assignment of the Sheriff’s Certificate of sale. Adding insult to injury, while Joe may have spent years trying to get BOA to “modify” his loan, and may have begged BOA for the right to pay BOA $1000 a month if only BOA will stop the foreclosure, Fannie now claims that BOA deeded Joe’s property to Fannie for nothing. That right, nothing. All county recorders require that a real estate purchaser claim how much they paid for the property to determine the tax value. Fannie claims on these recorded documents that it paid nothing for Joe’s home and, further, falsely claims that it is exempt because it is a US government agency. It isn’t. It is a government sponsored entity that is currently in conservatorship and run by the US government.
Great advice Newt.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the US government is so broke that it will do anything to pay its bills, including stealing Average Joe’s home.
That’s change that both Barack Obama and Newt Gingrich can believe in.
APPENDIX
More and more courts are agreeing that the banks “inside” the PSA do not have legal standing (they have no skin in the game and so cannot show the necessary “injury in fact”), are not “real parties in interest” (they cannot show that they followed the terms of the PSA or are otherwise “entitled to enforce” the note) and that there are real questions of whether any securitized mortgage can ever be properly perfected.
The banks’ weakness is exposed most often in bankruptcy courts because it is there that they have to show their cards and explain how they claim a legal right, rather than the “of record” right, to foreclose the mortgage. More and more courts are recognizing that, without proof of ownership of the underlying note, holding a mortgage means nothing.
The most recent crack in the Banks’s position is evidenced by the federal Eight Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in In Re Banks, No. 11-6025 (8th Cir., Sept. 13, 2011). In Banks, a bank attempted to execute a foreclosure within a bankruptcy case. The bank had a note payable to the order of another entity; that is, the foreclosing bank was “Bank C” but had a note payable to the order of “Bank B” and endorsed in blank by Bank B. The bank, Bank C, alleged that, because the note was endorsed in blank and “without recourse,” that it had the right to foreclose. The Court held that this was insufficient to show a sufficient chain of title to the note, reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded for findings regarding when and how Bank C acquired the note.
See also, In Re Aagard, No. 810-77338-reg (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., Feb. 10, 2011) (Judge Grossman slams MERS as lacking standing, working as both principal and agent in same transaction, and exposes MERS’ alleged principal US Bank as unable to produce or provide evidence that it is in fact the holder of the note); In Re Vargas, No. 08-17036SB (Bankr. C.D. Cal., Sept. 30, 2008) (Judge Bufford correctly applied rules of evidence and held that MERS could not establish right to possession of the 83-year old Mr. Vargas’ home through the testimony of a low-level employee who had no foundation to testify about the legal title to the original note); In Re Walker, Bankr. E.D. Cal. No. 10-21656-E-11 (May 20, 2010) (holding that neither MERS nor its alleged principal could show that they were “real parties in interest” because neither could provide any evidence of the whereabouts of, much less legal title to, the original note); Landmark v.Kesler, 216 P.2d 158 (Kan. 2009) (in this case the Kansas Supreme Court provides the most cogent state court analysis of the problem created by securitization – the “splitting” of the note and the mortgage and the real party in interest and standing problems that the holder of the mortgage has when it cannot also show that it has clean and clear legal title to the note); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 NE 40 (Mass. 2011), (the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied two banks’ attempts to “quiet title” following foreclosure because the banks’ proffered evidence did not show ownership of the mortgages – or for that matter, the notes – prior to the Sheriff’s sale); and Jackson v. MERS, 770 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. 2009) (this federal-gun-to-the-head – certified question from federal court asking for state court blessing of its already decided ruling – to the Minnesota Supreme Court is most notable for the courageous dissent of NFL Hall of Fame player and only popularly elected Justice Alan Page who opined that MERS should pound sand and obey state recording standards).
November 28, 2011
Bill Butler [send him mail] is a Minneapolis attorney and the owner of Butler Liberty Law.
Millions of current and former homeowners will have a chance to get their foreclosure cases examined to determine whether they should be compensated for banks’ mistakes, under a wide-ranging review being planned by federal regulators. Ssoo let’s see 6 Million foreclosures 50,000.00 each that’s 300 BILLION I think they are going to sweep this under the carpet just like the Countrywide deal and say they fixed it. I believe that the only way to get compensated is through litigation although this is a great admission and could be used in future litigation.
The review process, which could be unveiled in the next few weeks, will be open to borrowers who were in some stage of foreclosure in 2009 or 2010. Estimates prepared by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which will oversee the review, indicate that 4.5 million borrowers could be eligible for review.
John Walsh, acting head of the OCC, unveiled some aspects of the plan in a speech last month to banking executives, when he said the agency was exploring “the best means of ensuring that injured homeowners had the opportunity to seek relief,” when they were harmed by lender improprieties.
WSJ’s Nick Timiraos has details of a plan by which 4.5 million homeowners who faced foreclosure in 2009 and 2010 could face a review of their foreclosure procedures due to errors by banks. Photo by John Moore/Getty Images
The process will include a broad public-outreach campaign, including direct mail to eligible borrowers and a single website and toll-free number. The reviews will be conducted by independent third-party companies that were hired earlier this year by 14 banks that signed consent orders in April with the OCC and the Federal Reserve. The regulators had to sign off on the selection of these companies.
“It’s a substantial undertaking at great expense to the banks,” said Tim Rood, a partner at Collingwood Group, a housing-finance consulting firm.
Borrowers who are determined to have suffered “financial injury” could be eligible for compensation that would be determined on a case-by-case basis by the third-party firms. Borrowers will have to request reviews before a cutoff date, likely to fall near the end of the first quarter of 2012. It hasn’t been determined whether borrowers that accept restitution would have to agree to surrender related legal claims.
Regulators declined to provide estimates of the amount of money that injured borrowers might receive or how much the program might cost lenders.
However, few if any borrowers are expected to have foreclosures overturned.
The review process is one of several continuing efforts to address disclosures that surfaced a year ago over banks’ use of “robo-signers,” bank employees who signed off on huge numbers of legal foreclosure filings daily and falsely claimed in the documents to have personally reviewed each case. The disclosures prompted some judges to question the veracity of other bank foreclosure practices.
The process is separate from the months-long talks between federal agencies, state attorneys general and banks to reach a multibillion-dollar settlement over foreclosure abuses. That effort took a big step backwards Friday, when California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris called the deal “inadequate” and pulled out of the settlement talks.
The loss of California could cripple any settlement because the state has among the nation’s highest volumes of foreclosures. Banks are less likely to agree to the $25 billion price tag pushed by federal and state officials without the participation of California. Banks, federal officials and state attorneys general are set to resume meetings in Washington on Tuesday.
Representatives for both sides said they still hope to reach an agreement despite Friday’s setback. The banks “remain committed to the dialogue and continue to believe that a global settlement would be an effective means of supporting the recovery of the housing market and helping to strengthen the economy,” said one person familiar with the banks’ thinking.
“We are still full-steam ahead,” said a spokesman for Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller, who is spearheading the 50-state negotiations. “With or without some states, we are still moving forward.”
Bloomberg NewsBorrowers who suffered ‘financial injury’ could be eligible for compensation. Here, a foreclosure sign hangs in front of a house in Canton, Mich., in March.
In the OCC review process, financial injury could cover a wide range of misrepresentations or errors committed by mortgage companies, according to people familiar with the process.
Banks could be liable if they miscalculated mortgage payments or applied impermissible fees or penalties. A handful of borrowers have alleged that mortgage-servicing companies, for example, improperly placed expensive insurance coverage onto their mortgage, pushing them into default and preventing them from becoming current with their payments.
Borrowers may be able to receive compensation if the review finds that the bank moved a borrower to foreclosure while the bank was receiving partial payments as part of a trial or permanent loan modification. Compensation might also be due if borrowers provide evidence that they provided the necessary documentation required to qualify for a modification but were denied the modification.
A separate report to be released on Tuesday raises new questions over Fannie Mae‘s oversight of the attorneys that conduct foreclosures on its behalf. The report, from the inspector general for the Federal Housing Finance Agency, faulted Fannie for inadequate oversight of those firms
Since 2008, Fannie has required its mortgage servicers to use designated law firms that are part of its “retained attorney network.” The network arrangement allows Fannie to negotiate discounted rates with approved firms, which in turn can lock in business from the nation’s largest mortgage investor.
The report said that in June 2010, the FHFA conducted a two-day field visit to Florida, where it found that “documentation problems were evident and law firms…were not devoting the time necessary to their cases due to Fannie Mae’s flat fee structure and volume-based processing model.”
FHFA staff subsequently informed senior Fannie officials that its attorneys were “increasingly unprepared when they enter the courtroom,” leading to a larger backlog of foreclosures.
SEE 42-in RE Cruz vs Aurora AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC, SCME MORTGAGE BANKERS INC, ING BANK FSB, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS ALL BITE THE DUST, SUBJECT TO LIABILITY AND NO ABILITY TO FORECLOSE WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH LAW. Salient points of Judge Mann’s Decision: TRUTH IN LENDING was dismissed because they were time-barred. LESSON: Don’t ignore […]
Posted on August 7, 2011 by Neil Garfield EDITOR’S NOTE: We know the foreclosures were gross misrepresentations of fact to the Courts, to the Borrowers and to the Investors. This article shows the crossover between the MegaBanks — sharing and diluting the responsibility for these fabrications as they went along. If you are talking about […]
I looked into the records for that entity in the SEC EDGAR online database and discovered that the last annual report was filed in 2007, contemporaneously with a FORM 15 filing.That Form 15 filing claimed a standing under 15d-6 of the 1934 SEC regulations which exempts the entity of filing an annual report, whereby the […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE Submitted on 2011/08/24 at 9:08 pm Norwest and Alt-A Land Title & Fidelity National Insurance morpted into Microsoft open platform on CLOUD and portals now through which new GMAC Mortgage & State of Maryland in the pass-thru-agency state portal funded to access FIS, […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S NOTE: It is comforting to know that at least some people are paying attention. From one of the largest servicers in the country comes an admission that securitization of mortgage loans was an illusion. The facts alleged by AHMSI in its lawsuit […]
Finality versus good and evil. In the battlefield it isn’t about good and evil. It is about winner and losers. In military battles around the world many battles have been one by the worst tyrants imaginable. Just because you are right, just because the banks did bad things, just because they have no right to […]
“If you’re allowed to foreclose and kick someone out of his or her home without being the party that either owns the loan or represents the person who owns the loan… if you can ignore those laws, why can’t you ignore other laws too? Which laws apply, when one of the parties didn’t make his […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE see VIDEO $1.2 Trillion in EXTRA BAILOUT MONEY FROM FED SECRETLY GIVEN TO DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BANKS Of course the figure is much higher, but the secrecy surrounding the money given by the Fed to the banks is something to enrage any tea […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S NOTE: Here is a good place to start — the devil is in the details. You will find that the more you probe the more people and bad documents emerge. Persistence pays. Here is a letter that one homeowner just sent to […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE The boys are playing rough now, but US Bank, failing to take its queues from Deutsch is plunging ahead with CalWestern by its side, using forged, fabircated, faked documents that wouldn’t be valid even if they were properly executed. The securitizers tricked and […]
SAN FRANCISCO — Attorney General Kamala D. Harris today announced that the California Department of Justice, in conjunction with the State Bar of California, has sued multiple entities accused of fraudulently taking millions of dollars from thousands of homeowners who were led to believe they would receive relief on their mortgages. Attorney General Harris sued […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE IF THE BANKS DON’T OWN THE PROPERTY OR THE MORTGAGE, WHO DOES? EDITOR’S NOTE: My figures tracking thousands of foreclosures indicate the same thing that the New York Post found. There are a scattered few foreclosures that are good old-fashioned foreclosures of valid […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S COMMENT: I was talking with an expert in landlord tenant law and I received an interesting suggestion. The case involved someone who has just been served with a writ of restitution where the owner had to peaceably leave her home — or […]
Wednesday, August 17th, 2011, 2:49 pm A controversial case challenging the ability of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems to foreclose on a California man was filed with the Supreme Court Monday, making it the first major MERS case to reach the nation’s highest court. If the Supreme Court agrees to hear Gomes v. Countrywide, Gomes’ attorney, […]
by KERRI PANCHUK Proposed Illinois Legislation Would Freeze Evictions for Four Months California AG Wants Pay Option ARM Answers Does the Senate’s housing bill encourage foreclosures? California Law Freezes Foreclosures, Burns Servicers Short Sales Cost Lenders $310m More Than Necessary, CoreLogic Study Finds Thursday, August 4th, 2011, 7:31 am A California man is on a […]
So you have denied the claims of the pretenders and put that in issue. You have even alleged fraud, forgery and fabrication and the catch-word “robosigning”. But the Judge, alleging that he did not want to “make new law” (which wasn’t true) or allegedly because he didn’t want to start an avalanche of litigation interfering […]
Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com Dear Homeowner, It’s been widely reported around the country, via internet, blogs and newspapers, how the lenders used the foreclosure mills and other legal ways, to fabricate fraudulent documents to record in the county recorder offices and pretend they have legal standing to initiate the foreclosure procedure. Neil Garfield in his blog […]
TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS, ESQ. SBN 147715 LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS 820 Main Street, Ste. 1 Martinez, CA (925) 957-9797 Telephone (909) 382-9956 Facsimile Attorney for Defendant Zenkarla S. Salazar SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC FKA GMAC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, vs. […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S NOTE: We know the foreclosures were gross misrepresentations of fact to the Courts, to the Borrowers and to the Investors. This article shows the crossover between the MegaBanks — sharing and diluting the responsibility for these fabrications as they went along. If […]
posted by Katie Porter As challenges to whether a “bank” (usually actually a securitized trust) has the right to foreclose because it owns the note and mortgage become more common, rumors swirl about the ability to use such tactics to get a “free house.” There are a few instances of consumer getting a free house, […]
From LivingLies: I think that everyone is missing the #1 problem MERS has in CA. MERS is a Non-Authorized Agent and cannot legally assign the Promissory Note, making any foreclosure by other than the original lender wrongful, for the following reasons. 1) Under established and binding Ca law, a Nominee can’t assign the Note. Born […]
Posted on August 1, 2011 by Neil Garfield I WRITE THIS BECAUSE WITH SO MANY PRO SE LITIGANTS AND UNINFORMED LAWYERS WEIGHING IN IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE ISSUES. Quiet Title is not a defense. If used defensively you will most likely lose your case and also unintentionally waive rights that you might […]
Pro Per Debtor Stops Attorneys for US Bank – in RE Deamicis Posted: 31 Jul 2011 10:21 PM PDT Pro Per Debtor Stops Attorneys for US Bank – in RE Deamicis By Daniel Edstrom DTC Systems, Inc. She has been fighting tooth and nail. Nobody was listening. The current bankruptcy judge was skeptical when she […]
Recent Consent Orders Consent Order, Sovereign Bank, Wyomissing, Pennsylvania, 04410, NE-11-17, April… Order shall be directed to the Comptroller of the Currency, or to the individual, … or office designated by the Comptroller of the Currency. Sovereign Bank Consent Order Page http://www.mortgagedaily.com/forms/OccConsentOrderSovereign041311.pdf Consent Order, OneWest Bank, FSB, Pasadena, California, 18129, WN-11-011,
A Bakersfield homeowner is taking on a bank, in a battle that could have sweeping implications for people facing foreclosure. Mark Demucha wants Wells Fargo to prove it owns his home loan. And, if his lawsuit is successful, it could set a legal precedent that slows or even stops foreclosures across the state. “Filled out the […]
A. Standing The party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing standing.28 Constitutional standing analysis includes three elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must […]
(1) Notaries Public § 1–Disciplinary Proceedings–Time for Instituting. Disciplinary action taken by the Secretary of State against a notary public was not barred by the fact that the proceeding was instituted more than three years after the notary’s alleged improper act and more than one year after its discovery. Statutes of limitation barring civil actions […]
SEPARATION OF DEED OF TRUST FROM NOTE: Bellistri Opinion Posted on April 28, 2010 by Neil Garfield There is a lot of conflicting opinions about this. My opinion is that the confusion arises not from the law, not from application of the law and not from what is written on the note or deed of Trust. […]
Brand New, Hot Off The Presses MERS Policy Bulletin July 24th, 2011 | Author: Matthew D. Weidner, Esq. After years of claiming that assignments don’t matter and the date of assignment certainly doesn’t matter, the MERS Monster has finally changed its tune, effective July 21, 2011: The Certifying Officer must execute the assignment of the […]
Stay of Execution and Appeal The defendant may request a stay of execution of the judgment whether or not an appeal is taken. [CCP §918(a), (c).] You may stay execution of the judgment for up to 40 days without the landlord’s consent in a limited civil case (or up to 70 days in an unlimited […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE factual issues for Unlawful Detainer case NFG 7-15-11 Various states have two levels of jurisdiction that make it difficult to raise the proper issues in eviction even if there has been no preceding judicial action or if the preceding judicial action has been […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE The Free House Myth posted by Katie Porter As challenges to whether a “bank” (usually actually a securitized trust) has the right to foreclose because it owns the note and mortgage become more common, rumors swirl about the ability to use such tactics […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S NOTE: The battle is heating up. BOA, for example, is stepping up efforts to cause as much trouble as possible for those foreclosure defense lawyers who are getting traction in the courts. This started some time ago as some people were actually […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE No Punishment = Continued Misconduct Posted on July 19, 2011 by Mark Stopa Esq. http://www.stayinmyhome.com/blog/?p=1565 In Maine, a group of drug dealers was caught distributing drugs to local middle schoolers. They confessed, yet the District Attorney declined to press charges, so the drug […]
Recently Discovered Flaw in Recording System Clouds Titles on Previously Foreclosed Properties The modern system of mortgage refinancing and assignments created during the housing boom has left behind a wave of title defects on properties that have ever had a foreclosure in their history, due to a loophole in the property records recording system. […]
The brief below as circulated by the California Bar’s: Insolvency Law Committee: Herrera vs. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2011 Westlaw 2547979 (Cal.App.) Facts: A married couple (“the homeowners”) purchased a home at a foreclosure sale. Supposedly, unbeknownst to them, their interest in the home was subject to a prior (and perhaps unrecorded) deed […]
If the court follows the rules of evidence (and they do) if proper objections are filed. No eviction of a secuitized loan should ever prevail on an eviction; they cannot produce the foundation to authenticate the Trustees Deed it is based upon preliminary facts that they are unable and unwilling to bring to court. The […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S NOTE: Anyone who has entered into mortgage modification process with BOA or any other bank acting as servicer or otherwise knows the story. The Bank does everything it can to delay the process until the borrower gets into serious trouble and then […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE JUDGES ARE STARTING TO EXAMINE DOCUMENTS AND THEY DON’T LIKE WHAT THEY ARE SEEING “Thus, while A.R.S. §33-807(E) may operate to dismiss a trustee in certain instances, if one of the allegations of a complaint is that the entity purporting to act as […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE The Allonge- Billions of Dollars in Commerce Hangs on A Single Scrap of Paper EDITOR’S NOTE: If you wrote a check to your next door neighbor, you would expect that he would either cash it or deposit it. But what if your neighbor […]
All banks love to use judicial notice to establish their position but with all the robo signing the evidence is being excluded. ROBERT HERRERA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEUTSCHE 1 BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents. No. C065630. Court of Appeals of California, Third District, El Dorado.Filed May 31, 2011. […]
False Statements 06/28/2011 California Bankruptcy Judge Laura Stuart Taylor has joined the ranks of judges who will not tolerate fraudulent documents produced by banks to foreclose. Judge Taylor entered an Order To Show Cause why OneWest Bank, FSB, should not incur “a significant coercive sanction intended to deter any future tender of misleading evidence to […]
From ChaseChase.org: Federal District Court Javaheri v. JPMorgan Chase, Case No. CV10-8185 ODW Otis D. Wright II, Judge, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles Douglas Gillies, attorney for Daryoush Javaheri Plaintiff sued to halt a foreclosure initiated by JPMorgan Chase and California Reconveyance Co. Chase responded with a Motion to Dismiss. Two […]
By Niel Garfield EDITOR’S NOTE AND COMMENT: LAWYERS BEWARE! Starting up an anti-foreclosure venture and making comments criticizing the system has reportedly caused some investigations to begin and may result in bar discipline for technical infractions. From what I can see, the Bar is focused on UPL — unauthorized practice of law. The use of […]
Each day I get calls from desperate people hoping against hope the there is a magic document that can be filed or recorded the will magically give them their home free and clear without recourse. I tell them if it sounds to good to be true it probably is. That’s not to say that I […]
Ohio Judge Steven Terry Found Guilty of Rigging Foreclosure and Mail Fraud Corruption Case AKRON, Ohio – The Cuyahoga County judge charged in the county corruption investigation for allegedly fixing a foreclosure case has been found guilty on three of the five charges he was facing. The federal jury returned the verdict
Abigail C. Field- The $8.5 billion settlement that Bank of New York and Bank of America hope will resolve all (or almost all) mortgage backed securities claims between them has faced a lot of opposition. The attorneys general of New York and Delaware oppose the deal, as do various investors not involved […]
Lets not get to excited just yet as this comes as a complete surprise. What does this mean for the AG’s who are pursuing their own investigations and how will this help homeowners? Or is this another bailout waiting to happen? NYT- The federal agency that oversees the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is set […]
In case you missed it.. I put together Special Events that Happened in 1999 …Welcome to the 99 Club. It’s incomplete but it was a start to the mess we have today. AP- By PALLAVI GOGOI, AP Business Writer Counties across the United States are discovering that illegal or questionable mortgage paperwork is far more […]
They can start here: Deposition Transcript of Litton Loan Servicing Litigation Manager Christopher Spradling CNN- NEW YORK (CNNMoney) — The Federal Reserve issued an enforcement action Thursday against Goldman Sachs, saying the investment bank must investigate questionable lending and foreclosure practices in its mortgage unit. The action orders Goldman to hire an independent consultant to investigate […]
American Banker did an outstanding, superb job with this article. Please read. American Banker- Some of the largest mortgage servicers are still fabricating documents that should have been signed years ago and submitting them as evidence to foreclose on homeowners. The practice continues nearly a year after the companies were caught cutting corners in […]
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Southern Essex District Registry of Deeds Shetland Park 45 Congress Street Suite 4100 Salem, Massachusetts 01970 NEWS FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Salem, MA August 30, 2011 Contact: John O’Brien, Register of Deeds 978-542-1722 jl.obrien@sec.state.ma.us . John O’Brien, Southern Essex District Register of Deeds in Salem, […]
WSJ– The mortgage industry will take a step toward cleaning up some of its most controversial practices under a deal between a New York regulator and three financial firms, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Under the agreement with the state’s financial-services superintendent, Benjamin M. Lawsky, the three firms—Goldman, its Litton Loan Servicing […]
WSJ- From: Home Loan News Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2011 4:19am Subject: Important Message From Barbara DeSoer To All IMS Associates I wanted to provide this team with information about a strategic announcement our Home Loans business will make today that is consistent with our ongoing efforts to align the business to […]
Aug 31 (Reuters) – Bank of New York Mellon Corp said Robert Kelly, who has held the company’s top job since 2008, has stepped down as chairman and chief executive officer, following differences in approach to managing the company. The company, one of the world’s largest custody banks, said it named board member Gerald Hassell as chairman […]
Bloomberg- New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s office has taken testimony from 53 witnesses in its investigation into Bank of America Corp. (BAC)’s 2008 acquisition of Merrill Lynch & Co., a federal judge said. U.S. District Judge Kevin Castel in Manhattan said in an order today that “there have been 53 examinations under oath by the […]
UPDATE: It was announced that he’s left to spend more time with his family. According to the Yahoo Message boards: Greg Whitworth FIRED If you do a google search under cached it brings you to his info, but when clicked on the message board link it brings you or redirects one to a 404 NOT FOUND. Mysteriously his info […]
False Statements Limited Purpose Corporate Officers Action Date: August 31, 2011 Location: TALLAHASSEE, FL A STATEMENT ON MORTGAGE FRAUD THAT EVERY ATTORNEY GENERAL COULD ISSUE TODAY There has been widespread, well-documented abuse of corporate officer titles by banks, mortgage companies and mortgage servicing companies on mortgage-related documents. Individuals who are not corporate officers have been directed to […]
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP today announced that it is investigating concerns by hedge funds and institutional investors who believe Bank of America Corp. (NYSE: BAC) may have failed to disclose to investors the risk associated with a $10 billion lawsuit threat from American International Group (“AIG”) (NYSE: AIG). According to […]
It’s going to tank! WSJ- Bank of America Corp. intends to sell its correspondent mortgage business, as the troubled lender looks to narrow its focus and bolster its financial strength, said people familiar with the situation. Employees could be notified as soon as Wednesday that the lender has decided to exit the […]
H/T David Dayen SURE DID! . For immediate release — Monday, October 6, 2008. Contact Bob Brammer – 515-281-6699 . Miller: AGs Reach Agreement with Countrywide Financial that Will Help Almost 400,000 Borrowers Facing Foreclosure The Iowa Attorney General says the settlement will offer mortgage loan modifications to more than 1,100 Iowans that will help many avoid […]
NEVADA vs. BANK OF AMERICA CORP. | Second Amended Complaint “The Breach, Trusts Never Became Holders of These Mortgages”” NY TIMES- The attorney general of Nevada is accusing Bank of America of repeatedly violating a broad loan modification agreement it struck with state officials in October 2008 and is seeking to rip up the deal so […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE SEE Corrective+Assignment[2] CHUTZPAH: Look it up if you are not familiar with the term. Here is a document that states on its face that Linda Green had no authority to to sign anything on behalf of MERS. So there goes thousands of documents […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE WHY DID THE LOAN SERVICER CLEAR THE LOAN OBLIGATION DOWN TO ZERO? Monday, August 29, 2011 Who owns the loan? The Ohio Supreme Court is taking up the question of what a bank needs to prove to force someone from his home. Story […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES CLICK HERE TO RESERVE SEATING AT HAWAII WORKSHOP GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE SEE US BANK OCC ORDER AND COMMENTARY It will be up on the store soon and on the American Homeowners Cooperative at http://www.Americanhomeownerscoop.com. Based upon an in depth analysis of our title and securitization combo […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES CLICK HERE TO RESERVE SEATING AT HAWAII WORKSHOP GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE Homeowner Associations Wake Up to Collections and Profit!! FORECLOSING ON THE BANK!! EDITOR’S COMMENT: Becker and Poliakoff in South Florida is probably the largest law firm representing homeowner associations in the U.S. Once upon a […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES CLICK HERE AND RESERVE SEATING NOW AT HAWAII WORKSHOP OCTOBER 14 GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE THEY WANT YOUR HOUSE!!! “The banks don’t care whether you made your payments or not. They want your house. They don’t care if someone else made your payments. They want your house. […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S NOTE: IT ALL COMES DOWN TO THIS: DO YOU WANT TO SAVE THE BANKS OR DO YOU WANT TO SAVE THE COUNTRY? Submitted on 2011/08/27 at 9:20 am by Nancy Drewe National Mortgage News sign up for your own subscription first 2 […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES CLICK HERE TO RESERVE SEATING AT HAWAII WORKSHOP GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE KISS: KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID Finality versus good and evil. In the battlefield it isn’t about good and evil. It is about winner and losers. In military battles around the world many battles have been […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE “bank is suddenly open to unlimited downside capital risk” BofA’s $8.5 Billion Settlement Could Fall Apart After Request Made To Move Mortgage Case From State To Federal Court As most know by now, the ridiculously low $8.5 billion putback settlement, which was supposed […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S NOTE: It is comforting to know that at least some people are paying attention. From one of the largest servicers in the country comes an admission that securitization of mortgage loans was an illusion. The facts alleged by AHMSI in its lawsuit […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE “If you’re allowed to foreclose and kick someone out of his or her home without being the party that either owns the loan or represents the person who owns the loan… if you can ignore those laws, why can’t you ignore other laws […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE REFUNDABLE RESERVATION NOW TO RESERVE SEATING CLICK HERE FOR ONE DAY PASS JOIN LIVINGLIES MEMBERSHIP NOW AND GET THE AUDIO-FILE ON LAST NIGHT’S 90 MINUTE BROADCAST WITH MANDELMAN MATTERS AND LIVINGLIES WRITERS. BLOG MEMBERSHIP SUBSCRIPTION We have twice monthly teleconferences, questions and answers […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE Bank Of America’s No-Good, Very Bad Enablers By Halah Touryalai | Forbes – Mon, Aug 22, 2011 What’s the worse than Bank of America acting as if it deserves immunity from all its bad foreclosure behavior? A presidential administration that agrees. President Obama’s administration is […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE TRANSFER TO POOL AFTER FORECLOSURE INITIATED: VOID “ The fact that Deutsche had possession of the mortgage, however, is irrelevant to its status as mortgagee. While a promissory note endorsed in blank may be enforced by the party in possession of the note, […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE TENNESSEE FEDERAL COURT DENIES BANK OF AMERICA’S MOTION TO DISMISS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION CHALLENGING ALLEGED OWNERSHIP OF LOAN Today, August 23, 2011, 6 hours ago | Jeff Barnes August 23, 2011 A Tennessee Federal court has issued an Order and Memorandum denying a […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE see VIDEO $1.2 Trillion in EXTRA BAILOUT MONEY FROM FED SECRETLY GIVEN TO DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BANKS Of course the figure is much higher, but the secrecy surrounding the money given by the Fed to the banks is something to enrage any tea […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE SEE 42-in_RE_Cruz_vs_Aurora AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC, SCME MORTGAGE BANKERS INC, ING BANK FSB, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS ALL BITE THE DUST, SUBJECT TO LIABILITY AND NO ABILITY TO FORECLOSE WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH LAW. Salient points of Judge Mann’s Decision: TRUTH IN LENDING was […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE ROBO-SIGNING IS NOW CALLED SURROGATE SIGNING AHMSI SUIT CONFIRMS PRACTICE IS WRONG, UNAUTHORIZED AND INVALID EDITOR’S NOTE: I find it interesting that LPS continued to fabricate and forge documents after AHMSI told them to stop. It could only mean that they were really […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE EDITOR’S NOTE: THE ONLY THING MISSING IS THE LARGEST QUESTION OF ALL: WERE THE MORTGAGE LIENS EVER PERFECTED? DO THEY EXIST? I also contest the issue of whether the banks were ever intending to do things right. I know from interviews I conducted […]
MOST POPULAR ARTICLES GET COMBO TITLE AND SECURITIZATION ANALYSIS – CLICK HERE SETTLEMENT TARGET: LABOR DAY!! “They wanted to be released from everything, including original sin,” said a U.S. official involved in the discussions. From today’s Wall Street Journal…. FORECLOSURE TALKS SNAG ON BANK LIABILITY By RUTH SIMON, VANESSA O’CONNELL and NICK TIMIRAOS Efforts to […]
Finality versus good and evil. In the battlefield it isn’t about good and evil. It is about winner and losers. In military battles around the world many battles have been one by the worst tyrants imaginable.
Just because you are right, just because the banks did bad things, just because they have no right to do what they are doing, doesn’t mean you will win. You might if you do it right, but you are up against a superior army with a dubious judge looking on thinking that this deadbeat borrower wants to get out of paying.
The court system is there to mediate disputes and bring them to a conclusion. Once a matter is decided they don’t want it to be easy to reopen a bankruptcy or issues that have already been litigated. The court presumably wants justice to prevail, but it also wants to end the dispute for better or for worse.
Otherwise NOTHING would end. Everyone who lost would come in with some excuse to have another trial. So you need to show fundamental error, gross injustice or an error that causes more problems that it solves.
These are the same issues BEFORE the matter is decided in court. Foreclosures are viewed as a clerical act or ministerial act. The outcome is generally viewed as inevitable.
And where the homeowner already admits the loan exists (a mistake), that the lien is exists and was properly filed and executed (a mistake) and admits that he didn’t make payments — he is admitting something he doesn’t even know is true — that there were payments due and he didn’t make them, which by definition puts him in default.
It’s not true that the homeowner would even know if the payment is due because the banks refuse to provide any accounting on the third party payments from bailout, insurance CDS, and credit enhancement.
That’s why you need reports on title, securitization, forensic reviews for TILA compliance and loan level accounting. If the Judges stuck to the law, they would require the proof first from the banks, but they don’t. They put the burden on the borrowers —who are the only ones who have the least information and the least access to information — to essentially make the case for the banks and then disprove it. The borrowers are litigating against themselves.
In the battlefield it isn’t about good and evil, it is about winners and losers. Name calling and vague accusations won’t cut it.
Sure you want to use the words surrogate signing, robo-signing, forgery, fabrication and misrepresentation. You also want to show that the court’s action would or did cloud title in a way that cannot be repaired without a decision on the question of whether the lien was perfected and whether the banks should be able to say they transferred bad loans to investors who don’t want them — just so they can foreclose.
But you need some proffers of real evidence — reports, exhibits and opinions from experts that will show that there is a real problem here and that this case has not been heard on the merits because of an unfair presumption: the presumption is that just because a bank’s lawyer says it in court, it must be true.
Check with the notary licensing boards, and see if the notaries on their documents have been disciplined and if not, file a grievance if you have grounds. Once you have that, maybe you have a grievance against the lawyers. After that maybe you have a lawsuit against the banks and their lawyers.
But the primary way to control the narrative or at least trip up the narrative of the banks is to object on the basis that counsel for the bank is referring to things not in the record. That is simple and the judge can understand that.
Don’t rely on name-calling, rely on the simplest legal requirements that you can find that have been violated. Was the lien perfected?
If the record shows that others were involved in the original transaction with the borrowers at the inception of the deal, then you might be able to show that there were only nominees instead of real parties in interest named on the note and mortgage.
Without disclosure of the principal, the lien is not perfected because the world doesn’t know who to go to for a satisfaction of that lien. If you know the other parties involved were part of a securitization scheme, you should say that — these parties can only be claiming an interest by virtue of a pooling and servicing agreement. And then make the point that they are only now trying to transfer what they are calling a bad loan into the pool that the investors bought — which is expressly prohibited for multiple reasons in the PSA.
This is impersonation of the investor because the investors don’t want to come forward and get countersued for the bad and illegal lending practices that were used in getting the borrower’s signature.
Point out that the auction of the property was improperly conducted where you can show that to be the case. Nearly all of the 5 million foreclosures were allowed to be conducted with a single bid from a non-creditor.
If you are not a creditor you must bid cash, put up a portion before you bid, and then pay the balance usually within 24-72 hours.
But instead they pretended to be the creditor when their own documents show they were supposed to be representing the investors who were not part of the lawsuit nor the judgment.
SO they didn’t pay cash and they didn’t tender the note. THEY PAID NOTHING. In Florida the original note must actually be filed with the court to make sure that the matter is actually concluded.
There is a whole ripe area of inquiry of inspecting the so-called original notes and bringing to the attention the fraud upon the court in submitting a false original. It invalidates the sale, by operation of law.
It’s been widely reported around the country, via internet, blogs and newspapers, how the lenders used the foreclosure mills and other legal ways, to fabricate fraudulent documents to record in the county recorder offices and pretend they have legal standing to initiate the foreclosure procedure.
A few years ago, when the Mortgage Debacle started, these lenders went after the Mortgage Brokers after they found themselves in trouble for the many defaulted loans. They filed civil and criminal lawsuits convicting these brokers for fabricating documents and forging signatures to fund the loans. The legal system, judges and General Attorneys were prompt to convict “these so called criminals”.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
Today the tables have turned 180 degrees and we have discovered how these entities have been widely practicing what they accused others of. Today the lenders are fabricating documents, forging signatures and filing fraudulent documents with the government agencies to weasel their way into owning the homeowners’ properties.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
The fact that judges preceding the Unlawful Detainer hearings are not educated enough about the matter and don’t want to take the time to hear the attorneys defending the homeowners, does not help to make this wrong right. Securitization is a very complicated subject that cannot be taught in an Unlawful Detainer hearing or even in a Wrongful Foreclosure hearing. The way judges have been manipulating the information provided by the homeowners in their lawsuits to rule in favor of the lenders is despicable!Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
That’s why it’s so important to have all your property recorded documents used to foreclose on your home, been researched and analyzed by an expert that can identify all the issues that can be used in a Court of Law to fight for your home.
When you go in front of a Judge with enough evidence to prove that fraud was committed by the lender when the lender fabricated documents used to foreclose, you have a good chance to get the Judge’s attention. Fraud is a subject they know, it’s a crime and they can rule in your favor. It would be very difficult for a Judge to justify this fraudulent behavior on the part of the lender.
Later on, once you have successfully received an injunction, you can bring the securitization argument in your complaint and make the lender prove their innocence.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
The documents used to initiate the foreclosure of your home have been fraudulently fabricated by either the Trustee or the Lender.
Some attorneys who have explored this cause of action in their civil lawsuits, have been able to get relief for the homeowners by getting the in Temporary Restraining Order and the Injunction granted.
Below please find proof of a very common practice within these entities when they fabricate documents. They use the name of one person who becomes an officer of many entities and the signature is very different in different documents. This has happened in your case too.
This is a portion of our report after thoroughly performing research and discovery for one of our clients: (testimonial letters can be provided upon request after signing a confidentiality agreement).
SIGNED BY: LINDA GREEN AS VICE PRESIDENT FOR AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. AS SUCCESOR IN INTEREST TO OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION
TOO MANY JOBS
For this report, over 500 mortgage assignments were examined.
Each Assignment was filed by Docx, a mortgage servicing company in Alpharetta, GA; each was notarized in Fulton County, GA.
Many of these Assignments have been used in foreclosure actions to prove that the lender has the legal right to file the foreclosure actions.
The name of Linda Green, frequently appears on Docx documents. The following list summarizes some of the many job titles used by Green.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
JOB TITLES HELD BY LINDA GREEN
11-11-2004 & 06-22-2006
Vice President, Loan Documentation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo
Home Mortgage, Inc.
08-11-2008 & 08-14-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
08-27-2008
Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation
09-19-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit
09-30-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
09-30-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit
10-08-2009
Vice President & Asst. Secretary, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer for Ameriquest Mortgage Corporation
10-16-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
10-17-2008, 11-20-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit
11-20-2008
Vice President, Option One Mortgage Corporation
12-08-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit
12-15-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for HLB Mortgage
12-24-2008
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
12-26-2008
Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc
01-13-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Family Lending Services, Inc
01-15-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
02-03-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Broker Conduit
02-24-2009
Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation
02-25-2009
Vice President, Bank of America, N A
02-27-2009
Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation
03-02-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage
03-04-2009
Vice President, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC by Citi Residential Lending Inc., attorney-in-fact
03-06-2009 & 03-20-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
04-15-2009, 04-17-2009, 04-20-2009
Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.
05-11-2009, 07-06-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
07-14-2009
Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.
07-30-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
08-12-2009
Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation
08-28-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.
09-03-2009
Asst. Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation formerly known as Option One Mortgage Corporation
09-03-2009
Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage
09-04-2009
Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage
09-08-2009
Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.
09-21-2009 & 09-22-2009
Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc
ATTACHED TO THIS DOCUMENT OTHER DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY LINDA GREEN THAT SHOW THE VARIATIONS OF HER SIGNATURE
IT APPEARS AS IF THE SIGNATURE OF MS. GREEN COULD BE A FORGERY.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
A forgery is a writing which falsely purports to be writing for another and is executed with the intent to defraud. Ordinarily a forged instrument cannot carry title.
THE SIGNATURE BELOW IS THE SIGNATURE IN THIS ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST:Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES ARE FROM DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS RECORDEDIN DIFFERENT COUNTIES:
THIS WHOLE SYSTEM IS A FARCE. A BROKEN DOWN, FRAUDULENT, SHAKY, DISHONEST AND TERRIFYINGLY CORRUPT SYSTEM.
The press and the general public is starting to pick up on these major systemic issues that judges, attorneys and other insiders have known about for some time…when the whole system collapses we’ve all got a real mess on our hands.
As we all struggle to unravel this monstrous mess, breaking down capacity will be a key focus in the problem. We’re all going to be searching around to determine who to sue and where to sue them, but because the courts failed to enforce the most basic pleading requirement….i.e. specifically identify who the parties to the lawsuit are, this is going to be most difficult.
One of the persistent and most pervasive problems in the whole foreclosure crisis is the inability of any party to get reliable or credible information about what is owed on a mortgage, who that phantom amount is owed to and what negotiated amount a lender, servicer or other party involved in the transaction might accept to modify or short sale the underlying loan.
A very concerning issue is the publication on the MERS website of information that identifies who the servicer on a loan is and who the investor in that loan is. But, neither the servicer or investor matches up to the information in many cases.
When you combine all this information with the depositions of Robo signers that are posted on many website, you’ll understand that in a large number of cases, the only connection between the plaintiff foreclosing and the mortgage being foreclosed is a sloppy and hastily executed Assignment signed by an officer that has no corporate authority and has no personal knowledge of the information contained on those documents.
It’s simply not okay to use the “robosigning” practice in the non judicial foreclosure states because these foreclosure cases don’t have to go to court.
The following are some of the most clear legal reasons why the Robo-Signer Controversy should entitle hundreds of thousands of homeowners wrongfully foreclosed and evicted to sue in non judicial foreclosure states. Robo Signers are illegal because fraud cannot be the basis of clear title, trustee’s deeds following Robo Signed sales should be void as a matter of law, notarization is a recording requirement for many of the documents, which was often botched, and most importantly because robo signed falsifications are meant for use in court, including unlawful detainers and bankruptcy matters.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
CALIFORNIA
1. Clear Title May Not Derive from a Fraud (including a bona fide purchaser for value).
In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Trout, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 stated:
“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:
“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).
If forged signatures are used to obtain the foreclosure it makes a difference!
2. Any apparent sale based on Robosigned documents or forged signatures should be void and without any legal effect.
In Bank of America v. LaJolla Group II, the California Court of Appeals held that if a trustee is not contractually empowered under the Deed of Trust to hold a sale, it is totally void. Voidness, as opposed to voidability, means that it is without legal effect. Title does not transfer. No right to evict arises. The property is not sold.
In turn, California Civil Code 2934a requires that the beneficiary execute, notarize and record a substitution for a valid Substitution of Trustee to take effect. Thus, if the Assignment of Deed of Trust, the Substitution of Trustee or the Notice of Default are Robo-Signed, the sale should be void.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
3. These documents are not recordable without good notarization.
In California, the reason these documents are notarized in the first place is because otherwise they will not be accepted by the County recorder. Moreover, a notary who helps commit real estate fraud is liable for $25,000 per offense.
Once the document is recorded, however, it is entitled to a “presumption of validity”, which is what spurned the falsification trend in the first place. California Civil Code Section 2924. Therefore, the notarization of a false signature not only constitutes fraud, but is every bit intended as part of a larger conspiracy to commit fraud on the court.
4. The documents are intended for court eviction proceedings.
A necessary purpose for these documents, after the non judicial foreclosure, is the eviction of the rightful owners afterward. Even in California, eviction is a judicial process, albeit summary and often sloppily conducted by judges who don’t really believe they can say no to the pirates taking your house. However, as demonstrated below, once these documents make it into court, the bank officers and lawyers become guilty of felonies:
California Penal Code section 118 provides (a) Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
This subdivision is applicable whether the statement, or the testimony, declaration, deposition, or certification is made or subscribed within or without the State of California.
Penal Code section 132 provides: Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.
The Doctrine of Unclean Hands provides: plaintiff’s misconduct in the matter before the court makes his hands “unclean” and he may not hold with them the pristine remedy of injunctive relief. California Satellite Sys. v Nichols (1985) 170 CA3d 56, 216 CR 180. California’s unclean hands rule requires that the Plaintiff don’t cheat, and behave fairly. The plaintiff must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v Superior Court (1999) 76 CA4th 970, 978, 90 CR2d 743. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact. CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v Jacobson (1998) 65 CA4th 631, 639, 76 CR2d 615.
5. Robo Signed Documents Are Intended for Use in California Bankruptcy Court Matters. One majorly overlooked facet of California is our extremely active bankrtupcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove “standing” to proceed with a foreclosure. If they are not signed by persons with the requisite knowledge, affidavits submitted in bankruptcy court proceedings such as objections to a plan and Relief from Stays are perjured.
The documents in support are often falsified evidence.
CONCLUSION
Verified eviction complaints, perjured motions for summary judgment, and all other eviction paperwork after robo signed non judicial foreclosures in California and other states are illegal and void. The paperwork itself is void. The sale is void. But the only way to clean up the hundreds of thousands of effected titles is through litigation, because even now the banks will simply not do the right thing. And that’s why robo signers count in non-judicial foreclosure states. Victims of robosigners in California may seek declaratory relief, damages under the Rosenthal Act; an injunction and attorneys fees for Unfair Business practices, as well as claims for slander of title; abuse of process, civil theft, and conversion.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com
posted by Katie Porter
As challenges to whether a “bank” (usually actually a securitized
trust) has the right to foreclose because it owns the note and mortgage become more common, rumors swirl about the ability to use such tactics to get a “free house.” There are a few instances of consumer getting a free house, see here and here, for examples, but these are extreme situations not premised on ownership, but on a more fundamental flaw with the mortgage. In general, the idea that even a successful ownership challenge will create a free house to the borrower is an urban myth. I’ll explain why below, but there is a policy point here. The myth of the free house drives policymakers to complain about the moral hazard risks of holding mortgage companies to the law and tries to set up homeowners who are paying their mortgages against those who are not. It serves the banks’ political agenda to be able to point to the “free house” as an obviously unacceptable alternative of consumers winning legal challenges. It’s key then to understand that the “free house” is largely a creature of consumers’
and banks’ over-active imaginations.
In sorting out why even a successful ownership challenge does not give homeowners a free house, it is helpful to parse some key concepts. The first one is standing, which is the right of a party to ask a court for the relief it seeks. This comes in different flavors, including constitutional standing, but in the foreclosure context, usually boils down to whether the moving party is the “real party in interest.” In re Veal, the recent decision from the 9th Circuit BAP authored by Judge Bruce Markell, mentioned previously on Credit Slips , contains a discussion of standing in the foreclosure context. At least in part, the concern of the real party in interest doctrine is to make sure that the plaintiff is the right person to get legal relief in order to protect the defendant from a later action by the person truly entitled to relief. Note that standing is a concept that only applies in court; here that means in judicial foreclosures. In states that allow non-judicial foreclosure, the issue is slightly different. Does the party initiating the non-judicial foreclosure have the authority to do so under the state statute authorizing the sale? For example, cases such as In re Salazar discuss whether a recorded assignment of the mortgage is needed, as opposed to an unrecorded assignment, to initiate a foreclosure. Under either standing or statutory authority, a “win” by the homeowner leads to the same result. The foreclosure cannot proceed.
But this win is not the same as a free house. Just because a party lacked standing or statutory authority does not mean that there is not some party out there that does have the authority to foreclosure. Nor does a win on standing mean that there cannot be action taken to give the initial foreclosing party the authority that they need, which might occur by transferring possession of the note or by executing a series of assignments, to foreclose at a later date. Unless other problems exist, there is still a valid note that obligates the homeowner to pay money due and there is still a mortgage encumbering the house. The homeowner does not get a free house. Rather, the homeowner just doesn’t lose her house today to foreclosure. These are pretty different outcomes!
This doesn’t mean that I think the standing/ownership issue is inconsequential. For homeowners, a successful challenge that results in the dismissal of a foreclosure can lead to a loan modification or the delay itself can give the homeowner the time to find another solution. For investors in mortgage-backed securities, the problems with paperwork likely increase their loss severities in foreclosure, both because of increased litigation costs and because of delay in correcting problems. (And there may be even more serious problems for investors relating to whether the transfers even succeeded in putting the homes in the trust.) But we shouldn’t confuse these issues with the idea that what is at stake in sorting out this mess is giving a “free house” to some Americans, despite the lamentations of this LaSalle Bank lawyer after a judge ruled that LaSalle as trustee lacked standing to foreclose. A fruitful discussion of these issues needs to begin with a clear understanding of the consequences of the problem, as well as empirical evidence on how widespread these problems are.
The free house is political handwringing, not legal reality.
July 18, 2011 at 4:22 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity Comments It’s certainly not a “free” house. I think it’ll be a nightmare for homeowners who prevail in one of these actions to try and sell their homes. Just because party X can’t foreclose doesn’t mean that there isn’t a valid mortgage still on the property. No buyer is going to want to buy (and no title insurer will want to insure) unless that mortgage is paid off. And that means determining who is the mortgagee.
Adverse possession and/or quiet title actions might help solve some of this, but they are not self-executing solutions. Homeowners will have to go to court and litigate. That’s expensive and it takes time. So, at best, these homeowners are getting not “free” houses but houses with a severely depressed value.
Posted by: Adam Levitin | July 18, 2011 at 06:46 AM
The author skims the surface of the latte and finds after skimming the surface there is no more cream. Duh.
The Banks are often appearing as trustees on behalf of NY Trusts most of which died on or about 2008. If the trusts are dead than who has the right to appear in court? Nemo est hires viventis. No one is the heir of a living person and I would suggest, no one is the a trustee able to act on behalf of a dead trust. If the paper was successfully transferred to the trust, then perhaps the thousands of suckers who bought a RMBS are the owners. But if the paper was never successfully transferred, then the trusts and the trustees are certainly not the owners with standing. The original lenders might be but after phony documents have been created assigning the note and the mortgage to dead trusts, how could they possibly have the right of ownership?
The “myth” of the free houses was created not by consumers “oy!!” but by the very Banks who are picking up “free” houses every day by pretending to be trustees acting on behalf of dead trusts or trusts that never properly held the mortgages and notes. It is very much like Ronald Reagan calling a nuclear submarine the Corpus Christie or calling armed combatants “peacekeepers.” The “free house” was the Orwellian double speak created by Bankers for Bankers and their judicial minions and hand maidens have adopted their language very well.
—
Jake Naumer
Resolution Advisors
3187 Morgan Ford
St Louis Missouri 63116
314 961 7600
Fax Voice Mail 314 754 9086
Pro Per Debtor Stops Attorneys for US Bank – in RE Deamicis
Posted: 31 Jul 2011 10:21 PM PDT
Pro Per Debtor Stops Attorneys for US Bank – in RE Deamicis
By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.
She has been fighting tooth and nail. Nobody was listening. The current bankruptcy judge was skeptical when she showed up in bankruptcy. But now his ruling on a motion for relief from stay blows the doors off her case. It seems that bank attorneys are confused by something that should be very simple for an attorney. The issue is who is the real party in interest? Many have failed to comprehend what is in a name. If a very large bank is included in the name, most just glaze over it and go right to the pleadings. Here it is in a nutshell: US Bank, NA as Indenture Trustee is MEANINGLESS. This is because when a trust is involved, the trust is the real party, not the bank. US Bank is a trustee of hundreds if not thousands of trusts. Naming them as Trustee does not identify an entity that is real. In the debtors case, the bank foreclosed on her home in the name of US Bank as Indenture Trustee of [some Terwin Trust]. This was a non-judicial foreclosure. In the UD (unlawful detainer), which is a judicial case to evict her, the name used was US Bank as Indenture Trustee. The lawyers did not specify a specific trust. She lost that case in state court and before she was evicted she filed bankruptcy. She had to keep objecting and protesting. Eventually the judge came to the realization that something was wrong. In fact the judge ruled as follows:
“The defect cannot be cured, either directly or implicitly, by any ruling this court can make on behalf of the Terwin Trust in the Second 362 Motion.”
I almost fell out of my chair when I read that. If they put the wrong name, they have to cure the problem. Based on my research, in a very large number of cases the wrong party is named. Including yours truly. Have a nice day, I know I will.
Download the case here: http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/in-RE-Deamicis-Real-Party-in-Interest-For-Publication.pdf
The defendant may request a stay of execution of the judgment whether or not an appeal is taken. [CCP §918(a), (c).] You may stay execution of the judgment for up to 40 days without the landlord’s consent in a limited civil case (or up to 70 days in an unlimited case). [See CCP §918(b); CRC 8.104(a), 8.822.] It is a common practice in some courts to require a tenant claiming hardship to pay into court the daily rental value for the length of the stay. [See CCP §1176(a).]
Related procedures govern stays of unlawful detainer judgments pending appeal. The following conditions apply [CCP §1176(a)]:
There is no automatic stay on appeal.
A request for a stay must first be directed to the judge who rendered the judgment.
A stay must be granted if the judge finds that (1) the moving party will suffer extreme hardship if no stay is granted and (2) a stay will not irreparably injure the nonmoving party.
Denial of a stay is reviewable by writ.
Any stay is subject to any conditions the court deems just.
Any stay must be conditioned on payment of the reasonable monthly rental value to the court each month in advance.
Appeals from UD actions are governed by CCP §§901–923. [See CCP §1178; Anchor Marine Repair Co. v Magnan (2001) 93 CA4th 525, 528–530.]
If the court follows the rules of evidence (and they do) if proper objections are filed. No eviction of a secuitized loan should ever prevail on an eviction; they cannot produce the foundation to authenticate the Trustees Deed it is based upon preliminary facts that they are unable and unwilling to bring to court. The Assignments Civil code 2932.5 , The Servicer, The Accounting, The Trustee, MERS, The Robo signer, The person that purportedly contacted the Borrower Trustor, The compliance documents with Civil Code 2924, all these are preliminary facts upon which the admission of the Trustees Deed depend Evidence code 400,401,402,403. Check out this motion !!
Timothy L. McCandless, Esq. (SBN 147715)
LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS
Attorney for Defendant,
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SOLANO
SOLANO COURT/ LIMITED JURISDICTION
FANNIE MAE et al,
Plaintiff,
v.
Defendant.
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)Case No.:
DEFENDANT’S IN LIMINE MOTION TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE (RE:FACIALLY INVALID DEED OF TRUST)
TRIAL DATE: Tues., June 15, 2010 )
To the Court, to Plaintiff FANNIE MAE, and its attorney of record:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on Tuesday, June 15, 2010, at 8:30 AM, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, Defendant, MICHELLE CABESAS, will in limine judicii move the court, and hereby does move, for an order excluding from trial all evidence proffered by Plaintiff FANNIE MAE.
The motion will be heard in Department 26, at 1:30 p.m. in front of the Honorable Judge Davis of the Solano Court of the above-captioned court.
The motion will be brought pursuant to Evidence Code sections 353 and 400 et seq., Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(b), and related decisional law.
The ground of the motion will be that the Unlawful Detainer Complaint, together with the publicly-filed “Deed of Trust” that is necessarily incorporated into it, is facially invalid because the Beneficiary did not have the power of sale. Such irregularities should constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the entire non-judicial foreclosure process. Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale should not be admitted as no lawful basis exists for its execution. Additionally, the Notice of Default, and Notice of Default Declaration should be excluded.
The failure of Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent to perform a condition precedent pursuant to Civil Code Section 2923.5 is fatal. The Notice of Default Declaration fails is several regards, (1) the language of the Notice does not comply with the statute because it does not set forth facts of how the statute was performed; (2) the Declaration is not sworn under penalty of perjury; (3) the only date of the Declaration is the date of execution which is one day prior to the Notice of Default which was recorded only five days later, thus, thirty days did not pass from the date of execution of the Declaration and the date of recordation. As such, under Section 2923.5, the Notice of Default Declaration is void and could not support the recordation of the Notice of Default. Because the non-judicial foreclosure process is subject to strict scrutiny, and given the material failure of a condition precedent by Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent, the entire non-judicial foreclosure process is invalid. Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale cannot be admitted into evidence, as no lawful foundation can be laid.
//
DATED: June 14, 2010. ________________________________________
LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS
By: Timothy P. McCandless, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant,
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The court’s records for this case will show that Plaintiff FANNIE MAE filed its Complaint on or about August 4, 2009. The apparent foreclosing beneficiary was plaintiff, FANNIE MAE. [See attachment to Unlawful Detainer Complaint entitled “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale.”]
This motion ensued in its present form, because sufficient time did not remain before trial, in order to permit Defendant CABESAS to bring a regularly-noticed general demurrer or “motion for judgment on the pleadings”.
II.
THE COURT HAS POWER TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE FROM TRIAL, ON GROUNDS ANALOGOUS TO A GENERAL DEMURRER.
The court has power to consider and grant an objection to all evidence under Evidence Code sections 353 and 400 et seq. If no cause of action or defense is stated by the respective pleading, then no “factual issue” any longer exists, and therefore no evidence may be admitted on grounds of “relevance” under Evidence Code sections 400 et seq.
It is well established that a party may bring an in limine objection in order to exclude all evidence, as a sort of general demurrer or “motion for judgment on the pleadings”. “Although not in form a motion, this method of attacking the pleading is identical in purpose to a general demurrer and motion for judgment on the pleadings and is governed by the same rules. [Citations.]” 5 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd page 386, “Pleading” at §953. See also 6 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd pages 571-573, “Proceedings Without Trial” at §§272-273.
According to 5 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd page 340, “Pleading” at §899, a “general” demurrer concerns only the defense that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense. That is precisely what defendant contends here: the Unlawful Detainer Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
III.
THE COURT MUST STRICTLY ENFORCE
THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A FORECLOSURE.
The harshness of non-judicial foreclosure has been recognized. “The exercise of the power of sale is a harsh method of foreclosing the rights of the grantor.” Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 6 215, citing to System Inv. Corporation v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 153. The statutory requirements are intended to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of his property Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; accord, Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 503; Lo Nguyen v. Calhoun (6th District 2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 440, and a valid foreclosure by the private power of sale requires strict compliance with the requirements of the statute. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.179; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211 (3d Dist. 1989), reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Bisno v. Sax (2d Dist. 1959) 175 Cal. App. 2d 714, 720.
It has been a cornerstone of foreclosure law that the statutory requirements, intending to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of the property, must be complied with strictly. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182. “Close” compliance does not count. As a result, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Default is invalid (emphasis added). Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3dDist. 1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash, Door & Mill Co.(3d Dist. 1931) 118 Cal. App. 379.
Additionally, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Trustee Sale is invalid. Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3d Dist. 1989) 11 208 Cal.App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989). The California Sixth District Court of Appeal observed, “Pursuing that policy [of judicial interpretation], the courts have fashioned rules to protect the debtor, one of them being that the notice of default will be strictly construed and must correctly set forth the amounts required to cure the default.” Sweatt v. The Foreclosure Co., Inc. (1985 – 6th District) 166 Cal.App.3d 273 at 278, citing to Miller v. Cote (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 888, 894 and SystemInv. Corp. v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-153.
The same reasoning applies even to a notice of a trustee’s sale. Courts will set aside a foreclosure sale when there has been fraud, when the sale has been improperly, unfairly, or unlawfully conducted, or when there has been such a mistake that it would be inequitable to let it stand. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Reidy (1940) 15 Cal. 2d 243, 248; Whitman v. Transtate Title Co.(4th Dist. 1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 312, 322-323; In re Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1228. See also Smith v. Williams (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 617, 621; Stirton v. Pastor (4th Dist. 1960) 177 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234; Brown v. Busch (3d Dist. 1957) 152 Cal.App. 2d 200, 203-204.
If somehow these foreclosing predecessor-in-interest can establish this standing, or right, to extrajudicially foreclose, still it should be prevented from pursuing this eviction action, because such an action, if successful, would result in a wrongful foreclosure, due to the predecessor-in-interest’s exercise of a non-existent extrajudicial power.
IV.
PLAINTIFF, OR PLAINTIFF’S PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST,
DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXTRAJUDICIALLY FORECLOSE
The foreclosing predecessor-in-interest simply did not have the right to foreclose under the subject trust deed, because the notice of default facially invalid.
The reason why the security instrument is not valid, is because it is facially void ! A copy of the subject trust deed – a public record!! — is attached hereto. Further, the trueness of the copy is readily verifiable, since it is a publicly-recorded document. Clear as daylight, contact with the trustor 30 days prior to the notice was imjpossible. The was no lender MERS is not a lender Plaintiff did not get the assignment till 7/8/2009 . The notice of default was recorded 7/31/2009 only 23 days after the assignment.
A trust deed adds a third party, of sorts, namely the beneficiary. It has been observed that a trust deed naming a purely fictitious person as beneficiary may be void. Woodward v. McAdam (1894), 101 Cal. 438. It has been held that a trust deed might be void for uncertainty, where the deed of trust does not name or describe any of the beneficiaries, but only classified them by reference to a common attribute. Watkins v. Bryant (1891), 91 Cal. 492. There seems to be no common-sense reason why the same principle should not apply to the designation of the grantee/ trustee, even were the law of deeds not generally applicable to trust deeds.
Beneficiary did not have the power of sale. Such irregularities should constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the entire non-judicial foreclosure process. Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale should not be admitted as no lawful basis exists for its execution. Additionally, the Notice of Default, and Notice of Default Declaration should be excluded.
The failure of Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent to perform a condition precedent pursuant to Civil Code Section 2923.5 is fatal. The Notice of Default Declaration fails is several regards, (1) the language of the Notice does not comply with the statute because it does not set forth facts of how the statute was performed; (2) the Declaration is not sworn under penalty of perjury; (3) the only date of the Declaration is the date of execution which is one day prior to the Notice of Default which was recorded only five days later, thus, thirty days did not pass from the date of execution of the Declaration and the date of recordation. As such, under Section 2923.5, the Notice of Default Declaration is void and could not support the recordation of the Notice of Default. Because the non-judicial foreclosure process is subject to strict scrutiny, and given the material failure of a condition precedent by Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent, the entire non-judicial foreclosure process is invalid. Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale cannot be admitted into evidence, as no lawful foundation can be laid.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff’s entire case rests upon the “facial” or “on the public record” legitimacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure by its predecessor-in-interest. The foreclosure was facially void. The case should be dismissed, upon the court’s determination that no factual “issue” remains.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED: June 14, 2010 _______________________________________
Richmond City Council Passes Just Cause Eviction Ordinance
Tenants protected from unfair evictions from foreclosed home
“It’s unfair for a tenant in good standing to be thrown out of their home because of a foreclosure that they could not prevent.” -Richmond City Council member, Dr. Jeff Ritterman
“We see tenants who have moved three to four times a year, from foreclosed property to foreclosed property, losing thousands in security deposits. It goes without saying that this legislation will provide tremendous relief to many of these individuals.” -Adam Poe, Staff Attorney, Bay Area Legal Aid
“The City of Richmond took an important step yesterday, saying ‘enough is enough’ to banks that are throwing tenants and their families out of their homes and ruining neighborhoods for no good reason. Other California cities should follow Richmond’s lead and pass eviction protection laws. This is a cost effective way for cities to prevent displacement and blight after foreclosure.” -Dean Preston, Executive Director of Tenants Together, California’s Statewide Organization for Renters’ Rights
On June 16th, before a packed chamber, the Richmond City Council became the second city in California to enact a “Just Cause” ordinance protecting tenants from unfair evictions from foreclosed homes. Passed unanimously, the ordinance spells out 12 specific circumstances where eviction is allowed, none of which is foreclosure. The ordinance provides an affirmative defense for a tenant in an unlawful detainer action, contains retaliatory eviction protection and it requires payment of a relocation fee in the amount of two times the monthly rent plus $1000.
Homeowners are not the only victim’s of the foreclosure crisis. Renters are often overlooked who, by no fault of their own, face eviction. In Richmond, 50% of residents are renters, and with 2,000 current foreclosures and a 30% increase predicted over the next year, there is a crisis. With an eviction on record, residents have difficulty finding new homes and many families have become homeless. The West Contra Costs County School District now reports 850 homeless students, a 44% increase from just 2 years ago.
Introduced by Council Member Dr. Jeff Ritterman, Labor, faith and community groups led by Richmond Vision and Richmond Equitable Development Initiative (REDI)* have long advocated for “Just Cause” tenant protection legislation. Art Hatchett, Co-chair of Richmond Vision and Executive Director of GRIP (The Greater Richmond Interfaith Project), which provides homeless housing and services in West Contra Costa County, expressed satisfaction with the passage. “We’ve seen a significant increase in our communities’ homeless population, both individuals and families. As of July 1, 2009, the new Just Cause legislation will help keep individuals and families who are renters from becoming homeless and victims of unfair evictions.”
This ordinance gained momentum this past March when The Richmond Equitable Development Initiative (REDI) held a community town hall meeting to present their comprehensive housing platform to keep families in their homes. Over 500 community members attended. Their housing platform included: a “Just Cause” eviction ordinance, policies to stabilize and revitalize Richmond neighborhoods, create more long-term affordable housing and put Richmond residents back to work rebuilding Richmond. Since the town hall, REDI community leaders have been meeting with council members and city staff to implement these policies.
The passage of the “Just Cause” ordinance is the first policy initiative to come out of these efforts and Council Member Ritterman has proclaimed, “I hope this will be one of many measures we take as a city to address this crisis. It’s bad for the city to allow neighborhoods to deteriorate and I believe elected officials have an obligation to protect the most vulnerable among us.”
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF ARIZONA
DIVISION ONE
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, as Trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 1998-8, its assignees and/or successors-in-interest,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PATRICIA DE MEO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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1 CA-CV 10-0177
DEPARTMENT B
O P I N I O N
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Cause No. CV 2009-035645
The Honorable Lindsay Best Ellis, Judge Pro Tempore (Retired)
REVERSED
Patricia De Meo, Appellant
In Propria Persona Phoenix
Perry & Shapiro, LLP
by Christopher R. Perry
Jason P. Sherman
Attorneys for Appellee Phoenix
Community Legal Services
by Jeffrey Kastner
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Phoenix
W E I S B E R G, Judge
2
¶1 Appellant, Patricia De Meo, appeals from a judgment finding her guilty of forcible entry and detainer and ordering her to surrender her leased premises to Appellee, The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 1998-8, its assignees and/or successors-in-interest (“the Bank”). For reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 The Bank held a note secured by a deed of trust on real property (“the property”) owned by J.S. J.S. had leased the property to De Meo pursuant to a written lease agreement for one year commencing on August 31, 2005, with an option to purchase that expired on August 31, 2006. After not exercising her option to purchase, De Meo continued to lease the property on a month-to-month basis.
¶3 J.S. later defaulted on the note and the Bank acquired the property at a trustee’s sale. The trustee’s deed was recorded on August 18, 2009. On August 19, 2009, the Bank, through its attorneys, sent a letter to J.S. and/or Occupants giving notice to vacate the property within five days of the date of the letter pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes
3
(“A.R.S.”) 12-1173 and 12-1173.01 (2003).
1
¶4 On November 24, 2009, the Bank filed a forcible entry and detainer (“FED”) complaint against J.S. and “Occupants and Parties-in-Possession.” De Meo was personally served on December 1, 2009. De Meo filed an answer on January 6, 2010 and raised several defenses, including that the Bank did not serve her with the 90-day notice required by the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (“PTFA”) § 702, 12 U.S.C. § 5220 (2009). The letter indicated that if the property was not vacated within the time prescribed, the Bank would begin legal proceedings to recover possession of it. De Meo was still a tenant on August 19, 2009 and received the Bank’s five-day written notice to vacate.
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¶5 Regarding the 90-day notice requirement under the PTFA, the Bank’s attorney told the court that the Bank did not file the FED action until 97 days after the August 19, 2009 letter, and that he did not “find anything here that would require us to provide any additional notice or any additional time.” The court noted that the PTFA was a new law and that
1Under A.R.S. § 12-1173, there is a forcible detainer when a month-to-month tenant refuses to surrender possession of property “for five days after written demand.” Under A.R.S. § 12-1173.01(A)(2), a person who retains possession of property after receiving “written demand of possession” may be removed through an action for forcible detainer “[i]f the property has been sold through a trustee’s sale under a deed of trust.”
2Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not address De Meo’s other arguments.
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“all of us had a little bit of problem[] trying to figure out what it required, but the one thing that is certain that it requires is 90 days before an individual is going to be subject to a writ of restitution on a piece of property that they’re renting.” The court continued, “You had a valid lease. Once the term of the original written lease expired, it became a month-to-month tenancy. You’re entitled to at least 90 days’ notice from the date of the trustee’s sale.” However, the court reasoned that because the bank was the rightful owner, there was “no theory” that precluded the court from granting immediate possession of the property to the Bank.
¶6 The court granted judgment in the Bank’s favor. The court denied De Meo’s motion for the court to set bond and for a stay pending the outcome of the appeal. De Meo timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) (2003).
DISCUSSION
¶7 De Meo claims the Bank violated the PTFA by failing to give her a 90-day written notice to vacate and that the court therefore erred in granting judgment in the Bank’s favor. The Bank responds that this appeal should be dismissed because De Meo no longer resides on the property, rendering the appeal moot. The Bank also argues that the court did not err in entering judgment in its favor because the PTFA does not require
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a written 90-day notice, and because the Bank waited more than 90 days after giving De Meo a written five-day notice to institute the FED action.
Mootness
¶8 “A decision becomes moot for purposes of appeal where as a result of a change of circumstances before the appellate decision, action by the reviewing court would have no effect on the parties.” Vinson v. Marton & Assocs., 159 Ariz. 1, 4, 764 P.2d 736, 739 (App. 1988) (citing Ariz. State Bd. of Dirs. for Junior Colls. v. Phoenix Union High Sch. Dist., 102 Ariz. 69, 73, 424 P.2d 819, 823 (1967)). When a tenant has abandoned property after entry of judgment granting the landlord possession, the issue of mootness arises. Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 344, 452 P.2d 122, 125 (1969). We may, however, consider an issue that has become moot “if there is either an issue of great public importance or an issue capable of repetition yet evading review.” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Molera, 200 Ariz. 457, 460, ¶ 12, 27 P.3d 814, 817 (App. 2001); Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 2 v. Phoenix Emp. Relations Bd., 133 Ariz. 126, 127, 650 P.2d 428, 429 (1982). Even accepting arguendo the Bank’s argument, the issue of notice under the PTFA and its application to the FED statutes falls within both
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exceptions to the mootness rule, and we therefore decline to dismiss this appeal on that basis.
90-Day Notice under the PTFA
¶9 The PTFA, effective May 20, 2009, is a federal law protecting tenants who reside in certain foreclosed properties. It provides in pertinent part,
(a) In General-In the case of any foreclosure on a federally-related mortgage loan or on any dwelling or residential real property after the date of enactment of this title, any immediate successor in interest in such property pursuant to the foreclosure shall assume such interest subject to—
(1) the provision, by such successor in interest of a notice to vacate to any bona fide tenant at least 90 days before the effective date of such notice; and
(2) the rights of any bona fide tenant—
(A) under any bona fide lease entered into before the notice of foreclosure to occupy the premises until the end of the remaining term of the lease, except that a successor in interest may terminate a lease effective on the date of sale of the unit to a purchaser who will occupy the unit as a primary residence, subject to the receipt by the tenant of the 90 day notice under subsection (1); or
(B) without a lease or with a lease terminable at will under state law, subject to the receipt by the tenant of the 90 day notice under subsection (1),
except that nothing under this section shall affect the requirements for termination of any Federal-or State-subsidized tenancy or of any State or local law that provides longer time
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periods or other additional protections for tenants.
(Emphasis added).
¶10 The Bank did not dispute below that the PTFA applies in this case.3
¶11 The interpretation and application of statutes are questions of law, which we review de novo. Kromko v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 499, 501, ¶ 4, 47 P.3d 1137, 1139 (App. 2002). In statutory construction, we first look to the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning and to discern the See Harper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 699 S.E.2d 854, 856 (Ga. App. 2010) (PTFA applies where federally-related mortgage loan is being foreclosed upon and the tenant is a bona fide tenant under a bona fide lease). The Bank argues, however, that the PTFA does not require a written 90-day notice to vacate. Instead, it claims, the tenant need only receive “some notice” and that in this case, the five-day written notice was sufficient.
3Community Legal Services, on behalf of a number of organizations, has filed a brief as an amicus curiae in support of De Meo’s position. See ARCAP 16. In its responsive brief, the Bank has argued, for the first time, that the PTFA is unconstitutional as applied to De Meo and, contrary to its earlier position, that she is not protected by the PTFA because she failed to allege that the foreclosure involved a federally-related mortgage. We do not consider these arguments, however, because they are new issues that were not raised below. Parkinson v. Guadalupe Pub. Safety Ret. Board, 214 Ariz. 274, 278, ¶ 22, 151 P.3d 557, 561 (App. 2007) (court will not consider issues in amicus curiae briefs not raised below).
8
intent of Congress. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004). We consider the words or phrases in their statutory context. Id. at 186. Also, if there is an ambiguity in a statute, we may consider its legislative history. Id. at 187, n.8.
¶12 Section 702(a)(1) of PTFA provides that a successor property owner assumes an interest in the property subject to its provision of “a notice to vacate to any bona fide tenant at least 90 days before the effective date of such notice.” (Emphasis added). Section 702(a)(2)(B) specifies that a successor property owner acquires its property interest subject to the right of a bona fide tenant who is “without a lease or a lease terminable at will under state law” to receive “the 90 day notice under subsection (1).” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, by its express terms, § 702 (a) requires that a successor property owner provide a bona fide month-to-month tenant with a 90-day notice to vacate before terminating the tenancy, and the 90-day period must be completed before the notice’s effective date.
¶13 The Bank nonetheless argues that the phrase “effective date of such notice” in § 702(a)(1) refers to the date the owner “takes action to force the tenant to vacate.” Because the FED hearing did not take place until 97 days after the notice, the
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Bank asserts that De Meo “received the notice required by the PTFA.” However, that interpretation is not consistent with the language of § 702(a) within the context of the entire provision. See BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 185 (“statutory context . . . confirms ordinary meaning”). As explained above, § 702(a) requires that the effective date provided in the notice to vacate be not less than 90 days after service of the notice upon the tenant. Our reading of this section is supported by the opinions of courts in other jurisdictions.
¶14 In Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2010 WL 2179885 at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2010), the court opined that “[t]he PTFA protects tenants who are the victims of the foreclosure crisis. Included in the Act is a right for the tenant to occupy the premises until the end of the lease, as well as a right to receive a notice to vacate 90 days before the effective date.” (citations omitted). See also Bank of America, N.A. v. Owens, 903 N.Y.S.2d 667, 671-72 (City Ct. 2010)(the PTFA’s advance notice provisions cannot be construed to permit owners to take measures to circumvent or “short-circuit” the 90-day notice requirement). Obviously, a five-day notice, even when followed by an unannounced 90-day delay, is at best misleading. The noticed tenant could reasonably conclude that all arrangements to vacate the property and relocate must
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be concluded within the five-day notice period. Such misleading information would not be consistent with the PTFA’s requirement.
¶15 Moreover, the Bank’s interpretation is contrary to the legislative intent expressed in support of the PTFA. As noted by Senator Christopher Dodd, one of the drafters of the PTFA, “all bona fide tenants who began renting prior to transfer of title by foreclosure . . . must be given at least 90 days’ notice before being required to vacate the property.” He added that [t]his new law protects tenants facing evictions due to foreclosure by ensuring that they . . . at the least, receive sufficient notice and time to relocate their families and lives to a new home.” 155 Cong. Rec. S8978-01 (August 6, 2009).4
¶16 Because the Bank failed to comply with the PTFA’s 90-day notice requirement, the trial court erred in finding De Meo guilty of forcible entry and detainer and in entering judgment in the Bank’s favor. The trial court further erred in failing to dismiss the FED action. See Alton v. Tower Capital Co., Inc., 123 Ariz. 602, 604, 601 P.2d 602, 604 (1979)(if landlord fails to give proper written notice, the trial court must find Our holding is consistent with this legislative intent.
4The Bank also asserts that a written 90-day notice to vacate is not required and that oral notice is sufficient to satisfy the PTFA. But the Bank has not cited any authority for this assertion and such an interpretation would be contrary to the express language of the law.
11
the tenant not guilty of forcible detainer and cannot enter judgment in the landlord’s favor); see also Rule 13(a)(2), Arizona Rules of Procedures for Eviction Actions, (if the tenant does not receive proper termination notice, “the court shall dismiss the [FED] action.”).
CONCLUSION
¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
_/s/_________________________
SHELDON H. WEISBERG, Judge
CONCURRING:
__/s/__________________________________
DONN KESSLER, Presiding Judge
__/s/_________________________________
DIANE M. JOHNSEN, Judge
Scott Pelley reports how problems with mortgage documents are prompting lawsuits and could slow down the weak housing market
Play CBS Video Video The next housing shockAs more and more Americans face mortgage foreclosure, banks’ crucial ownership documents for the properties are often unclear and are sometimes even bogus, a condition that’s causing lawsuits and hampering an already weak housing market. Scott Pelley reports.
Video Extra: Eviction reprieveFlorida residents AJ and Brenda Boyd spent more than a year trying to renegotiate their mortgage and save their home. At the last moment, questions about who owns their mortgage saved them from eviction.
Video Extra: “Save the Dream” eventsBruce Marks, founder and CEO of the nonprofit Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America talks to Scott Pelley about his “Save the Dream” events and how foreclosures are causing a crisis in America.
(CBS News)If there was a question about whether we’re headed for a second housing shock, that was settled last week with news that home prices have fallen a sixth consecutive month. Values are nearly back to levels of the Great Recession. One thing weighing on the economy is the huge number of foreclosed houses.Many are stuck on the market for a reason you wouldn’t expect: banks can’t find the ownership documents.
Who really owns your mortgage? Scott Pelley explains a bizarre aftershock of the U.S. financial collapse: An epidemic of forged and missing mortgage documents.
It’s bizarre but, it turns out, Wall Street cut corners when it created those mortgage-backed investments that triggered the financial collapse. Now that banks want to evict people, they’re unwinding these exotic investments to find, that often, the legal documents behind the mortgages aren’t there. Caught in a jam of their own making, some companies appear to be resorting to forgery and phony paperwork to throw people – down on their luck – out of their homes.
In the 1930s we had breadlines; venture out before dawn in America today and you’ll find mortgage lines. This past January in Los Angeles, 37,000 homeowners facing foreclosure showed up to an event to beg their bank for lower payments on their mortgage. Some people even slept on the sidewalk to get in line.
So many in the country are desperate now that they have to meet in convention centers coast to coast.
In February in Miami, 12,000 people showed up to a similar event. The line went down the block and doubled back twice.
Dale DeFreitas lost her job and now fears her home is next. “It’s very emotional because I just think about it. I don’t wanna lose my home. I really don’t,” she told “60 Minutes” correspondent Scott Pelley.
“It’s your American dream,” he remarked.
“It was. And still is,” she replied.
These convention center events are put on by the non-profit Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America, which helps people figure what they can afford, and then walks them across the hall to bank representatives to ask for lower payments. More than half will get their mortgages adjusted, but the rest discover that they just can’t keep their home.
For many that’s when the real surprise comes in: these same banks have fouled up all of their own paperwork to a historic degree.
“In my mind this is an absolute, intentional fraud,” Lynn Szymoniak, who is fighting foreclosure, told Pelley.
While trying to save her house, she discovered something we did not know: back when Wall Street was using algorithms and computers to engineer those disastrous mortgage-backed securities, it appears they didn’t want old fashioned paperwork slowing down the profits.
“This was back when it was a white hot fevered pitch to move as many of these as possible,” Pelley remarked.
“Exactly. When you could make a whole lotta money through securitization. And every other aspect of it could be done electronically, you know, key strokes. This was the only piece where somebody was supposed to actually go get documents, transfer the documents from one entity to the other. And it looks very much like they just eliminated that stuff all together,” Szymoniak said.
Szymoniak’s mortgage had been bundled with thousands of others into one of those Wall Street securities traded from investor to investor. When the bank took her to court, it first said it had lost her documents, including the critical assignment of mortgage which transfers ownership. But then, there was a courthouse surprise.
“They found all of your paperwork more than a year after they initially said that they had lost it?” Pelley asked.
“Yes,” she replied.
Asked if that seemed suspicious to her, Szymoniak said, “Yes, absolutely. What do you imagine? It fell behind the file cabinet? Where was all of this? ‘We had it, we own it, we lost it.’ And then more recently, everyone is coming in saying, ‘Hey we found it. Isn’t that wonderful?'”
But what the bank may not have known is that Szymoniak is a lawyer and fraud investigator with a specialty in forged documents. She has trained FBI agents.
She told Pelley she asked for copies of those documents.
Asked what she found, Szymoniak told Pelley, “When I looked at the assignment of my mortgage, and this is the assignment: it looked that even the date they put in, which was 10/17/08, was several months after they sued me for foreclosure. So, what they were saying to the court was, ‘We sued her in July of 2008 and we acquired this mortgage in October of 2008.’ It made absolutely no sense.”
Produced by Robert Anderson and Daniel Ruetenik
Now for the pleading
Timothy L. McCandless, Esq. SBN 147715
LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS
1881 Business Center Drive, Ste. 9A
San Bernardino, CA 92392
Tel: 909/890-9192
Fax: 909/382-9956
Attorney for Plaintiffs
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ____________
___________________________________,
And ROES 1 through 5,000,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAND CANYON CORPORATION f/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION; AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2; DOCX, LLC; and PREMIER TRUST DEED SERVICES and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on Plaintiff’s title thereto, Does 1 through 10, Inclusive,
Defendants.
CASE NO:
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
FOR QUIET TITLE, DECLARATORY RELIEF, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNTION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION, CANCELATION OF INSTRUMENT AND FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM:
SLANDER OF TITLE; TORTUOUS
VIOLATION OF STATUTE [Penal
Code § 470(b) – (d); NOTARY FRAUD;
///
///
///
///
Plaintiffs ___________________________ allege herein as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiffs ___________ (hereinafter individually and collectively referred to as “___________”), were and at all times herein mentioned are, residents of the County of _________, State of California and the lawful owner of a parcel of real property commonly known as: _________________, California _______ and the legal description is:
2. At all times herein mentioned, SAND CANYON CORPORATION f/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION (hereinafter SAND CANYON”), is and was, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of California and claims an interest adverse to the right, title and interests of Plaintiff in the Subject Property.
3. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter “AMERICAN”), is and was, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, and at all times herein mentioned was conducting ongoing business in the State of California.
4. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2 (hereinafter referred to as “WELLS FARGO”), is and was, a member of the National Banking Association and makes an adverse claim to the Plaintiff MADRIDS’ right, title and interest in the Subject Property.
5. At all times herein mentioned, Defendant DOCX, L.L.C. (hereinafter “DOCX”), is and was, a limited liability company existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Georgia, and a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation.
6. At all times herein mentioned, __________________, was a company existing by virtue of its relationship as a subsidiary of __________________.
7. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES I through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiffs’ title, or any cloud on Plaintiffs’ title thereto. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint as required to allege said Doe Defendants’ true names and capacities when such have been fully ascertained. Plaintiffs further allege that Plaintiffs designated as ROES 1 through 5,000, are Plaintiffs who share a commonality with the same Defendants, and as the Plaintiffs listed herein.
8. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, were the agent and employee of each of the remaining Defendants.
9. Plaintiffs allege that each and every defendants, and each of them, allege herein ratified the conduct of each and every other Defendant.
10. Plaintiffs allege that at all times said Defendants, and each of them, were acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment.
11. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that circa July 2004, DOCX was formed with the specific intent of manufacturing fraudulent documents in order create the false impression that various entities obtained valid, recordable interests in real
properties, when in fact they actually maintained no lawful interest in said properties.
12. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that as a regular and ongoing part of the business of Defendant DOCX was to have persons sitting around a table signing names as quickly as possible, so that each person executing documents would sign approximately 2,500 documents per day. Although the persons signing the documents claimed to be a vice president of a particular bank of that document, in fact, the party signing the name was not the person named on the document, as such the signature was a forgery, that the name of the person claiming to be a vice president of a particular financial institution was not a “vice president”, did not have any prior training in finance, never worked for the company they allegedly purported to be a vice president of, and were alleged to be a vice president simultaneously with as many as twenty different banks and/or lending institutions.
13. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that the actual signatories of the instruments set forth in Paragraph 12 herein, were intended to and were fraudulently notarized by a variety of notaries in the offices of DOCX in Alpharetta, GA.
14. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that for all purposes the intent of Defendant DOCX was to intentionally create fraudulent documents, with forged signatures, so that said documents could be recorded in the Offices of County Recorders through the United States of America, knowing that such documents would forgeries, contained false information, and that the recordation of such documents would affect an interest in real property in violation of law.
15. Plaintiffs allege that on or about, ____________, that they conveyed a first deed of trust (hereinafter “DEED”) in favor of Option One Mortgage, Inc. with an interest of
The California Department of Real Estate has issued the following
“CONSUMER ALERT” warning consumers about claims being made by marketers
of “Mass Joinder” Lawsuits. I have provided two links to the California
Department’s Website containing the text of the “Alert,” but have also
re-posted it in its entirety to help broaden the distribution of the
document. Mandelman
California Department of Real Estate ** CONSUMER ALERT **
FRAUD WARNING REGARDING LAWSUIT MARKETERS REQUESTING UPFRONT FEES FOR
SO-CALLED “MASS JOINDER” OR CLASS LITIGATION PROMISING EXTRAORDINARY
HOME MORTGAGE RELIEF
By Wayne S. Bell, Chief Counsel, California Department of Real Estate
I. HOME MORTGAGE RELIEF THROUGH LITIGATION (and “Too Good to Be True”
Claims Regarding Its Use to Avoid and/or Stop Foreclosure, Obtain Loan
Principal Reduction, and to Let You Have Your Home “Free and Clear” of
Any Mortgage).
This alert is written to warn consumers about marketing companies,
unlicensed entities, lawyers, and so-called attorney-backed,
attorney-affiliated, and lawyer referral entities that offer and sell
false hope and request the payment of upfront fees for so-called “mass
joinder” or class litigation that will supposedly result in
extraordinary home mortgage relief.
The California Department of Real Estate (“DRE” or “Department”)
previously issued a consumer alert and fraud warning on loan
modification and foreclosure rescue scams in California. That alert was
followed by warnings and alerts regarding forensic loan audit fraud,
scams in connection with short sale transactions, false and misleading
designations and claims of special expertise, certifications and
credentials in connection with home loan relief services, and other real
estate and home loan relief scams.
The Department continues to administratively prosecute those who engage
in such fraud and to work in collaboration with the California State
Bar, the Federal Trade Commission, and federal, State and local criminal
law enforcement authorities to bring such frauds to justice.
On October 11, 2009, Senate Bill 94 was signed into law in California,
and it became effective that day. It prohibited any person, including
real estate licensees and attorneys, from charging, claiming, demanding,
collecting or receiving an upfront fee from a homeowner borrower in
connection with a promise to modify the borrower’s residential loan or
some other form of mortgage loan forbearance.
Senate Bill 94’s prohibitions seem to have significantly impacted the
rampant fraud that was occurring and escalating with respect to the
payment of upfront fees for loan modification work.
Also, forensic loan auditors must now register with the California
Department of Justice and cannot accept payments in advance for their
services under California law once a Notice of Default has been
recorded. There are certain exceptions for lawyers and real estate
brokers.
On January 31, 2011, an important and broad advance fee ban issued by
the Federal Trade Commission became effective and outlaws providers of
mortgage assistance relief services from requesting or collecting
advance fees from a homeowner.
Discussions about Senate Bill 94, the Federal advance fee ban, and the
Consumer Alerts of the DRE, are available on the DRE’s website at www.dre.ca.gov.
Lawyer Exemption from the Federal Advance Fee Ban –
The advance fee ban issued by the Federal Trade Commission includes a
narrow and conditional carve out for attorneys.
If lawyers meet the following four conditions, they are generally exempt
from the rule:
1. They are engaged in the practice of law, and mortgage assistance
relief is part of their practice.
2. They are licensed in the State where the consumer or the
dwelling is located.
3. They are complying with State laws and regulations governing the
“same type of conduct the [FTC] rule requires”.
4. They place any advance fees they collect in a client trust
account and comply with State laws and regulations covering such
accounts. This requires that client funds be kept separate from the
lawyers’ personal and/or business funds until such time as the funds
have been earned.
It is important to note that the exemption for lawyers discussed above
does not allow lawyers to collect money upfront for loan modifications
or loan forbearance services, which advance fees are banned by the more
restrictive California Senate Bill 94.
But those who continue to prey on and victimize vulnerable homeowners
have not given up. They just change their tactics and modify their
sales pitches to keep taking advantage of those who are desperate to
save their homes. And some of the frauds seeking to rip off desperate
homeowners are trying to use the lawyer exemption above to collect
advance fees for mortgage assistance relief litigation.
This alert and warning is issued to call to your attention the often
overblown and exaggerated “sales pitch(es)” regarding the supposed value
of questionable “Mass Joinder” or Class Action Litigation.
Whether they call themselves Foreclosure Defense Experts, Mortgage Loan
Litigators, Living Free and Clear experts, or some other official,
important or impressive sounding title(s), individuals and companies are
marketing their services in the State of California and on the Internet.
They are making a wide variety of claims and sales pitches, and offering
impressive sounding legal and litigation services, with quite
extraordinary remedies promised, with the goal of taking and getting
some of your money.
While there are lawyers and law firms which are legitimate and
qualified to handle complex class action or joinder litigation, you must
be cautious and BEWARE. And certainly check out the lawyers on the
State Bar website and via other means, as discussed below in Section
III. II.
QUESTIONABLE AND/OR FALSE CLAIMS OF THE SO-CALLED MORTGAGE LOAN DEFENSE
OR “MASS JOINDER” AND CLASS LITIGATORS.
A. What are the Claims/Sales Pitches? They are many and varied, and
include:
1. You can join in a mass joinder or class action lawsuit already
filed against your lender and stay in your home. You can stop paying
your lender.
2. The mortgage loans can be stripped entirely from your home.
3. Your payment obligation and foreclosure against your home can be
stopped when the lawsuit is filed.
4. The litigation will take the power away from your lender.
5. A jury will side with you and against your lender.
6. The lawsuit will give you the leverage you need to stay in your
home.
7. The lawsuit may give you the right to rescind your home loan,
or to reduce your principal.
8. The lawsuit will help you modify your home loan. It will give
you a step up in the loan modification process.
9. The litigation will be performed through “powerful” litigation
attorney representation.
10. Litigation attorneys are “turning the tables on lenders and
getting cash settlements for homeowners”. In one Internet advertisement,
the marketing materials say, “the damages sought in your behalf are
nothing less than a full lien strip or in otherwords [sic] a free and
clear house if the bank can’t produce the documents they own the note on
your home. Or at the very least, damages could be awarded that would
reduce the principal balance of the note on your home to 80% of market
value, and give you a 2% interest rate for the life of the loan”.
B. Discussion.
Please don’t be fooled by slick come-ons by scammers who just want your
money. Some of the claims above might be true in a particular case,
based on the facts and evidence presented before a Court or a jury, or
have a ring or hint of truth, but you must carefully examine and analyze
each and every one of them to determine if filing a lawsuit against your
lender or joining a class or mass joinder lawsuit will have any value
for you and your situation. Be particularly skeptical of all such
claims, since agreeing to participate in 4 such litigation may require
you to pay for legal or other services, often before any legal work is
performed (e.g., a significant upfront retainer fee is required).
The reality is that litigation is time-consuming (with formal discovery
such as depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, requests
for admissions, motions, and the like), expensive, and usually
vigorously defended. There can be no guarantees or assurances with
respect to the outcome of a lawsuit.
Even if a lender or loan owner defendant were to lose at trial, it can
appeal, and the entire process can take years. Also, there is no
statistical or other competent data that supports the claims that a mass
joinder and class action lawsuit, even if performed by a licensed,
legitimate and trained lawyer(s), will provide the remedies that the
marketers promise.
There are two other important points to be made here:
First, even assuming that the lawyers can identify fraud or other legal
violations performed by your lender in the loan origination process,
your loan may be owned by an investor – that is, someone other than your
lender. The investor will most assuredly argue that your claims against
your originating lender do not apply against the investor (the purchaser
of your loan). And even if your lender still owns the loan, they are not
legally required, absent a court judgment or order, to modify your loan
or to halt the foreclosure process if you are behind in your payments.
If they happen to lose the lawsuit, they can appeal, as noted above.
Also, the violations discovered may be minor or inconsequential, which
will not provide for any helpful remedies.
Second, and very importantly, loan modifications and other types of
foreclosure relief are simply not possible for every homeowner, and the
“success rate” is currently very low in California. This is where the
lawsuit marketing scammers come in and try to convince you that they
offer you “a leg up”. They falsely claim or suggest that they can
guarantee to stop a foreclosure in its tracks, leave you with a home
“free and clear” of any mortgage loan(s), make lofty sounding but
hollow promises, exaggerate or make bold statements regarding their
litigation successes, charge you for a retainer, and leave you with less
money.
III. THE KEY HERE IS FOR YOU TO BE ON GUARD AND CHECK THE LAWYERS OUT
(Know Who You Are or May Be Dealing With) – Do Your Own Homework (Avoid
The Traps Set by the Litigation Marketing Frauds).
Before entering into an attorney-client relationship, or paying for
“legal” or litigation services, ascertain the name of the lawyer or
lawyers who will be providing the services. Then check them out on the
State Bar’s website, at www.calbar.ca.gov. Make certain that they are
licensed by the State Bar of California. If they are licensed, see if
they have been disciplined.
Check them out through the Better Business Bureau to see if the Bureau
has received any complaints about the lawyer, law firm or marketing firm
offering the services (and remember that only lawyers can provide legal
services). And please understand that this is just another resource for
you to check, as the litigation services provider might be so new that
the Better Business Bureau may have little or nothing on them (or
something positive because of insufficient public input).
Check them out through a Google or related search on the Internet. You
may be amazed at what you can and will find out doing such a search.
Often consumers who have been scammed will post their experiences,
insights, and warnings long
before any criminal, civil or administrative action has been brought
against the scammers.
Also, ask them lots of specific, detailed questions about their
litigation experience, clients and successful results. For example, you
should ask them how many mortgage-related joinder or class lawsuits they
have filed and handled through settlement or trial. Ask them for
pleadings they have filed and news stories about their so-called
successes. Ask them for a list of current and past “satisfied” clients.
If they provide you with a list, call those people and ask those former
clients if they would use the lawyer or law firm again.
Ask the lawyers if they are class action or joinder litigation
specialists and ask them what specialist qualifications they have. Then
ask what they will actually do for you (what specific services they will
be providing and for what fees and costs). Get that in writing, and take
the time to fully understand what the attorney-client contract says and
what the end result will be before proceeding with the services.
Remember to always ask for and demand copies of all documents that you
sign.
IV. CONCLUSION.
Mortgage rescue frauds are extremely good at selling false hope to
consumers in trouble with regard to home loans. The scammers continue
to adapt and to modify their schemes as soon as their last ones became
ineffective. Promises of successes through mass joinder or class
litigation are now being marketed. Please be careful, do your own
diligence to protect yourself, and be highly suspect if anyone asks you
for money up front before doing any service on your behalf. Most
importantly, DON’T LET FRAUDS TAKE YOUR HARD EARNED MONEY.
###########
Here’s another link to the California Department of Real Estate’s page
containing this fraud warning:
FRAUD WARNING REGARDING LAWSUIT MARKETERS REQUESTING UPFRONT FEES FOR
SO-CALLED “MASS JOINDER” OR CLASS LITIGATION PROMISING EXTRAORDINARY
HOME MORTGAGE RELIEF
Were the motion to be amended to properly name the movant to be the UD plaintiff and the purported titleholder – “U S BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee,” any such movant would still have no standing to bring this motion without naming the trust for whose benefit they are purporting to act as trustee. If there is a trust, it must be named. There is no trust.
This nuance has been too difficult for other judges to grasp and clearly beyond the abilities of the debtor’s attorney to communicate. Esteemed bankruptcy judges have shown no interest in the identity of, or the existence of, the trust purporting to hold title to the subject property. The unlawful detainer commissioners who ruled in summary judgment while debtor’s counsel was on vacation were similarly unconcerned.
By way of illustration, debtor’s counsel suggests that the court substitute the hypothetical name “BOZO THE CLOWN” for “U S BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION.” If “BOZO THE CLOWN, as Trustee” were to have acquired the subject property by trustee’s deed upon sale, one may wonder aloud that it was not “BOZO THE CLOWN” that acquired the subject property, but rather “BOZO THE CLOWN, as Trustee” for another entity – a trust. Indeed, it would be ridiculous to say that “BOZO THE CLOWN” owned the property. Instead, it would be imminently reasonable to inquire as to the identity of the trust on whose behalf “BOZO THE CLOWN” was acting as trustee. One might expect some courts to make such an inquiry sua sponte. One would readily expect any court to take some interest in the issue were a party to object to a motion filed by “BOZO THE CLOWN” – as trustee or otherwise – for failing to identify the trust purporting to own the subject property.
In the motion before the court, there are no clowns, just a bank acting as trustee for an unnamed trust. A trust that debtor’s counsel contends does not exist. It’s one thing to lose one’s home to a bank that cheats. It’s quite another to lose it to a bank or a trust that doesn’t exist
With all of the press robo-signing has gotten, it is a bit surprising that everyone is having such a hard time concluding whether these practices effect California foreclosures. My assistant even said to me today, “but the banks say that it doesn’t matter because California is non judicial.”
Because the topic has not gotten the treatment it deserves, I will gladly do the job. The following are by no means a complete list, but are the most clear LEGAL reasons (setting aside pure moral questions and the U.S. Constitution) that the Robo-Signer Controversy will lead to massive litigation in California.
In short, Robo Signers are illegal in California because good title cannot be based on fraud, robo signed non judicial foreclosure sales are void as a matter of law, the documents are not able to be recorded in California if they are not notarized, which we know was often not done properly, and finally, because they robo signed forgeries ARE intended for judicial proceedings, including evictions and bankruptcy relief from stay motions.
1. Good Title Cannot Be Based on Fraud (Even as to a 3d Party).
In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Trout, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 made as much plain:
“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:
“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).
Hence, if forged Robo Signed signatures are used to obtain the foreclosure, it CERTAINLY makes a difference in California and other non-judicial foreclosure states.
2. Any apparent sale based on Robosigned documents is void – without any legal effect – like Monopoly Money.
In Bank of America v. LaJolla Group II, the California Court of Appeals held that if a trustee is not contractually empowered under the Deed of Trust to hold a sale, it is totally void. It has no legal effect whatsoever. Title does not transfer. No right to evict arises. The property is not sold.
In turn, California Civil COde 2934a requires that the beneficiary execute and notarize and record a substitution for a valid substitution of trustee to take effect. Thus, if the Assignment of Deed of Trust is robo-signed, the sale is void. If the substitution of trustee is robo-signed, the sale is void. If the Notice of Default is Robo-Signed, the sale is void.
3. These documents are not recordable without good notarization.
In California, the reason these documents are notarized in the first place is because otherwise they will not be accepted by the County recorder. Moreover, a notary who helps commit real estate fraud is liable for $25,000 per offense.
Once the document is recorded, however, it is entitled to a “presumption of validity”, which is what spurned the falsification trend in the first place. Civil Code section 2924.
Therefore, the notarization of a false signature not only constitutes fraud, but is every bit intended as part of a larger conspiracy to commit fraud on the court.
4. The documents are intended for court eviction proceedings.
A necessary purpose for these documents, AFTER the non judicial foreclosure, is the eviction of the rightful owners afterward. Even in California, eviction is a judicial process, albeit summary and often sloppily conducted by judges who don’t really believe they can say no to the pirates taking your house. However, as demonstrated below, once these documents make it into court, the bank officers and lawyers become guilty of FELONIES:
California Penal Code section 118 provides (a) Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. This subdivision is applicable whether the statement, or the testimony, declaration, deposition, or certification is made or subscribed within or without the State of California.
Penal Code section 132 provides: Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.
The Doctrine of Unclean Hands provides: plaintiff’s “unclean hands” bar injunctive relief when the plaintiff’s misconduct arose from the transaction pleaded in the complaint. California Satellite Sys. v Nichols (1985) 170 CA3d 56, 216 CR 180. The unclean hands doctrine demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he or she seeks a remedy. The plaintiff must come into
court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v Superior Court (1999) 76 CA4th 970, 978, 90 CR2d 743. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact. CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v Jacobson (1998) 65 CA4th 631, 639, 76 CR2d 615.
5. Robo Signed Documents Are Intended for Use in California Bankruptcy Court Matters.
One majorly overlooked facet of California is our extremely active bankrtupcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove “standing” to proceed with a foreclosure. All declarations submitted in support of standing to file a proof of claim, objections to a plan and most importantly perhaps Relief from Stays are fraud upon bankruptcy court if signed by robo-signers.
Conclusion
Verified eviction complaints, perjured motions for summary judgment, and all other eviction paperwork after robo signed non judicial foreclosures in California and other states are illegal and void. The paperwork itself is void. The sale is void. But the only way to clean up the hundreds of thousands of effected titles is through litigation, because even now the banks will simply not do the right thing. And that’s why robo signers count in non-judicial foreclosure states. Victims of robosigners in California may seek declaratory relief, damages under the Rosenthal Act; an injunction and attorneys fees for Unfair Business practices, as well as claims for slander of title; abuse of process, civil theft, and conversion.Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide
Generally, the purchaser at a trustee’s sale may institute an unlawful detainer action to obtain possession if the “property has been duly sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code” and if “title under the sale has been duly perfected.” [Code of Civ. Proc. § 1161a(b) (3). ] A transferee of the purchaser also has standing to use the unlawful detainer process. [See Evans v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 162, 169-70; 136 Cal.Rptr. 596.] The action may be brought after the failure to vacate following the service of a three-day notice to quit. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 116la(b).] However, unlawful detainer proceedings may be used against a tenant or subtenant only after the service of notice to quit at least as long as the periodic tenancy but not exceeding 30 days. [Code Civ. Pro. § 1161a(c).] The remedy is cumulative to common law actions such as ejectment which may be brought to obtain possession. [See Duckett v. Adolph Wexler Bldg. & Fin. Corp. (1935) 2 Cal.2d 263, 265-66; 40 P.2d 506; Mutual Bldo. & Loan Assn. v. Corum (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 56, 58; 38 P.2d 793.] With very rare exceptions, the purchaser will invoke summary unlawful detainer proceedings rather than other proceedings to gain possession.
However, the purchaser is precluded from invoking unlawful detainer if a local ordinance, such as a rent control law, does not permit eviction after foreclosure. [See Gross v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 265; 217 Cal.Rptr. 284.] The purchaser may also be bound to rent ceilings. [See People v. Little (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14; 192 Cal.Rptr. 619.]
The courts have charted inconsistent paths in determining what defenses may be raised in unlawful detainer proceedings and to what extent the trustor may be able to attack the purchaser’s title. In the early cases, the courts concluded that the purchaser had the burden of proving that the purchaser acquired the property in the manner expressed in the unlawful detainer statute; i.e., the property was duly sold and the purchaser duly perfected title. No other questions of title could be litigated. [See e.g., Nineteenth Realty Co. v. Diacrs (1933) 134 Cal.App. 278, 288-89; 25 P.2d 522; Hewitt v. Justice’s Court (1933) 131 Cal.App. 439, 443; 21 P.2d 641.]
This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158; 69 P.2d 832. The Supreme Court held that:
… in the summary proceeding in unlawful detainer the right to possession alone was involved, and the broad question of title could not be raised and litigated by cross-complaint or affirmative defense. [Citations omitted.] It is true that where the purchaser at a trustee’s sale proceeds under section 1161a of the Code of Civil Procedure he must prove his acquisition of title by purchase at the sale; but it is only to this limited extent, as provided by statute, that the title may be litigated in such a proceeding. [Citations omitted.] . . . the plaintiff need only prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by purchase at such sale, and the defendant may raise objections only on that phase of the issue of title. Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or primary obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiff’s title, are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment. (Id. at 159-60.)
Accordingly, in numerous cases trustors have been forbidden from defending against the unlawful detainer on grounds other than showing that the sale was not conducted pursuant to Civil Code § 2924. [See e.g., California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 136, 140 n.2; Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 162, 170-71; MCA. Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 170, 176-77; 103 Cal.Rptr. 522; Cruce v. Stein, supra, 146 Cal.App.2d 688, 692; Abrahamer v. Parks, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d 82, 84; Hiaoins v. Covne (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 69, 72-73, 75; 170 P.2d 25; Delov v. Ono (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 301, 303; 70 P.2d 960.]
Other courts, on the other hand, have considered defenses extrinsic to compliance with statutory foreclosure procedure in determining unlawful detainer matters. In Seidell v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 913, 921; 132 P.2d 12, the Court of Appeal construed Cheney to prohibit only equitable but not legal defenses. Therefore, the Court thought that lack of consideration and other issues going to the validity of the note and the trust deed were proper defenses. (Id. at 922.) Other cases have permitted the unlawful detainer defenses whether or not the grounds were technically legal or equitable. [See e.g., Kartheiser v. Superior Court (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 617, 621; 345 P.2d 135 (beneficiary’s waiver of default); Freeze v. Salot, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 561; (no default); Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 837; 327 P.2d 241 (rescission, lack of delivery); Altman v. McCollum. supra, 107 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847; (estoppel to assert default).]
The issue of what defenses can or should be raised also significantly affects the application of the res judicata doctrine to any action by the trustor after the unlawful detainer to challenge the trustee’s sale. Cases, proceeding from Seidell, which hold that potential defenses are far ranging, have also held that issues which were, or might have been, determined in the unlawful detainer proceeding are barred by res judicata in subsequent proceedings. [See Freeze v. Salot. supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 561, 565-66; Bliss v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 50, 58; Seidell v. Analo-California Trust Co., supra, 55 Cal.App.2d 913.]
The Court of Appeal, however, ruled differently in Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036. The court recognized the extreme difficulty of conducting complicated defenses in the context of a summary proceeding; investigation and discovery procedures are limited, and the proceeding is too swift to afford sufficient time for preparation. Therefore, the court denied a res judicata effect to issues such as fraud.
The resolution of the problems raised by these cases appears in Vella v. Hudoins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251; 142 Cal.Rptr. 414 and Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141; 166 Cal.Rptr.
306. In Vella, the Supreme Court held generally that only claims “bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession are permitted; consequently, a judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title [citations omitted], or to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties [citations omitted].” (20 Cal.3d at 255.) The purchaser, however, must show that the sale was regularly conducted and that the purchaser’s title was duly perfected. (Id.)
The court reaffirmed the holding in Cheney that claims dealing with the validity of the trust deed or the obligation or with other basic defects in the purchaser’s title should not be litigated in unlawful detainer proceedings, and that determination made regarding such claims should not be given res judicata effect. (Id. at 257.) Defenses which need not be raised may nonetheless be considered if there is no objection. [See Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 948, 953.] Res judicata will apply only to defenses, including those ordinarily not cognizable but raised without objection, if there is a fair opportunity to litigate, rvella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d 251, 256-57.] Since complex claims, such as for fraud, can very rarely be fairly litigated in summary unlawful detainer proceedings, the trustor is not required to raise those issues as a defense. (Id.at 258.)
Although not required and ordinarily not allowed to litigate critical issues involving the obligation, the trust deed, and title, the homeowner-trustor is practically impelled to litigate these issues or be dispossessed since an unlawful detainer hearing will certainly precede a trial on a quiet title action. [See Code of Civ. Proc. § 1179a; Kartheiser v. Superior Court, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d 617, 621-23.] The California Supreme Court, citing Justice Douglas, aptly observed:
. . . the home, even though it be in the slums, is where man’s roots are. To put him into the street . . . deprives the tenant of a fundamental right without any real opportunity to defend. Then he loses the essence of the controversy, being given only empty promises that somehow, somewhere, someone may allow him to litigate the basic question in the case. S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez (1976) 17 Cal.3d 719, 730; 131 Cal.Rptr. 761.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held in Asuncion, supra, that “homeowners cannot be evicted, consistent with due process guaranties, without being permitted to raise the affirmative defenses which if proved would maintain their possession and ownership.” (108 Cal.App.3d at 146.) Nonetheless, the Court was mindful that an unlawful detainer action was “not a suitable vehicle to try complicated ownership issues. …” [Id. at 144; see Mehr v. Superior Court (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1049; 189 Cal.Rptr. 138; Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036.] The Court thus prescribed the following procedure when the trustor had on file a superior court action contesting title: (a) the municipal court should transfer the unlawful detainer proceeding to the superior court because that action ultimately involves the issue of title which is beyond the municipal court’s jurisdiction; and (b) the superior court should stay the eviction action, subject to a bond if appropriate, until trial of the action dealing with title, or (c) the superior court should consolidate the actions. (Id. at 146-47.)
If the challenge to title is based on fraud in the acquisition of title, improper sales methods, or other improprieties that directly impeach the unlawful detainer plaintiff’s title or the procedures followed in the foreclosure sale, Asuncion and Mehr dictate that the unlawful detainer should be stayed. On the other hand, if the challenge to title is based on a claim unrelated to the specific property in question, such as a fraud not directly related to the obtaining of title to the property that is the subject of the unlawful detainer, the rule in Asuncion does not apply. [See Old National Financial Services, Inc. v. Seibert (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 460, 464-67.]
Asuncion should also be distinguished from Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 486; 145 Cal.Rptr. 17, which is frequently cited in opposition to the procedure authorized in Asuncion♦ In Mobil, the court ruled that statutory procedure accorded unlawful detainer proceedings precluded staying the unlawful detainer action until the tenant gas station operator could try his action alleging unfair practices in the termination of his franchise. (Id. at 494.) The Asuncion court noted some procedural distinctions: the commercial lessee did not seek a preliminary injunction and obtained a stay on apparently inadequate factual grounds, while the Asuncions had not yet had the opportunity to present facts on which a preliminary injunction might issue. (See 108 Cal.App.3d at 146 n. 1.)
In addition, the differences between the interests presented in commercial and residential transactions suggest that different considerations may apply to each. The courts have recognized a distinction between commercial and residential cases and have been more willing to allow affirmative defenses in residential cases. [See S. P. Growers Assn., supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 730; 131 Cal.Rptr. 761; Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 90, 96-100; 187 Cal.Rptr. 674; Schulman v. Vera (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 552, 560-63; 166 Cal.Rptr. 620; Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 145, 146 n. 1; Mobil Oil Corp.v, Handlev (1976) 76 Cal.App.3d 956, 966;- 143 Cal.Rptr. 321; see generally, Union Oil Co. v. Chandler (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 725; 84 Cal.Rptr. 756.]
The commercial lessee may be able to establish its rights in an action apart from the unlawful detainer. The trustor, however, will lose possession of the trustor’s home. While the lessee’s loss is likely compensable in money, the loss of the home and the attendant adverse impact on the psychological well being of the residents and the family structure will not as easily be amenable to compensation. Moreover, the family cast out onto the streets may be unable to maintain an action which may come to trial years later. [See S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 730.] In addition, the affirmative defenses alleged in the recent commercial lease cases have presented substantial and complex issues [see e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 486, 495 (unfair business practice charge involving all Mobil service station operators); Onion Oil Co. v. Chandler, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 725-26 (antitrust violations)] and would likely consume more trial time than most trustee’ s sale cases.
Moreover, the court’s decision on whether to recognize various affirmative defenses in unlawful detainer proceedings results from a balancing of the public policies furthered by protecting the tenant or property owner from eviction against the state’s interest in the expediency of a summary proceeding. [See e.g., Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 250; 178 Cal.Rptr. 618; S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 729-30; Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 90.] There is a strong public policy supporting homeownership and the conservation of neighborhoods from destabilizing influences. [See discussion in Chapter III B 1 “Propriety of Injunctive Relief”.] These interests when coupled with the due process concerns mentioned in Asuncion militate for the hearing of affirmative defenses in accord with the procedure set forth in Asuncion.
As an alternative to an Asuncion motion prior to the hearing of the unlawful detainer action, the homeowner’s counsel could file a superior court action to challenge title and to restrain the purchasers from initiating or prosecuting an unlawful detainer. If the homeowner has lost the unlawful detainer, the injunction could be aimed at restraining the purchasers from enforcing the writ of possession or from taking possession of the premises.
Counsel should not direct the injunction against the municipal court or the sheriff or marshall since the superior court has no jurisdiction to enjoin a judicial proceeding or a public officer’s discharge of regular duties. [See e.g., Code of Civ. Proc. § 526.]
The courts have not ruled on whether traditional landlord-tenant defenses could ever be invoked in unlawful detainer,proceedings between the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and the person in possession. However, these defenses do not apply if the person in possession has no independent right to possession after the foreclosure. [See California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin. supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 136, 143.] In Sutfin, for example, the court held that a trustor could not invoke a retaliatory eviction defense because the trustor had no lease agreement giving the trustor a right to possession and the trustor’s only claim to possession derived from his title to the property which was lost at a valid foreclosure sale. (Id.)
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Most landlord-tenant attorneys only represent the landlords. The following is a list of lawyers and legal agencies who help tenants in California. The areas are arranged generally North to South. The red city names make scanning easier for you. The downloading of this list may take a minute, so please be patient.] Visit the main website.
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Northern California
Legal Services of Northern California
190 Reamer Street Auburn, CA 95603
(530) 823-7560 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (530) 823-7560 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
541 Normal Avenue; PO Box 3728 Chico, CA 95927
(530) 345-9493 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (530) 345-9493 end_of_the_skype_highlighting123 Third Street; PO Box 1017 Eureka, CA 95502
(707) 445-0866 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (707) 445-0866 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (800) 972-0002 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800) 972-0002 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
807 S. Dora St. Ukiah, CA 95482
(707) 462-1471 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (707) 462-1471 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
1370 West Street Redding, CA 96001
(530) 241-3565 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (530) 241-3565 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (800) 822-9687 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800) 822-9687 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
714 West Main Street #8 Nevada City, CA 95945
(530) 470-8562 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (530) 470-8562 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
515 12th Street Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 551-2150 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (916) 551-2150 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Michael W. Blacksburg
315 Noe Street San Francisco, California 94114
(415) 861-9900 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415) 861-9900 end_of_the_skype_highlighting Facsimile: (415) 861-9908
David Rouda
285 12th Avenue, First Floor San Francisco, CA 94118-2103
(415) 221-7683 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415) 221-7683 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Dave Crow & Solvejg Rose
605 Market Street, Suite 400 San Francisco, CA 94105
(415)552-9060 FAX (415)222-9995
Rachel E. Shapiro
530 Divisadero, #203 San Francisco, CA 94117
415.621.5302 FAX 415.651.8712
Carol S. Gordon
P O Box 27056 San Francisco, CA 94127
(415)989-8444 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415)989-8444 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Michael Bracamontes / Bracamontes & Vlasak APLC
220 Montgomery St #870 San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 835-6777 FAX 415 835-6780
Richard Sax
448 Sebastopol Ave. Santa Rosa, CA 95401
(707)525-1824 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (707)525-1824 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
J. Scott Weaver, Paul Wartelle, Christina Schreiber
369 Pine St. #506 San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 693-0504; (FAX 415) 693-9102
Sally Morin
Law Offices of James M. Millar
100 Montgomery Street, #1600 San Francisco, CA 94104
(415)981-8100 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415)981-8100 end_of_the_skype_highlighting ; FAX (415)981-9024
Mark Hooshmand/Hooshmand Law Group
654 Sacramento St. 3rd Floor San Francisco, CA 94111
(415)835-5900 Fax (415)376-5897
Kenneth Greenstein /Steve McDonald
Greenstein & McDonald
300 Montgomery St, #1621 San Francisco. CA 94104
(415)773-1240 X304; FAX (415)773-1244
Larry Becker
819 Eddy St. San Francisco, CA 94119
(415)771-6174
Richard Hurlburt
870 Market St. #315 San Francisco, CA 94102
(415)391-6496 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415)391-6496 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Marylin Kalman
45 Polk St. 2d floor San Francisco, CA 9410
(415)824-3250 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415)824-3250 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Mary Jane Foran, Cathy Mosbrucker
Mosbrucker & Foran
870 Market Street, Suite 313 San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 398-9880 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415) 398-9880 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
James Coy Driscoll
2740 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94109
(415) 673-6000; FAX (415) 673-6030
Robert DeVries
785 Market St #1150 San Francisco, CA 94103
(415)546-5100 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415)546-5100 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Thomas Swihart
2039 Shattuck Ave. #308 Berkeley, CA 94704
(510) 843-2750; FAX (510)843-2766
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Jeffery Carter
2041 Bancroft Way #207 Berkeley, CA 94704
(510) 548-4774 FAX (510)845-6419
East Bay Community Law Center
3130 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley, California 94705
(510) 548-4040 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (510) 548-4040 end_of_the_skype_highlighting, FAX (510) 548-2566
Robert J. Evans
1736 Franklin Street, 10th Floor Oakland CA 94612
510-238-4190 Fax 510-444-1704
Bay Area Legal Aid 1735 Telegraph Ave. Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 663-4744 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (510) 663-4744 end_of_the_skype_highlighting1017 MacDonald Ave. Richmond, CA 94802
(510) 233-9954 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (510) 233-9954 end_of_the_skype_highlighting;
50 Fell Street San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 982-1300 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415) 982-1300 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
2 West Santa Clara St., 8th Floor San Jose, CA 95113
(408) 283-3700 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (408) 283-3700 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Legal Aid of the North Bay
30 N. San Pedro Road #245 San Rafael, CA 94903
(415) 492-0230 FAX (415) 472-7400
Gregory Reed Brockbank
101 Lucas Valley Rd #380 San Rafael, CA 94903
(415) 472-4400 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (415) 472-4400 end_of_the_skype_highlighting;
Legal Aid of Sonoma County
1105 N. Dutton #B Santa Rosa, CA 95404
(707) 542-1290
Marc A. Eisenhart /Gates Eisenhart Dawson
125 S. Market St #1200 San Jose, CA 95113
408 288 8100; FAX 408 288 9409
Legal Aid Society of Santa Clara 480 North First Street San Jose, CA 95112
(408) 998-5200 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (408) 998-5200 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Senior Adults Legal Assistance
160 E. Virginia Street #260 San Jose, CA 95112
(408) 295-5991/ (408)847-7252 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (408)847-7252 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Central Coast
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Ed Frey
2820 Porter St Soquel, CA 95073
(831)479-8911 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (831)479-8911 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Ernest Fox
555 Soquel Ave. #230 Santa Cruz, CA 95062
(831)427-2114 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (831)427-2114 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Kent Washburn
501 Moraga Way Orinda, CA 94563
(925) 377-0231 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (925) 377-0231 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; FAX (925) 254-3815
California Rural Legal Assistance
2100 Garden Road, #D Monterey, CA 93940
(831) 375-0505 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (831) 375-0505 end_of_the_skype_highlighting21 Carr Street Watsonville, CA 95076
(831) 724-2253; FAX 831 724 7530
Santa Cruz/Housing Law Center
501 Soquel Avenue, Suite D Santa Cruz, CA 95062
(831) 458-1089; FAX 831 458-1140
Randolph W. Andell
1591 Spinnaker Dr. #203 Ventura, CA 93001
(805) 339-0101; Fax (805) 339-0202
—————and————–
1220 1/2 State Street Santa Barbara, CA. 93101
(805) 339-0101; Fax (805) 339-0202
Legal Aid Foundation Santa Barbara
301 E. Canon Perdido Street Santa Barbara, CA 93101
(805) 963-6754 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (805) 963-6754 end_of_the_skype_highlighting505A S. McClelland Ave. Santa Maria, CA 93454
(805) 922-9909 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (805) 922-9909 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
110 S. “C” Street, Ste. C Lompoc, CA 93436
(805) 736-6582
Legal Services for Seniors
915 Hilby Ave. Ste. 2 Seaside, CA 93955
(831) 899-0492 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (831) 899-0492 end_of_the_skype_highlighting21 W. Laurel Drive, Suite 83 Salinas, CA 93906
(831) 442-7700 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (831) 442-7700 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (800) 499-1247 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800) 499-1247 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Central Valley
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Greater Bakersfield Legal Assistance
615 California Avenue Bakersfield, CA 93304
661-325-5943 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 661-325-5943 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; tollfree 888.292.GBLA begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 888.292.GBLA end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Central California Legal Services
357 W. Main Street, Suite 201 Merced, CA 95340
(209) 723-5466 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (209) 723-5466 end_of_the_skype_highlighting1401 Fulton St #700 Fresno, CA 93721-2011
(559) 441-1611 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (559) 441-1611 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (800)-675-8001 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800)-675-8001 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
208 W. Main Street, Suite U-1 Visalia, CA 93291
(559)733-8770 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (559)733-8770 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (800)350-3654 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800)350-3654 end_of_the_skype_highlighting (Tulare)
(559)584-2631 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (559)584-2631 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (800)417-3296 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800)417-3296 end_of_the_skype_highlighting (Kings)
visalia
Brian Lawlor Legal Services of Northern California 515 12th Street Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 551-2150 FAX (916)551-2196
Los Angeles
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Fran Campbell .
633 W. Fifth Street, Ste. 2800 Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 223-2065 FAX (213) 223-2066
Daniel Marquez
1605 W. Olympic Blvd #588 Los Angeles, CA 90015
(213)632-6111; FAX (213)632-6114
Robert Sainburg
620 N. Brand Blvd #405 Glendale, California 91203
(818) 550-5001 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (818) 550-5001 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; FAX: (818) 550-5008
Eviction Defense Network
1930 Wilshire Blvd. #208 Los Angeles, CA 90057
(213) 385-8112 FAX (213)385-8181
Scott Broffman
5455 Wilshire Blvd #1012 Los Angeles, CA 90036
(323)937-5030; FAX 323 937-3510
Law Offices of Liddle & Liddle
310 South Vermont Avenue Glendora, CA 91741
626-963-1638 FAX 626-914-0710 [Commercial leasing consultations ONLY]
Robb M. Strom
6500 Wilshire Blvd 16th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90048
(323)852-1888 FAX (323) 852 1889
Pomona Self-Help Legal Center
400 Civic Center Plaza, 7th Fl Pomona, CA 91766-3201
David C. Dantes
12400 Ventura Blvd., Suite 689 Studio City, CA 91604
(818)386-9333 FAX (818)386-9444
Philip Shakhnis
1055 Wilshire Blvd #1660
Los Angeles, CA 90017
(213)250-9367; FAX (213)937-9368
Larry Rosenberg
14401 Sylvan Street, # 200 Van Nuys, CA 91401-2637
(818) 989-2434 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (818) 989-2434 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (323) 873-4044 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (323) 873-4044 end_of_the_skype_highlighting ; Fax: (818) 989-3815
Stephen Downey
10200 Sepulveda Blvd. #140 Mission Hills, CA 91345
(818)672-8258 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (818)672-8258 end_of_the_skype_highlighting FAX: -8266
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Edward I. Sands
835 S. Lucerne Blvd #110 Los Angeles, CA 90005
(323)931-6990 FAX (323)931-5643
Charles Odiase
3540 Wilshire Blvd #511 Los Angeles, CA 90010
(213)385-0193 FAX -0576
Omatshola Enafete Dafeta
3540 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1118 Los Angeles, CA 90010
(213)381-1155 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (213)381-1155 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Levi Uku
3540 Wilshire Blvd #1028 Los Angeles, CA 90010
(213)385-0193 FAX -0576
Victor Hairapetian
300 W Glenoaks Blvd 202 Glendale, CA 91202
(818)500-9881 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (818)500-9881 end_of_the_skype_highlighting FAX: (818)500-9886
Raymond Hovsepian
3171 Los Feliz Blvd #301 Los Angeles, CA 90039
(323)953-9494 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (323)953-9494 end_of_the_skype_highlighting FAX: (323)953-9777
William J. Middleton
5002 York Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90042
(323) 478-1156 FAX (323) 478-9094
Sonya Bekoff Molho
12240 Venice Blvd #22 Los Angeles, CA 90066
(310)390-3583 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (310)390-3583 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Andrew M Zanger
2118 Wilshire Blvd #984 Santa Monica, CA 90403
(310)393-9794 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (310)393-9794 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Franklin Radoff
19528 Ventura Blvd #572 Tarzana, CA 91356
(818)705-3059 FAX (818)705-4920
James G McCone
25835 Narbonne Ave #295 Lomita, CA 90717
(310)539-4555 Fax (310)539-4888
Lawrence C. Hales
5130 Batris Ln. Quartz Hill, CA 93536
(661)723-5530; FAX (661)942-7055
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles
1102 South Crenshaw Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90019-3111
(800) 399-4529 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800) 399-4529 end_of_the_skype_highlightingEviction Defense Center
1550 W. 8th St. Los Angeles, CA 90022
(213) 640-3881 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (213) 640-3881 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
110 Pine Ave., Suite 420 Long Beach, CA 90802
(562) 435-3501 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (562) 435-3501 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
1640 5th St., Suite 124 Santa Monica, CA 90401
(310) 899-6200 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (310) 899-6200 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
5228 Whittier Blvd. Los Angeles, CA 90022
(213) 640-3883 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (213) 640-3883 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
8601 S. Broadway Ave. Los Angeles, CA 90003
(213) 640-3884 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (213) 640-3884 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Bet Tzedek Legal Services
145 South Fairfax Avenue, #200 Los Angeles, CA 90036
(323) 939-0506 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (323) 939-0506 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
12821 Victory Boulevard North Hollywood, CA 91606
(818) 769-0136 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (818) 769-0136 end_of_the_skype_highlighting@Plummer Park
3435 Wilshire Blvd #470 Los Angeles, CA 90010
(213) 384-3243 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (213) 384-3243 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Valley Legal Services
243 E. Mission Boulevard Pomona, CA 91766
(909) 620-5547 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909) 620-5547 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Community Services of Southeast LA 725 W. Rosecrans Compton, California 90222
(800) 834-5001 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800) 834-5001 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; 310 638 5524 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 310 638 5524 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
11834 E. Firestone Blvd Norwalk, California 90650
(800) 834-5001 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800) 834-5001 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; 562 864-9935 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 562 864-9935 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Legal Services for Pasadena & San Gabriel-Pomona Valleys
241 & 243 East Mission Boulevard Pomona, CA 91766
(909) 623-6357 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909) 623-6357 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Neighborhood Legal Services Inc.
13327 Van Nuys Boulevard Pacoima, CA 91331-3099
(818) 896-5211 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (818) 896-5211 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Inland Empire
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Michael S. Feinberg / Feinberg & Fitch
24641 Washington Ave. Murrieta, Ca. 92562
(909) 698-9900 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909) 698-9900 end_of_the_skype_highlighting FAX: (909) 698-9909
Ken Carlson
PO Box 2417 Idyllwild, CA 92549
(951 659-6043 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 951 659-6043 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; FAX 888 764 1919
Suzanne Klump
PO Box 4020, Crestline CA 92325
(909)338-9362-1FAX(909)338-5658
Robert J. Spitz
204 N. San Antonio Ontario, CA 91762
(909) 395 0909 Fax 909 395 9535
Inland Counties Legal Services
1737 Atlanta Ave., #H3 Riverside, CA 92507
(909) 368-2555 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909) 368-2555 end_of_the_skype_highlighting45-550 Grace Street Indio, CA 92201
(760) 342-1591 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (760) 342-1591 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
715 N. Arrowhead Avenue, #113 San Bernardino, CA 92401
(909) 884-8615 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909) 884-8615 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (800) 677-4257 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (800) 677-4257 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Inland Empire Latino Lawyers Legal Aid
2060 University Avenue,#113 Riverside, CA 92507
(909) 369-3009 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909) 369-3009 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Legal Aid Society of San Bernardino
354 West 6th Street San Bernardino, CA 92401
(909) 381-4633 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909) 381-4633 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Orange County
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Deborah M. Vasquez 600 W. Santa Ana Blvd., Suite 814 Santa Ana, California 92701
(71`4)505-4529; FAX (714)590-6484
Robert P. Famularo
12842 Valley View #202 Garden Grove, CA 92845 2514
(714)379-3195 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (714)379-3195 end_of_the_skype_highlighting famularoassociates@socal.rr.com
Jeffrey Wilens, Esq. Lakeshore Law Center
17476 Yorba Linda Blvd., Suite 221 Yorba Linda, CA 92886
714-854-7205 714-854-7206 (fax)
David Salisbury
10646 El Morro Cir Fountain Valley, CA 92708-4825 (714)654-5739
Richard Spix
1505 E. 17th St., Ste. 229 Santa Ana, CA 92705
(714) 835-5112 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (714) 835-5112 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
E. Daniel Bors Jr.
23461 South Pointe Drive #350 Laguna Hills, CA 92653-1546
(949) 206-9900 FAX (949) 586-7798
L. Sue Loftin [Mobilehome Residency Law]
5760 Fleet Street, Suite 110 Carlsbad CA 92008
760-431-2111 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting 760-431-2111 end_of_the_skype_highlighting, FAX 760-431-2003
Legal Aid Society of Orange County 2101 N., Tustin Ave. Santa Ana, CA 92701
(714)571-5200 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (714)571-5200 end_of_the_skype_highlighting250 E. Center St. Anaheim, California 92801
(714) 571-5200 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (714) 571-5200 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Public Law Center
601 Civic Center Drive West Santa Ana, CA 92701
(714) 541-1010 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (714) 541-1010 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
San Diego
Area
Attorney or Legal Agency
e-mail
Website
Steve Kellman Tenants Legal Center of San Diego
5252 Balboa Ave, #408 San Diego, California 92117
(858) 571-7100 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (858) 571-7100 end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Legal Aid Society of San Diego
110 South Euclid Avenue San Diego, CA 92114
(619) 262-0896 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (619) 262-0896 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (877) 734-3258 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (877) 734-3258 end_of_the_skype_highlighting216 South Tremont Street Oceanside, CA 92054
(760) 722-1935 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (760) 722-1935 end_of_the_skype_highlighting; (760) 724-2740
Multi County
The following have many offices throughout California, in the rural areas as well as urban areas. See the associated map to see all of the locations and make contact with the closest office.
(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Manufactured home" has the same meaning as provided in
Section 18007 of the Health and Safety Code.
(2) "Mobilehome" has the same meaning as provided in Section 18008
of the Health and Safety Code.
(3) "Floating home" has the same meaning as provided in
subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code.
(b) In any of the following cases, a person who holds over and
continues in possession of a manufactured home, mobilehome, floating
home, or real property after a three-day written notice to quit the
property has been served upon the person, or if there is a subtenant
in actual occupation of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as
prescribed in Section 1162, may be removed therefrom as prescribed in
this chapter:
(1) Where the property has been sold pursuant to a writ of
execution against such person, or a person under whom such person
claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.
(2) Where the property has been sold pursuant to a writ of sale,
upon the foreclosure by proceedings taken as prescribed in this code
of a mortgage, or under an express power of sale contained therein,
executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims,
and the title under the foreclosure has been duly perfected.
(3) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section
2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed of
trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such person
claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.
(4) Where the property has been sold by such person, or a person
under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been
duly perfected.
(5) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section
18037.5 of the Health and Safety Code under the default provisions of
a conditional sale contract or security agreement executed by such
person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title
under the sale has been duly perfected.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b), a tenant or
subtenant in possession of a rental housing unit which has been sold
by reason of any of the causes enumerated in subdivision (b), who
rents or leases the rental housing unit either on a periodic basis
from week to week, month to month, or other interval, or for a fixed
period of time, shall be given written notice to quit pursuant to
Section 1162, at least as long as the term of hiring itself but not
exceeding 30 days, before the tenant or subtenant may be removed
therefrom as prescribed in this chapter.
(d) For the purpose of subdivision (c), "rental housing unit"
means any structure or any part thereof which is rented or offered
for rent for residential occupancy in this state.
“Just when you thought Wall Street couldn’t defraud the economy any further, it went ahead and did it. After pushing millions of borrowers into foreclosure with fraudulent loans, big banks are now being implicated in a massive new fraud scandal involving the foreclosure process itself. All over the country, banks and their lawyers are resorting to outright fraud in order to kick people out of their homes and slap them with huge, illegal fees. It may be the biggest scandal of the entire financial crisis, one that could result in epic losses for the nation’s largest banks.
We’ve been hearing for years about the horrific mortgages bankers pushed borrowers into, the outrageous scams they deployed in dumping these mortgages on investors, and the lies they told to their own shareholders about those mortgages in order to boost bonuses. Fraud was a major part of this machine at every stage of production, but the foreclosure fraud being uncovered by lawyers today appears to be the broadest scandal to emerge from the mortgage mess thus far.
Yves Smith has done an outstanding job covering this scandal, so be sure to check out her posts for all the details, but here’s the basic story: Banks intentionally skimped on their mortgage paperwork during the housing bubble—it cut their costs and made the sale of mortgage-backed securities more profitable. A basic, standardized part of the mortgage process at many banks included forging or destroying key documents, or never bothering to write them up in the first place. Those reckless procedures have been applied to millions of mortgages issued over the past decade, and allowed inflated bonus checks to be written for years. But things are about to get very ugly for the banks.
Mortgage documentation has been so shoddy that banks can’t actually prove that they own the mortgages they want to foreclose on. This isn’t a small scandal, it isn’t a minor clerical issue, and it isn’t a problem that banks deserve help from taxpayers to solve. Wall Street has simply not performed the basic tasks necessary to track ownership of its assets. Imagine a car manufacturer being unable to document the sale of automobiles. The basic business has broken.
If banks can’t prove that they have the right to foreclose, they’re not allowed to foreclose. The borrower gets to keep the house—even if he or she has stopped making payments on the mortgage. So banks—and the scummy law firms they hire—are resorting to all kinds of new tricks in order to foreclose (see Andy Kroll’s excellent article detailing the sharks who operate these law firms). They’re creating new documents, forging signatures and lying to judges. This is all fraud.
And this fraud doesn’t only help banks cut costs—it also enables lawyers to slap troubled borrowers with huge, illegal fees, squeezing them for money even after they’ve been tapped out on mortgage payments. If you can’t pay the foreclosure fees in court, debt collectors will chase you down and garnish your wages for years to come. These are massive fees—tens of thousands of dollars assessed on individual families for the luxury of being booted out of their home, all made possible by fraudulent documents, forged paperwork, and straightforward lies.
The ownership chain for mortgages is so complex—one bank issues a loan, which is sliced and diced into multiple mortgage-backed securities and sold to multiple investors—that the right to foreclose is not clear without precise and meticulous paperwork. If banks don’t keep these records, there is no way for them to prove the losses or profits they make from a given loan.
Banks can’t even keep track of what houses they actually have the right to foreclose on. In addition to slipping illegal fees into the mix, the financial establishment is slamming incorrect foreclosures through the legal pipeline. Banks are actually kicking people out of homes who have been paying their mortgages on time. In some cases, they’re even evicting borrowers who have already paid off their loan.
When banks can’t get the documents they want, they resort to still more drastic measures. Banks are violating the law by physically breaking into peoples’ homes, stealing their belongings and changing the locks. Add breaking and entering and larceny to the list of crimes committed by banks in the foreclosure process.
This scandal ought to put people behind bars. When somebody breaks into your home and steals your stuff, he goes to jail. But it also creates very serious problems for the entire financial system—if banks can’t prove they own mortgages, how can we trust their quarterly earnings statements? How can the bonuses based on those earnings be justified?
In other words, the inhumane and illegal way banks have treated their borrowers is only part of the fraud scandal Wall Street now faces. There is also the makings of a massive corporate accounting scandal—one that easily rivals Enron and WorldComm in its scope.
GMAC, Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase—three of the largest mortgage servicers in the nation—have already frozen foreclosures in 23 states. These are the states in which banks must obtain a court order to proceed with a foreclosure, but there is every reason to suspect that the same illegal practices are occurring in other states. Shoddy documentation has been a standardized element of the mortgage process for years—it has just been easier to prove this malfeasance in states that require courts to sign-off on foreclosures.
When housing prices are in decline, banks lose money on foreclosures. Today, the average loss on a foreclosed subprime or Alt-A mortgage is about 63 percent, according to data analyzed by Valparaiso University Law Professor Alan White. But if banks can’t actually take over the home, a foreclosure is far worse for the bank—it can’t cut its losses on an unpaid loan by seizing the house and selling it. If borrowers assert their rights, and courts uphold the law, some of the nation’s largest banks are about to take massive, unexpected losses.
That fact—combined with the prospect of shareholder lawsuits over improper accounting—should radically change the landscape for foreclosure relief and broader financial reform. Most banks cannot afford to go to zero on every mortgage they own from the housing bubble. If troubled borrowers stand up to their banks, the resulting losses could easily jeopardize the solvency of some major firms. This gives reformers and policymakers a critical tool to demand stronger medicine for Wall Street: Give us real reform, or we’ll let you go under.
Here’s an all-too-common scenario these days: A property goes into foreclosure, the owner who buys the foreclosed property wants to evict the current tenants, who are living there lawfully. The owner decides to skirt the normal legal processes and engage in a self-help eviction. This is a very risky and potentially illegal course of action! Additionally when it is the lender evicting. If the foreclosure was Wrongful that makes the eviction Wrongful and substantial damages may be available as against the biggest banks in the world.
A self-help eviction can take many forms: changing the lock on a unit, adding a lock without providing keys to the tenant, cutting off utilities, and forcibly entering the rental unit and refusing to permit the tenant to reenter. These practices have one thing in common: to oust the tenant from possession without complying with the legal requirements for eviction.
California law is clear that an owner who has purchased property at a foreclosure sale cannot take possession after the foreclosure unless the occupants’ consent has been freely obtained or a judge has awarded possession following a court proceeding. See CCP §§1159-1179a. Also note that the law governing evictions after foreclosure is rapidly changing. In rent-controlled cities, the eviction of tenants of the borrower following foreclosure is prohibited unless the tenant defaults.
Unlawful self-help by a landlord or owner can result in
* Criminal penalties (see Pen C §§418, 602.5), and
* Actual and punitive damages (see Jordan v Talbot (1961) 55 C2d 597, 12 CR 488).
OwnerSecrets.com warns that self-help evictions can result in suits for the common law intentional torts of conversion, trespass to chattels, and trespass.
Self-help is never a good choice for evictions. Instead, evictions should always be handled through legal processes, generally by an unlawful detainer action, i.e., a fast, summary procedure that is generally limited to the issues of possession of the premises and associated damages.
On how to legally conduct a lawful eviction, see CEB’s online book Handling Unlawful Detainers and Landlord-Tenant Practice book (evictions following foreclosure are governed by both state and federal law and are covered in chap 8 of that book). On defending evictions, see CEB’s Eviction Defense Manual.
Also, check out our June programs on Representing Residential Landlords and Tenants in Unlawful Detainer Actions, which will be available On Demand beginning June 29th.
1. No governmental relief is in sight for homeowners except in isolated instances of community action together with publicity from the media.
2. State and federal governments continue to sink deeper into debt, cutting social and necessary services while avoiding the elephant in the living room: the trillions of dollars owed and collectible in taxes, recording fees, filing fees, late fees, penalties, financial damages, punitive damages and interest due from the intermediary players on Wall Street who created trading “instruments” based upon conveyance of interests in real property located within state borders. The death grip of the lobby for the financial service industry is likely to continue thus making it impossible to resolve the housing crisis, the state budget crisis or the federal budget deficit.
3. Using taxpayer funds borrowed from foreign governments or created through quantitative easing, trillions of dollars have been paid, or provided in “credit lines” to intermediaries on the false premise that they own or control the mortgage backed securities that have defaulted. Foreclosures continue to hit new highs. Total money injected into the system exceeds 8 trillion dollars. Record profits announced by the financial services industry in which power is now more concentrated than before, making them the strongest influence in Federal and State capitals around the world.
4. Toxic Titles reveal unmarketable properties in and out of foreclosures with no relief in sight because nearly everyone is ignoring this basic problem that is a deal-breaker on every transfer of an interest in real property.
5. Evictions continue to hit new highs as Judges continue to be bombarded with ill-conceived motions that do not address the jurisdiction or authority of the court. The illegal evictions are based upon fraudulent conveyances procured through abuse of the foreclosure process and direct misrepresentations and fraud upon the court and recording system in each county as to the documents fabricated for purposes of foreclosure — creating the illusion of a proper paper trail.
6. 1.7 million new foreclosed properties are due to hit the market according to published statistics. Livinglies estimate the number to be at least 4 million.
7. Downward pressure on both price and marketability continues with no end in sight.
8. Unemployment continues to rise, albeit far more slowly than at the beginning of 2009. Unemployment, underemployment, employment drop-outs, absence of entry-level jobs, low statistics on new business starts, and former members of workforce (particularly men) are harbingers for continued decline in median income combined with higher expenses for key components, particularly health care. The ability to pay anything other than rent is continuing its decline.
9. Concurrent with the increase in foreclosures and the decrease in housing prices, official figures put the number of homes underwater at 25%. Livinglies estimates that when you look at three components not included in official statistics, the figure rises to more than 45%. The components are selling discounts, selling expenses, and continued delusional asking prices that will soon crash when sellers realize that past high prices were an illusion, not a market fluctuation.
10. The number of people walking from their homes is increasing daily, including people who are not behind in their mortgages. This is increasing the inventory of homes that are not officially included in the pipeline because they are not sufficiently advanced in the delinquency or foreclosure process. This is a hidden second wave of pressure on housing prices and marketability.
11. With the entire economy on government life-support that is not completely effective in preventing rises in homelessness and people requiring public assistance, the likelihood of severe social unrest and political upheaval increases month by month. Increasing risks of unrest prompted at least one Wall Street Bank to order enough firearms and ammunition to start an armory.
12. Modification of mortgages has been largely a sham.
13. Short-sales have been largely a sham.
14. Quiet titles in favor of homeowners are increasing at a slow pace as the sophistication of defenses improves on the side of financial services companies seeking free homes through foreclosures.
15. Legislative Intervention has been ineffective and indeed, misleading
16. Executive intervention has been virtually non-existent. The people who perpetrated this fraud not only have evaded prosecution, they maintain close relationships with the Obama administration.
17. Judicial intervention has been spotty and could be much better once people accept the complexity of securitization and the simplicity of STRATEGIES THAT WORK.
18. Legal profession , slow to start went from zero to 15 mph during 2009. Let’s hope they get to 60 mph during 2010.
19. Accounting profession, which has thus far stayed out of the process is expected to jump in on several fronts, including closer scrutiny of the published financial statements of public companies and financial institutions and the cottage industry of examining loan documents for compliance issues and violations of Federal and State lending laws.
20. Prospects for actual economic recovery affecting the average citizen are dim. While there has been considerable improvement from the point of risk we had reached at the end of 2008, the new President and Congress have yet to address essential reforms on joblessness, regulation of financial services (including insurance businesses permitted to write commitments without sufficient assets in reserve to assure the payment of the risk. The economic indicators have been undermined by the intentional fraud perpetrated upon the world economic and financial system. Thus the official figures are further than ever from revealing the truth about about our current status. Without key acceptance of these anomalies it is inconceivable that the economy will, in reality, improve during 2010.
21. Real inflation affecting everyday Americans has already started to rise as credit markets become increasingly remote from the prospective borrowers. Hyperinflation remains a risk although most of us were off on the timing because we underestimated the tenacious grip the dollar had on world commerce. While this assisted us in moving toward a softer landing, the probability that the dollar will continue to fall is still very high, thus making certain non-dollar denominated commodities more valuable. This phenomenon could affect housing prices in an upward direction if the trend continues. However the higher dollar prices will be offset by the fact that the cheaper dollars are required in greater quantities to buy anything. Thus the home prices might rise from $125,000 to $150,000 but the price of a loaf of bread will also be higher by 20%.
22. GDP has been skewed away from including econometrics for actual work performed in the home unless money changes hands. Societal values have thus depreciated the value of child-rearing and stable homes. The results have been catastrophic in education, crime, technological innovation and policy making. While GDP figures are officially announced as moving higher, the country continues to move further into a depression. No actual increase in GDP has occurred for many years, unless the declining areas of the society are excluded from what is counted.
23. The stock market is vastly overvalued again based upon vaporous forward earnings estimates and completely arbitrary price earnings ratios used by analysts. The vapor created by a 1000% increase in money supply caused by deregulation of the private financial institutions together with the illusion of profits created by these institutions trading between themselves has resulted in an increase from 16% to 45% of GDP activity. This figure is impossible to be real. As long as it is accepted as real or even possible, public figures, appointed and elected will base policy decisions on the desires of what is currently seen as the main driver of the U.S. economy. The balance of wealth will continue to move toward the levels of revolutionary France or the American colonies.
24. Perceptible increases in savings and consumer resistance to retail impulse buying bodes well for the long-term prospects of the country. As the savings class becomes more savvy and more wealthy, they will, like their counterparts in the upper echelons of government commence exercising their power in the marketplace and in the voting booth.
This is general information and assumes that you have access to the rest of the material on the blog. Foreclosures come in various flavors.
First of all you have non-judicial and judicial foreclosure states. Non-judicial basically means that instead of signing a conventional mortgage and note, you signed a document that says you give up your right to a judicial proceeding. So the pretender lender or lender simply instructs the Trustee to sell the property, giving you some notice. Of course the question of who is the lender, what is a beneficiary under a deed of trust, what is a creditor and who owns the loan NOW (if anyone) are all issues that come into play in litigation.
In a non-judicial state you generally are required to bring the matter to court by filing a lawsuit. In states like California, the foreclosers usually do an end run around you by filing an unlawful detainer as soon as they can in a court of lower jurisdiction which by law cannot hear your claims regarding the illegality of the mortgage or foreclosure.
In a judicial state the forecloser must be the one who files suit and you have considerably more power to resist the attempt to foreclose.
Then you have stages:
STAGE 1: No notice of default has been sent.
In this case you want to get a forensic analysis that is as complete as humanly possible — TILA, RESPA, securitization, title, chain of custody, predatory loan practices, fraud, fabricated documents, forged documents etc. I call this the FOUR WALL ANALYSIS, meaning they have no way to get out of the mess they created. Then you want a QWR (Qualified Written Request) and DVL (Debt Validation Letter along with complaints to various Federal and State agencies. If they fail to respond or fail to answer your questions you file a suit against the party who received the QWR, the party who originated the loan (even if they are out of business), and John Does 1-1000 being the owners of mortgage backed bonds that are evidence of the investors ownership in the pool of mortgages, of which yours is one. The suit is simple — it seeks to stop the servicer from receiving any payments, install a receiver over the servicer’s accounts, order them to answer the simple question “Who is my creditor and how do I get a full accounting FROM THE CREDITOR? Alternative counts would be quiet title and damages under TILA, RESPA, SEC, etc.
Tactically you want to present the forensic declaration and simply say that you have retained an expert witness who states in his declaration that the creditor does not include any of the parties disclosed to you thus far. This [prevents you from satisfying the Federal mandate to attempt modification or settlement of the loan. You’ve asked (QWR and DVL) and they won’t tell. DON’T GET INTO INTRICATE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING SECURITIZATION UNTIL IT IS NECESSARY TO DO SO WHICH SHOULD BE AFTER A FEW HEARINGS ON MOTIONS TO COMPEL THEM TO ANSWER.
IN OTHER WORDS YOU ARE SIMPLY TELLING THE JUDGE THAT YOUR EXPERT HAS PRESENTED FACTS AND OPINION THAT CONTRADICT AND VARY FROM THE REPRESENTATIONS OF COUNSEL AND THE PARTIES WHO HAVE BEEN DISCLOSED TO YOU THUS FAR.
YOU WANT TO KNOW WHO THE OTHER PARTIES ARE, IF ANY, AND WHAT MONEY EXCHANGED HANDS WITH RESPECT TO YOUR LOAN. YOU WANT EVIDENCE, NOT REPRESENTATIONS OF COUNSEL. YOU WANT DISCOVERY OR AN ORDER TO ANSWER THE QWR OR DVL. YOU WANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IF IT IS NECESSARY.
Avoid legal argument and go straight for discovery saying that you want to be able to approach the creditor, whoever it is, and in order to do that you have a Federal Statutory right (RESPA) to the name of a person, a telephone number and an address of the creditor — i.e., the one who is now minus money as a result of the funding of the loan. You’ve asked, they won’t answer.
Contemporaneously you want to get a temporary restraining order preventing them from taking any further action with respect to transferring, executing documents, transferring money, or collecting money until they have satisfied your demand for information and you have certified compliance with the court. Depending upon your circumstances you can offer to tender the monthly payment into the court registry or simply leave that out.
You can also file a bankruptcy petition especially if you are delinquent in payments or are about to become delinquent.
STAGE 2: Notice of Default Received
Believe it or not this is where the errors begin by the pretender lenders. You want to challenge authority, authenticity, the amount claimed due, the signatory, the notary, the loan number and anything else that is appropriate. Then go back to stage 1 and follow that track. In order to effectively do this you need to have that forensic analysis and I don’t mean the TILA Audit that is offered by so many companies using off the shelf software. You could probably buy the software yourself for less money than you pay those companies. I emphasize again that you need a FOUR WALL ANALYSIS.
Stage 3 Non-Judicial State, Notice of Sale received:
State statutes usually give you a tiny window of opportunity to contest the sale and the statute usually contains exact provisions on how you can do that or else your objection doesn’t count. At this point you need to secure the services of competent, knowledgeable, experienced legal counsel — professionals who have been fighting with these pretender lenders for a while. Anything less and you are likely to be sorely disappointed unless you landed, by luck of the draw, one of the increasing number of judges you are demonstrating their understanding and anger at this fraud.
Stage 4: Judicial State: Served with Process:
You must answer usually within 20 days. Failure to do so, along with your affirmative defenses and counterclaims, could result in a default followed by a default judgment followed by a Final Judgment of Foreclosure. See above steps.
Stage 5: Sale already occurred
You obviously need to reverse that situation. Usually the allegation is that the sale should be vacated because of fraud on the court (judicial) or fraudulent abuse of non-judicial process. This is a motion or Petitioner but it must be accompanied by a lawsuit, properly served and noticed to the other side. You probably need to name the purchaser at sale, and ask for a TRO (Temporary Restraining Order) that stops them from moving the property or the money around any further until your questions are answered (see above). At the risk of sounding like a broken record, you need a good forensic analyst and a good lawyer.
Stage 6: Eviction (Unlawful Detainer Filed or Judgment entered:
Posted 21 hours ago by livinglies on Livinglies’s Weblog
Editor’s Note: Why do I do this? Because we are delivering a message to future generations about how the world works contrary to our constitution and contrary to American values and ideals. Conservatives conserve nothing except the wealth of the fantastic few while the liberals liberate nobody from the yoke of economic slavery. Maybe it’s all a game. I won’t play and if you care about this country and wish to avoid a societal collapse, you should stop playing too.
History has shown us with grim clarity what happens to any country or empire when the power and the wealth gets so concentrated in just a few people while the rest of the population can’t keep a roof over their head and can’t eat food and can’t get medical care, all hell breaks loose. Galbraith, IMF economists, World Bank economists, all know what is going to happen do to our failure to police our own, our failure to make it right and our failure to make amends to our allies or would-be allies.
Children are learning an important lesson: in their world, Mom and Dad are powerless to prevent the worst things from happening and there is nobody else they can depend upon. A whole generation is growing up with the notion that the American Dream is an unknown, unknowable fantasy. Every time the far right asserts personal responsibility in the face of a wretched fraud committed on most of the country, they close the gate a little more, waiting for the final slaughter. Every time the far left wimps out on their own paltform, the one the people elected them on for CHANGE NOW, they deceive and abandon our citizens.
And so we are a Prozac nation because everyone is depressed. We are a Xanax nation because everyone is so stressed out we can’t think straight. And those of us who are entering our twilight years see a future where our children and grandchildren and their children will lead bleak lives of quiet desperation in a country which proclaims free speech and assembly but has surrendered that basic right to about 100 institutions that control the lobbyists who control the flow of money in Washington and state houses.
In April, 2007 stocks were up, confidence was high and everyone had been convinced that all was well without questioning anything. Meanwhile in the inner recesses of the Federal Reserve and halls of power of the executive branch and the U.S. Department of Treasury in particular, they knew the collapse was coming and the only reason they did nothing was political — they didn’t want to admit that the free market was not working, that it wasn’t free, that it was controlled by monopoly and oligopoly, and that the government wasn’t working either because we the people had allowed people to get re-elected despite their sell-out of our countries and our lives.
In I did some very simple calculations and determined that the DJIA was not actually worth 14,000, it was worth 8,000. As it came down, more stumps revealed themselves as the high water receded. The equities market is overpriced by about 25%-30%. Housing is still inflated by 15%-20%. Nobody wants to hear this. The dollar is in a swan dive because everyone in the world knows the reality except the citizens of the United States of America where we have a “free press” that would rather entertain us than actually tell us the news.
I’m doing my part. What are you doing to end this catastrophe?
Job Woes Exacting a Toll on Family Life
By MICHAEL LUO
THE WOODLANDS, Tex. — Paul Bachmuth’s 9-year-old daughter, Rebecca, began pulling out strands of her hair over the summer. His older child, Hannah, 12, has become noticeably angrier, more prone to throwing tantrums.
Initially, Mr. Bachmuth, 45, did not think his children were terribly affected when he lost his job nearly a year ago. But now he cannot ignore the mounting evidence.
“I’m starting to think it’s all my fault,” Mr. Bachmuth said.
As the months have worn on, his job search travails have consumed the family, even though the Bachmuths were outwardly holding up on unemployment benefits, their savings and the income from the part-time job held by Mr. Bachmuth’s wife, Amanda. But beneath the surface, they have been a family on the brink. They have watched their children struggle with behavioral issues and a stress-induced disorder. He finally got a job offer last week, but not before the couple began seeing a therapist to save their marriage.
For many families across the country, the greatest damage inflicted by this recession has not necessarily been financial, but emotional and psychological. Children, especially, have become hidden casualties, often absorbing more than their parents are fully aware of. Several academic studies have linked parental job loss — especially that of fathers — to adverse impacts in areas like school performance and self-esteem.
“I’ve heard a lot of people who are out of work say it’s kind of been a blessing, that you have more time to spend with your family,” Mr. Bachmuth said. “I love my family and my family comes first, and my family means more than anything to me, but it hasn’t been that way for me.”
A recent study at the University of California, Davis, found that children in families where the head of the household had lost a job were 15 percent more likely to repeat a grade. Ariel Kalil, a University of Chicago professor of public policy, and Kathleen M. Ziol-Guest, of the Institute for Children and Poverty in New York, found in an earlier study that adolescent children of low-income single mothers who endured unemployment had an increased chance of dropping out of school and showed declines in emotional well-being.
In the long term, children whose parents were laid off have been found to have lower annual earnings as adults than those whose parents remained employed, a phenomenon Peter R. Orszag, director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, mentioned in a speech last week at New York University.
A variety of studies have tied drops in family income to negative effects on children’s development. But Dr. Kalil, a developmental psychologist and director of the university’s Center for Human Potential and Public Policy, said the more important factor, especially in middle-class households, appeared to be changes in family dynamics from job loss.
“The extent that job losers are stressed and emotionally disengaged or withdrawn, this really matters for kids,” she said. “The other thing that matters is parental conflict. That has been shown repeatedly in psychological studies to be a bad family dynamic.”
Dr. Kalil said her research indicated that the repercussions were more pronounced in children when fathers experience unemployment, rather than mothers.
She theorized that the reasons have to do with the importance of working to the male self-image, or the extra time that unemployed female breadwinners seem to spend with their children, mitigating the impact on them.
Certainly, some of the more than a dozen families interviewed that were dealing with long-term unemployment said the period had been helpful in certain ways for their families.
Denise Stoll, 39, and her husband, Larry, 47, both lost their positions at a bank in San Antonio in October 2008 when it changed hands. Mrs. Stoll, a vice president who managed a technology group, earned significantly more than her husband, who worked as a district loan origination manager.
Nevertheless, Mr. Stoll took unemployment much harder than she did and struggled to keep his spirits up, before he landed a new job within several months in the Kansas City area, where the family had moved to be closer to relatives. He had to take a sizable pay cut but was grateful to be working again.
Mrs. Stoll is still looking but has also tried to make the most of the additional time with the couple’s 5-year-old triplets, seeking to instill new lessons on the importance of thrift.
“Being a corporate mom, you work a lot of hours, you feed them dinner — maybe,” she said. “This morning, we baked cookies together. I have time to help them with homework. I’m attending church. The house is managed by me. Just a lot more homemaker-type stuff, which I think is more nurturing to them.”
Other families, however, reported unmistakable ill effects.
Robert Syck, 42, of Fishers, Ind., lost his job as a call-center manager in March. He has been around his 11-year-old stepson, Kody, more than ever before. Lately, however, their relationship has become increasingly strained, Mr. Syck said, with even little incidents setting off blowups. His stepson’s grades have slipped and the boy has been talking back to his parents more.
“It’s only been particularly in the last few months that it’s gotten really bad, to where we’re verbally chewing each other out,” said Mr. Syck, who admitted he had been more irritable around the house. “A lot of that is due to the pressures of unemployment.”
When Mr. Bachmuth was first laid off in December from his $120,000 job at an energy consulting firm, he could not even bring himself to tell his family. For several days, he got dressed in the morning and left the house as usual at 6 a.m., but spent the day in coffee shops, the library or just walking around.
Mr. Bachmuth had started the job, working on finance and business development for electric utilities, eight months earlier, moving his family from Austin. They bought something of a dream home, complete with a backyard pool and spa.
Although she knew the economy was ultimately to blame, Mrs. Bachmuth could not help feeling angry at her husband, both said later in interviews.
“She kind of had something in the back of her mind that it was partly my fault I was laid off,” Mr. Bachmuth said. “Maybe you’re not a good enough worker.”
Counseling improved matters significantly, but Mrs. Bachmuth still occasionally dissolved into tears at home.
Besides quarrels over money, the reversal in the couple’s roles also produced friction. Mrs. Bachmuth took on a part-time job at a preschool to earn extra money. But she still did most, if not all, of the cooking, cleaning and laundry.
Dr. Kalil, of the University of Chicago, said a recent study of how people spend their time showed unemployed fathers devote significantly less time to household chores than even mothers who are employed full-time, and do not work as hard in caring for children.
Mr. Bachmuth’s time with his girls, however, did increase. He was the one dropping off Rebecca at school and usually the one who picked her up. He began helping her more with homework. He and Hannah played soccer and chatted more.
But the additional time brought more opportunities for squabbling. The rest of the family had to get used to Mr. Bachmuth being around, sometimes focused on his search for a job, but other times lounging around depressed, watching television or surfing soccer sites on the Internet.
“My dad’s around a lot more, so it’s a little strange because he gets frustrated he’s not at work, and he’s not being challenged,” Hannah said. “So I think me and my dad are a lot closer now because we can spend a lot more time together, but we fight a lot more maybe because he’s around 24-7.”
When Rebecca began pulling her hair out in late summer in what was diagnosed as a stress-induced disorder, she insisted it was because she was bored. But her parents and her therapist — the same one seeing her parents — believed it was clearly related to the job situation.
The hair pulling has since stopped, but she continues to fidget with her brown locks.
The other day, she suddenly asked her mother whether she thought she would be able to find a “good job” when she grew up.
Hannah said her father’s unemployment had made it harder for her to focus on schoolwork. She also conceded she had been more easily annoyed with her parents and her sister.
At night, she said, she has taken to stowing her worries away in an imaginary box.
“I take all the stress and bad things that happen over the day, and I lock them in a box,” she said.
Then, she tries to sleep.
Your tags: Eviction, foreclosure
Other Tags: conservatives, DJIA, IMF, Prozac, U.S Department of Treasury, World Bank, Xanax, bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud
Published: November 12, 2009 6:04 pm
Livinglies’s Weblog, Eviction, foreclosure
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“Officials” Who Sign for MERS: False, Fraudulent, Fabricated, Forged and Void Documents in the Chain
Posted 3 days ago by livinglies on Livinglies’s Weblog
all we have left is the obligation, unsecured and subject to counterclaims etc. MOST IMPORTANT procedurally, it requires a lawsuit by the would-be forecloser in order to establish the terms of the obligation and the security, if any. This means they must make allegations as to ownership of the receivable and prove it — the kiss of death for all would be lenders except investors who funded these transactions.
sirrowan
sirrowan@peoplepc.com
“I just thought of something. I was reading what was posted a few above me regarding MERS own rules. They claim that their “officers” tend to act without authority from MERS and they do not use any records held by MERS etc.
How can this be? How can they be officers then? They aren’t if you ask me. Now wonder all these judges are telling them they are nothing but agents if even that, lol.
But if they were officers, wouldn’t MERS be liable for the actions of their “officers” on behalf of MERS?”
ANSWER from Neil
Sirrowan: GREAT POINT! The answer is that if they have a user ID and password ANYONE can become a “limited signing officer” for MERS.
Sometimes they say they are vice-president, sometimes they use some other official title. But the fact remains that they have no connection with MERS, no employment with MERS, no access to MERS records, and definitely no direct grant of a POA (Power of attorney). It’s a game.
This is why I have repeatedly say that in every securitized chain, particularly in the case of a MERS chain, there are one or more documents that are fabricated, forged or voidable. Whether this rises the level of criminality is up to future courts to determine.
One thing is sure — a party who signs a document that has no authority to sign it in the capacity they are representing has just committed violations of federal and state statute and common law. And the Notary who knew the party was not authorized as represented has committed a violation as well. Most states have statutes that say a bad notarization renders the document void, even if it was recorded. This breaks the chain of title and reverts back to the originating lender (at best) or voids the documents in the originating transaction (at worst).
In either event, the distinction I draw between the obligation (the substance of the transaction caused by the funding of a “loan product”) and the note (which by law is ONLY EVIDENCE of the obligation and the mortgage which is ONLY incident to the note, becomes very important. If the documents (note and mortgage) are void then all we have left is the obligation, unsecured and subject to counterclaims etc. MOST IMPORTANT procedurally, it requires a lawsuit by the would-be forecloser in order to establish the terms of the obligation and the security, if any. This means they must make allegations as to ownership of the receivable and prove it — the kiss of death for all would be lenders except investors who funded these transactions.
Published: November 10, 2009 3:10 pm
Livinglies’s Weblog, Eviction, foreclosure
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What to Look For and Demand Through QWR or Discovery Part II
Posted 4 days ago by livinglies on Livinglies’s Weblog
Dan Edstrom, you are great!
OK I found the loan level details for my deal. It shows my loan in foreclosure and my last payment in 6/2008 (which is accurate). What it doesn’t say (among other things) is what advances were made on the account. Very interesting. This report is generated monthly but they are only reporting the current month. It also shows which pool my loan is in (originally their were approx. 4 pools, now there are 2). This means I can use all of this information to possibly calculate the advances reported – except that two months before I missed my first payment they stopped reporting SUB-servicer advances. [Editor’s Note: Those who are computer savvy will recognize that these are field names, which is something that should be included in your demand and in your QWR. You will also wanat the record data and metadata that is attached to each record. ]
If anyone wants this file or any of the servicing reports so they can see the actual data shoot me an email.
Thanks,
Dan Edstrom
dmedstrom@hotmail.com
Your tags: Eviction, foreclosure
Other Tags: accounting, disclosure, discovery, Edstrom, foreclosure defense, foreclosure offense, fraud, lost note, Mortgage, quiet title, QWR, TILA audit, trustee, bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, GTC | Honor, Investor, securities fraud
Published: November 9, 2009 6:24 pm
Livinglies’s Weblog, Eviction, foreclosure
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TENT CITY, California While Vacant Houses Deteriorate
Posted 4 days ago by livinglies on Livinglies’s Weblog
TENT CITY, California While Vacant Houses Deteriorate
From watergatesummer.blogspot.com we have this post on the moronic ideology that misuses our natural and creative resources. It can be said that conservatives do not conserve and liberals do not liberate. I coined that because it is obvious that politics in this country is degrading even while some try to revive it.
Out of pure ideology and ignorance, people are being ejected from homes they own on the pretense that they don’t own the home. This sleight of hand is accomplished by “bridge to nowhere” logic — the pretender lender merely pretends to be authorized to initiate foreclosure proceedings. They come into court with a pile of inconsistent documents with little or no REAL connection with the originating papers and zero connection with the REAL lender.
So we end up with hundreds of thousands of homes that are empty, subject to vandalism and decay from lack of mainteance and lack of anyone living in them, combined with nobody paying utility bills etc that would help take the edge off the crisis. Instead, we choose to allow TENT CITY where there are no decent facilities, where people are living in tents literally, resulting in a greater drain on social services, police, fire, health, schools etc.
Why because some ideologue and people who mindlessly subscribe to such ideology has already played Judge and Jury and convicted these victims of Wall Street fraud. They are certain that these are deadbeats that don’t pay thier bills and won’t listen when someone points out that many of these people had nearly perfect credit scores before tragedy hit. That means the victims were generally considered to have been better credit risks based upon an excellent record of paying their bills, than their ideological detractors.
Someone of this ideology will tell us or anyone who will listen that the victims should have read what they were signing. The is fact that NOBODY reads those closing documents, not even lawyers, not even the ideological (don’t confuse me with the facts) conservatives. So the same people who say you should have read those documents, didn’t read their own.
And now everyone who is NOT in foreclosure or who has already lost possession of their home and who signed a securitized loan package is “underwater” an average of 25% , which means that they are, on average around $70,000 in debt that will never be covered by equity in their lifetime — so they can’t move without coming to the table with the shortfall.
Such ideologues fall short of helping their fellow citizens to be sure. What is astonishing is that they fall short of helping themselves, which means they subject their life partners, spouses, children and other dependents to the same mindless mind-numbing shoot myself in the foot political theology. And somehow it is THESE people who are controlling the pace of the recovery, controlling the correction in housing and social services who are claiming to be angry about their country being taken away from them!
Your tags: Eviction, foreclosure
Other Tags: bailout, housing, lender, POLICY, securitization, tent city, CDO, CORRUPTION, GTC | Honor, Mortgage, securities fraud
Published: November 9, 2009 6:15 pm
Livinglies’s Weblog, Eviction, foreclosure
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U.S. STANDS FIRM IN SUPPORT OF WALL STREET WHILE THE REST OF THE WORLD TAKES THE ECONOMIC CRISIS SERIOUSLY
Posted 5 days ago by livinglies on Livinglies’s Weblog
MR. GEITNER, MR. SUMMERS AND OTHERS WHO ARE ON THE ECONOMIC TEAM DESERVE some CREDIT FOR BRINGING US BACK FROM AN ECONOMIC PRECIPICE THAT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A DEPRESSION FAR DEEPER AND LONGER THAN THE GREAT DEPRESSION. AND THEY SHOULD BE CUT SOME SLACK BECAUSE THEY WERE HANDED A PLATE ON WHICH THE ECONOMY WAS BASED LARGELY ON VAPOR — THE CONTRACTION OF WHICH WILL SPELL DISASTER IN MORE WAYS THAN ONE.
THAT SAID, THEY ARE GOING TOO FAR IN PROTECTING INVESTMENT BANKS AND DEPOSITORY BANKS FROM THEIR OWN STUPIDITY AND ENCOURAGING BEHAVIOR THAT THE TAXPAYERS WILL ABSORB — AT LEAST THEY THINK THE TAXPAYERS WILL DO IT.
As the following article demonstrates, the model currently used in this country and dozens of other countries is “pay to play” — and if there is a crash it is the fees the banks paid over the years that bails them out instead of the taxpayers.
For reasons that I don’t think are very good, the economic team is marginalizing Volcker and headed down the same brainless path we were on when Bush was in office, which was only an expansion of what happened when Clinton was in office, which was a “me too” based upon Bush #1 and Reagan. The end result is no longer subject to conjecture — endless crashes, each worse than the one before.
The intransigence of Wall Street and the economic team toward any meaningful financial reform adds salt to the wound we created in the first palce. We were fortunate that the rest of the world did not view the economic meltdown as an act of war by the United States. They are inviting us to be part of the solution and we insist on being part of the problem.
Sooner or later, the world’s patience is going to wear thin. Has anyone actually digested the fact that there is buyer’s run on gold now? Does anyone care that the value of the dollar is going down which means that those countries, companies and individuals who keep their wealth in dollars are dumping those dollars in favor of diversifying into other units of storage?
The short-term “advantage” will be more than offset by the continuing joblessness and homelessness unless we take these things seriously. Culturally, we are looking increasingly barbaric to dozens of countries that take their role of protecting the common welfare seriously.
Bottom Line on these pages is that it shouldn’t be so hard to get a judge to realize that just because the would-be forecloser has a big expensive brand name doesn’t mean they are anything better than common thieves. But like all theft in this country, the bigger you are the more wiggle room you get when you rob the homeless or a bank or the government or the taxpayers. Marcy Kaptur is right. She calls for a change of “generals” (likening Obama’s situation to Lincoln), since their skills were perhaps valuable when Obama first tackled the economic crisis — but now are counterproductive. We need new generals on the economic team that will steer us clear from the NEXT crisis not the LAST crisis.
November 8, 2009
Britain and U.S. Clash at G-20 on Tax to Insure Against Crises
By JULIA WERDIGIER
ST. ANDREWS, Scotland — The United States and Britain voiced disagreement Saturday over a proposal that would impose a new tax on financial transactions to support future bank rescues.
Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain, leading a meeting here of finance ministers from the Group of 20 rich and developing countries, said such a tax on banks should be considered as a way to take the burden off taxpayers during periods of financial crisis. His comments pre-empted the International Monetary Fund, which is set to present a range of options next spring to ensure financial stability.
But the proposal was met with little enthusiasm by the United States Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, who told Sky News in an interview that he would not support a tax on everyday financial transactions. Later he seemed to soften his position, saying it would be up to the I.M.F. to present a range of possible measures.
“We want to make sure that we don’t put the taxpayer in a position of having to absorb the costs of a crisis in the future,” Mr. Geithner said after the Sky News interview. “I’m sure the I.M.F. will come up with some proposals.”
The Russian finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, also said he was skeptical of such a tax. Similar fees had been proposed by Germany and France but rejected by Mr. Brown’s government in the past as too difficult to manage. But Mr. Brown is now suggesting “an insurance fee to reflect systemic risk or a resolution fund or contingent capital arrangements or a global financial transaction levy.”
Supporters of a tax had argued that it would reduce the volatility of markets; opponents said it would be too complex to enact across borders and could create huge imbalances. Mr. Brown said any such tax would have to be applied universally.
“It cannot be acceptable that the benefits of success in this sector are reaped by the few but the costs of its failure are borne by all of us,” Mr. Brown said at the summit. “There must be a better economic and social contract between financial institutions and the public based on trust and a just distribution of risks and rewards.”
At the meeting at the Scottish golf resort, the last to be hosted by Britain during its turn leading the group, the ministers agreed on a detailed timetable to achieve balanced economic growth and reiterated a pledge not to withdraw any economic stimulus until a recovery was certain.
They also committed to enact limits on bonuses and force banks to hold more cash reserves. But they failed to reach an agreement on how to finance a new climate change deal ahead of a crucial meeting in Copenhagen next month.
The finance ministers agreed that economic and financial conditions had improved but that the recovery was “uneven and remains dependent on policy support,” according to a statement released by the group. The weak condition of the economy was illustrated Friday by new data showing the unemployment rate in the United States rising to 10.2 percent in October, the highest level in 26 years.
The finance ministers also acknowledged that withdrawing stimulus packages required a balancing act to avoid stifling the economic recovery that has just begun.
“If we put the brakes on too quickly, we will weaken the economy and the financial system, unemployment will rise, more businesses will fail, budget deficits will rise, and the ultimate cost of the crisis will be greater,” Mr. Geithner said. “It is too early to start to lean against recovery.”
As part of the group’s global recovery plan, the United States would aim to increase its savings rate and reduce its trade deficit while countries like China and Germany would reduce their dependence on exports. Economic imbalances were widely faulted as helping to bring about the global economic downturn.
Mr. Geithner acknowledged on Saturday that the changes would take time but that “what we are seeing so far has been encouraging.”
If the lawyer is not a competent witness with personal knowledge, then he should shut up and sit down.
So you sent a QWR and you know the loan is securitized. The orignating lender says talk to the servicer and the servicer declines to answer all the questions because they didn’t originate the loan. Or you are in court and the lawyer is trying to finesse his way past basic rules of evidence and due process by making representations to the Judge as an officer of the court.
He’s lying of course and if you let it go unchallenged, you will lose the case. Basically opposing counsel is saying “trust me Judge I wouldn’t say it if it wasn’t so.” And your answer is that the lawyer is not a witness, that you don’t trust the lawyer or what he has to say, that if he is a witness he should be sworn in and subject to cross examaintion and if he is not a witness you are entitled to be confronted with a real witness with real testimony based upon real knowledge.
First Questions: When did you first learn of this case? What personal knowledge do you have concerning the payments received from the homeowner or third parties? What personal knowledge do you have as to who providing the actual cash from which the subject loan was funded?
Only when pressed relentlessly by the homeowner, the servicer comes up with a more and more restrictive answer as to what role they play. But they always start with don’t worry about a thing we control everything. Not true. Then later after you thought you worked out a modification they tell the deal is off because the investor declined. The investor is and always was the lender. That is the bottom line and any representation to the contrary is a lie and a fraud upon the court.
So whoever you sent the QWR to, always disclaims your right to ask, or tells you the name of the investor (i.e., your lender) is confidential, or that they have authority (but they won’t show it to you). That doesn’t seem to be a lender, does it? In fact they disclaim even knowing enough to answer your questions.
So AFTER THEY SERVE YOU with something file a motion to compel an immediate full answer to your QWR since under TILA service on the servicer is the same as service on the lender. You argue that everyone seems to be claiming rights to be paid under the original obligation, everyone seems to be claiming the right to enforce the note and mortgage, but nobody is willing to state unequivocally that they are the lender.
You are stuck in the position of being unable to seek modification under federal and State rules, unable to sell the property because you don’t know who can sign a satisfaction of mortgage or a release and reconveyance, unable to do a short-sale, and unable to refinance — all because they won’t give a simple answer to a simple question: who is the lender and what is the balance claimed by the real lender on the obligation? At this point you don’t even know that any of the real lenders wish to make a claim.
This is probably because they received TARP funds and insurance proceeds on defaults of pools that they had purchased multiple insurance policies (credit default swaps). But whether they are paid by someone who acquired rights of subrogation or they were not paid, you have a right to a FULL accounting and to know who they are and whether they received any third party money. If they were paid in part or otherwise sold their interest, then you have multiple additional unknown parties.
The reason is simple. They are not the lender and they know it. The lender is a group of investors who funded the transaction with Petitioner/Homeowner and others who purchased similar financial products from the same group of participants in the securitization chain relating to the subject loan.
The people currently in court do not include all the real parties in interest for you to make claims against the lender. Cite to the Massachusetts case where Wells Fargo and its lawyer were subject to an $850,000 sanction for misrepresenting its status to the court.
It is not enough for them to bluff their way by saying that they have already answered the interrogatories. When they lost and it came time to allocate damages and attorneys fees, Wells suddenly said they were NOT the lender, beneficiary or current holder and that therefore the damages and attorneys fees should be assessed against the real lender — who was not a party to the pending litigation and whom they refused to disclose along with their misrepresentation that they were the true lender.
It is not enough that the lawyer makes a representation to the court as an officer of the court. That is not how evidence works. If the lawyer wants to represent facts, then he/she should be sworn in and be subject to (1) voir dire to establish that he/she is opposing counsel that it came from some company.
The witness must be a competent witness who takes an oath, has personal knowledge regarding the content of the document, states that personal knowledge and whose testimony conforms to what is on the document.
There is no such thing as foundation without a witness. There is no such thing as foundation without a competent witness. So if the lawyer tries to finesse the subject by making blanket representations to the court(e.g. the property is “underwater” by $xxx,xxx and we need a lift of stay…yet, there is no certified appraisal entered into evidence with a certified appraiser that can be cross examined…just a statement from opposing counsel) point to Wells, or even point to other inconsistencies between what counsel has represented and what now appears to be the truth, and demand an evidentiary hearing. If the lawyer is not a competent witness with personal knowledge, then he should shut up and sit down.
File a motion to extend time to file adversary proceeding(in BK situation), answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaim UNTIL YOU GET A FULL AND COMPLETE ANSWER TO YOUR QWR so you can determine the real parties in interest and serve them with process. Otherwise, we will have a partial result wherein the real owner of the loan can and will claim damages and injunctive relief probably against all the current parties to this action including the Homeowner.
In short, the opposing counsel cannot just make statements of “fact” and have them accepted by the court as “fact” if they don’t pass the sniff test of real evidence corroborated by a competent witness. …and with every pleading ask for an evidentiary hearing and attorneys fees. Follow rule 11 procedure in Federal Court or the state law counterpart so you can get them later.
A Sacramento area court ruling against the plaintiff came in an unlawful detainer hearing last Friday. Lenders and servicers are taking notice of the “sale” by trustee that was set aside in favor of a loan modification. Submitted by Steve Shafer
February 5, 2009 / Sacramento California – The Bay Area Superior Court decision and judgment against the plaintiff allows the “sale” by the trustee to be set aside in favor of a loan modification.
Lenders nationwide who originate and service loans know California offers them a “safe haven” from homeowner’s who dispute a recent foreclosure. That means overwhelming odds for anyone in foreclosure who loses their home to a lender in a foreclosure. The borrower becomes a holdover and must respond to an unlawful detainer after their home is lost.
That was not the case for an El Dorado area resident at a recent hearing for an unlawful detainer matter heard in a Placerville County superior court room. The recent victory in court was in an unlawful detainer matter for the defendant Ms. Stella Onyeu and mortgage lender and securities sponsor – AURORA LOAN SERVICES v. STELLA D. ONYEU (case number PCU2008032).
AURORA LOAN SERVICES like so many other lender servicing agents has come under greater scrutiny as of late for questionable business practices. According to its web site Aurora Loan Services is operating as usual. The company is a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers Bank, and not part of the Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. bankruptcy filing.
The case was originally filed in October of last year and shortly thereafter was dismissed when the Plaintiff failed to show at a scheduled hearing. Subsequent motions were filed to vacate the dismissal in favor of a motion to dismiss by the plaintiffs. The matter was heard recently heard again by the same court and earlier mentioned presiding judge. Mark Terbeek is the attorney for the Defendant and Maher Soliman a Juris Pro witness provided case development and court expert testimony.
This judgment for the defendant is monumental given the courts limited jurisdiction related to the lenders sole focus to have the borrower removed from the home. The issues at hand are the legal procedural limitations and high attrition rate for defendants and their attorney’s. The problem is the defendant’s lack of standing for pleading a wrongful foreclosure due to jurisdiction of the court.
So what does this all mean? Many homeowners can find some hope, for the moment, in knowing the otherwise unfriendly California UD courts will now hold some promise for hearing arguments as to the foreclosure and the plaintiffs standing. According to foreclosure and REO sales analyst Brenda Michelson of Nationwide Loan Services “It’s hit or miss at this level of the law and the courts willingness to step outside of its jurisdiction.” The smaller outlying courts seem to me to be more willing to entertain defense arguments that the plaintiff may not be the holder in due course and lacks capacity throughout the foreclosure” Terbeek’s response is that if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a logical and properly conveyed transfer of the beneficial interest – it is not entitled to possession.
After the foreclosure and conveyance back to the trustee, the homeowner is considered unlawfully occupying the dwelling as a holdover. However, the court ruled that AURORA had in fact violated its duty to show good faith and comply accordingly under the recent California statutes and amendments Power of Sale provision. The presiding judge who heard the matter ordered a judgment against the company allowed for Terbeek to enter a request for all legal fees due.
According to legal expert Soliman, “there are more attorneys willing to now jump into the wrongful foreclosure business and fight the court on the jurisdiction issue. However, it is nearly impossible to rely on the judge and courts at this level”. Soliman is an examiner with Nationwide Loan Services and has engagements in multiple cases throughout California through attorneys such as Terbeek who represented the defendant.
Jurisdiction: An Overview
The term jurisdiction is really synonymous with the word “power” and the sovereignty on behalf of which it functions. Any court possesses jurisdiction over matters only to the extent granted to it by the Constitution, or legislation of a paramount fundamental question for lawyers is whether a given court has jurisdiction to preside over a given case. A jurisdictional question may be broken down into various components including whether there is jurisdiction over the person (in personam), the subject matter, or res (in rem), and to render the particular judgment sought.
An unlawful detainer lawsuit is a “summary” court procedure. This means that the court action moves forward very quickly, and that the time given the tenant to respond during the lawsuit is very short. For example, in most cases, the tenant has only five days to file a written response to the lawsuit after being served with a copy of the landlord’s complaint. Normally, a judge will hear and decide the case within 20 days after the borrower now tenant files an answer.
The question of whether a given court has the power to determine a jurisdictional question is itself a jurisdictional question. Such a legal question is referred to as “jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.” In order to evict the tenant, the landlord must file an unlawful detainer lawsuit in superior court. In an eviction lawsuit, the lender is the “plaintiff” and the prior borrower and homeowners become an occupant holdover and the “defendant.” Immediately after the trustee sale of the home the conveyance by the trustee is entered in favor of the lender. Until recently in most cases the lender is with in its right foreclose if a borrower has missed a number of payments, failed to make the insurance premiums or not paid the property taxes. “But sometimes a lender is wrong and you can fight foreclosure by challenging the foreclosure process and related documents” said Soliman.
As the new owner of record AURORA HOME LOAN SERVICES must follow procedures no different than that of a landlord in a tenant occupancy dispute. The next step is to remove the homeowner from the subject dwelling. If the tenant doesn’t voluntarily move out after the landlord has properly given the required notice to the tenant, the landlord can evict the tenant. If the lender makes a mistake in its filing of the foreclosure documents a court my throw out the whole foreclosure case. In the case of a wrongful foreclosure the borrower’s claims are limited to affirmative defenses.
Affirmative Defenses
Unlike a judicial proceeding, California lenders need to merely wait out the mandatory term for issuing default notices and ensure it has properly served those notices to the borrower. In other words the hearing and trial taken place in the above referenced matter is not subject to arguments brought by the homeowner for wrongful foreclosure versus the question as to lawful possession of the property by the lender.
California lenders are typically limited to only the defenses a landlord will face when opposed and made subject to claims of wrongfully trying to evict a tenant. Claims such as the Plaintiff has breached the warranty to provide habitable premises, plaintiff did not give proper credit before the notice to pay or quit expired or plaintiff waived, changed, or canceled the notice to quit, or filed the complaint to retaliate against defendant are often completely unrelated to the matter at hand. The courts decision to enforce the provisions of an earlier modification in lieu of a foreclosure sends a major wake up call to the lenders who are under siege to avoid foreclose and be done with mortgage mess affecting United States homeowners. Soliman says the decision is unfortunately not likely to be read into as case precedent for future lawyers and wrongful defendants seeking to introduce our case as an example of a lenders wrongful action.
Soliman goes on to say “it’s both interesting and entertaining to see experienced attorneys who jump in and immediately question the issue of the courts authority. Its reality time when they get to their first hearing and see first hand the problematic issues with jurisdiction.”
Servicing agents are never the less on notice they must be ready to defend themselves when the opportunity to argue the plaintiffs standing are allowed in an unlawful detainer motivate by a foreclosure. Therefore, the debate about what the courts hear will remain open and subject to further scrutiny by the lawyers for both sides and judges who preside over the courts at this level.
Nationwide Loan Servicing is an approved Expert Witness who provides court testimoney in matters concerning wrongful foreclosures, Federal Savings Banks regultory violations and SEC filings for private registrations.
CA SB 94 on Lawyers & Loan Modifications Passes Assembly… 62-10
The California Assembly has passed Senate Bill 94, a bill that seeks to protect homeowners from loan modification scammers, but could end up having the unintended consequence of eliminating a homeowner’s ability to retain an attorney to help them save their home from foreclosure.
The bill, which has an “urgency clause” attached to it, now must pass the State Senate, and if passed, could be signed by the Governor on October 11th, and go into effect immediately thereafter.
SB 94’s author is California State Senator Ron Calderon, the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, which shouldn’t come as much of a surprise to anyone familiar with the bigger picture. Sen. Calderon, while acknowledging that fee-for-service providers can provide valuable services to homeowners at risk of foreclosure, authored SB 94 to ensure that providers of these services are not compensated until the contracted services have been performed.
SB 94 prevents companies, individuals… and even attorneys… from receiving fees or any other form of compensation until after the contracted services have been rendered. The bill will now go to the Democratic controlled Senate where it is expected to pass.
Supporters of the bill say that the state is literally teeming with con artists who take advantage of homeowners desperate to save their homes from foreclosure by charging hefty fees up front and then failing to deliver anything of value in return. They say that by making it illegal to charge up front fees, they will be protecting consumers from being scammed.
While there’s no question that there have been some unscrupulous people that have taken advantage of homeowners in distress, the number of these scammers is unclear. Now that we’ve learned that lenders and servicers have only modified an average of 9% of qualified mortgages under the Obama plan, it’s hard to tell which companies were scamming and which were made to look like scams by the servicers and lenders who failed to live up to their agreement with the federal government.
In fact, ever since it’s come to light that mortgage servicers have been sued hundreds of times, that they continue to violate the HAMP provisions, that they foreclose when they’re not supposed to, charge up front fees for modifications, require homeowners to sign waivers, and so much more, who can be sure who the scammers really are. Bank of America, for example, got the worst grade of any bank on the President’s report card listing, modifying only 4% of the eligible mortgages since the plan began. We’ve given B of A something like $200 billion and they still claim that they’re having a hard time answering the phones over there, so who’s scamming who?
To make matters worse, and in the spirit of Y2K, the media has fanned the flames of irrationality with stories of people losing their homes as a result of someone failing to get their loan modified. The stories go something like this:
We gave them 1,000. They told us to stop making our mortgage payment. They promised us a principal reduction. We didn’t hear from them for months. And then we lost our house.
I am so sure. Can that even happen? I own a house or two. Walk me through how that happened again, because I absolutely guarantee you… no way could those things happen to me and I end up losing my house over it. Not a chance in the world. I’m not saying I couldn’t lose a house, but it sure as heck would take a damn sight more than that to make it happen.
Depending on how you read the language in the bill, it may prevent licensed California attorneys from requiring a retainer in advance of services being rendered, and this could essentially eliminate a homeowner’s ability to hire a lawyer to help save their home.
Supporters, on the other hand, respond that homeowners will still be able to hire attorneys, but that the attorneys will now have to wait until after services have been rendered before being paid for their services. They say that attorneys, just like real estate agents and mortgage brokers, will now only be able to receive compensation after services have been rendered.
But, assuming they’re talking about at the end of the transaction, there are key differences. Real estate agents and mortgage brokers are paid OUT OF ESCROW at the end of a transaction. They don’t send clients a bill for their services after the property is sold.
Homeowners at risk of foreclosure are having trouble paying their bills and for the most part, their credit ratings have suffered as a result. If an attorney were to represent a homeowner seeking a loan modification, and then bill for his or her services after the loan was modified, the attorney would be nothing more than an unsecured creditor of a homeowner who’s only marginally credit worthy at best. If the homeowner didn’t pay the bill, the attorney would have no recourse other than to sue the homeowner in Small Claims Court where they would likely receive small payments over time if lucky.
Extending unsecured credit to homeowners that are already struggling to pay their bills, and then having to sue them in order to collect simply isn’t a business model that attorneys, or anyone else for that matter, are likely to embrace. In fact, the more than 50 California attorneys involved in loan modifications that I contacted to ask about this issue all confirmed that they would not represent homeowners on that basis.
One attorney, who asked not to be identified, said: “Getting a lender or servicer to agree to a loan modification takes months, sometimes six or nine months. If I worked on behalf of homeowners for six or nine months and then didn’t get paid by a number of them, it wouldn’t be very long before I’d have to close my doors. No lawyer is going to do that kind of work without any security and anyone who thinks they will, simply isn’t familiar with what’s involved.”
“I don’t think there’s any question that SB 94 will make it almost impossible for a homeowner to obtain legal representation related to loan modifications,” explained another attorney who also asked not to be identified. ”The banks have fought lawyers helping clients through the loan modification process every step of the way, so I’m not surprised they’ve pushed for this legislation to pass.”
Proponents of the legislation recite the all too familiar mantra about there being so many scammers out there that the state has no choice but to move to shut down any one offering to help homeowners secure loan modifications that charges a fee for the services. They point out that consumers can just call their banks directly, or that there are nonprofit organizations throughout the state that can help homeowners with loan modifications.
While the latter is certainly true, it’s only further evidence that there exists a group of people in positions of influence that are unfamiliar , or at the very least not adequately familiar with obtaining a loan modification through a nonprofit organization, and they’ve certainly never tried calling a bank directly.
The fact that there are nonprofit housing counselors available, and the degree to which they may or may not be able to assist a given homeowner, is irrelevant. Homeowners are well aware of the nonprofit options available. They are also aware that they can call their banks directly. From the President of the United States and and U.S. Attorney General to the community newspapers found in every small town in America, homeowners have heard the fairy tales about about these options, and they’ve tried them… over and over again, often times for many months. When they didn’t get the desired results, they hired a firm to help them.
Yet, even the State Bar of California is supporting SB 94, and even AB 764, a California Assembly variation on the theme, and one even more draconian because of its requirement that attorneys only be allowed to bill a client after a successful loan modification has been obtained. That means that an attorney would have to guarantee a homeowner that he or she would obtain a modification agreement from a lender or servicer or not get paid for trying. Absurd on so many levels. Frankly, if AB 764 passes, would the last one out of California please turn off the lights and bring the flag.
As of late July, the California State Bar said it was investigating 391 complaints against 141 attorneys, as opposed to nine investigations related to loan modifications in 2008. The Bar hasn’t read anywhere all of the complaints its received, but you don’t have to be a statistician to figure out that there’s more to the complaints that meets the eye. So far the State Bar has taken action against three attorneys and the Attorney General another four… so, let’s see… carry the 3… that’s 7 lawyers. Two or three more and they could have a softball team.
At the federal level they’re still reporting the same numbers they were last spring. Closed 11… sent 71 letters… blah, blah, blah… we’ve got a country of 300 million and at least 5 million are in trouble on their mortgage. The simple fact is, they’re going to have to come up with some serious numbers before I’m going to be scared of bumping into a scammer on every corner.
Looking Ahead…
California’s ALT-A and Option ARM mortgages are just beginning to re-set, causing payments to rise, and with almost half of the mortgages in California already underwater, these homeowners will be unable to refinance and foreclosures will increase as a result. Prime jumbo foreclosure rates are already up a mind blowing 634% as compared with January 2008 levels, according to LPS Applied Analytics.
Clearly, if SB 94 ends up reducing the number of legitimate firms available for homeowners to turn to, everyone involved in its passage is going to be retiring. While many sub-prime borrowers have suffered silently through this horror show of a housing crisis, the ALT-A and Option ARM borrowers are highly unlikely to slip quietly into the night.
There are a couple of things about the latest version of SB 94 that I found interesting:
1. It says that a lawyer can’t collect a fee or any other compensation before serivces have been delivered, but it doesn’t make clear whether attorneys can ask the client to deposit funds in the law firm’s trust account and then bill against thsoe funds as amounts are earned. Funds deposited in a law firm trust account remain the client’s funds, so they’re not a lawyer’s “fees or other compensation”. Those funds are there so that when the fees have been earned, the lawyer doesn’t have to hope his or her bill gets paid. Of course, it also says that an attorney can’t hold any security interest, but money in a trust account a client’s money, the attorney has no lien against it. All of this is a matter of interpretation, of course, so who knows.
2. While there used to be language in both the real estate and lawyer sections that prohibited breaking up services related to a loan modification, in the latest version all of the language related to breaking up services as applied to attorneys has been eliminated. It still applies to real estate licensed firms, but not to attorneys. This may be a good thing, as at least a lawyer could complete sections of the work involved as opposed to having to wait until the very end, which the way the banks have been handling things, could be nine months away.
3. The bill says nothing about the amounts that may be charged for services in connection with a loan modification. So, in the case of an attorney, that would seem to mean that… well, you can put one, two and three together from there.
4. Lawyers are not included in definition of foreclosure consultant. And there is a requirement that new language be inserted in contracts, along the lines of “You don’t have to pay anyone to get a loan modification… blah, blah, blah.” Like that will be news to any homeowner in America. I’ve spoken with hundreds and never ran across one who didn’t try it themselves before calling a lawyer. I realize the Attorney General doesn’t seem to know that, but look… he’s been busy.
Conclusion…
Will SB 94 actually stop con artists from taking advantage of homeowners in distress? Or will it end up only stopping reputable lawyers from helping homeowners, while foreclosures increase and our economy continues its deflationary free fall? Will the California State Bar ever finishing reading the complaints being received, and if they ever do, will they understand what they’ve read. Or is our destiny that the masses won’t understand what’s happening around them until it sucks them under as well.
I surely hope not. But for now, I’m just hoping people can still a hire an attorney next week to help save their homes, because if they can’t… the Bar is going to get a lot more letters from unhappy homeowners.
By Walter Hackett, Esq.
The federal government has trumpeted its Home Affordable Modification Program or “HAMP” solution as THE solution to runaway foreclosures – few things could be further from the truth. Under HAMP a homeowner will be offered a “workout” that can result in the homeowner being “worked out” of his or her home. Here’s how it works. A participating lender or servicer will send a distressed homeowner a HAMP workout agreement. The agreement consists of an “offer” pursuant to which the homeowner is permitted to remit partial or half of their regular monthly payments for 3 or more months. The required payments are NOT reduced, instead the partial payments are placed into a suspense account. In many cases once enough is gathered to pay the oldest payment due the funds are removed from the suspense account and applied to the mortgage loan. At the end of the trial period the homeowner will be further behind than when they started the “workout” plan.
In California, the agreements clearly specify the acceptance of partial payments by the lender or servicer does NOT cure any default. Further, the fact a homeowner is in the workout program does NOT require the lender or servicer to suspend or postpone any non-judicial foreclosure activity with the possible exception of an actual trustee’s sale. A homeowner could complete the workout plan and be faced with an imminent trustee’s sale. Worse, if a homeowner performs EXACTLY as required by the workout agreement, they are NOT assured a loan modification. Instead the agreement will include vague statements that the homeowner MAY receive an offer to modify his or her loan however there is NO duty on the part of the servicer or lender to modify a loan regardless of the homeowner’s compliance with the agreement.
A homeowner who fully performs under a HAMP workout is all but guaranteed to have given away thousands of dollars with NO assurance of keeping his or her home or ever seeing anything resembling an offer to modify a mortgage loan.
While it may well be the case the government was making an honest effort to help, the reality is the HAMP program is only guaranteed to help those who need help least – lenders and servicers. If you receive ANY written offer to modify your loan meet with a REAL licensed attorney and ask them to review the agreement to determine what you are REALLY agreeing to, the home you save might be your own.
The judge waves you into his chambers in the State Supreme Court building in Brooklyn, past the caveat taped to his wall — “Be sure brain in gear before engaging mouth” — and into his inner office, where foreclosure motions are piled high enough to form a minor Alpine chain.
“I don’t want to put a family on the street unless it’s legitimate,” Justice Arthur M. Schack said.
Every week, the nation’s mightiest banks come to his court seeking to take the homes of New Yorkers who cannot pay their mortgages. And nearly as often, the judge says, they file foreclosure papers speckled with errors.
He plucks out one motion and leafs through: a Deutsche Bank representative signed an affidavit claiming to be the vice president of two different banks. His office was in Kansas City, Mo., but the signature was notarized in Texas. And the bank did not even own the mortgage when it began to foreclose on the homeowner.
The judge’s lips pucker as if he had inhaled a pickle; he rejected this one. “I’m a little guy in Brooklyn who doesn’t belong to their country clubs, what can I tell you?” he says, adding a shrug for punctuation. “I won’t accept their comedy of errors.”
The judge, Arthur M. Schack, 64, fashions himself a judicial Don Quixote, tilting at the phalanxes of bankers, foreclosure facilitators and lawyers who file motions by the bale. While national debate focuses on bank bailouts and federal aid for homeowners that has been slow in coming, the hard reckonings of the foreclosure crisis are being made in courts like his, and Justice Schack’s sympathies are clear. He has tossed out 46 of the 102 foreclosure motions that have come before him in the last two years. And his often scathing decisions, peppered with allusions to the Croesus-like wealth of bank presidents, have attracted the respectful attention of judges and lawyers from Florida to Ohio to California. At recent judicial conferences in Chicago and Arizona, several panelists praised his rulings as a possible national model.
His opinions, too, have been greeted by a cry of affront from a bank official or two, who say this judge stands in the way of what is rightfully theirs. HSBC bank appealed a recent ruling, saying he had set a “dangerous precedent” by acting as “both judge and jury,” throwing out cases even when homeowners had not responded to foreclosure motions. Justice Schack, like a handful of state and federal judges, has taken a magnifying glass to the mortgage industry. In the gilded haste of the past decade, bankers handed out millions of mortgages — with terms good, bad and exotically ugly — then repackaged those loans for sale to investors from Connecticut to Singapore. Sloppiness reigned. So many papers have been lost, signatures misplaced and documents dated inaccurately that it is often not clear which bank owns the mortgage.
Justice Schack’s take is straightforward, and sends a tremor through some bank suites: If a bank cannot prove ownership, it cannot foreclose. “If you are going to take away someone’s house, everything should be legal and correct,” he said. “I’m a strange guy — I don’t want to put a family on the street unless it’s legitimate.”
Justice Schack has small jowls and big black glasses, a thin mustache and not so many hairs combed across his scalp. He has the impish eyes of the high school social studies teacher he once was, aware that something untoward is probably going on at the back of his classroom. He is Brooklyn born and bred, with a master’s degree in history and an office loaded with autographed baseballs and photographs of the Brooklyn Dodgers. His written decisions are a free-associative trip through popular, legal and literary culture, with a sideways glance at the business pages.
Confronted with a case in which Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs passed a defaulted mortgage back and forth and lost track of the documents, the judge made reference to the film classic “It’s a Wonderful Life” and the evil banker played by Lionel Barrymore. “Lenders should not lose sight,” Justice Schack wrote in that 2007 case, “that they are dealing with humanity, not with Mr. Potter’s ‘rabble’ and ‘cattle.’ Multibillion-dollar corporations must follow the same rules in the foreclosure actions as the local banks, savings and loan associations or credit unions, or else they have become the Mr. Potters of the 21st century.”
Last year, he chastised Wells Fargo for filing error-filled papers. “The court,” the judge wrote, “reminds Wells Fargo of Cassius’s advice to Brutus in Act 1, Scene 2 of William Shakespeare’s ‘Julius Caesar’: ‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.’ ”
Then there is a Deutsche Bank case from 2008, the juicy part of which he reads aloud:
“The court wonders if the instant foreclosure action is a corporate ‘Kansas City Shuffle,’ a complex confidence game,” he reads. “In the 2006 film ‘Lucky Number Slevin,’ Mr. Goodkat, a hit man played by Bruce Willis, explains: ‘A Kansas City Shuffle is when everybody looks right, you go left.’ ”The banks’ reaction? Justice Schack shrugs. “They probably curse at me,” he says, “but no one is interested in some little judge.”
Little drama attends the release of his decisions. Beaten-down homeowners rarely show up to contest foreclosure actions, and the judge scrutinizes the banks’ papers in his chambers. But at legal conferences, judges and lawyers have wondered aloud why more judges do not hold banks to tougher standards.
“To the extent that judges examine these papers, they find exactly the same errors that Judge Schack does,” said Katherine M. Porter, a visiting professor at the School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and a national expert in consumer credit law. “His rulings are hardly revolutionary; it’s unusual only because we so rarely hold large corporations to the rules.”
Banks and the cottage industry of mortgage service companies and foreclosure lawyers also pay rather close attention. A spokeswoman for OneWest Bank acknowledged that an official, confronted with a ream of foreclosure papers, had mistakenly signed for two different banks — just as the Deutsche Bank official did. Deutsche Bank, which declined to let an attorney speak on the record about any of its cases before Justice Schack, e-mailed a PDF of a three-page pamphlet in which it claimed little responsibility for foreclosures, even though the bank’s name is affixed to tens of thousands of such motions. The bank described itself as simply a trustee for investors.
Justice Schack came to his recent prominence by a circuitous path, having worked for 14 years as public school teacher in Brooklyn. He was a union representative and once walked a picket line with his wife, Dilia, who was a teacher, too. All was well until the fiscal crisis of the 1970s.
“Why’d I go to law school?” he said. “Thank Mayor Abe Beame, who froze teacher salaries.”
He was counsel for the Major League Baseball Players Association in the 1980s and ’90s, when it was on a long winning streak against team owners. “It was the millionaires versus the billionaires,” he says. “After a while, I’m sitting there thinking, ‘He’s making $4 million, he’s making $5 million, and I’m worth about $1.98.’ ”
So he dived into a judicial race. He was elected to the Civil Court in 1998 and to the Supreme Court for Brooklyn and Staten Island in 2003. His wife is a Democratic district leader; their daughter, Elaine, is a lawyer and their son, Douglas, a police officer.Justice Schack’s duels with the banks started in 2007 as foreclosures spiked sharply. He saw a plague falling on Brooklyn, particularly its working-class black precincts. “Banks had given out loans structured to fail,” he said.
The judge burrowed into property record databases. He found banks without clear title, and a giant foreclosure law firm, Steven J. Baum, representing two sides in a dispute. He noted that Wells Fargo’s chief executive, John G. Stumpf, made more than $11 million in 2007 while the company’s total returns fell 12 percent. “Maybe,” he advised the bank, “counsel should wonder, like the court, if Mr. Stumpf was unjustly enriched at the expense of W.F.’s stockholders.”
He was, how to say it, mildly appalled. “I’m a guy from the streets of Brooklyn who happens to become a judge,” he said. “I see a bank giving a $500,000 mortgage on a building worth $300,000 and the interest rate is 20 percent and I ask questions, what can I tell you?”
News Release
July 15, 2009
For Immediate Release
Contact: (916) 324-5500
Print Version
Attachments
Los Angeles – As part of a massive federal-state crackdown on loan modification scams, Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. at a press conference today announced the filing of legal action against 21 individuals and 14 companies who ripped off thousands of homeowners desperately seeking mortgage relief.
Brown is demanding millions in civil penalties, restitution for victims and permanent injunctions to keep the companies and defendants from offering mortgage-relief services.
“The loan modification industry is teeming with confidence men and charlatans, who rip off desperate homeowners facing foreclosure,” Brown said. “Despite firm promises and money-back guarantees, these scam artists pocketed thousands of dollars from each victim and didn’t provide an ounce of relief.”
Brown filed five lawsuits as part of “Operation Loan Lies,” a nationwide sweep of sham loan modification consultants, which he conducted with the Federal Trade Commission, the U.S. Attorney’s office and 22 other federal and state agencies. In total, 189 suits and orders to stop doing business were filed across the country.
Following the housing collapse, hundreds of loan modification and foreclosure-prevention companies have cropped up, charging thousands of dollars in upfront fees and claiming that they can reduce mortgage payments. Yet, loan modifications are rarely, if ever, obtained. Less than 1 percent of homeowners nationwide have received principal reductions of any kind.
Brown has been leading the fight against fraudulent loan modification companies. He has sought court orders to shut down several companies including First Gov and Foreclosure Freedom and has brought criminal charges and obtained lengthy prison sentences for deceptive loan modification consultants.
Brown’s office filed the following lawsuits in Orange County and U.S. District Court for the Central District (Los Angeles):
– U.S. Homeowners Assistance, based in Irvine;
– U.S. Foreclosure Relief Corp and its legal affiliate Adrian Pomery, based in the City of Orange;
– Home Relief Services, LLC, with offices in Irvine, Newport Beach and Anaheim, and its legal affiliate, the Diener Law Firm;
– RMR Group Loss Mitigation, LLC and its legal affiliates Shippey & Associates and Arthur Aldridge. RMR Group has offices in Newport Beach, City of Orange, Huntington Beach, Corona, and Fresno;
– and
– United First, Inc, and its lawyer affiliate Mitchell Roth, based in Los Angeles.
U.S. Homeowners Assistance
Brown on Monday sued U.S. Homeowners Assistance, and its executives — Hakimullah “Sean” Sarpas and Zulmai Nazarzai — for bilking dozens of homeowners out of thousands of dollars each.
U.S. Homeowners Assistance claimed to be a government agency with a 98 percent success rate in aiding homeowners. In reality, the company was not a government agency and was never certified as an approved housing counselor by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. None of U.S. Homeowners Assistance’s known victims received loan modifications despite paying upfront fees ranging from $1,200 to $3,500.
For example, in January 2008, one victim received a letter from her lender indicating that her monthly mortgage payment would increase from $2,300 to $3,500. Days later, she received an unsolicited phone call from U.S. Homeowners Assistance promising a 40 percent reduction in principal and a $2,000 reduction in her monthly payment. She paid $3500 upfront for U.S. Homeowners Assistance’s services.
At the end of April 2008, her lender informed her that her loan modification request had been denied and sent her the documents that U.S. Homeowners Assistance had filed on her behalf. After reviewing those documents, she discovered that U.S. Homeowners Assistance had forged her signature and falsified her financial information – including fabricating a lease agreement with a fictitious tenant.
When she confronted U.S. Homeowners Assistance, she was immediately disconnected and has not been able to reach the company.
Brown’s suit contends that U.S. Homeowners Assistance violated:
– California Business and Professions Code section 17500 by falsely stating they were a government agency and misleading homeowners by claiming a 98 percent success rate in obtaining loan modifications;
– California Business and Professions Code section 17200 by failing to perform services made in exchange for upfront fees;
– California Civil Code section 2945.4 for unlawfully collecting upfront fees for loan modification services;
– California Civil Code section 2945.45 for failing to register with the California Attorney General’s Office as foreclosure consultants; and
– California Penal Code section 487 for grand theft.
Brown is seeking $7.5 million in civil penalties, full restitution for victims, and a permanent injunction to keep the company and the defendants from offering foreclosure consultant services.
US Homeowners Assistance also did business as Statewide Financial Group, Inc., We Beat All Rates, and US Homeowners Preservation Center.
US Foreclosure Relief Corporation
Brown last week sued US Foreclosure Relief Corporation, H.E. Service Company, their executives — George Escalante and Cesar Lopez — as well as their legal affiliate Adrian Pomery for running a scam promising homeowners reductions in their principal and interest rates as low as 4 percent. Brown was joined in this suit by the Federal Trade Commission and the State of Missouri.
Using aggressive telemarketing tactics, the defendants solicited desperate homeowners and charged an upfront fee ranging from $1,800 to $2,800 for loan modification services. During one nine-month period alone, consumers paid defendants in excess of $4.4 million. Yet, in most instances, defendants failed to provide the mortgage-relief services. Once consumers paid the fee, the defendants avoided responding to consumers’ inquiries.
In response to a large number of consumer complaints, several government agencies directed the defendants to stop their illegal practices. Instead, they changed their business name and continued their operations – using six different business aliases in the past eight months alone.
Brown’s lawsuit alleges the companies and individuals violated:
– The National Do Not Call Registry, 16 C.F.R. section 310.4 and California Business and Professions Code section 17200 by telemarketing their services to persons on the registry;
– The National Do Not Call Registry, 16 C.F.R. section 310.8 and California Business and Professions Code section 17200 by telemarketing their services without paying the mandatory annual fee for access to telephone numbers within the area codes included in the registry;
– California Civil Code section 2945 et seq. and California Business and Professions Code section 17200 by demanding and collecting up-front fees prior to performing any services, failing to include statutory notices in their contracts, and failing to comply with other requirements imposed on mortgage foreclosure consultants;
– California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500 by representing that they would obtain home loan modifications for consumers but failing to do so in most instances; by representing that consumers must make further payments even though they had not performed any of the promised services; by representing that they have a high success rate and that they can obtain loan modification within no more than 60 days when in fact these representations were false; and by directing consumers to avoid contact with their lenders and to stop making loan payments causing some lenders to initiate foreclosure proceedings and causing damage to consumers’ credit records.
Victims of this scam include a father of four battling cancer, a small business owner, an elderly disabled couple, a sheriff whose income dropped due to city budget cuts and an Iraq-war veteran. None of these victims received the loan modification promised.
Brown is seeking unspecified civil penalties, full restitution for victims, and a permanent injunction to keep the company and the defendants from offering foreclosure consultant services.
The defendants also did business under other names including Lighthouse Services and California Foreclosure Specialists.
Home Relief Services, LLC
Brown Monday sued Home Relief Services, LLC., its executives Terence Green Sr. and Stefano Marrero, the Diener Law Firm and its principal attorney Christopher L. Diener for bilking thousands of homeowners out of thousands of dollars each.
Home Relief Services charged homeowners over $4,000 in upfront fees, promised to lower interest rates to 4 percent, convert adjustable-rate mortgages to low fixed-rate loans and reduce principal up to 50 percent within 30 to 60 days. None of the known victims received a modification with the assistance of the defendants.
In some cases, these companies also sought to be the lenders’ agent in the short-sale of their clients’ homes. In doing so, the defendants attempted to use their customers’ personal financial information for their own benefit.
Home Relief Services and the Diener Law Firm directed homeowners to stop contacting their lender because the defendants would act as their sole agent and negotiator.
Brown’s lawsuit contends that the defendants violated:
– California Business and Professions Code section 17500 by claiming a 95 percent success rate and promising consumers significant reductions in the principal balance of their mortgages;
– California Business and Professions Code section 17200 by failing to perform on promises made in exchange for upfront fees;
– California Civil Code section 2945.4 for unlawfully collecting upfront fees for loan modification services;
– California Business and Professions Code section 2945.3 by failing to include cancellation notices in their contracts;
– California Civil Code section 2945.45 by not registering with the Attorney General’s office as foreclosure consultants; and
– California Penal Code section 487 for grand theft.
Brown is seeking $10 million in civil penalties, full restitution for victims, and a permanent injunction to keep the company and the defendants from offering foreclosure consultant services.
Two other companies with the same management were also involved in the effort to deceive homeowners: Payment Relief Services, Inc. and Golden State Funding, Inc.
RMR Group Loss Mitigation Group
Brown Monday sued RMR Group Loss Mitigation and its executives Michael Scott Armendariz of Huntington Beach, Ruben Curiel of Lancaster, and Ricardo Haag of Corona; Living Water Lending, Inc.; and attorney Arthur Steven Aldridge of Westlake Village as well as the law firm of Shippey & Associates and its principal attorney Karla C. Shippey of Yorba Linda – for bilking over 500 victims out of nearly $1 million.
The company solicited homeowners through telephone calls and in-person home visits. Employees claimed a 98 percent success rate and a money-back guarantee. None of the known victims received any refunds or modifications with the assistance of defendants.
For example, in July 2008, a 71-year old victim learned his monthly mortgage payments would increase from $2,470 to $3,295. He paid $2,995, yet received no loan modification and no refund.
Additionally, RMR insisted that homeowners refrain from contacting their lenders because the defendants would act as their agents.
Brown’s suit contends that the defendants violated:
– California Business and Professions Code section 17500 by claiming a 98 percent success rate and promising consumers significant reductions in the principal balance of their mortgages;
– California Business and Professions Code section 17200 by failing to perform on promises made in exchange for upfront fees;
– California Civil Code section 2945.4 for unlawfully collecting upfront fees for loan modification services;
– California Business and Professions Code section 2945.3 by failing to include cancellation notices in their contracts;
– California Civil Code section 2945.45 by not registering with the Attorney General’s office as foreclosure consultants; and
– California Penal Code section 487 for grand theft.
Brown is seeking $7.5 million in civil penalties, full restitution for victims, and a permanent injunction to keep the company and the defendants from offering foreclosure consultant services.
United First, Inc.
On July 6, 2009, Brown sued a foreclosure consultant and an attorney — Paul Noe Jr. and Mitchell Roth – who conned 2,000 desperate homeowners into paying exorbitant fees for “phony lawsuits” to forestall foreclosure proceedings.
These lawsuits were filed and abandoned, even though homeowners were charged $1,800 in upfront fees, at least $1,200 per month and contingency fees of up to 80 percent of their home’s value.
Noe convinced more than 2,000 homeowners to sign “joint venture” agreements with his company, United First, and hire Roth to file suits claiming that the borrower’s loan was invalid because the mortgages had been sold so many times on Wall Street that the lender could not demonstrate who owned it. Similar suits in other states have never resulted in the elimination of the borrower’s mortgage debt.
After filing the lawsuits, Roth did virtually nothing to advance the cases. He often failed to make required court filings, respond to legal motions, comply with court deadlines, or appear at court hearings. Instead, Roth’s firm simply tried to extend the lawsuits as long as possible in order to collect additional monthly fees.
United First charged homeowners approximately $1,800 in upfront fees, plus at least $1,200 per month. If the case was settled, homeowners were required to pay 50 percent of the cash value of the settlement. For example, if United First won a $100,000 reduction of the mortgage debt, the homeowner would have to pay United First a fee of $50,000. If United First completely eliminated the homeowner’s debt, the homeowner would be required to pay the company 80 percent of the value of the home.
Brown’s lawsuit contends that Noe, Roth and United First:
– Violated California’s credit counseling and foreclosure consultant laws, Civil Code sections 1789 and 2945
– Inserted unconscionable terms in contracts;
– Engaged in improper running and capping, meaning that Roth improperly partnered with United First, Inc. and Noe, who were not lawyers, to generate business for his law firm violating California Business and Professions Code 6150; and
– Violated 17500 of the California Business and Professions Code.
Brown’s office is seeking $2 million in civil penalties, full restitution for victims, and a permanent injunction to keep the company and the defendants from offering foreclosure consultant services.
Tips for Homeowners
Brown’s office issued these tips for homeowners to avoid becoming a victim:
DON’T pay money to people who promise to work with your lender to modify your loan. It is unlawful for foreclosure consultants to collect money before (1) they give you a written contract describing the services they promise to provide and (2) they actually perform all the services described in the contract, such as negotiating new monthly payments or a new mortgage loan. However, an advance fee may be charged by an attorney, or by a real estate broker who has submitted the advance fee agreement to the Department of Real Estate, for review.
DO call your lender yourself. Your lender wants to hear from you, and will likely be much more willing to work directly with you than with a foreclosure consultant.
DON’T ignore letters from your lender. Consider contacting your lender yourself, many lenders are willing to work with homeowners who are behind on their payments.
DON’T transfer title or sell your house to a “foreclosure rescuer.” Fraudulent foreclosure consultants often promise that if homeowners transfer title, they may stay in the home as renters and buy their home back later. The foreclosure consultants claim that transfer is necessary so that someone with a better credit rating can obtain a new loan to prevent foreclosure. BEWARE! This is a common scheme so-called “rescuers” use to evict homeowners and steal all or most of the home’s equity.
DON’T pay your mortgage payments to someone other than your lender or loan servicer, even if he or she promises to pass the payment on. Fraudulent foreclosure consultants often keep the money for themselves.
DON’T sign any documents without reading them first. Many homeowners think that they are signing documents for a new loan to pay off the mortgage they are behind on. Later, they discover that they actually transferred ownership to the “rescuer.”
DO contact housing counselors approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who may be able to help you for free. For a referral to a housing counselor near you, contact HUD at 1-800-569-4287 (TTY: 1-800-877-8339) or http://www.hud.gov.
If you believe you have been the victim of a mortgage-relief scam in California, please contact the Attorney General’s Public Inquiry Unit at http://ag.ca.gov/consumers/general.php.
# # #
— read and weep. Game Over. Over the next 6-12 months the entire foreclosure mess is going to be turned on its head as it becomes apparent to even the most skeptical that the mortgage mess is just that — a mess. From the time the deed was recorded to the time the assignments, powers of attorneys, notarization and other documents were fabricated and executed there is an 18 minute Nixonian gap in the record that cannot be cured. Just because you produce documents, however real they appear, does not mean you can shift the burden of proof onto the borrower. In California our legislator have attempted to slow this train wreck but the pretender lenders just go on with the foreclosure by declaring to the foreclosure trustee the borrower is in default and they have all the documents the trustee then records a false document. A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall include a declaration from the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent that it has contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section, or the borrower has surrendered the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.
Invalid Declaration on Notice of Default and/or Notice of Trustee’s Sale.
The purpose of permitting a declaration under penalty of perjury, in lieu of a sworn statement, is to help ensure that declarations contain a truthful factual representation and are made in good faith. (In re Marriage of Reese & Guy, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (4th Dist. 1999).
In addition to California Civil Code §2923.5, California Code of Civil Procedure §2015.5 states:
Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, regulation, order or requirement made pursuant to the law of this state, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same, such matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, established or proved by the unsworn statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, in writing of such person which recites that is certified or declared by him or her to be true under penalty of perjury, is subscribed by him or her, and (1), if executed within this state, states the date and place of execution; (2) if executed at any place, within or without this state, states the date of execution and that is so certified or declared under the laws of the State of California. The certification or declaration must be in substantially the following form:
(a) If executed within this state:
“I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct”:
_____________________ _______________________
(Date and Place) (Signature)
For our purposes we need not look any farther than the Notice of Default to find the declaration is not signed under penalty of perjury; as mandated by new Civil Code §2923.5(c). (Blum v. Superior Court (Copley Press Inc.) (2006) 141 Cal App 4th 418, 45 Cal. Reptr. 3d 902 ). The Declaration is merely a form declaration with a check box.
No Personal Knowledge of Declarant
According to Giles v. Friendly Finance Co. of Biloxi, Inc., 199 So. 2nd 265 (Miss. 1967), “an affidavit on behalf of a corporation must show that it was made by an authorized officer or agent, and the officer him or herself must swear to the facts.” Furthermore, in Giles v. County Dep’t of Public Welfare of Marion County (Ind.App. 1 Dist.1991) 579 N.E.2d 653, 654-655 states in pertinent part, “a person who verified a pleading to have personal knowledge or reasonable cause to believe the existence of the facts stated therein.” Here, the Declaration for the Notice of Default by the agent does not state if the agent has personal knowledge and how he obtained this knowledge.
The proper function of an affidavit is to state facts, not conclusions, ¹ and affidavits that merely state conclusions rather than facts are insufficient. ² An affidavit must set forth facts and show affirmatively how the affiant obtained personal knowledge of those facts. ³
Here, The Notice of Default does not have the required agent’s personal knowledge of facts and if the Plaintiff borrower was affirmatively contacted in person or by telephone
to assess the Plaintiff’s financial situation and explore options for the Plaintiff to avoid foreclosure. A simple check box next to the “facts” does not suffice.
Furthermore, “it has been said that personal knowledge of facts asserted in an affidavit is not presumed from the mere positive averment of facts, but rather, a court should be shown how the affiant knew or could have known such facts, and, if there is no evidence from which the inference of personal knowledge can be drawn, then it is
¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬____________________________________________________________________________
¹ Lindley v. Midwest Pulmonary Consultants, P.C., 55 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2001).
² Jaime v. St. Joseph Hosp. Foundation, 853 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1993).
³ M.G.M. Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Castro, 8 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App. Corpus Chrisit 1999).
presumed that from which the inference of personal knowledge can be drawn, then it is presumed that such does not exist.” ¹ The declaration signed by agent does not state anywhere how he knew or could have known if Plaintiff was contacted in person or by telephone to explore different financial options. It is vague and ambiguous if he himself called plaintiff.
This defendant did not adhere to the mandates laid out by congress before a foreclosure can be considered duly perfected. The Notice of Default states,
“That by reason thereof, the present beneficiary under such deed of trust, has executed and delivered to said agent, a written Declaration of Default and Demand for same, and has deposited with said agent such Deed of Trust and all documents evidencing obligations secured thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured thereby immediately due and payable and has elected and does hereby elect to cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured thereby.”
However, Defendants do not have and assignment of the deed of trust nor have they complied with 2923.5 or 2923.6 or 2924 the Deed of Trust, nor do they provide any documents evidencing obligations secured thereby. For the aforementioned reasons, the Notice of Default will be void as a matter of law. The pretender lenders a banking on the “tender defense” to save them ie. yes we did not follow the law so sue us and when you do we will claim “tender” Check Mate but that’s not the law.
Recording a False Document
Furthermore, according to California Penal Code § 115 in pertinent part:
(a) Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.
If you say you have a claim, you must prove it. If you say you are the lender, you must prove it. Legislators take notice: Just because bankers give you money doesn’t mean they can change 1000 years of common law, statutory law and constitutional law. It just won’t fly. And if you are a legislator looking to get elected or re-elected, your failure to act on what is now an obvious need to clear title and restore the wealth of your citizens who were cheated and defrauded, will be punished by the votes of your constituents.
CALIFORNIA CODES
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 437c-438
437c. (a) Any party may move for summary judgment in any action or
proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that
there is no defense to the action or proceeding. The motion may be
made at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general
appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the
motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general
appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause
shown, may direct. Notice of the motion and supporting papers shall
be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before
the time appointed for hearing. However, if the notice is served by
mail, the required 75-day period of notice shall be increased by five
days if the place of address is within the State of California, 10
days if the place of address is outside the State of California but
within the United States, and 20 days if the place of address is
outside the United States, and if the notice is served by facsimile
transmission, Express Mail, or another method of delivery providing
for overnight delivery, the required 75-day period of notice shall be
increased by two court days. The motion shall be heard no later than
30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause
orders otherwise. The filing of the motion shall not extend the time
within which a party must otherwise file a responsive pleading.
(b) (1) The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of
which judicial notice shall or may be taken. The supporting papers
shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and
concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are
undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a
reference to the supporting evidence. The failure to comply with this
requirement of a separate statement may in the court’s discretion
constitute a sufficient ground for denial of the motion.
(2) Any opposition to the motion shall be served and filed not
less than 14 days preceding the noticed or continued date of hearing,
unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. The opposition,
where appropriate, shall consist of affidavits, declarations,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of
which judicial notice shall or may be taken.
(3) The opposition papers shall include a separate statement that
responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party
to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or
disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall
set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the
opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by
the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference
to the supporting evidence. Failure to comply with this requirement
of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the
court’s discretion, for granting the motion.
(4) Any reply to the opposition shall be served and filed by the
moving party not less than five days preceding the noticed or
continued date of hearing, unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise.
(5) Evidentiary objections not made at the hearing shall be deemed
waived.
(6) Except for subdivision (c) of Section 1005 relating to the
method of service of opposition and reply papers, Sections 1005 and
1013, extending the time within which a right may be exercised or an
act may be done, do not apply to this section.
(7) Any incorporation by reference of matter in the court’s file
shall set forth with specificity the exact matter to which reference
is being made and shall not incorporate the entire file.
(c) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. In determining whether the papers show that there is
no triable issue as to any material fact the court shall consider
all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which
objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary
judgment may not be granted by the court based on inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contradicted by other
inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any
material fact.
(d) Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall be
made by any person on personal knowledge, shall set forth admissible
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated in the affidavits or declarations.
Any objections based on the failure to comply with the requirements
of this subdivision shall be made at the hearing or shall be deemed
waived.
(e) If a party is otherwise entitled to a summary judgment
pursuant to this section, summary judgment may not be denied on
grounds of credibility or for want of cross-examination of witnesses
furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary
judgment, except that summary judgment may be denied in the
discretion of the court, where the only proof of a material fact
offered in support of the summary judgment is an affidavit or
declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to that
fact; or where a material fact is an individual’s state of mind, or
lack thereof, and that fact is sought to be established solely by the
individual’s affirmation thereof.
(f) (1) A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or
more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative
defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of
duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or
that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no
merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both,
or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in
Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either
owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion
for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely
disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for
damages, or an issue of duty.
(2) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as
an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in
all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. However, a
party may not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a
prior motion for summary adjudication and denied by the court,
unless that party establishes to the satisfaction of the court, newly
discovered facts or circumstances or a change of law supporting the
issues reasserted in the summary judgment motion.
(g) Upon the denial of a motion for summary judgment, on the
ground that there is a triable issue as to one or more material
facts, the court shall, by written or oral order, specify one or more
material facts raised by the motion as to which the court has
determined there exists a triable controversy. This determination
shall specifically refer to the evidence proffered in support of and
in opposition to the motion which indicates that a triable
controversy exists. Upon the grant of a motion for summary judgment,
on the ground that there is no triable issue of material fact, the
court shall, by written or oral order, specify the reasons for its
determination. The order shall specifically refer to the evidence
proffered in support of, and if applicable in opposition to, the
motion which indicates that no triable issue exists. The court shall
also state its reasons for any other determination. The court shall
record its determination by court reporter or written order.
(h) If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication or both that
facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for
reasons stated, then be presented, the court shall deny the motion,
or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
discovery to be had or may make any other order as may be just. The
application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may
also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the
opposition response to the motion is due.
(i) If, after granting a continuance to allow specified additional
discovery, the court determines that the party seeking summary
judgment has unreasonably failed to allow the discovery to be
conducted, the court shall grant a continuance to permit the
discovery to go forward or deny the motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication. This section does not affect or limit the
ability of any party to compel discovery under the Civil Discovery
Act (Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4).
(j) If the court determines at any time that any of the affidavits
are presented in bad faith or solely for purposes of delay, the
court shall order the party presenting the affidavits to pay the
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of
the affidavits caused the other party to incur. Sanctions may not be
imposed pursuant to this subdivision, except on notice contained in
a party’s papers, or on the court’s own noticed motion, and after an
opportunity to be heard.
(k) Except when a separate judgment may properly be awarded in the
action, no final judgment may be entered on a motion for summary
judgment prior to the termination of the action, but the final
judgment shall, in addition to any matters determined in the action,
award judgment as established by the summary proceeding herein
provided for.
(l) In actions which arise out of an injury to the person or to
property, if a motion for summary judgment was granted on the basis
that the defendant was without fault, no other defendant during
trial, over plaintiff’s objection, may attempt to attribute fault to
or comment on the absence or involvement of the defendant who was
granted the motion.
(m) (1) A summary judgment entered under this section is an
appealable judgment as in other cases. Upon entry of any order
pursuant to this section, except the entry of summary judgment, a
party may, within 20 days after service upon him or her of a written
notice of entry of the order, petition an appropriate reviewing court
for a peremptory writ. If the notice is served by mail, the initial
period within which to file the petition shall be increased by five
days if the place of address is within the State of California, 10
days if the place of address is outside the State of California but
within the United States, and 20 days if the place of address is
outside the United States. If the notice is served by facsimile
transmission, Express Mail, or another method of delivery providing
for overnight delivery, the initial period within which to file the
petition shall be increased by two court days. The superior court
may, for good cause, and prior to the expiration of the initial
period, extend the time for one additional period not to exceed 10
days.
(2) Before a reviewing court affirms an order granting summary
judgment or summary adjudication on a ground not relied upon by the
trial court, the reviewing court shall afford the parties an
opportunity to present their views on the issue by submitting
supplemental briefs. The supplemental briefing may include an
argument that additional evidence relating to that ground exists, but
that the party has not had an adequate opportunity to present the
evidence or to conduct discovery on the issue. The court may reverse
or remand based upon the supplemental briefing to allow the parties
to present additional evidence or to conduct discovery on the issue.
If the court fails to allow supplemental briefing, a rehearing shall
be ordered upon timely petition of any party.
(n) (1) If a motion for summary adjudication is granted, at the
trial of the action, the cause or causes of action within the action,
affirmative defense or defenses, claim for damages, or issue or
issues of duty as to the motion which has been granted shall be
deemed to be established and the action shall proceed as to the cause
or causes of action, affirmative defense or defenses, claim for
damages, or issue or issues of duty remaining.
(2) In the trial of the action, the fact that a motion for summary
adjudication is granted as to one or more causes of action,
affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty within
the action shall not operate to bar any cause of action, affirmative
defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty as to which summary
adjudication was either not sought or denied.
(3) In the trial of an action, neither a party, nor a witness, nor
the court shall comment upon the grant or denial of a motion for
summary adjudication to a jury.
(o) A cause of action has no merit if either of the following
exists:
(1) One or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be
separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded.
(2) A defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause
of action.
(p) For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary
adjudication:
(1) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of
showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party
has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to
judgment on that cause of action. Once the plaintiff or
cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto. The defendant or cross-defendant may not rely upon the mere
allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue
of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific
facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto.
(2) A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of
showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown
that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not
separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant or
cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant may not rely upon the
mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable
issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the
specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists
as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.
(q) This section does not extend the period for trial provided by
Section 1170.5.
(r) Subdivisions (a) and (b) do not apply to actions brought
pursuant to Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1159) of Title 3 of
Part 3.
(s) For the purposes of this section, a change in law does not
include a later enacted statute without retroactive application.
438. (a) As used in this section:
(1) “Complaint” includes a cross-complaint.
(2) “Plaintiff” includes a cross-complainant.
(3) “Defendant” includes a cross-defendant.
(b) (1) A party may move for judgment on the pleadings.
(2) The court may upon its own motion grant a motion for judgment
on the pleadings.
(c) (1) The motion provided for in this section may only be made
on one of the following grounds:
(A) If the moving party is a plaintiff, that the complaint states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against
the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a defense to the complaint.
(B) If the moving party is a defendant, that either of the
following conditions exist:
(i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint.
(ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against that defendant.
(2) The motion provided for in this section may be made as to
either of the following:
(A) The entire complaint or cross-complaint or as to any of the
causes of action stated therein.
(B) The entire answer or one or more of the affirmative defenses
set forth in the answer.
(3) If the court on its own motion grants the motion for judgment
on the pleadings, it shall be on one of the following bases:
(A) If the motion is granted in favor of the plaintiff, it shall
be based on the grounds that the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the
answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to
the complaint.
(B) If the motion is granted in favor of the defendant, that
either of the following conditions exist:
(i) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint.
(ii) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against that defendant.
(d) The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall
appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of
which the court is required to take judicial notice. Where the motion
is based on a matter of which the court may take judicial notice
pursuant to Section 452 or 453 of the Evidence Code, the matter shall
be specified in the notice of motion, or in the supporting points
and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit.
(e) No motion may be made pursuant to this section if a pretrial
conference order has been entered pursuant to Section 575, or within
30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever
is later, unless the court otherwise permits.
(f) The motion provided for in this section may be made only after
one of the following conditions has occurred:
(1) If the moving party is a plaintiff, and the defendant has
already filed his or her answer to the complaint and the time for the
plaintiff to demur to the answer has expired.
(2) If the moving party is a defendant, and the defendant has
already filed his or her answer to the complaint and the time for the
defendant to demur to the complaint has expired.
(g) The motion provided for in this section may be made even
though either of the following conditions exist:
(1) The moving party has already demurred to the complaint or
answer, as the case may be, on the same grounds as is the basis for
the motion provided for in this section and the demurrer has been
overruled, provided that there has been a material change in
applicable case law or statute since the ruling on the demurrer.
(2) The moving party did not demur to the complaint or answer, as
the case may be, on the same grounds as is the basis for the motion
provided for in this section.
(h) (1) The motion provided for in this section may be granted
with or without leave to file an amended complaint or answer, as the
case may be.
(2) Where a motion is granted pursuant to this section with leave
to file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be, then the
court shall grant 30 days to the party against whom the motion was
granted to file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be.
(3) If the motion is granted with respect to the entire complaint
or answer without leave to file an amended complaint or answer, as
the case may be, then judgment shall be entered forthwith in
accordance with the motion granting judgment to the moving party.
(4) If the motion is granted with leave to file an amended
complaint or answer, as the case may be, then the following
procedures shall be followed:
(A) If an amended complaint is filed after the time to file an
amended complaint has expired, then the court may strike the
complaint pursuant to Section 436 and enter judgment in favor of that
defendant against that plaintiff or a plaintiff.
(B) If an amended answer is filed after the time to file an
amended answer has expired, then the court may strike the answer
pursuant to Section 436 and proceed to enter judgment in favor of
that plaintiff and against that defendant or a defendant.
(C) Except where subparagraphs (A) and (B) apply, if the motion is
granted with respect to the entire complaint or answer with leave to
file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be, but an
amended complaint or answer is not filed, then after the time to file
an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be, has expired,
judgment shall be entered forthwith in favor of the moving party.
(i) (1) Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted
with leave to amend, the court shall not enter a judgment in favor of
a party until the following proceedings are had:
(A) If an amended pleading is filed and the moving party contends
that pleading is filed after the time to file an amended pleading has
expired or that the pleading is in violation of the court’s prior
ruling on the motion, then that party shall move to strike the
pleading and enter judgment in its favor.
(B) If no amended pleading is filed, then the party shall move for
entry of judgment in its favor.
(2) All motions made pursuant to this subdivision shall be made
pursuant to Section 1010.
(3) At the hearing on the motion provided for in this subdivision,
the court shall determine whether to enter judgment in favor of a
particular party.
So what is worse, bankruptcy or foreclosure? Which will have the biggest impact on my credit score? Both bankruptcy and foreclosure will have serious negative affects on your personal credit report and your credit score as well. With re-established credit after a bankruptcy and/or foreclosure you can possibly qualify for a good mortgage once again in as little as 24 months. Therefore, it is very difficult to say one is worse than the other, but the bottom line is that they are both very bad for you and should be avoided if all possible.
Foreclosure is worse then bankruptcy because you are actually losing something of value, your home. Once you are in foreclosure you will lose any and all equity in your home. If there is no equity in the home you will be responsible for the remaining balance after the property auction. With chapter 7 bankruptcy all of your unsecured debts are erased and you start over and in most cases you will not lose anything other then your credit rating.
Many times qualifying for a mortgage after a foreclosure is more difficult than applying for a home after a bankruptcy. With that said, that could possibly lead you to believe that foreclosure is worse than bankruptcy. Most people who have a home foreclosed upon end up filing bankruptcy as well.
Bankruptcy and Foreclosure filings are public records, however no one would know about your proceedings under normal circumstances. The Credit Bureaus will record your bankruptcy and a foreclosure. Bankruptcies will remain on your credit record for 10 years while foreclosures can stay on your report for up to 7 years.
In some cases, one can refinance out of a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy with a 12 month trustee payment history and a timely mortgage history. It is much more difficult to obtain financing with a foreclosure on your record.
Foreclosure is worse because of the loss of value. You will not receive any compensation for the equity in your home if it proceeds to foreclosure.
(b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
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Mortgage Asistance 877-227-4341 