Getting the 50,000 or three times the actual damages after Foreclosure

Getting the 50,000 or three times the actual damages

sanctions-604x270 (b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
be liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to
Section 3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.55,
2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that
mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent where the violation was not corrected and remedied prior to the
recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale. If the court finds that
the material violation was intentional or reckless, or resulted from
willful misconduct by a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award the borrower
the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000).

2923.55. (a) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary,
or authorized agent may not record a notice of default pursuant to
Section 2924 until all of the following:
(1) The mortgage servicer has satisfied the requirements of
paragraph (1) of subdivision (b).
(2) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) or 30 days after satisfying the due
diligence requirements as described in subdivision (f).
(3) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (c) of Section
2923.6, if the borrower has provided a complete application as
defined in subdivision (h) of Section 2923.6.
(b) (1) As specified in subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall
send the following information in writing to the borrower:
(A) A statement that if the borrower is a servicemember or a
dependent of a servicemember, he or she may be entitled to certain
protections under the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50
U.S.C. Appen. Sec. 501 et seq.) regarding the servicemember’s
interest rate and the risk of foreclosure, and counseling for covered
servicemembers that is available at agencies such as Military
OneSource and Armed Forces Legal Assistance.
(B) A statement that the borrower may request the following:
(i) A copy of the borrower’s promissory note or other evidence of
indebtedness.
(ii) A copy of the borrower’s deed of trust or mortgage.
(iii) A copy of any assignment, if applicable, of the borrower’s
mortgage or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right of the
mortgage servicer to foreclose.
(iv) A copy of the borrower’s payment history since the borrower
was last less than 60 days past due.
(2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by
telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the
initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that
he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur
within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower’s financial situation
and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at
the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case,
the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
Any meeting may occur telephonically.
(c) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the
borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as
required by this section, or that no contact was required because the
individual did not meet the definition of “borrower” pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.
(d) A mortgage servicer’s loss mitigation personnel may
participate by telephone during any contact required by this section.
(e) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser
to discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower’s behalf, the
borrower’s financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. That contact made at the direction of the borrower shall
satisfy the contact requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision
(b). Any foreclosure prevention alternative offered at the meeting by
the mortgage servicer is subject to approval by the borrower.
(f) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924
when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), provided that the failure to
contact the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the
mortgage servicer. For purposes of this section, “due diligence”
shall require and mean all of the following:
(1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower
by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone
number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer
shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three
times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall
be made to the primary telephone number on file.
(B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an
automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone
call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of
the mortgage servicer.
(C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact
requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting
contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower’s primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file,
if any, have been disconnected.
(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgage servicer shall then send a certified letter, with return
receipt requested, that includes the toll-free telephone number made
available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
(4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower
to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone
number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
(5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the
homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following
information:
(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.
(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
(g) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(i) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.

2923.6. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty that
mortgage servicers may have to maximize net present value under their
pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan
pool, or to all investors under a pooling and servicing agreement,
not to any particular party in the loan pool or investor under a
pooling and servicing agreement, and that a mortgage servicer acts in
the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or investors in
the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to or implements a
loan modification or workout plan for which both of the following
apply:
(1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is
reasonably foreseeable.
(2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout
plan exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net
present value basis.
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer
offer the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a
modification or plan is consistent with its contractual or other
authority.
(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien
loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage
servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of
sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale, while the complete first lien loan
modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice
of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until any of
the following occurs:
(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the
borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any
appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.
(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan
modification within 14 days of the offer.
(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification,
but defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower’s obligations
under, the first lien loan modification.
(d) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan
modification is denied, the borrower shall have at least 30 days from
the date of the written denial to appeal the denial and to provide
evidence that the mortgage servicer’s determination was in error.
(e) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan
modification is denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default
or, if a notice of default has already been recorded, record a
notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until the later of:
(1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of
the denial.
(2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision
(d), the later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days
after a first lien loan modification is offered after appeal but
declined by the borrower, or, if a first lien loan modification is
offered and accepted after appeal, the date on which the borrower
fails to timely submit the first payment or otherwise breaches the
terms of the offer.
(f) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification
application, the mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the
borrower identifying the reasons for denial, including the
following:
(1) The amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which
the borrower may request an appeal of the denial of the first lien
loan modification and instructions regarding how to appeal the
denial.
(2) If the denial was based on investor disallowance, the specific
reasons for the investor disallowance.
(3) If the denial is the result of a net present value
calculation, the monthly gross income and property value used to
calculate the net present value and a statement that the borrower may
obtain all of the inputs used in the net present value calculation
upon written request to the mortgage servicer.
(4) If applicable, a finding that the borrower was previously
offered a first lien loan modification and failed to successfully
make payments under the terms of the modified loan.
(5) If applicable, a description of other foreclosure prevention
alternatives for which the borrower may be eligible, and a list of
the steps the borrower must take in order to be considered for those
options. If the mortgage servicer has already approved the borrower
for another foreclosure prevention alternative, information necessary
to complete the foreclosure prevention alternative.
(g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple
applications for first lien loan modifications for the purpose of
delay, the mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate
applications from borrowers who have already been evaluated or
afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated for a first lien loan
modification prior to January 1, 2013, or who have been evaluated or
afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated consistent with the
requirements of this section, unless there has been a material change
in the borrower’s financial circumstances since the date of the
borrower’s previous application and that change is documented by the
borrower and submitted to the mortgage servicer.
(h) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed
“complete” when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with
all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable
timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.
(i) Subdivisions (c) to (h), inclusive, shall not apply to
entities described in subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(j) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(k) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.

2923.7. (a) Upon request from a borrower who requests a foreclosure
prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall promptly
establish a single point of contact and provide to the borrower one
or more direct means of communication with the single point of
contact.
(b) The single point of contact shall be responsible for doing all
of the following:
(1) Communicating the process by which a borrower may apply for an
available foreclosure prevention alternative and the deadline for
any required submissions to be considered for these options.
(2) Coordinating receipt of all documents associated with
available foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the
borrower of any missing documents necessary to complete the
application.
(3) Having access to current information and personnel sufficient
to timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the
current status of the foreclosure prevention alternative.
(4) Ensuring that a borrower is considered for all foreclosure
prevention alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage
servicer, if any.
(5) Having access to individuals with the ability and authority to
stop foreclosure proceedings when necessary.
(c) The single point of contact shall remain assigned to the
borrower’s account until the mortgage servicer determines that all
loss mitigation options offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer
have been exhausted or the borrower’s account becomes current.
(d) The mortgage servicer shall ensure that a single point of
contact refers and transfers a borrower to an appropriate supervisor
upon request of the borrower, if the single point of contact has a
supervisor.
(e) For purposes of this section, “single point of contact” means
an individual or team of personnel each of whom has the ability and
authority to perform the responsibilities described in subdivisions
(b) to (d), inclusive. The mortgage servicer shall ensure that each
member of the team is knowledgeable about the borrower’s situation
and current status in the alternatives to foreclosure process.
(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(g) (1) This section shall not apply to a depository institution
chartered under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to
Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing
with Section 50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed
pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of
the Business and Professions Code, that, during its immediately
preceding annual reporting period, as established with its primary
regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer residential real properties,
containing no more than four dwelling units, that are located in
California.
(2) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or
annual reporting period as established with its primary regulator
during which an entity or person described in paragraph (1) exceeds
the threshold of 175 specified in paragraph (1), that entity shall
notify its primary regulator, in a manner acceptable to its primary
regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor who is delinquent on a
residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of the date on
which that entity will be subject to this section, which date shall
be the first day of the first month that is six months after the
close of the calendar year or annual reporting period during which
that entity exceeded the threshold.

2924.9. (a) Unless a borrower has previously exhausted the first
lien loan modification process offered by, or through, his or her
mortgage servicer described in Section 2923.6, within five business
days after recording a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924, a
mortgage servicer that offers one or more foreclosure prevention
alternatives shall send a written communication to the borrower that
includes all of the following information:
(1) That the borrower may be evaluated for a foreclosure
prevention alternative or, if applicable, foreclosure prevention
alternatives.
(2) Whether an application is required to be submitted by the
borrower in order to be considered for a foreclosure prevention
alternative.
(3) The means and process by which a borrower may obtain an
application for a foreclosure prevention alternative.
(b) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(c) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(d) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.

2924.10. (a) When a borrower submits a complete first lien
modification application or any document in connection with a first
lien modification application, the mortgage servicer shall provide
written acknowledgment of the receipt of the documentation within
five business days of receipt. In its initial acknowledgment of
receipt of the loan modification application, the mortgage servicer
shall include the following information:
(1) A description of the loan modification process, including an
estimate of when a decision on the loan modification will be made
after a complete application has been submitted by the borrower and
the length of time the borrower will have to consider an offer of a
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative.
(2) Any deadlines, including deadlines to submit missing
documentation, that would affect the processing of a first lien loan
modification application.
(3) Any expiration dates for submitted documents.
(4) Any deficiency in the borrower’s first lien loan modification
application.
(b) For purposes of this section, a borrower’s first lien loan
modification application shall be deemed to be “complete” when a
borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents
required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes
specified by the mortgage servicer.
(c) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(d) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(e) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.

2924.11. (a) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in
writing prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
not record a notice of default under either of the following
circumstances:
(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.
(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
(b) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
after the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record
a notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale under either of the
following circumstances:
(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.
(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
(c) When a borrower accepts an offered first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, the
mortgage servicer shall provide the borrower with a copy of the fully
executed loan modification agreement or agreement evidencing the
foreclosure prevention alternative following receipt of the executed
copy from the borrower.
(d) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall record a
rescission of a notice of default or cancel a pending trustee’s sale,
if applicable, upon the borrower executing a permanent foreclosure
prevention alternative. In the case of a short sale, the rescission
or cancellation of the pending trustee’s sale shall occur when the
short sale has been approved by all parties and proof of funds or
financing has been provided to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
(e) The mortgage servicer shall not charge any application,
processing, or other fee for a first lien loan modification or other
foreclosure prevention alternative.
(f) The mortgage servicer shall not collect any late fees for
periods during which a complete first lien loan modification
application is under consideration or a denial is being appealed, the
borrower is making timely modification payments, or a foreclosure
prevention alternative is being evaluated or exercised.
(g) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and
the servicing of that borrower’s loan is transferred or sold to
another mortgage servicer, the subsequent mortgage servicer shall
continue to honor any previously approved first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, in
accordance with the provisions of the act that added this section.
(h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
(i) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
(j) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.

2924.17. (a) A declaration recorded pursuant to Section 2923.5 or,
until January 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 2923.55, a notice of
default, notice of sale, assignment of a deed of trust, or
substitution of trustee recorded by or on behalf of a mortgage
servicer in connection with a foreclosure subject to the requirements
of Section 2924, or a declaration or affidavit filed in any court
relative to a foreclosure proceeding shall be accurate and complete
and supported by competent and reliable evidence.
(b) Before recording or filing any of the documents described in
subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has
reviewed competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower’
s default and the right to foreclose, including the borrower’s loan
status and loan information.
(c) Until January 1, 2018, any mortgage servicer that engages in
multiple and repeated uncorrected violations of subdivision (b) in
recording documents or filing documents in any court relative to a
foreclosure proceeding shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to
seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) per mortgage or deed of
trust in an action brought by a government entity identified in
Section 17204 of the Business and Professions Code, or in an
administrative proceeding brought by the Department of Business
Oversight or the Bureau of Real Estate against a respective licensee,
in addition to any other remedies available to these entities. This
subdivision shall be inoperative on January 1, 2018.

Watchdog Report: Foreclosure Review Scrapped On Eve Of Critical, Congressman Says

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Posted: 12/31/2012 3:53 pm EST  |  Updated: 12/31/2012 4:08 pm EST

Foreclosure Review
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The surprising decision by regulators to scrap a massive and expensive foreclosure review program in favor of a $10 billion settlement with 14 banks — reported by The New York Times Sunday night — came after a year of mounting concerns about the independence and effectiveness of the controversial program.

The program, known as the Independent Foreclosure Review, was supposed to give homeowners who believe that their bank made a mistake in handling their foreclosure an opportunity for a neutral third party to review the claim. It’s not clear what factors led banking regulators to abandon the program in favor of a settlement, but the final straw may have been a pending report by the Government Accountability Office, a nonpartisan investigative arm of Congress, which was investigating the review program.

Rep. Brad Miller, a North Carolina Democrat, told The Huffington Post that the report, which has not been released, was “critical” and that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which administers the review, was aware of its findings. Miller said that that one problem the GAO was likely to highlight was an “unacceptably high” error rate of 11 percent in a sampling of bank loan files.

The sample files were chosen at random by the banks from their broader pool of foreclosed homeowners, who had not necessarily applied for relief. The data suggests that of the 4 million families who lost their homes to foreclosure since the housing crash, more than 400,000 had some bank-caused problem in their loan file. It also suggests that many thousands of those who could have applied for relief didn’t — because they weren’t aware of the review, or weren’t aware that their bank had made a mistake. Some of these mistakes pushed homeowners into foreclosure who otherwise could have afforded to keep their homes.

Miller said the news that a settlement to replace the review was in the works caught him by surprise, and stressed that he had no way of knowing whether the impending GAO report had triggered the decision.

It’s not clear what will happen to the 250,000 homeowners who have already applied to the Independent Foreclosure Review for relief. The Times, citing people familiar with the negotiations, said that a deal between the banks and banking regulators, led by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, could be reached by the end of the week. It wasn’t clear how that money would be distributed or how many current and former homeowners who lost their homes to foreclosure — or who were hit with an unnecessary fee — might qualify.

Bryan Hubbard, a spokesman for the OCC, which administers the program, declined to comment on the Times’ story. Hubbard told HuffPost, “The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is committed to ensuring the Independent Foreclosure Review proceeds efficiently and to ensuring harmed borrowers are compensated as quickly as possible.”

Since the housing market crashed in 2007, thousands of foreclosed homeowners have complained that their mortgage company made a mistake in the management of their home loan, such as foreclosing on someone making payments on a loan modification plan. The Independent Foreclosure Review emerged from a legal agreement in April 2011 between 14 mortgage companies and bank regulators over these abusive “servicing” practices. It was supposed to give homeowners an opportunity to have an unbiased third party review their foreclosure and determine whether they might qualify for a cash payout of up to $125,000.

The initial response was tepid, at best. Homeowners and advocates complained that the application forms were confusing and that information about what type of compensation they might get was missing. Some told HuffPost that they were so disillusioned by the federal government’s anemic response to widely reported bank errors that they weren’t going to bother to apply.

In one instance, Daniel Casper, an Illinois wedding videographer, applied to the program in January after years of combat with Bank of America over his home loan. As The Huffington Post reported in October, he was initially rejected, because, according to the bank, his mortgage was not in the foreclosure process during the eligible review period. Promontory Financial Group, which Bank of America hired to review his loan, apparently did not double check Bank of America’s analysis against the extensive documentation that Chase submitted. That documentation clearly showed that his loan was eligible for review.

In recent months ProPublica, an investigative nonprofit, has issued a series of damning articles about the Independent Foreclosure Review. The most recent found that supposedly independent third-party reviewers looking over Bank of America loan files were given the “correct” answers in advance by the bank. These reviewers could override the answers, but they weren’t starting from a blank slate.

Banks, if they did not find a “compensable error,” did not have to pay anything, giving them a strong incentive to find no flaws with their own work.

“It was flawed from the start,” Miller said of the review program. “There was an inherent conflict of interest by just about everyone involved.”

Also on HuffPost:

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California Can Finally Say “Show Me The…..Note!”

Attorneys representing homeowners in all 50 states must undoubtedly feel that their states do not do enough to protect homeowners from preventable foreclosures. In non-judicial states like California, the lack of oversight in the foreclosure process at all levels has led to rampant abuse, fraud and at the very least, negligence. Our courts have done little to diffuse this trend with cases like Chilton v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n holding: “(n)on-judicial foreclosure under a deed of trust is governed by California Civil Code Section 2924 which relevant section provides that a “trustee, mortgagee or beneficiary or any of their authorized agents” may conduct the foreclosure process.” California courts have held that the Civil Code provisions “cover every aspect” of the foreclosure process, and are “intended to be exhaustive.” There is no requirement that the party initiating foreclosure be in possession of the original note.

Chilton and many other rulings refuse to acknowledge that homeowners have any rights to challenge wrongful foreclosures including Gomes v Countrywide, Fontenot v Wells Fargo, and a long line of tender cases holding that a plaintiff seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale must first allege tender of the amount of the secured indebtedness. Complicating matters further is the conflict between state, federal and bankruptcy cases regarding Civil Code 2932.5 and the requirement of recording an assignment prior to proceeding to foreclosure.
While the specific terms are still evolving, the http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/ information website has released the Servicing Standards Highlights that set forth the basic changes that the banks and servicers have agreed to as part of the settlement. When the AG Settlement is finalized, it will be reduced to a judgment that can be enforced by federal judges, the special independent monitor Joseph Smith, federal agencies and Attorneys General. This judgment can be used by attorneys to define a standard and therefore allow us to fashion a remedy that will improve our chances of obtaining relief for our clients.

Lean Forward

Many have opined about the deficiencies in the AG Settlement, from the lack of investigation to inadequacy of the dollars committed to compensate for wrongful foreclosures, principal reduction or refinancing. The reality is, as tainted as it may be, the AG Settlement leaves us better off than were were for future cases. It does not however, address past wrongs in any meaningful way. The terms make it abundantly clear that this is not the settlement for compensation; if there is any remote possibility of compensation it must be sought in the OCC Independent Foreclosure Review and the homeowner must meet the extreme burden of proving financial harm caused by the wrongful foreclosure. For California, the AG Settlement at best, improves our ability to request crucial documents to challenge wrongful foreclosures which previously were difficult if not impossible to obtain. This will allow us to negotiate better loss mitigation options for clients.

Loan Modification 2008-2011

The homeowner submits an application 10 times, pays on 3 different trial plans, speaks to 24 different representatives who give him various inconsistent versions of status. After two years, and thousands of default fees later, he is advised that the investor won’t approve a modification and foreclosure is imminent. Actually, the truth was that the homeowner was in fact qualified for the modification, the data used for the NPV analysis was incorrect and the investor had in fact approved hundreds of modifications according to guidelines that were known to the servicer from the beginning. How could the AG Settlement not improve on this common scenario?

Foreclosure Rules
14 days prior to initiating foreclosure, the servicer must provide the homeowner with notice which must include:

facts supporting the bank’s right to foreclose
payment history
a copy of the note with endorsements
the identity of the investor
amount of delinquency and terms to bring loan current
summary of loss mitigation efforts
A prompt review of the 14 Day Pre Foreclosure Notice and investigation regarding the securitization aspects of the case can result in the filing of a lawsuit and request for TRO if all terms have not been complied with or the documents provided do not establish the right to foreclose. There will be no issue of tender, prejudice or show me the note that can be raised in opposition by defendants and this is an opportunity that we have not been afforded under current case law. Additionally, a loan level review will reveal improper fees and charges that can be challenged. Deviation from the AG Settlement Servicing Standards should be aggressively pursued through the proper complaint channels.

Loan Modification Guidelines

Notify the homeowner of all loss mitigation options
Servicer shall offer a loan modification if NPV positive
HAMP trial plans shall promptly be converted to permanent modifications
Servicer must review and make determination within 30 days of receipt of complete package
Homeowner must submit package within 120 days of delinquency to receive answer prior to referral to foreclosure (could be problematic since most homeowners are more than 120 days late)
After the loan has been referred to foreclosure, the homeowner must apply for a loan modification within 15 days before sale. Servicer must expedite review.
Servicer must cease all collection efforts while a complete loan modification package is under review or homeowner is making timely trial modification payments
Other significant terms include the requirement that the servicer maintain loan portals where the homeowner can check status which must be updated every ten days, assign a single point of contact to every loan, restriction on default fees and forced placed insurance, modification denials must state reasons and provide document support and the homeowner has 30 days to appeal a negative decision.

Short Sales Will Now Really Be Short

The rules regarding short sales will greatly increase the chances that short sales will be processed in a timely manner and accordingly, will result in more short sales being closed.

Banks/servicers must make short sale requirements public
Banks/servicers must provide a short sale price evaluation upon request by the homeowner prior to listing the property
Receipt of short sale packages must be confirmed and notification of missing documents must be provided within 30 days
Knowledge of all of the new requirements for processing foreclosures, loan modifications and short sales can greatly increase our chances of obtaining successful outcomes for clients. Resolution is the goal, and now, we may have leverage that did not exist before.

What is a Wrongful Foreclosure Action?

The pretender lender does not have the loan and did not invest any of the servicers money. Yet these frauds are occurring every day. They did not loan you the money yet they are the ones foreclosing, taking the bail out money, the mortgage insurance, and then throwing it back on the investor for the loss. We could stop them if a few plaintiffs where awarded multi million dollar verdicts for wrongful foreclosure.
A wrongful foreclosure action typically occurs when the lender starts a non judicial foreclosure action when it simply has no legal cause. Wrongful foreclosure actions are also brought when the service providers accept partial payments after initiation of the wrongful foreclosure process, and then continue on with the foreclosure process. These predatory lending strategies, as well as other forms of misleading homeowners, are illegal.

The borrower is the one that files a wrongful disclosure action with the court against the service provider, the holder of the note and if it is a non-judicial foreclosure, against the trustee complaining that there was an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed or court judicial proceeding. The borrower can also allege emotional distress and ask for punitive damages in a wrongful foreclosure action.
Causes of Action

Wrongful foreclosure actions may allege that the amount stated in the notice of default as due and owing is incorrect because of the following reasons:

Incorrect interest rate adjustment
Incorrect tax impound accounts
Misapplied payments
forbearance agreement which was not adhered to by the servicer
Unnecessary forced place insurance,
Improper accounting for a confirmed chapter 11 or chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.
Breach of contract
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Negligent infliction of emotional distress
Unfair Business Practices
Quiet title
Wrongful foreclosure

Injunction

Any time prior to the foreclosure sale, a borrower can apply for an injunction with the intent of stopping the foreclosure sale until issues in the lawsuit are resolved. The wrongful foreclosure lawsuit can take anywhere from ten to twenty-four months. Generally, an injunction will only be issued by the court if the court determines that: (1) the borrower is entitled to the injunction; and (2) that if the injunction is not granted, the borrower will be subject to irreparable harm.
Damages Available to Borrower

Damages available to a borrower in a wrongful foreclosure action include: compensation for the detriment caused, which are measured by the value of the property, emotional distress and punitive damages if there is evidence that the servicer or trustee committed fraud, oppression or malice in its wrongful conduct. If the borrower’s allegations are true and correct and the borrower wins the lawsuit, the servicer will have to undue or cancel the foreclosure sale, and pay the borrower’s legal bills.
Why Do Wrongful Foreclosures Occur?

Wrongful foreclosure cases occur usually because of a miscommunication between the lender and the borrower. This could be as a result of an incorrectly applied payment, an error in interest charges and completely inaccurate information communicated between the lender and borrower. Some borrowers make the situation worse by ignoring their monthly statements and not promptly responding in writing to the lender’s communications. Many borrowers just assume that the lender will correct any inaccuracies or errors. Any one of these actions can quickly turn into a foreclosure action. Once an action is instituted, then the borrower will have to prove that it is wrongful or unwarranted. This is done by the borrower filing a wrongful foreclosure action. Costs are expensive and the action can take time to litigate.
Impact

The wrongful foreclosure will appear on the borrower’s credit report as a foreclosure, thereby ruining the borrower’s credit rating. Inaccurate delinquencies may also accompany the foreclosure on the credit report. After the foreclosure is found to be wrongful, the borrower must then petition to get the delinquencies and foreclosure off the credit report. This can take a long time and is emotionally distressing.

Wrongful foreclosure may also lead to the borrower losing their home and other assets if the borrower does not act quickly. This can have a devastating affect on a family that has been displaced out of their home. However, once the borrower’s wrongful foreclosure action is successful in court, the borrower may be entitled to compensation for their attorney fees, court costs, pain, suffering and emotional distress caused by the action. Fortunately, these wrongful foreclosure incidences are rare. The majority of foreclosures occur as a result of the borrower defaulting on their mortgage payments.

Mortgage paperwork mess: Next housing shock?

Scott Pelley reports how problems with mortgage documents are prompting lawsuits and could slow down the weak housing market

  • Play CBS Video Video The next housing shockAs more and more Americans face mortgage foreclosure, banks’ crucial ownership documents for the properties are often unclear and are sometimes even bogus, a condition that’s causing lawsuits and hampering an already weak housing market. Scott Pelley reports.
  • Video Extra: Eviction reprieveFlorida residents AJ and Brenda Boyd spent more than a year trying to renegotiate their mortgage and save their home. At the last moment, questions about who owns their mortgage saved them from eviction.
  • Video Extra: “Save the Dream” eventsBruce Marks, founder and CEO of the nonprofit Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America talks to Scott Pelley about his “Save the Dream” events and how foreclosures are causing a crisis in America.
(CBS News)If there was a question about whether we’re headed for a second housing shock, that was settled last week with news that home prices have fallen a sixth consecutive month. Values are nearly back to levels of the Great Recession. One thing weighing on the economy is the huge number of foreclosed houses.Many are stuck on the market for a reason you wouldn’t expect: banks can’t find the ownership documents.Who really owns your mortgage?
Scott Pelley explains a bizarre aftershock of the U.S. financial collapse: An epidemic of forged and missing mortgage documents.

It’s bizarre but, it turns out, Wall Street cut corners when it created those mortgage-backed investments that triggered the financial collapse. Now that banks want to evict people, they’re unwinding these exotic investments to find, that often, the legal documents behind the mortgages aren’t there. Caught in a jam of their own making, some companies appear to be resorting to forgery and phony paperwork to throw people – down on their luck – out of their homes.

In the 1930s we had breadlines; venture out before dawn in America today and you’ll find mortgage lines. This past January in Los Angeles, 37,000 homeowners facing foreclosure showed up to an event to beg their bank for lower payments on their mortgage. Some people even slept on the sidewalk to get in line.

So many in the country are desperate now that they have to meet in convention centers coast to coast.

In February in Miami, 12,000 people showed up to a similar event. The line went down the block and doubled back twice.

Video: The next housing shock
Extra: Eviction reprieve
Extra: “Save the Dream” events

Dale DeFreitas lost her job and now fears her home is next. “It’s very emotional because I just think about it. I don’t wanna lose my home. I really don’t,” she told “60 Minutes” correspondent Scott Pelley.

“It’s your American dream,” he remarked.

“It was. And still is,” she replied.

These convention center events are put on by the non-profit Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America, which helps people figure what they can afford, and then walks them across the hall to bank representatives to ask for lower payments. More than half will get their mortgages adjusted, but the rest discover that they just can’t keep their home.

For many that’s when the real surprise comes in: these same banks have fouled up all of their own paperwork to a historic degree.

“In my mind this is an absolute, intentional fraud,” Lynn Szymoniak, who is fighting foreclosure, told Pelley.

While trying to save her house, she discovered something we did not know: back when Wall Street was using algorithms and computers to engineer those disastrous mortgage-backed securities, it appears they didn’t want old fashioned paperwork slowing down the profits.

“This was back when it was a white hot fevered pitch to move as many of these as possible,” Pelley remarked.

“Exactly. When you could make a whole lotta money through securitization. And every other aspect of it could be done electronically, you know, key strokes. This was the only piece where somebody was supposed to actually go get documents, transfer the documents from one entity to the other. And it looks very much like they just eliminated that stuff all together,” Szymoniak said.

Szymoniak’s mortgage had been bundled with thousands of others into one of those Wall Street securities traded from investor to investor. When the bank took her to court, it first said it had lost her documents, including the critical assignment of mortgage which transfers ownership. But then, there was a courthouse surprise.

“They found all of your paperwork more than a year after they initially said that they had lost it?” Pelley asked.

“Yes,” she replied.

Asked if that seemed suspicious to her, Szymoniak said, “Yes, absolutely. What do you imagine? It fell behind the file cabinet? Where was all of this? ‘We had it, we own it, we lost it.’ And then more recently, everyone is coming in saying, ‘Hey we found it. Isn’t that wonderful?’”

But what the bank may not have known is that Szymoniak is a lawyer and fraud investigator with a specialty in forged documents. She has trained FBI agents.

She told Pelley she asked for copies of those documents.

Asked what she found, Szymoniak told Pelley, “When I looked at the assignment of my mortgage, and this is the assignment: it looked that even the date they put in, which was 10/17/08, was several months after they sued me for foreclosure. So, what they were saying to the court was, ‘We sued her in July of 2008 and we acquired this mortgage in October of 2008.’ It made absolutely no sense.”

Produced by Robert Anderson and Daniel Ruetenik

Now for the pleading

Timothy L. McCandless, Esq. SBN 147715

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

1881 Business Center Drive, Ste. 9A

San Bernardino, CA 92392

Tel:  909/890-9192

Fax: 909/382-9956

Attorney for Plaintiffs

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

COUNTY OF ____________

___________________________________,And ROES 1 through 5,000,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAND CANYON CORPORATION f/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION; AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2; DOCX, LLC; and PREMIER TRUST DEED SERVICES and all persons unknown claiming any legal or  equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest  in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on Plaintiff’s  title thereto, Does 1 through 10, Inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO:FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR QUIET TITLE, DECLARATORY RELIEF, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNTION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION, CANCELATION OF INSTRUMENT AND FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM:

SLANDER OF TITLE; TORTUOUS

VIOLATION OF STATUTE [Penal

Code § 470(b) – (d); NOTARY FRAUD;

///

///

///

///

Plaintiffs ___________________________ allege herein as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

            1.         Plaintiffs ___________ (hereinafter individually and collectively referred to as “___________”), were and at all times herein mentioned are,  residents of the County of _________, State of California and the lawful owner of a parcel of real property commonly known as: _________________, California _______ and the legal description is:

Parcel No. 1:

A.P.N. No. _________ (hereinafter “Subject Property”).

2.         At all times herein mentioned, SAND CANYON CORPORATION f/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION (hereinafter SAND CANYON”), is and was, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of California and claims an interest adverse to the right, title and interests of Plaintiff in the Subject Property.

3.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter “AMERICAN”), is and was, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, and at all times herein mentioned was conducting ongoing business in the State of California.

4.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2 (hereinafter referred to as “WELLS FARGO”), is and was, a member of the National Banking Association and makes an adverse claim to the Plaintiff MADRIDS’ right, title and interest in the Subject Property.

5.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant DOCX, L.L.C. (hereinafter “DOCX”), is and was, a limited liability company existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Georgia, and a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation.

6.         At all times herein mentioned, __________________, was a company existing by virtue of its relationship as a subsidiary of __________________.

7.         Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES I through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiffs’ title, or any cloud on Plaintiffs’ title thereto. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint as required to allege said Doe Defendants’ true names and capacities when such have been fully ascertained. Plaintiffs further allege that Plaintiffs designated as ROES 1 through 5,000, are Plaintiffs who share a commonality with the same Defendants, and as the Plaintiffs listed herein.

8.         Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, were the agent and employee of each of the remaining Defendants.

9.         Plaintiffs allege that each and every defendants, and each of them, allege herein ratified the conduct of each and every other Defendant.

10.       Plaintiffs allege that at all times said Defendants, and each of them, were acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment.

11.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that circa July 2004, DOCX was formed with the specific intent of manufacturing fraudulent documents in order create the false impression that various entities obtained valid, recordable interests in real

properties, when in fact they actually maintained no lawful interest in said properties.

12.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that as a regular and ongoing part of the business of Defendant DOCX was to have persons sitting around a table signing names as quickly as possible, so that each person executing documents would sign approximately 2,500 documents per day. Although the persons signing the documents claimed to be a vice president of a particular bank of that document, in fact, the party signing the name was not the person named on the document, as such the signature was a forgery, that the name of the person claiming to be a vice president of a particular financial institution was not a “vice president”, did not have any prior training in finance, never worked for the company they allegedly purported to be a vice president of, and were alleged to be a vice president simultaneously with as many as twenty different banks and/or lending institutions.

13.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that the actual signatories of the instruments set forth in Paragraph 12 herein, were intended to and were fraudulently notarized by a variety of notaries in the offices of DOCX in Alpharetta, GA.

14.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that for all purposes the intent of Defendant DOCX was to intentionally create fraudulent documents, with forged signatures, so that said documents could be recorded in the Offices of County Recorders through the United States of America, knowing that such documents would forgeries, contained false information, and that the recordation of such documents would affect an interest in real property in violation of law.

15.       Plaintiffs allege that on or about, ____________, that they conveyed a first deed of  trust (hereinafter “DEED”) in favor of Option One Mortgage, Inc. with an interest of

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Robo-signers List

COMPLETE GUIDE TO ROBO-SIGNERS 

FOR NEWEST LIST OF ROBO-SIGNERS  SEE http://takeyourhomeback.com/?p=428

FORECLOSURE SELF-DEFENSE COMPLETE GUIDE TO ROBO-SIGNERS *

* IF YOU HAVE A PROBLEM LOCATING THE NAME/INFO YOU WANT-SEND US AN EMAIL (AT BOTTOM OF ARTICLE) AND WE WILL ASSIST

What is a robo-signer?

Robo-signers are mortgage lending company employees who prepared and signed off on foreclosures without reviewing them, as the law requires. Jeffrey Stephan, the GMAC employee who was the first identified as a robo-signer, has acknowledged in sworn deposition that he prepared 400 such foreclosures a day. The discovery of robo-signers could simply be the tip of the iceberg. If so, more revelations could only increase the pressure on large banks. Their potential exposure to losses could skyrocket.

What’s the significance?

The “robo-signing of affidavits and Assignments of Mortgage and all other mortgage foreclosure documents served to cover up the fact that loan servicers cannot demonstrate the facts required to conduct a lawful foreclosure. If it turns out that robo-signers did indeed sign off on loans without review, they committed fraud by claiming knowledge of a financial matter of which they had no personal knowledge. It could also mean that some people are wrongly being evicted from their houses.

From underwriting fraudulent mortgages; to shuffling it through the mortgage securitization chain without following proper legal procedures like the simple act of passing along paperwork; to concealing or doctoring basic facts when securitizing the mortgages and selling them to investors, large lenders and their partners on Wall Street could face hundreds of billions of dollars in losses by being forced to buy back faulty mortgages, some of which have already defaulted, from misled investors.

Investors bought mortgage-linked securities with the promise that the underlying mortgages conformed to basic underwriting standards, and that proper procedures were followed in the chain of securitization and a tax-exempt status. Steep losses on those investments and the discovery of potentially fraudulent activity are pushing investors to force banks to buy them back.

With all of the press robo-signing has gotten, it is a bit surprising that everyone is having such a hard time concluding whether these practices effect non-judicial foreclosures.
The topic has not gotten the treatment it deserves, I will try to help. The following are by no means a complete list, but are the most clear LEGAL reasons (setting aside pure moral questions and the U.S. Constitution) that the Robo-Signer Controversy will entitle hundreds of thousands of homeowners wrongfully foreclosed and evicted to sue in non-judicial foreclosure states.

Briefly, Robo Signers are illegal because fraud cannot be the basis of clear title, trustee’s deeds following Robo Signed sales are void as a matter of law, notarization is a recording requirement for many of the documents, which we also know was often botched, and most importantly because robo signed falsifications ARE meant for use in court, including unlawful detainers and bankruptcy matters.

Clear Title May Not Derive From A Fraud (including a bona fide purchaser for value).
In the case of a fraudulent transaction the law is well settled.

Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that purchaser acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.

It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.

Hence, if forged Robo Signed signatures are used to obtain the foreclosure, it CERTAINLY makes a difference in non-judicial foreclosure states as well as judicial states.

Any apparent sale based on Robo Signed documents is void – without any legal effect – like Monopoly Money.

In turn, the law requires that the beneficiary execute and notarize and record a substitution for a valid substitution of trustee to take effect. Thus, if the Assignment of Deed of Trust/ Mortgage is robo-signed, the sale is void. If the substitution of trustee is robo-signed, the sale is void. If the Notice of Default is Robo-Signed, the sale is void.

These documents are not recordable without good notarization.The reason these documents are notarized in the first place is because otherwise they will not be accepted by the County recorder. Moreover, a notary who helps commit real estate fraud is liable.

Once the document is recorded, however, it is entitled to a “presumption of validity”, which is what spurned the falsification trend in the first place. Therefore, the notarization of a false signature not only constitutes fraud, but is every bit intended as part of a larger conspiracy to commit fraud on the court.

The documents are intended for court proceedings. A necessary purpose for these documents, AFTER the non judicial foreclosure, is the eviction of the rightful owners afterward. While the foreclosures are non-judicial, evictions afterwards still are conducted in court, although the process moves quickly and is mostly a “rubber stamping” by skeptical judges. However, as demonstrated below, once these documents make it into court, the bank officers and lawyers become guilty of FELONIES:

The Doctrine of Unclean Hands provides: plaintiff’s misconduct in the matter before the court makes his hands “unclean” and he may not hold with them the pristine remedy of injunctive relief. The unclean hands rule requires that the Plaintiff not cheat, and behave fairly. The plaintiff must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact.

Robo Signed Documents Are Intended for Use in Bankruptcy Court Matters. One majorly overlooked facet is the extremely active bankruptcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove “standing” to proceed with a foreclosure. If they are not signed by persons with the requisite knowledge, affidavits submitted in bankruptcy court proceedings such as objections to a plan and Relief from Stays are perjured. The documents in support are often falsified evidence. Conclusion

Verified eviction complaints, perjured motions for summary judgment, and all other eviction paperwork after robo signed non judicial foreclosures are illegal and void. The paperwork itself is void. The sale is void. But the only way to clean up the hundreds of thousands of effected titles is through litigation, because even now the banks will simply not do the right thing. And that’s why robo signers count in non-judicial foreclosure states. Victims of robosigners in may seek declaratory relief and damages, an injunction and attorney’s fees for Unfair Business practices, as well as claims for slander of title; abuse of process, civil theft, and variety of other civil remedies. 

Final words: the “Robo” actions are just the tip of the iceberg but the “Robo” actions allowed part of the iceberg to be seen.

For the complete Congressional Written Report go to : http://www.foreclosureself-defense.com/downloads/Congressional_Foreclosure_Report.pdf

Admission by Florida Law Group- http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/37452927-FDLG-Admits-to-Violation-of-Professional-Conduct-Code-Jeffrey-Stephan-Affidavits.pdf,

TOP INDICATORS/SIGNS YOU PROBABLY HAVE A FALSE DOCUMENTS AND A VICTIM OF FORECLOSURE FRAUD

  1. Any document signed by an officer of MERS. MERS states at www.mersinc.org that: Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution from MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
  2. The signor of the document states that they are acting “solely as nominee” for some other party.
  3. The document was notarized in Dakota County, Minnesota
  4. The document was notarized in Hinnepin County, Minnesota
  5. The document was notarized in Duval County, Florida
  6. The document was notarized in Palm Beach County, Florida
  7.  The document was notarized in Pinellas County Florida
  8. The document was notarized in San Diego County, CA
  9.  The document was notarized in Fulton County, GA
  10.  The document was notarized in Polk County, IA
  11.  The document was notarized in Travis County, Texas
  12.  The document was notarized in Harris County, Texas
  13.  The document was notarized in Salt Lake County, Utah
  14. The document was execute the same day it was filed with the Court
  15. The party who signed the document executed it as “an authorized agent” for the servicer or the Plaintiff.
  16. The party who signed the document executed it as “an attorney in fact” for the servicer or the Plaintiff.
  17. The name of the signing party is stamped on the documents in block letters.
  18. The name of the servicer or Plaintiff is stamped on the document in block letters.
  19.  The document appears to be a standard form with “fill-in-the-blanks” for the names of the signors and entities.
  20.  The paragraph numbers are not consistent (for example the first page may end with paragraph 7 and the second page may start with paragraph 10)
  21.  The party who signed the document and the notary are the same person.
  22.  You cannot read the signature of the signor and the name is not printed out on the document. (some people refer to these a “squiggle marks”) The bottom line is you cannot decipher any name or word on the document.
  23.  The signature on the document consists of one loop in the shape of an “S” or something that looks like an “8”.
  24.  The date of the signature and the date of the notarization are not the same.
  25.  The same “officer” or Vice President” of a mortgage company or lender is also the “Vice President” or “officer” of many other entities or lenders in the chain of assignments or endorsements.
  26.  The same “officer” or “ Vice President” of a lender signing the documents is located in various cities throughout the United States.
  27.   The document includes numerous pre-stamped names and signatures.
  28.  The document includes a second page or last page notarization that does not conform in type font, style, format, texture, age, from the primary pages of the document.
  29.  Backdating effective dates on assignments.
  30.  Signatures of officers are dated years after an entity has been out of business, merged with another company or filed for bankruptcy.
  31.   The party who signed the document executed it as a representative of the servicer. 
  32.  The notary failed to attach a notarial seal. 
  33.  The notary failed to sign the notarization. 
  34.  The name of the party appearing before the notary is blank. 
  35.  The name of the party appearing before the notary is block stamped. 
  36.  The endorsement is not at the foot of the note, but on a separate page or allonge to the note. (if there is room at the foot of the note, the endorsement must appear there. An allonge may only be used if there is insufficient room at the foot of the note for the endorsement) 
  37.  The document purports to assign the mortgage or the deed of trust from the originator directly to the trust. 
  38.  The document that purports to assign the mortgage of deed of trust to the Trust is dated BEFORE the Trust was registered with the SEC.
  39.  The document that purports to assign the mortgage of deed of trust to the Trust was signed AFTER        the cut-off date for the transfer of all such to the  Trust pursuant to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
  40.  The origination date on the mortgage note is not within the origination and cut-off dates provided for by the terms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.
  41.  The mortgage note is assigned rather than endorsed from Party “A” to Party “B” or from any party to another party or entity.
  42.  The mortgage note is endorsed from the originator to the securitized Trust.
  43.  The mortgage note is endorsed from the originator to the current mortgage servicer.
  44.  The mortgage note is endorsed from the originator to the depositor for the securitized trust.
  45.  The affidavit is a “Lost Note Affidavit” filed by the mortgage servicer.
  46.  The affidavit is a “Lost Note Affidavit” filed by the Trustee for the securitized Trust and claims they never received the original Note. ( You can only file a lost note affidavit under the UCC if you possessed the Note before it was lost)
  47.  The assignment of mortgage or deed of trust was filed or signed after the filing of the bankruptcy case.
  48. The assignment of mortgage or deed of trust was filed or signed after the foreclosure proceeding began/was filed.
  49.  The assignment of mortgage or deed of trust was filed or signed after the filing of the Motion for Relief from Stay in Bankruptcy Court.
  50.  The affidavit was signed by an employee  MR Default Servicers or has the MR Default Servicers information on the document as an identification number.
  51.  The affidavit was signed by an employee  Promiss Solutions or has the Promiss Solutions information on the document as an identification number.
  52.  The affidavit was signed by an employee  NDEx Technologies, LLC or has the NDEx  information on the document as an identification number.
  53.  The affidavit was signed by the same attorney that signed the foreclosure complaint.
  54. The affidavit was filed by an employee of the attorney that filed the foreclosure complaint.
  55.  The documents are clearly two photocopies of the same document with different information filled in regarding the names of the assignor and assignee.
  56. The Note is stamped with the following: “Certified True Copy”.
  57.  The signature of the Vice President states that they are a Vice President of Lehman Brother Holding Company, but the printed or stamped name on the document is Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB.
  58.  The document is signed by a “Bank Officer” without any designation of the office/position held.
  59.  The affidavit is signed by the “designated agent” of any entity or party.
  60.  The affidavit includes one or more bar codes. ( Similar to the bar codes you see on items at the grocery store, etc.)
  61.  Any document signed by an individual who states that they are the “legal coordinator” for any entity involved in the lawsuit or chain of custody.
  62.  The return address on the Assignment or affidavit is to a third party provider, such as Financial Dimensions, Inc, FANDO or FNFS.
  63.  The transferor and the transferee  have the exact same physical address including the same street and/or P.O. box numbers.
  64.  The document bears the image: “This is not a certified copy”
  65.  The document refers to a Power of Attorney, but no such document is attached or filed and recorded.

PLEASE NOTE: FOR YOUR CONVIENENCE  TO LOCATE A PERSON A “FIND” FEATURE HAS BEEN INSTALLED ON THIS SECTION.

INSTRUCTIONS: PRESS THE CONTROL KEY AND THE “F” KEY AT THE SAME TIME, A BOX WILL APPEAR, TYPE IN THE NAME OR PART OF THE NAME YOU ARE LOOKING FOR AND THE SITE WILL TAKE YOU TO IT.

KNOWN ALLEGED ROBO-SIGNERS 

Cheryl Samons–  the person which may have been responsible for more Floridians losing their homes  than any other person in the state – Ms. Samons was in fact the Office Manager of the Law Offices of David J. Stern and supervised the other Robo-Signers. see full deposition at http://4closurefraud.org/2010/02/23/full-deposition-of-the-soon-to-be-infamous-cheryl-samons-re-deutsche-bank-national-trust-company-as-trustee-for-morgan-stanley-abs-capital-inc-plaintiff-vs-belourdes-pierre-50-2008-ca-028558-xx/ For different signatures see http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Samons_Cheryl.GIF, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Samons_Cheryl.1.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/BsIiyb-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/NY4Csi-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Snowbound.pdf,  http://www.palmbeachpost.com/money/real-estate/foreclosure-robo-signers-appear-to-be-widespread-968114.html

Tammie Lou Kapusta – David J. Stern former employee- see Attorney General’s full deposition at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38890568/Full-Deposition-of-Tammie-Lou-Kapusta-Law-Office-of-David-J-Stern                                                                                                 http://www.palmbeachpost.com/money/real-estate/foreclosure-robo-signers-appear-to-be-widespread-968114.html 

Beth Cerniemployee of David J. Stern- see full deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WM1_FULL-DEPOSITION-OF-LAW-OFFICES-OF-DAVID-J.-STERN-BETH-CERNI.pdf 

Mary R. Cordova– employee at David J. Stern. See Attorney General’s full depo of Sept 23, 2010 at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Copy-of-WM-FULL-DEPOSITION-TRANSCRIPT-OF-MARY-CARDOVA-OF-LAW-OFFICES-OF-DAVID-J.-STERN.pdf 

Kelly Scott– employee at David J. Stern, P.A. , legal assistant to Cheryl Samons. See Attorney General’s full deposition of October 4, 2010 at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WM_FULL-DEPOSITION-TRANSCRIPT-OF-KELLY-SCOTT-OF-LAW-OFFICES-OF-DAVID-J.-STERN.pdf 

Shannon Smith– employee of David J. Stern, P.A. Illegally claimed she is a paralegal, lacks any credentials and not certified, false notarization. See full depo at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/FULL-DEPOSITION-OF-DAVID-J.-STERNS-SHANNON-SMITH.pdf 

Kathy Smith–   Employee at Lender Processing Services see more info at http://www.foreclosurehamlet.org/profiles/blogs/robosigners-michelle-halyard , and signature and false credentials at http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Smith_Kathy.2.pdf http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kaminski_Joseph.6.pdf , http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Corrective+Assignment%5b2%5d.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Gx12P0-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Linda%20Green%20no%20authority%20to%20sign%20on%20behalf%20of%20MERS%20Sept%202009.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Sanisidro%20Garcia%20Aff%20Lost%20Note%20by%20Kathy%20Smith.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Linda%20Green%20no%20authority%20to%20sign%20on%20behalf%20of%20MERS%20Sept%202009.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Corrective+Assignment%5b2%5d.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_42_4247609_img.pdf.pdf,

Joseph Kaminski– Employee at Lender Processing Services, see signature and false credentials at http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Smith_Kathy.2.pdf  , http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kaminski_Joseph.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kaminski_Joseph.1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kaminski_Joseph.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kaminski_Joseph.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kaminski_Joseph.6.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Corrective+Assignment%5b2%5d.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Gx12P0-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Linda%20Green%20no%20authority%20to%20sign%20on%20behalf%20of%20MERS%20Sept%202009.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Corrective+Assignment%5b2%5d.pdf,  

Michelle Hayard– see more info at http://www.foreclosurehamlet.org/profiles/blogs/robosigners-michelle-halyard 

Caryn Graham– Sr. Attorney at Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson. See http://livinglies.wordpress.com/2010/03/29/caryn-a-graham-%E2%80%93-mers-assistant-secretary-bofa-countrywide-wells-fargo/,   http://my.firedoglake.com/cindykouril/2010/04/19/the-story-of-the-law-firm-that-built-its-own-evidence-for-foreclosures/                              http://www.foreclosurehamlet.org/profiles/blogs/caryn-graham-attorney-at-thehttp://www.scribd.com/doc/34557527/Caryn-Graham-attorney-at-the-Law-Office-of-Marshall-Watson-signing-for-MERS, http://www.scribd.com/doc/34557449/Caryn-Graham-attorney-at-the-Law-Office-Of-Marshall-Watson-signing-for-MERS-on-assignment-of-mortgage, http://api.ning.com/files/6MrupP07zeOCtzJg1hjlQO0cgPH7AuDLhu4YlaW6JY3dPdA*I0L*wavvUccY*IDQ01m78tWzagio6ve-ulgmZgNmdvgNFF7I/Grahamv2.pdf, http://www.foreclosurehamlet.org/profiles/blogs/protecting-caryn-graham-and-oh,  

Patricia Arango– employee/attorney of Marshall C. Watson, see-  http://4closurefraud.org/2011/01/12/bam-full-deposition-of-patricia-arango-of-marshall-c-watson-arangos-testimony-contradicts-congressional-testimony-of-merscorp-president/ http://my.firedoglake.com/cindykouril/2010/04/19/the-story-of-the-law-firm-that-built-its-own-evidence-for-foreclosures/

C.Troy Crouse a.k.a. Charles Troy Crouse– attorney at McCalla Raymerhttp://www.mccallaraymer.com/index.php?searchword=crouse&ordering=&searchphrase=all&Itemid=73&option=com_search http://www.wsbtv.com/news/25635807/detail.html  http://www.operationrest.org/xSites/Agents/OperationRestorationInc/Content/UploadedFiles/ClassActionLawSuit.pdf  http://dockets.justia.com/search?query=Prommis+Solutions%2C+LLC&circuit=11

http://4closurefraud.org/2010/11/05/georgias-version-of-david-stern-and-friends-mccalla-raymer-charles-troy-crouse-and-prommis-solutions/ http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction  http://www.lawyers.com/Georgia/Atlanta/McCalla-Raymer,-LLC-885136-f.html http://www.mccallaraymer.com/

Crystal Wilder– notary- employee at McCalla Raymer- http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction  http://www.operationrest.org/xSites/Agents/OperationRestorationInc/Content/UploadedFiles/ClassActionLawSuit.pdf  http://dockets.justia.com/search?query=Prommis+Solutions%2C+LLC&circuit=11

Chiquita Raglin– Notary Public and as an employee of McCalla Raymer- http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction http://www.operationrest.org/xSites/Agents/OperationRestorationInc/Content/UploadedFiles/ClassActionLawSuit.pdf  http://dockets.justia.com/search?query=Prommis+Solutions%2C+LLC&circuit=11  

Victoria Marie Allen– Notary Public and as an employee of McCalla Raymer- http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction http://www.operationrest.org/xSites/Agents/OperationRestorationInc/Content/UploadedFiles/ClassActionLawSuit.pdf  

Iris Gisella Bey–  Notary Public and as an employee of McCalla Raymer- http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction http://www.operationrest.org/xSites/Agents/OperationRestorationInc/Content/UploadedFiles/ClassActionLawSuit.pdf

Jamelia Reynolds, Notary Public and as an employee of McCalla Raymer- http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction http://www.operationrest.org/xSites/Agents/OperationRestorationInc/Content/UploadedFiles/ClassActionLawSuit.pdf

Latasha Daniel, Notary Public and as an employee of McCalla Raymer- http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction http://www.operationrest.org/xSites/Agents/OperationRestorationInc/Content/UploadedFiles/ClassActionLawSuit.pdf  

Elizabeth Lofaronotary- employee at McCalla Raymer- http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction  http://www.operationrest.org/xSites/Agents/OperationRestorationInc/Content/UploadedFiles/ClassActionLawSuit.pdf

Carla Tinoco– employee of Ocwen- false notary- http://livinglies.wordpress.com/2010/03/27/juan-pardo-mersocwen-cross-employment/  

Rhonda Weston– one of 10,000 listed Vice Presidents for Bank of America. see affidavit on Exhibit “B” at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/10/24/ohio-woman-sues-bank-of-america-robo-signer-fannie-mae-ag-cordray/,     http://www.msfraud.org/fraudsterlist.html 

 Dhurata Doko–  employee of Nationwide Title Clearing–see video deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/07/video-deposition-of-nationwide-title-clearing-dhurata-doko/ 

different signatures, see http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Doko_Dhurata.pdf. http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Doko_Dhurata.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Doko_Dhurata.4.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Doko_Dhurata.5.pdf,  

Roderick Sedahttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick_1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick.3.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick.4.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick.5.pdf,

Erica Johnson-Seck a/k/a Erica A. Johnson-Seck – see full deposition at http://4closurefraud.org/2009/11/15/full-deposition-of-the-infamous-erica-johnson-seck-re-indymac-federal-bank-fsb-plaintiff-vs-israel-a-machado-50-2008-ca-037322xxxx-mb/  IndyMac Bank (years after IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. ceased to exist, many of the signers will sign as officers of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (the entity that should have made the assignment to the trust years earlier)

Bryan Bly-employee at Nationwide Title Clearing. See video deposition at  http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/07/video-deposition-of-nationwide-title-clearing-bryan-bly/

Hollan M. Fintel– Attorney for Florida Default Group and Shapiro & Fishman, utilizing false credentials, robo-signing, and supervising robo-signing, See full deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WB1_FULL_DEPOSITION_-of_HOLLAN-FINTEL_-former-associate-attorney-of-Florida-Default-Law-Group.-Executed-assignment-of-mortgage-as-vice-president-of-Wells-Fargo-Bank-N.A..pdf 

Erin Cullaro– former attorney for Florida Default GroupEmployee of Florida’s Attorney General’s Office while notarizing  and filing false affidavits for former employer during A.G. investigation.  See http://www.zerohedge.com/article/florida-notary-fraud-erin-cullaro-%E2%80%93-scandalous-%E2%80%93-substantiated-allegations-foreclosure-fraud  http://www2.tbo.com/content/2010/may/01/bz-state-ag-investigates-its-own/, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Cullaro_Erin.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Cullaro_Erin.1.JPG, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Cullaro_Erin.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Cullaro_Erin.6.pdf,  http://mattweidnerlaw.com/blog/2010/03/bombshell-substantiated-allegations-of-foreclosureaffidavit-fraud-that-implicates-the-florida-attorney-generals-office/, ,

See multiple signatures for Erin Cullaro:  http://4closurefraud.org/2010/10/21/bout-time-ags-office-reprimands-erin-cullaro-for-foreclosure-mill-work/, http://www.woodwardlaw.com/foreclosure-news/erincollinscullarocaughtlyingtothecourtagainhttp://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/MRAY-7P5HJP/$file/AttorneyDebtServicesAVC.pdfhttp://www.mediation-drz.com/FORECLOSURE_PROCESS.html,

Tamara Savery– Wells Fargo/ASC employee. See full depo at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WM_FULL-DEPOSITION-TRANSCRIPT-OF-WELLS-FARGO-TAMARA-SAVERY.pdf 

Angela Nolan– V.P. with Chase. See full depo at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Deposition_of_Angela_Nolan.pdf http://www.scribd.com/doc/27975756/Full-Deposition-of-Angela-Nolan-Robo-Signer-at-Chase-Home-Finance-DeUTSCHE-BANK-NATIONAL-TRUST-COMPANY 

Beth Cottrell– Employee of Lenders Processing Services, claims is an employee of Chase, robo-signer, signed false affidavits, never had personal knowledge of contents. See full depo of May 18, 2010 at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/BETH-COTTRELL-CHASE-HOME-FINANCE.pdf

 http://api.ning.com/files/4jnqlbCXwfs3Z3-ENgcbtAI8PtVjEEe18j-hetj0ZLHpOAhU*wooq8prvl7jmLs7P8e21Ao4FVmONCwYSba49IFrvpTt9701/CookandCottrellUSBankNAatFLehman7109.pdf 

Jeffrey Stephan– One of the largest robo-signers in the country, approx. 400 per week. See depo at  http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Deposition_of_Jeffrey_Stephan.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Stephan_Jeffrey.BMP,

Krystal Hall– robo signer, see full deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/DEPOSITION_OF_KRYSTAL-HALL.pdf 

Stacy Spohn– Employee of Lenders Processing Services. See http://4closurefraud.org/2010/09/29/can-it-be-true-fraud-digest-mortgage-fraud-jpmorgan-chase-barbara-hindman-et-al/#comments 

Crystal Moore–  employee at Nationwide Title Clearing. See signatures at http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Doko_Dhurata.3.pdf,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Doko_Dhurata.4.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Doko_Dhurata.5.pdf,  See video deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/07/sff-exclusive-video-deposition-of-nationwide-title-crystal-moore/ 

http://search.wn.com/?template=cheetah-search-adv/index.txt&action=search&results_type=news&search_string=crystal moore robosigner deposition on mortgage fraud of 4mp4&language_id=1&sort_type=-pub-datetime&corpus=current&search_type=expression 

Margaret Dalton– Employee of Lenders Processing Services. See http://4closurefraud.org/2010/09/29/can-it-be-true-fraud-digest-mortgage-fraud-jpmorgan-chase-barbara-hindman-et-al/#comments,  http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/  

SIGNED AFFIDAVIT BY AN EXPERT http://whatsignature.com/files/Affidavit_of_Robo-Signer_Margaret_Dalton.pdf

Christina Allen– see http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/

 Alfonzo Greene– see http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/

Laura Hescott– See http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hescott_Laura.pdf, and http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/03/12/topako-love-laura-hescott-christina-allen-eric-tate-officers-of-way-way-too-many-banks-part-deux-the-twilight-zone/ 

Bethany Hood– see http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hood_Bethany.GIF, http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/ http://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo  

Barbara Hindman– Too many jobs at the same time http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.1.JPG, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.4.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.5.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.6.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.8.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.9.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.10.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.11.pdf,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.12.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.13.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.16.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Hindman_Barbara.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thievin_Shelley.JPG, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thievin_Shelley.1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick_1.pdf http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Seda_Roderick.3.pdf, http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/,  

http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/YEHiDw-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/AssignmentofMortgage.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/MTF5p2-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/MTF5p2-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nl6WZo-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/K8LQQ4-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/YEHiDw-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/AssignmentofMortgage.pdf.pdf

Shelley Thievenhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thievin_Shelley.JPG, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thievin_Shelley.1.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thievin_Shelley.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thieven_Shelley.7.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/AssignmentofMortgage.pdf.pdf,

Zuhra Huftio–  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Huftio_Zuhra.JPGhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Huftio_Zuhra.1.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Huftio_Zuhra.2.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Huftio_Zuhra.3.pdf,

Linda Green– employee of Lenders Processing, Fulton County Georgia, see different signature at http://www.frauddigest.com/TOO_MANY_JOBS.pdf,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.1.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.2.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.4.pdf,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thomas_Tywanna.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thomas_Tywanna.3.pdf,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thoresen_Linda.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thoresen_Linda.1.pdf,   http://www.myprivateaudio.com/11_Trust_Assignment_Fraud_Letter_to_SEC.doc , http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Cf2fyq-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/JkM4KF-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Linda%20Green%20no%20authority%20to%20sign%20on%20behalf%20of%20MERS%20Sept%202009.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/QHOlVR-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Registry%20of%20Deeds.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Untitled.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/VErRd8-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/green%20titles.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/l%20green.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Registry%20of%20Deeds.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Untitled.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_590_16232253_img.pdf, http://www.progressivenewsdaily.com/?p=10012 http://api.ning.com/files/aqSARSiTkefAl9393gVzsI3f4SH1*K1goYHMlptGDfY6PAwGI82Ew0u8u0YJVF82HF8Gbyo90CbsDap8NovcnUFMr36wxshl/JessicaOhdesignaturesamples.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/znwiYjn7FBGiR1q-G6aV1ttAWTjihjjK9WabIYLkCOgT4Hr7uzRUybEIxH6Grn-fe8TaUVTcQwhP1Zp-Xh8F0buIGRwrE3m5/LindaGreen5signaturesamples.pdf  – 5 different signatures

NO AUTHORITY: http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Linda%20Green%20no%20authority%20to%20sign%20on%20behalf%20of%20MERS%20Sept%202009.pdf. http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Corrective+Assignment%5b2%5d.pdf,

Karrel Harp–  employee of Lenders Processing, Fulton County Georgia http://www.frauddigest.com/TOO_MANY_JOBS.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.3.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.4.pdf,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thomas_Tywanna.1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thomas_Tywanna.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thoresen_Linda.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thoresen_Linda.1.pdf,  http://www.myprivateaudio.com/11_Trust_Assignment_Fraud_Letter_to_SEC.doc , ,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/FCOT4y-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/JkM4KF-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/QHOlVR-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/RQndQL-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/VErRd8-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/W6XJgC-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/green%20titles.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/t%20thomas.pdf, http://api.ning.com/files/aqSARSiTkefAl9393gVzsI3f4SH1*K1goYHMlptGDfY6PAwGI82Ew0u8u0YJVF82HF8Gbyo90CbsDap8NovcnUFMr36wxshl/JessicaOhdesignaturesamples.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/wcUUmX7oCvO2NtBWk4POMcHmea0acZWXrXKaYOW0K0h-mufX1-k3mk1GX*WGvcLM9frbdOD8LioPGYOg6gu1-yL82y-WI4S3/KorellHarpSignatureSamples.pdf

Jessica Ohde– employee of Lenders Processing, Fulton County Georgia, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thoresen_Linda.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/VErRd8-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf, http://api.ning.com/files/aqSARSiTkefAl9393gVzsI3f4SH1*K1goYHMlptGDfY6PAwGI82Ew0u8u0YJVF82HF8Gbyo90CbsDap8NovcnUFMr36wxshl/JessicaOhdesignaturesamples.pdf  – 5different signatures http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/

 

Tawanna Thomasemployee of Lenders Processing, Fulton County Georgia , see different signatures at http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.2.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thomas_Tywanna.1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thomas_Tywanna.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thomas_Tywanna.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thoresen_Linda.pdf,  http://www.myprivateaudio.com/11_Trust_Assignment_Fraud_Letter_to_SEC.doc , http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/t%20thomas.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/l%20green.pdf,  http://www.progressivenewsdaily.com/?p=10012  http://api.ning.com/files/znwiYjn7FBGiR1q-G6aV1ttAWTjihjjK9WabIYLkCOgT4Hr7uzRUybEIxH6Grn-fe8TaUVTcQwhP1Zp-Xh8F0buIGRwrE3m5/LindaGreen5signaturesamples.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/aqSARSiTkee3tbDeMIFoHE4wu1iHuumF-uiTADvL*knBNwLuoZg8h*a5CYRPbQbQtPiu2qQOgXIx58z8lsR3FMFtVwNko7hy/TywannaThomassignaturesamples.pdf  http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/  

Tawanna Thomas – TOO MANY JOBS http://www.frauddigest.com/TOO_MANY_JOBS.pdf,   http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Cf2fyq-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/FCOT4y-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/JkM4KF-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/QHOlVR-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/RQndQL-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/W6XJgC-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/green%20titles.pdf,  http://www.progressivenewsdaily.com/?p=10012  http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/

Jessica Leeteemployee of Lenders Processing, Fulton County Georgia. See http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Untitled.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_590_16232253_img.pdf,  

Shelley Scheffey– see http://www.frauddigest.com/TOO_MANY_JOBS.pdf,

Linda Thorsen–  employee of Lenders Processing, Fulton County Georgia http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Green_Linda.4.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thoresen_Linda.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Thoresen_Linda.1.pdf,

Christina Huang–  employee of Lenders Processing Services, Fulton County Georgia http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Huang_Christina.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Huang_Christina.1.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Huang_Christina.2.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Huang_Christina.3.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/Cf2fyq-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdfhttp://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/FCOT4y-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/JkM4KF-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/RQndQL-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/W6XJgC-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/green%20titles.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/t%20thomas.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/l%20green.pdf,

Dawn Williams– employee of Lenders Processing Services, Fulton County, Georgia http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/l%20green.pdf,

Cecelia Knox–  SEE http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/  http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/

 Topako Love– See http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/03/12/topako-love-laura-hescott-christina-allen-eric-tate-officers-of-way-way-too-many-banks-part-deux-the-twilight-zone/, http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/                              http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/                                                                        http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html 

Christine Allen– See http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/                http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/03/12/topako-love-laura-hescott-christina-allen-eric-tate-officers-of-way-way-too-many-banks-part-deux-the-twilight-zone/ http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Jodi Sobotta,- see http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/

Eric Tate– See http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/03/12/topako-love-laura-hescott-christina-allen-eric-tate-officers-of-way-way-too-many-banks-part-deux-the-twilight-zone/, http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/,  

Herman John Kennerty – employee of Wells Fargo Bank. False affidavits, see deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Full-Deposition-of-Wells_Fargo_John-Herman-Kennerty.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kennerty_Herman_John.1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kennerty_Herman_John.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kennerty_Herman_John.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kennerty_John.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Kennerty_John.1.pdf, http://livinglies.wordpress.com/2010/03/29/caryn-a-graham-%E2%80%93-mers-assistant-secretary-bofa-countrywide-wells-fargo/                                                 http://www.dsnews.com/articles/jpmorgan-halts-foreclosures-robo-signers-appear-commonplace-2010-09-30 http://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo

Judy Faber–  see full deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WM_FULL_DEPOSITION_OF_RESIDENTIAL-FUNDING.GMAC_JUDY_FABER.pdf

Renee D. Hertzler– employee of Bank of America. See full deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WM_FULL_DEPOSITION_TRANSCRIPT_OF_BANK_OF_AMERICA_RENEE_D_HERTZLER.pdf

Robert R. Stoudmire– see signature and false credentials at http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Stoudemire_Robert.pdf

Roger Stotts– different signatures and credentials see  at http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Stotts_Roger.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Stotts_Roger.1.GIF, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Stotts_Roger.3.JPG,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Stotts_Roger.4.JPG, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Stotts_Roger_D.GIF, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Stotts_Roger_D.1.GIF

Tamara Price– see full deposition at http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WM_FULL-DEPOSITION-OF-CITI-RESIDENTIAL-AMC-TAMARA-PRICE.pdf http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

R.K. Arnold– former  CEO of MERSCORP and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Depo taken at the American Association for Justice, Washington, D.C. on September 25, 2009. See http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/MERS-DEPO-OF-CEO-RK-Arnold-2009.pdf

Margaret Dalton– Expert Affidavit by an Attorney, see http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Affidavit_of_Robo-Signer_Margaret_Dalton.pdf,  http://www.frauddigest.com/fraud.php?ident=4663 , http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/YEHiDw-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/forclosure%20deed.pdf.pdf,  

Liquenda Allotey– employee of Lenders Processing Services, Dakota County, MN signing as V.P. of MERS-  unreadable signature http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Unknown_MERS_-_First_Financail_Equities.GIF, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allotey_Liquenda.2.pdf,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allen_Greg.4.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allotey_Liquenda.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allotey_Liquenda.4.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allotey_Liquenda.5.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allotey_Liquenda.6.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allotey_Liquenda.7.pdf,

William Hultman–  actual MERS  executive– see full depo at http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/MERS%20VP%20William%20Hultman%20Deposition%20NJ.pdf,

Greg Allenhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allen_Greg.1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allen_Greg2.1.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allen_Greg2.2.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allen_Greg.3.pdf, http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allen_Greg.4.pdfhttp://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allen_Greg.5.pdf,  http://www.whatsignature.com/files/Allotey_Liquenda.5.pdf,

Tam Doanhttp://money.cnn.com/2010/10/28/real_estate/robosigner/index.htm, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/28/tam-doan-robosigner-bank-of-america_n_775225.htmlhttp://realestate.about.com/b/2010/10/28/tam-doan-i-was-a-bank-of-america-robosigner-oct-28-2010.htm,

Stanley Silvadeposition http://4closurefraud.org/2011/01/21/more-wells-fargo-woes-full-deposition-of-stanley-silva-notice-of-default-robo-signer/#comment-18380

Nate Blackstun– – employee of CitiBank – http://mattweidnerlaw.com/blog/2010/07/the-new-foreclosure-fraud-battleground-fraud-and-motions-to-disqualify-counsel/

Jamie Hardcastle– employee of CitiBank – http://mattweidnerlaw.com/blog/2010/07/the-new-foreclosure-fraud-battleground-fraud-and-motions-to-disqualify-counsel/

Steven Nagyhttp://www.scribd.com/doc/20887303/New-Century-Mortgage-Forgeries-Notarized-Illegal-Stamped-Signatures-Newsletter-Nagy  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/0LNWLQ-ShowPDF.aspx.pdf.pdf http://4closurefraud.org/2011/01/09/fraudclosuregate-grandma-in-california-does-some-sleuthing-and-uncovers-major-robo-notary-violations/

NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING COMPANY – FULL DEPOSITION http://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo

TICOR TITLE – FULL DEPOSITION http://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo

 

JUDGE SCHACK’S ( NY )FAVORITE ROBO-SIGNERS

Rosa C. Larahttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Tamara Pricehttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Christopher M. Zeishttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

John Shelleyhttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Ely Harlesshttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Jeff Rivashttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Cathy Menchisehttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Bryan Kusichhttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Margery Rotundohttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Jessica Dybashttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Albert Fiorellohttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Victor F. Parisihttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Leo Ortega, Jr.- http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Keri Selmanhttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

Joe Lanninghttp://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/

ROBO SIGNERS BY LOCATION AND/OR  COMPANY

Bank of America’s Robo-Signer Listhttp://www.scribd.com/doc/40927249/Bank-Of-America-Robo-signer-List

Tom Croft-employee of  Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC – Orange County CA.

G. Soberanis– employee of  Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC  and signer for Deutsche Bank– Orange County CA

Rachel Warmack– employee of  Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC – signing as VP of Option One Mortgage Corporation, Orange County, CA

Gino Tomasino – signing as Assistant Secretary of American Home Mortgage Servicing, Orange County, CA

Smith, Hiatt & Diaz –  Broward County, Florida http://whatsignature.com/files/Smith_Hiatt_Diaz_P.A._-_unknown_signature.JPG

Valerie Broom– employee of  Lender Processing Services, Duval County, Florida

Margaret Dalton- employee of  Lender Processing Services, Duval County, Florida

Michele Halyard- employee of  Lender Processing Services, Duval County, Florida

Michael Hunt- employee of  Lender Processing Services, Duval County, Florida

Joseph Kaminsky- employee of  Lender Processing Services, Duval County, Florida

Coleman Stokes – employee of  Lender Processing Services, Duval County, Florida

Tara Stabile– employee of Shapiro & Fishman, LLP signing as Vice President and Asst. Secretary of MERS for America’s Wholesale Lender, Hillsborough County, Florida

Scott Anderson– employee of  Ocwen Loan Servicing Palm Beach County, Florida http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_978_16592874_img.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_363_16824558_img.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_625_17027721_img.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_646_17433704_img.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_52_17505354_img.pdf.pdf,

Oscar Taveras– employee of  Ocwen Loan Servicing Palm Beach County, Florida, http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_52_17505354_img.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_646_17433704_img.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_52_17505354_img.pdf.pdf,

Doris Chapman– employee of  Ocwen Loan Servicing Palm Beach County, Florida, http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_52_17505354_img.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_52_17505354_img.pdf.pdf,

Leticia Ariasemployee of  Ocwen Loan Servicing Palm Beach County, Florida, http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html  http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_978_16592874_img.pdf.pdf, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_363_16824558_img.pdf,

Dana Moore– employee of Owen Laon Servicing, Palm Beach, County, Florida, http://www.frauddigest.com/indictments/nv_978_16592874_img.pdf.pdf,

Jonathan Burgess– employee of  Ocwen Loan Servicing Palm Beach County, Florida http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Laura Buxton– employee of  Ocwen Loan Servicing Palm Beach County, Florida http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Rebecca Winner– employee at Shapiro & Fishman, LP, Palm Beach County, Florida http://whatsignature.com/files/Shapiro_Fishman_LLP.1.GIF http://whatsignature.com/files/Shapiro_Fishman_LLP.GIF

Bryan Bly– employee of  Nationwide Title Clearing,  Pinellas County Florida http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Vilma Castro– employee of  Nationwide Title Clearing,  Pinellas County Florida http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Mary Jo McGowan – employee of  Nationwide Title Clearing,  Pinellas County Florida, signing as Asst V.P. Washington Mutual Bank

Dhurato Doko– employee of  Nationwide Title Clearing,  Pinellas County Florida, more above  http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Jessica Fretwell– employee of  Nationwide Title Clearing,  Pinellas County Florida and others http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Cheryl Thomas– employee of Lenders Processing, Fulton County Georgia,

Christie Baldwin– employee of Lenders Processing, Fulton County Georgia

Darin Bueltelsigning as V.P. Wells Fargo Financial, Polk County, IA

Kevin Butterweggesigning as V.P. Wells Fargo Financial, Polk County, IA 

Topeka Love– employee of Lenders Processing Services, Dakota County, MN

Christine Anderson- employee of Lenders Processing Services, Dakota County, MN

Dory or Dorey Goebel – employee of Lenders Processing Services, signing as Asst. Secretary of Option One Mortgage, Dakota County, MN

Christine Allen- employee of Lenders Processing Services, Dakota County, MN

Mark Bischop-  is a FIS Foreclosure Solutions notary from Dakota County, MN.

Eric Tate- employee of Lenders Processing Services, Dakota County, MN

Michael Ackerman– attorney at Zucker, Goldberg and Ackerman, NJ

Christina Trowbridge– employee of Chase Home Finance, Franklin County, OH, http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/09/29/here-comes-jpmorgan-chase-lender-processing-services-and-its-robo-signers/ http://api.ning.com/files/tlbopfq3IZ0rstKpWUwhKXuuhfsfFdGnDCFaVjhwU3zbo1YTXQHRy8OczkZTiaqKRsnKVwKz4vaDqg6H1IIk-2DS1sQryfJW/TowbridgeandCookChaseBankUSA6809.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/wwpdBrEz4Fz-ltD8ICz0te23fyFAAGjKHhznRJQEvlZXVqIAZoaEIGle2NJI7vHqmdid7QnQRFOmmRNiiT7RHzomi7tJV7tr/TowbridgeandCookJPMorganChaseBank122008.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/i0L51jUXROyI7sEHaUnVJtPbmqwdSlsf*XSl1ERD2xNKyqL9pmmYfqXKxJdvfwUB8iMy4HLlR-WsO3JtdNSu7pyfcdQvHwJI/TowbridgeandCookMERS52109.pdf

Whitney Cook– employee of Chase Home Finance, Franklin County, OH http://api.ning.com/files/gDnjnrj7Oj3riU2vVL9qsIcGIPTDad8znRRP*ea0YuASQtrKdQyOGeislELEw5Ix5JRpbYlqcPEuFHtqok4oY4YfkDEPFNuU/CookADO2.pdf http://api.ning.com/files/V33VP3LtT7615dwidPPUxlEKbZj-YQSviH8ywJqApvfZpFXgx9zVrJuuuWP-21L1*C*MPu56UbTvw7rr5VNe6gRbluekNIEa/CookCitibankEMC1_0003.pdf http://api.ning.com/files/4jnqlbCXwfs3Z3-ENgcbtAI8PtVjEEe18j-hetj0ZLHpOAhU*wooq8prvl7jmLs7P8e21Ao4FVmONCwYSba49IFrvpTt9701/CookandCottrellUSBankNAatFLehman7109.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/qwWP9H3ypGk*9U3tdBjULSquKCZaoH3hzp4GvpzbMFdYMAEHq7zsswHu5IkVQf02Q6t2q0LeZT-Qjs-spA9ZgTQXPBLjHE-N/CookandTowbridgeJPMorganChase52109.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/wwpdBrEz4Fz-ltD8ICz0te23fyFAAGjKHhznRJQEvlZXVqIAZoaEIGle2NJI7vHqmdid7QnQRFOmmRNiiT7RHzomi7tJV7tr/TowbridgeandCookJPMorganChaseBank122008.pdf http://api.ning.com/files/V33VP3LtT74vil7ye2kM4fb2kCnMyuszQ*YFk2W*lfMo6wy2qraegqrVisqOC6bqgI9w9ypw5kpFoO5pfuR5EuATeQiP-Jty/CookChaseBankNA12262008.pdf http://api.ning.com/files/gDnjnrj7Oj2sd8XrmTJLhSU8a-Xxp6wUDZGhZgvoEDmTIWXApXesiwh9X1n6d5VZlRlo1N8Qqxdc-v11R*QdGgr1N6O40MsA/CookChaseBankUSA82808.pdf http://api.ning.com/files/X1iGwvmnVRnZilM1l5ptzXKUJiG-*7K*aSyaTasWFKAR22*pr0iDks5vDLsCCB8RfW7I4qv57pSOze06AMOZfJ0hxm8TXwFR/CookChaseHomeFinance22509.pdf http://api.ning.com/files/HYdFdD9AInlkIIyoxOmR5Cb54FLjpkrPE-1FZKvc7V8lld59iIwVLaSZb-Qm17VrZs5py6XUteMlsUR-FZKYtIYiH8kGdLtV/CookMERS4909.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/tlbopfq3IZ0rstKpWUwhKXuuhfsfFdGnDCFaVjhwU3zbo1YTXQHRy8OczkZTiaqKRsnKVwKz4vaDqg6H1IIk-2DS1sQryfJW/TowbridgeandCookChaseBankUSA6809.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/i0L51jUXROyI7sEHaUnVJtPbmqwdSlsf*XSl1ERD2xNKyqL9pmmYfqXKxJdvfwUB8iMy4HLlR-WsO3JtdNSu7pyfcdQvHwJI/TowbridgeandCookMERS52109.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/qwWP9H3ypGnbgiBwiJxGflMKRoYt7Ij*LAZ71D*LO8UDNshAyR-ESB2r7XsETxGyDKCTVm3Ph9kTg3dS4oUOVDswPzN-jOSG/WhitneyKCookMERSAmnet2009MWAsg.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/HYdFdD9AInnaws6IJl6aLRPpbREuttbV2el5CAg5SZ-r3-H1Ud2QUSC2xo1zSxmAaV7JZgINGve3lPh*yenlAR3hA2fgq3Hn/2009.12.22PLWhitneyKCookResptoDFsInterr.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/Xt0W0vH8Dd6JTnuTtSHrH*Zw-ibhKCrFaaYetgNCSxa9erbDwER-Qj8jwqT3zPYj5*dw5pFcs8cjeGSf1mbo2bZJenG5cADk/CookVerification0603.pdf  http://api.ning.com/files/RDFm1oi-lqT4WIIV9acxA4SgAuHsyeUvmCH78T1-6t7habrP*NEKKJD3ID5A1MTWrwwRxsamKRVX80k01NMQLQuO3Vn-EXp4/WhitneyKCookAllonge.pdf

Kevin Prieshoff- signing as Asst. Secretary & V.P. of MERS, Hamilton County, OH

Laura Carroll– Foreclosure Specialist for Home Loan Services, Allegheny County, PA

John Kerr– GMAC / Homecomings, Montgomery County, PA http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

China Brown– employee of  America’s Servicing Company, York County, SC http://www.frauddigest.com/fraud.php?ident=4670  http://whatcomforum.blogspot.com/2010/10/wells-fargo-and-its-robo-signers-must.html http://wfhmcaught.blogspot.com/2010/10/oh-good-grief-wells-fargo-will-you.html http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/                                                          http://www.dsnews.com/articles/jpmorgan-halts-foreclosures-robo-signers-appear-commonplace-2010-09-30                                                  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-01/wells-fargo-foreclosure-robo-signer-draws-maryland-dismissal-motion.html                                  http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/16/mind-blowing-judge-schack-names-robo-signers-in-many-foreclosure-cases-greatest-hits/ http://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo

Xee Moua– employee of  America’s Servicing Company, York County, SC http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-01/wells-fargo-foreclosure-robo-signer-draws-maryland-dismissal-motion.html  http://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo

Noriko Colstonhttp://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo

Natasha Clark – Employee of America’s Servicing Company, York County, SC- signing as V.P. Washington Mutual Bank                                           http://whatcomforum.blogspot.com/2010/10/wells-fargo-and-its-robo-signers-must.html http://www.veritasaudits.com/blog/tag/intentional-misrepresentation/ http://wfhmcaught.blogspot.com/2010/10/oh-good-grief-wells-fargo-will-you.html

Heather Carrico- employee of America’s Servicing Company, York County, SC http://whatcomforum.blogspot.com/2010/10/wells-fargo-and-its-robo-signers-must.html http://wfhmcaught.blogspot.com/2010/10/oh-good-grief-wells-fargo-will-you.html

Micall Bachman a.k.a. Michelle Bachman– signing as V.P. of Argent Mortgage, Collin County, TX- http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/10/robo-signers-threaten-foreclosure-lawyers_n_795291.html                                                              http://www.scribd.com/doc/40927249/Bank-Of-America-Robo-signer-List http://washingtonexaminer.com/nep/2010/11/robo-signing-mers-issues-create-new-concerns-foreclosure-buyers

Marti Noriega- employee of  Litton Loan Servicing, LP, Harris County, TX- http://whatsignature.com/files/Unknown_-_from_South_Carolina.pdf  http://www.deanmostofi.com/?p=924

Denise Bailey– employee of  Litton Loan Servicing, LP, Harris County, TX http://www.housingwire.com/2010/11/12/florida-court-robo-signing-not-sufficient-to-stop-foreclosure                                                                      http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html                                                    http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/

Diane Dixon– employee of  Litton Loan Servicing, LP, Harris County, TX- http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/the-dirty-dozen-banks-most-responsible-for-foreclosure-fraud/

D.M. Wileman– signing as VP of MERS, Tarrant County, TX

Brian Burnett– employee of  IndyMac Bank Home Loan Servicing, Travis County, TX- http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Kristen Kemp– employee of  IndyMac Bank Home Loan Servicing, Travis County, TX http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Suchan Murray – employee of  IndyMac Bank Home Loan Servicing, Travis County, TX http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Chamagne Williams– employee of  IndyMac Bank Home Loan Servicing, Travis County, TX http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Dennis Kirkpatick– employee of  IndyMac Bank,  Williamson County, TX (years after IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. ceased to exist, many of the signers will sign as officers of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (the entity that should have made the assignment to the trust years earlier) http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Eric Friedman- IndyMac Bank (years after IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. ceased to exist, many of the signers will sign as officers of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. (the entity that should have made the assignment to the trust years earlier)                           http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Luisa Alfonso– employee of Select Portfolio Servicing, Salt Lake County, UT http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Bill Koch- employee of Select Portfolio Servicing, Salt Lake County, UT http://pippinghole.blogspot.com/2010/12/robo-signers-signors-names-revealed.html

Pam January- signer for CR Title and CitiMortgage              http://www.loansafe.org/forum/citi-mortgage/36803-mers-robo-citimortgage-sold-loan-pennymac-aug-2010-a.html

Lisa Markham– signer for CR Title, CitiMortgage and Deutsche Bank http://www.loansafe.org/forum/citi-mortgage/36803-mers-robo-citimortgage-sold-loan-pennymac-aug-2010-a.html

Tam Doan- signer at Bank of America               http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/28/tam-doan-robosigner-bank-of-america_n_775225.html                                            http://realestate.about.com/b/2010/10/28/tam-doan-i-was-a-bank-of-america-robosigner-oct-28-2010.htm

Chris Jones –  http://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo

Brenda McKinzyhttp://www.deanmostofi.com/?p=924 http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/122195-bank-of-america-suspends-foreclosure-proceedings-in-23-states

Daniella Marie Garretthttp://www.deanmostofi.com/?p=924  http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/122195-bank-of-america-suspends-foreclosure-proceedings-in-23-states

Debra Lymanhttp://www.deanmostofi.com/?p=924 http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/122195-bank-of-america-suspends-foreclosure-proceedings-in-23-states

John Crandallhttp://www.deanmostofi.com/?p=924 http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/122195-bank-of-america-suspends-foreclosure-proceedings-in-23-states http://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo

Leigh Blackwellhttp://www.deanmostofi.com/?p=924 http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/122195-bank-of-america-suspends-foreclosure-proceedings-in-23-states

Martha Kunkle– died in 1995-see http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204204004576049902142690400.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Melissa Bellhttp://www.deanmostofi.com/?p=924  http://www.massrealestatelawblog.com/2010/10/02/major-lenders-halt-foreclosures-over-concerns-with-faulty-documents/  http://livinglies.wordpress.com/2010/11/05/georgia-notary-fraud-revealed-by-tv-investigation/  http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/122195-bank-of-america-suspends-foreclosure-proceedings-in-23-states http://homesolutioncounselors.com/indymac-onewest-time-to-halt-foreclosures

Stanley Silvahttp://www.gastonforeclosures.org/full_deposition_transcript_of_ticor_title_stanley_silva__notice_of_defaults__lps__fidelity__mers__wells_fargo 

BANK OF AMERICA ROBO-SIGNERS – AS RECORDED IN PUBLIC RECORDS  FILED / EFFECTIVE DATE 3/18/2010  http://www.scribd.com/doc/40927249/Bank-Of-America-Robo-signer-List

Carrie Erbe– Senior Vice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Catherine M. Gorlewski– Senior Vice President Vice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Jeanette Grodsky– Senior Vice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Suzanne M. Haumesser – Senior Vice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Cynthia A. Mach– Senior Vice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Mark Acosta – Senior Vice-President- of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Brandon Sciumbato– Senior Vice President

John S. Smith– Senior Vice President

David P. Sunlin – Senior Vice President

Christine AlbertVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Lisa AllinsonVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Micall  BachmanVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Lance BellVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Donald R. ClarkVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Kimberly DawsonVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Renee HertzlerVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Lancia HerzogVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Mary  LoosVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Mary KistVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Michael PrindleVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Rhoena RiceVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Sheri SolumVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Melissa ViverosVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Rhonda WestonVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Jill WosnakVice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Gregory Higeons – Assistant Vice  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Michele Holtz – Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Kaneisha Hunley- Assistant Vice President  of  Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Holly M. Jarmusz – Assistant Vice President of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Deborah A. Jurek – Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Barbara Komisarof – Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Bridget Lett – Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Cody Mahon – Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Cheryl Mallory- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Susan McCaughan- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Timothy E. Moran- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Roxanne Nowicki- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Frances Pecoraro- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

David M, Perez- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Laura M. Pirritano – Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Tania Ramos – Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Robert Rybarczyk- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Ken Satsky- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Joyce Sciumbato – Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Keri Selman- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Teresa Skinner- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

TiaQuanda Turner- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Sandra Williams- Assistant Vice President  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Ashley Barraza – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Destiny Bentley – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Tyira Ganison – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Benjamin Hillis – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Julia Myra- Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Gregory J. Price – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Donna Powell- Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Kathy Repka – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Gail Stein – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Vicki Lynn Vasquez – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Lisa Wickser – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Rachelle Wickware – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

Diane Young – Assistant Secretary  of Bank of America / BAC GP, LLC / BAC Home Loans LP formerly Countrywide Home Loans

ADDITIONAL ALLEGED SIGNERS ALPHABETICAL BY FIRST NAME


Aimee Austin

Amie Davis

Amy Jo Cauthern-Munoz

Amy Payment

Amy Weis

Andrew Keardy

Angela L. Freckman

Andres Rojas

Ann Pinto

Anne Sutcliffe

Annmarie Morrison

Azin Rahmanpanah

Bernadette Polux

Bernice Thell

Beverly Clark

Bharati Lengade

Brian J. LaForest

Brock Martin

Cardless Dixon

Carolyn Mcleod

Cathy Hagstrom

Charmaine Marchesi

Christopher Bray

Chyrs Houston

Clifton Childs

Craig Hanlon

Craig Hinson

Dawn L. Reynolds

Denise A. Marvel

Donna McNaught

Dory or Dorey Goebel

Dulce Diaz

Eileen J. Gonzales

Elizabet Geretschlaeger

Emmanuel Tabot

Erika Reyes

Erika Spencer

Etsuko Kaybeya

Fanessa Fuller

Fedelis Fondunggallah

Felix Amenumey

Fifi Volgarkis

Frank Coon

Gloria Karau

Hang Luu

Hari Charagundla

Indgrid Pittman

Jacqueline Brown

Jamie Bilot

Jamil Kahin

Jan Zimmerman

Janeete Boatman

Janice M. Baker

Jason Dreher

Jason Emory

Jeff Rivas

Jennifer Duncan

Jeremy Cox

Jerrie Moton

Jerry Yang

Joel Martinson

John Cody

Joseph Alvarado

Joseph Lutz

Joseph P. Hillery

Judith Stone

Julie Coon

Katie Zrust

Katrina Bailey

Katrina Whitfield

Katrina Whitfiled-Bailey

Keith Chapman

Keith S. Reno

Kevin Fletcher

Keo Maney Kue Vang

Kim Kenny

Kim Kinney

Kim Mullins

Kim Waldroff

Kimberly Sanford

Kimley Godfrey

Kimbretta Duncan

Kyurstina Lawton

Larry Dingmann

Laura Hescott

Leticia Arias

Lindsay Lesch

Lisa Gerard

Marcia Medley

Margie Kwiatanowsk

 

Marisa G. Carrasco

 

Margery A Rotundo

Marisa Menza

Maya Stevenson

Mellisa Ziertman

Mellissa Mosloski

Melody Moore

Michael Ackerman

Michael H. Moreland

Michael Hanna

Michele Boiko

Michelle Flores

Michelle Halyard

Mutru Kumar

Natalie Anderson

Neil E. Dyson

Paige Sahr

Pam Anderson

Pam Kammerer

Pam January

Pat Kingston

Paul Bruha

Paul Hunt

Paul Mann-notary

Peggy Glass

Peter Read

R.P. Umali

Rashonda Turner

Rebecca Verdeja

Renae Stanton

Renee L. Hensley

Richard Delgado

Richard Olasande

Rick Wilken

Robert E. Kaltenbach

Robyn Colburn

Rodney Cadwell

Rona Ramos

Roy Stringfellow

Sakhada Lad

Salena Edwards

Sara Rubin

Sarah Block

Sarah Rubin

Scott Anderson

Scott Keller

Scott W. Anderson

September Stoudemire

Sheri Bongaarts

Shivani L. Ram

Silvia Marchan

Steve A. Nielsen

Steve Ballman

Steve Moe

Steven Grount

Sue Fillczkowski

Susan Nightingale

Tam Doan

Tammy Brooks-Saleh

Tammy Saleh

Taylor Moore

Teresa DeBaker

Tina Jones

Tishana Gibbs

Toccoa Lenair

Treva Moreland

Van Johnson

Varsha Thakkar

Verdine A Freeman

Vicki Kyle

Victor Perez

Vinod Vishwakarma

Vishal Karingada

Whitney Lewis

Yvette Day

 


 

ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF ALLEGED ROBO-SIGNERS* AND LINKS*

*NOTE: FOR THE NAMES LISTED BELOW, TO FIND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION JUST PLACE YOUR MOUSE ON NAME, PRESS THE CONTROL BUTTON AND LEFT CLICK AT THE SAME TIME AND THE WEBSITE WILL LEAD YOU TO A SUPPORTING DOCUMENT OF THAT PERSON

Allen, Greg       Allen, Greg.1       Allen, Greg.2       

Allen, Greg.4       

Allotey, Liquenda       Allotey, Liquenda.1       

Allotey, Liquenda.3       Allotey, Liquenda.4       

Allotey, Liquenda.6       

Anderson, Christine       Anderson, Christine.1       

Arce, Michael Matthew       

Arias, Leticia

Boytchev, Galina.1       Boytchev, Galina.2       

Brown, China       

Burgess, Jonathan

Castro, Vilma       Castro, Vilma.1       Castro, Vilma.2       

Causevic, Rusmir       

Cavka, Esad       

Chua, James       

Ciarlariello, Carolin       

Clements, Ashley       Clements, Ashley.1       

Clements, Ashley.3

Coats, Stacy

Cody, John       

Costello, Loretta V       

Cullaro, Erin (appointment to Assistant State Attorney General – March 4, 1996

Cullaro, Erin       Cullaro, Erin.1       Cullaro, Erin.2       

Cullaro, Erin.4       Cullaro, Erin.5       Cullaro, Erin.6       

Cullaro, Erin.8       

Cullaro, John       Cullaro, John.1       Cullaro, John, 2       

Cullaro, John.4       Cullaro, John.5       Cullaro, John.6       

Cullaro, Lisa       Cullaro, Lisa.1       Cullaro, Lisa.2       

Cullaro, Lisa.4       Cullaro, Lisa.5       

Cullaro, Lisa.7       Cullaro, Lisa.8        Cullaro, Lisa.9

Dallavalle, Cherita       

Dalton, Margaret       Dalton, Margaret.1       

Dalton, Margaret.3       Dalton, Margaret.4       

Dalton, Margaret.6       Dalton, Margaret.7       

Dalton, Margaret.9       Dalton, Margaret.10       

Davila, Monique       Davila, Monique.1       Davila, Monique.2       

Dhimitri, Alisa       

Doko, Dhurata       Doko, Dhurata.1       Doko, Dhurata.2       

Doko, Dhurata.4       

Douglas, Sarah L

Esposito, Michael Ro

Eubanks, Richard H

Faber, Judy       

Fadil, Ingrid       

Frazier, Brenda       

Freeman, Jacquelyn

Gorman, Kim       

Green, Linda       Green, Linda.1       Green, Linda.2       

Griffith, Scott A       Griffith, Scott A.1       Griffith, Scott A.2       

Guerrero, Irene

 Harvey, Laura       Harvey, Laura.1       

Hosenfeld, Amanda Elizabeth          

Hosenfeld, Amanda Elizabeth.2          

Howard, Caroly

 Hunter, Rose       Hunter, Rose.1       Hunter, Rose.2       

Hutchinson, Cheryl

Johnson, Cherri       

 

Jones, Chris       

Jones, Christopher       

Jones, William C

Kaminski, Joseph       Kaminski, Joseph.1        

Kaminski, Joseph.3       Kaminski, Joseph.4       

Kane, Alexandra       

Kelley, Justin J       Kelley, Justin J.1       Kelley, Justin J.2       

Kelly, Adrienne       

Kennerty, Herman John       Kennerty, Herman John.1       

Kennerty, John       

Kingston, Pat       

Klein, Connie       

Kosciuk, Henry John

Lalovic, Zoran       Lalovic, Zoran.1       

Lamet, Judith       

Layden, Scott G       

Lazzara, Troy       Lazzara, Troy.1       Lazzara, Troy.2       

Leonard, Lynn B       

Love, Topako

Malcomson, Karen       

Manson, Heather       

Marcum, M.L.

Maslak, Michael L       Maslak, Michael L.1       

Maslak, Michael L.3       

McEwen, Wendy       McEwen, Wendy.1       McEwen, Wendy.2       

McEwen, Wendy.4       

McNulty, Deborah A       McNulty, Deborah A.1       

McNulty, Deborah A.3       McNulty, Deborah A.4       

McNulty, Deborah A.6       McNulty, Deborah A.7       

McNulty, Deborah A.9       McNulty, Deborah A.10       

McNulty, Deborah.2       McNulty, Deborah.3       

McNulty, Deborah.5       McNulty, Deborah.6       

Medic, Velida       Medic, Velida.1       Medic, Velida.2       

Mesker, Jonathan       Mesker, Jonathan.1       

Mesker, Jonathan.3       Mesker, Jonathan.4       

Miner, Patricia       Miner, Patricia.1       

Moore, Amy J       

Moore, Crystal       Moore, Crystal.1       Moore, Crystal.2       

Moore, Crystal.4       Moore, Crystal.5       Moore, Crystal.6       

Moore, Crystal.8       Moore, Crystal.9       

Morales, Marisol       

Morris, James C       Morris, James C.1       Morris, James C.2       

Moua, Shoua       Moua, Shoua.1       Moua, Shoua.2       

Munoz, Florina       Munoz, Florina.1       Munoz, Florina.2       

Munoz, Nina       Munoz, Nina.1       Munoz, Nina.2       

Munoz, Nina.4       Munoz, Nina.5       

Muros, Melissa

Nadarevic, Nura       Nadarevic, Nura.1       Nadarevic, Nura.2       

Noriega, Marti

Ohde, Jessica       

Oterino, Mayret

Palermo, Michael James       

Patrick, Steven       

Pekusic, D       

Pidala, Andrea       

Poole, Yolanda

Rice, Ron G., Jr.       Rice, Ron G., Jr.1       

Riley, Cynthia       Riley, Cynthia.1       Riley, Cynthia.2       Riley, Cynthia.

Roe, Abigail       

Rosenthal, Arnold S

Russ, Kirk M
Sears, Thomas A. Esq.- http://www.operationrest.org/GAClassAction

Ustovic, Enso       Ustovic, Enso.1       Ustovic, Enso.2

Vu, Mai

Williams, Darryl K       Williams, Darryl K.1       

Williams, Darryl K.3       

Williams, Dawn       

Williams, Sonya       

Wissner, Karen

 

KNOWN ALLEGED BANKSTERS, FRAUDSTERS, WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS

And other assorted co-conspirators to

FORECLOSURE FRAUD a.k.a. FRAUDCLOSURE

Ablitt Law Offices, P.C.
Account Portfolios
Accredited Home Lenders
ACORN
Adler & Associates
Aegis Mortgage
AIG
Alegis Group
Alliance Mortgage Group
AllianceOne Receivables Management
AllianceOne, Inc.
Allied Home Mortgage Capital
Allied Interstate
All State Mortgage Lender
ALLTEL

Ally Financial
Altegra Credit Company
Alternative Home Financing
Aman Collection Service
AMC (Ameriquest)
American Alliance for Loan Management
American Coradius
American General Finance
American Home Modifications
American Recovery Systems
American Revenue
American Servicing Company
America’s Mortgage Banc
American Legal Process
America’s Servicing Company
Ameri-CK
Ameridebt
Amerifund Home Mortgage
Ameriquest Mortgage
Amerix
AmNet Mortgage
AMO Recoveries,
Asset Management Outsourcing
Appletree Mortgage
Argent Mortgage (Ameriquest)
Arrow Financial Services
Ashwood Financial
Asset Acceptance Capital Corp
Asset Acceptance Corporation
Asset Protection & Recovery Solutions, L.L.C.
Associated Recovery Systems/ ARS National Services
Associates  (Citigroup)
Atlantic Credit & Finance
Aurora Loan Servicing
Balboa Insurance
Banc Boston Mortgage
Bank of America
Bank of New York
Bank One/Banc One
Bank United
Bankers Trust of California
Barrett – Burke 
Baum Law Firm
Bayview Financial LP
Bear Stearns
Bear Stearns Mortgage (a.k.a. EMC Mortgage)
Beneficial
Beneficial Financial Services
Bennett & Deloney
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC
Best Interest Rate Mortgage Company
Bierman, Geesing & Ward, LLC
Blatt, Hasenmiller
Blitt & Gaines
Bonded Collection Corporation
Boudreau & Associates
Bowman, Heintz
The Law Office of Brett Margolin PC
Bronson  &Migliaccio, LLP
Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick P.C.
Buchalter Nemer Fields & Younger
Bureaus Investment
Burke, Costanza & Cuppy
Burroughs & Smythe Financial Services
Calmco / Olympus
Cambridge Credit
Cambridge Credit Counseling
Capital City Mortgage
Capital Management Services
Capital Mortgage Services
Capitol Credit Service (Madison, WI)
Castle Meinhold & Stawarski, LLC
Cavalry
C-BASS (Litton Loan Servicing)
CBE Group
CCB Credit Services
Celink
Cendant Mortgage
Cenlar F.S.B
Centex Home Equity
Central Pacific Mortgage
Certegy
CFIC Home Mortgage
Chase Financial Funding
Chase Manhattan Mortgage
Chase Mortgage

Chex Systems
CitiCorp Mortgage
CitiFinancial Mortgage
CitiMortgage
City Finance (Washington Mutual)
Client Services, Inc.
Coalition for Fair and Affordable Housing
Coldata
Collect America, LTD
Collectcorp
Collection Associates
Collins Financial
Comerica Bank
Commercial Credit
Conseco
Consumer Credit Counseling
Consumer Data Industry Association
ConsumerInfo.com
ContiMortgage
Conti-Mortgage
Continental Services
Countrywide Mortgage
CR Title Services
Credit Bureau Enterprises
Credit Collection Service
Credit Management Services
Credit Protection Association
Creditors’ Alliance
Creditors Interchange
Credit Suisse First Boston
Credit Union National Mortgage
Creve Coeur Mortgage
Cross Country Bank
Crossland Mortgage
CSFB
CTX Mortgage Co.
D&B Receivables Mangagement
Tam Doan
Law office of David J.Stern
DebtOne
Debtworks
Decision One Mortgage
Delta Financial

Deutsche Trust (Bankers Trust)
DiTech Funding (.com)
Ditech.com
Diversified Adjustment Services
DJSP Enterprises Inc.
DLJ Mortgage Acceptance
Dovenmuehle Mortgage
Docx
Draper, Goldberg
Dun & Bradstreet RMS
DUNSCOMM
Dymacol
eAppriaseIT
EMC Mortgage Corporation
Emerald Home Loan
EMPIRE MORTGAGE
Encore Capital Group
Encore Receivable
Entrust Financial Services
Epstein & Frisch
Equicredit (NationsBank n.k.a. Bank of America)
Equifirst
Equity One
ER Systems
E*Trade Bank
Everest Consumer Svcs.
Everhome
Experian
Fairbanks Capital (nka – Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS)
FBCS (Philadelphia, PA)
Federal Loan Modification Law Center and Federal Loan Modification
Ferleger & Associates
FedMod

Fein, Such & Crane
Fidelity et al
Fieldstone Mortgage
Fifth Third Bank
Finance America
Financial Asset Management
Financial Credit Corporation
Financial Recovery Services
Financial Resources Mortgage Inc.

First Alliance
First Alliance Mortgage
First American Investment Company
First Beneficial Mortgage
First Capital Mortgage
First Franklin Financial (NCFS)
First Horizon
First Horizon Home LoanL
First Metropolitan Mortgage
First Nationwide Mortgage
First NLC Financial Services
First Pacific Corp.
First Performance Recovery
First Residential Mortgage (Louisville, KY)
First Select Corporation
FlexPoint Funding (HomeFirst)
FLM Law Center LLP
Florida Default Law Group
FMA Enterprises
Fordham Investment Group
ForeclosureLink
Fourscore
Frankel, Lambert, Weiss, Weisman & Gordon, LLP
Franklin Credit Management
Franklin Credit Management (FCMC)
Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae
Freemont Investment & Loan
Fulbright & Jaworski
Full Spectrum Lending
FSA
Gateway Bank
GC Services
GE Capital
GE Consumer Finance
Gerald E. Moore & Associates

Tishana Gibbs
GMAC or GMAC Mortgage Corp.
Goldbeck, McCafferty, & McKeever
Goldman Sachs
Grabowski & Greene
Greatstone
Green Light Financial

Greentree Financial
GreenPoint Mortgage
Guaranty Bank
Guaranty Residential Lending
Guaranty Residential Mortgage Corporation
Gulf State Credit
Guyer & Enichen
H&R Block Mortgage
Hammer Financial (Illinois)
Harmon Law Offices, P.C
Harris & Harris
Harvard Collection Services
Heady Financial
H.E. Servicing
HFC (Home Funding Corp.)

HiberniaHirsch & Westheimer
Holland & Knight
HomeBanc Mortgage
Homecomings Financial (GMAC)
Homecomings Financial Network
HomeEq (Wachovia/Money Store)
Homeloan Management Ltd
Homeq Servicing Corp.
HomeSavers USA
Homeside Lending (WAMU-Washington Mutual)
Homestar Mortgage
Household / Beneficial
Household Finance
Housing Assistance Services, Inc. (HAS)
HSBC
Hunt Leibert
I.C. System
Illinois Collection Services
IMC Mortgage
Indecomm Global Services
IndyMac Bank
Innovis
IntelliRisk
Irwin Home Equity
Irwin Union Bank & Trust
J. C. Christensen & Associates
JBC Legal Group (Boyajian)
Jessie Riddle & Associates
Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger
Jones Day
Jordan S. Katz, P.C.
J. P. Morgan/Chase
KCA Financial Services
Kramer & Frank
KeyBank
Landsafe
LaSalle Bank (ABN Amro)
Leader Mortgage
Lehman Brothers
Lenahan Law Offices
Lending Tree
Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss

Liberty Mortgage
Litton Loan Servicing
Loan Arranger (broker)
Loan Giant
Long Beach Mortgage
LTD Financial Services
Luminent Mortgage Capital
M.R.S. Associates
Macey, Wilensky, Cohen
Malcolm S. Gerald & Associates
Mann & StevensMaris & Lanier (Dallas)
Law offices of Marshall C. Watson in Fort Lauderdale
McCalla Raymer
Maverick Acquisition Corp.
M & T Bank
McMahan & Sigunick
MEDCLR
Medical Collection System/ Robert Mistovich
Mercantile Mortgage
Meritage Mortgage
Meritech Mortgage (formerly Saxon)
Merrill Lynch
Merrill Lynch Mortgage
MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Services)
Metropolitan Mortgage
MGIC
MidFirst Bank
Midland Credit Management/ MCM
Midland Mortgage
MKM Acquisitions
Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Lenders Network (MLNUSA)
MortgageIT
Moss, Codillis, Stawiarski, Morris, Schneider & Prior
Mozilo, AngeloMR Default
MRS Associates
M & T Bank
National Action Financial Services
National Asset Management Enterprises
National Asset Recovery Services
National City (Altegra)

National Enterprise Systems
National Financial Systems
Nations Credit
NationsBanc/Nationsbank
Nationwide Credit
Nationwide Modification Agency Inc
NB Lending
NCO
NCO Financial Systems
NCO Group

NDEx Technologies, LLC
Network Mortgage Servicing
New Century Financial Services, Inc.
New Century Mortgage
North Fork Bank (GreenTree)
Northland Group
NorWest Mortgage
Novastar
Ocwen/ Ocwen Federal Bank/ Ocwen Financial
Olympus Mortgage (Ameriquest)
Olympus Servicing

One West
Option One Mortgage (H&R Block)
Option One Mortgage (Irvine, Ca.)
Origen
Outsourcing Solutions (OSI)
Pacific Republic Mortgage
PCFS Mortgage Resources
People’s Choice Home Loan
Perry Homes
Peters and Freedman
PHH Mortgage
Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd.

Pite Duncan, LLP
Pioneer Credit Recovery
Platinum Financial Services
Platinum Home Mortgage
Plaza Associates
PMI Group
Portfolio Recovery Associates
Portfolio Recovery Services
PRA III, LLC
Principal Residential Mortgage

Pro Com Services
Professional Credit Management
Professional Recovery Systems

Promiss Solutions
Protocol Recovery Service
Provident Bank
Quicken Loans
Quality Loan Service
RBMG
Receivables Management Solutions
Redline Recovery Services
Regent & Associates
Rels Valuation
REMIC
Renaissance Mortgage Acceptance
Residential Loan Centers of America
Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”)(1980′s Savings & Loan Scandal)
Revenue Management
Revenue Production Management, Inc. (RPM)
Risk Management Alternatives
RJM (Fingerhut)
ROBO-Signors (see below)
RRReview, Inc
RX Financial

Sand Canyon

Saxon Mortgage
Sagres Co.
Salvatore Spinelli
Saxon Mortgage Services
Schreiber & Associates of Danvers, Massachusetts
Schwartz & Schwartz
Security Finance Corporation of Oklahoma
Security National Servicing
Select Portfolio Servicing – SPS (formerly Fairbanks Capital)
Settleware.com
Shapiro & Fishman in Boca Raton

Shapiro & Fishman in Tampa
Shapiro & Kreisman
Sherman Acquisitions / Alegis
Smith, Hiatt and Diaz
Southwest Credit Corp.

Specialized Loan Services
Summit Mortgage
Sunrise Credit Services
Suntrust Mortgage
Superior Bank
Surpas Resource Corporation
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp.
Tate & Kirlin Associates
Temple Inland Mortgage
The Associates
Town and Country Credit
TranSouth Financial Corporation
Transworld
Trauner, Cohen & Thomas
U. S. Bank
Unifund
Unifund Group
United Financial Mortgage
United Law Group
Universal Fidelity Corporation
Upland Mortgage
U.S. Bank
U.S. Foreclosure Relief Corporation
U.S. Mortgage Corp.
Valentine & Kebartas
Van Ru Credit
Wachovia Bank
Walinski & Trunkett
Walsh Securities Inc.
Washington Mutual (WAMU)
The Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, P.A. (Florida)
Wells Fargo
Weltman, Weinberg
Wendover Financial Services/
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Co. (WMC)
Williams & Williams
Wilshire Credit Corp
WMC Mortgage

Wolf Law Firm
Wolpoff & Abramson
World Wide Financial Services
Worldwide Asset Management
Worldwide Asset Purchasing

Worldwide Financial Resources
Worldzen
Znet Financial
Zwicker & Associates

Final words: the “Robo” actions are just the tip of the iceberg but the “Robo” actions allowed part of the iceberg to be seen.

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The Top Twelve Reasons Why You Should Hate the Mortgage Settlement

As readers may know by now, 49 of 50 states have agreed to join the so-called mortgage settlement, with Oklahoma the lone refusenik. Although the fine points are still being hammered out, various news outlets (New York Times, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal) have details, with Dave Dayen’s overview at Firedoglake the best thus far.

The Wall Street Journal is also reporting that the SEC is about to launch some securities litigation against major banks. Since the statue of limitations has already run out on securities filings more than five years old, this means they’ll clip the banks for some of the very last (and dreckiest) deals they shoved out the door before the subprime market gave up the ghost.

The various news services are touting this pact at the biggest multi-state settlement since the tobacco deal in 1998. While narrowly accurate, this deal is bush league by comparison even though the underlying abuses in both cases have had devastating consequences.

The tobacco agreement was pegged as being worth nearly $250 billion over the first 25 years. Adjust that for inflation, and the disparity is even bigger. That shows you the difference in outcomes between a case where the prosecutors have solid evidence backing their charges, versus one where everyone know a lot of bad stuff happened, but no one has come close to marshaling the evidence.

The mortgage settlement terms have not been released, but more of the details have been leaked:

1. The total for the top five servicers is now touted as $26 billion (annoyingly, the FT is calling it “nearly $40 billion”), but of that, roughly $17 billion is credits for principal modifications, which as we pointed out earlier, can and almost assuredly will come largely from mortgages owned by investors. $3 billion is for refis, and only $5 billion will be in the form of hard cash payments, including $1500 to $2000 per borrower foreclosed on between September 2008 and December 2011.

Banks will be required to modify second liens that sit behind firsts “at least” pari passu, which in practice will mean at most pari passu. So this guarantees banks will also focus on borrowers where they do not have second lien exposure, and this also makes the settlement less helpful to struggling homeowners, since borrowers with both second and first liens default at much higher rates than those without second mortgages. Per the Journal:

“It’s not new money. It’s all soft dollars to the banks,” said Paul Miller, a bank analyst at FBR Capital Markets.

The Times is also subdued:

Despite the billions earmarked in the accord, the aid will help a relatively small portion of the millions of borrowers who are delinquent and facing foreclosure. The success could depend in part on how effectively the program is carried out because earlier efforts by Washington aimed at troubled borrowers helped far fewer than had been expected.

2. Schneiderman’s MERS suit survives, and he can add more banks as defendants. It isn’t clear what became of the Biden and Coakley MERS suits, but Biden sounded pretty adamant in past media presentations on preserving that.

3. Nevada’s and Arizona’s suits against Countrywide for violating its past consent decree on mortgage servicing has, in a new Orwellianism, been “folded into” the settlement.

4. The five big players in the settlement have already set aside reserves sufficient for this deal.

Here are the top twelve reasons why this deal stinks:

1. We’ve now set a price for forgeries and fabricating documents. It’s $2000 per loan. This is a rounding error compared to the chain of title problem these systematic practices were designed to circumvent. The cost is also trivial in comparison to the average loan, which is roughly $180k, so the settlement represents about 1% of loan balances. It is less than the price of the title insurance that banks failed to get when they transferred the loans to the trust. It is a fraction of the cost of the legal expenses when foreclosures are challenged. It’s a great deal for the banks because no one is at any of the servicers going to jail for forgery and the banks have set the upper bound of the cost of riding roughshod over 300 years of real estate law.

2. That $26 billion is actually $5 billion of bank money and the rest is your money. The mortgage principal writedowns are guaranteed to come almost entirely from securitized loans, which means from investors, which in turn means taxpayers via Fannie and Freddie, pension funds, insurers, and 401 (k)s. Refis of performing loans also reduce income to those very same investors.

3. That $5 billion divided among the big banks wouldn’t even represent a significant quarterly hit. Freddie and Fannie putbacks to the major banks have been running at that level each quarter.

4. That $20 billion actually makes bank second liens sounder, so this deal is a stealth bailout that strengthens bank balance sheets at the expense of the broader public.

5. The enforcement is a joke. The first layer of supervision is the banks reporting on themselves. The framework is similar to that of the OCC consent decrees implemented last year, which Adam Levitin and yours truly, among others, decried as regulatory theater.

6. The past history of servicer consent decrees shows the servicers all fail to comply. Why? Servicer records and systems are terrible in the best of times, and their systems and fee structures aren’t set up to handle much in the way of delinquencies. As Tom Adams has pointed out in earlier posts, servicer behavior is predictable when their portfolios are hit with a high level of delinquencies and defaults: they cheat in all sorts of ways to reduce their losses.

7. The cave-in Nevada and Arizona on the Countrywide settlement suit is a special gift for Bank of America, who is by far the worst offender in the chain of title disaster (since, according to sworn testimony of its own employee in Kemp v. Countrywide, Countrywide failed to comply with trust delivery requirements). This move proves that failing to comply with a consent degree has no consequences but will merely be rolled into a new consent degree which will also fail to be enforced. These cases also alleged HAMP violations as consumer fraud violations and could have gotten costly and emboldened other states to file similar suits not just against Countrywide but other servicers, so it was useful to the other banks as well.

8. If the new Federal task force were intended to be serious, this deal would have not have been settled. You never settle before investigating. It’s a bad idea to settle obvious, widespread wrongdoing on the cheap. You use the stuff that is easy to prove to gather information and secure cooperation on the stuff that is harder to prove. In Missouri and Nevada, the robosigning investigation led to criminal charges against agents of the servicers. But even though these companies were acting at the express direction and approval of the services, no individuals or entities higher up the food chain will face any sort of meaningful charges.

9. There is plenty of evidence of widespread abuses that appear not to be on the attorney generals’ or media’s radar, such as servicer driven foreclosures and looting of investors’ funds via impermissible and inflated charges. While no serious probe was undertaken, even the limited or peripheral investigations show massive failures (60% of documents had errors in AGs/Fed’s pathetically small sample). Similarly, the US Trustee’s office found widespread evidence of significant servicer errors in bankruptcy-related filings, such as inflated and bogus fees, and even substantial, completely made up charges. Yet the services and banks will suffer no real consequences for these abuses.

10. A deal on robosiginging serves to cover up the much deeper chain of title problem. And don’t get too excited about the New York, Massachusetts, and Delaware MERS suits. They put pressure on banks to clean up this monstrous mess only if the AGs go through to trial and get tough penalties. The banks will want to settle their way out of that too. And even if these cases do go to trial and produce significant victories for the AGs, they still do not address the problem of failures to transfer notes correctly.

11. Don’t bet on a deus ex machina in terms of the new Federal foreclosure task force to improve this picture much. If you think Schneiderman, as a co-chairman who already has a full time day job in New York, is going to outfox a bunch of DC insiders who are part of the problem, I have a bridge I’d like to sell to you.

12. We’ll now have to listen to banks and their sycophant defenders declaring victory despite being wrong on the law and the facts. They will proceed to marginalize and write off criticisms of the servicing practices that hurt homeowners and investors and are devastating communities. But the problems will fester and the housing market will continue to suffer. Investors in mortgage-backed securities, who know that services have been screwing them for years, will be hung out to dry and will likely never return to a private MBS market, since the problems won’t ever be fixed. This settlement has not only revealed the residential mortgage market to be too big to fail, but puts it on long term, perhaps permanent, government life support.

As we’ve said before, this settlement is yet another raw demonstration of who wields power in America, and it isn’t you and me. It’s bad enough to see these negotiations come to their predictable, sorry outcome. It adds insult to injury to see some try to depict it as a win for long suffering, still abused homeowners.

Freddie Mac Bets Against American Homeowners

Freddie Mac
Image via Wikipedia


Freddie Mac, the taxpayer-owned mortgage giant, has placed multibillion-dollar bets that pay off if homeowners stay trapped in expensive mortgages with interest rates well above current rates.

Freddie began increasing these bets dramatically in late 2010, the same time that the company was making it harder for homeowners to get out of such high-interest mortgages.

No evidence has emerged that these decisions were coordinated. The company is a key gatekeeper for home loans but says its traders are “walled off” from the officials who have restricted homeowners from taking advantage of historically low interest rates by imposing higher fees and new rules.

Freddie’s charter calls for the company to make home loans more accessible. Its chief executive, Charles Haldeman Jr., recently told Congress that his company is “helping financially strapped families reduce their mortgage costs through refinancing their mortgages.”

But the trades, uncovered for the first time in an investigation by ProPublica and NPR, give Freddie a powerful incentive to do the opposite, highlighting a conflict of interest at the heart of the company. In addition to being an instrument of government policy dedicated to making home loans more accessible, Freddie also has giant investment portfolios and could lose substantial amounts of money if too many borrowers refinance.

“We were actually shocked they did this,” says Scott Simon, who as the head of the giant bond fund PIMCO’s mortgage-backed securities team is one of the world’s biggest mortgage bond traders. “It seemed so out of line with their mission.”

The trades “put them squarely against the homeowner,” he says.

Those homeowners have a lot at stake, too. Many of them could cut their interest payments by thousands of dollars a year.

Freddie Mac, along with its cousin Fannie Mae, was bailed out in 2008 and is now owned by taxpayers. The companies play a pivotal role in the mortgage business because they insure most home loans in the United States, making banks likelier to lend. The companies’ rules determine whether homeowners can get loans and on what terms.

The Federal Housing Finance Agency effectively serves as Freddie’s board of directors and is ultimately responsible for Freddie’s decisions. It is run by acting director Edward DeMarco, who cannot be fired by the president except in extraordinary circumstances.

Freddie and the FHFA repeatedly declined to comment on the specific transactions.

Freddie’s moves to limit refinancing affect not only individual homeowners but the entire economy. An expansive refinancing program could help millions of homeowners, some economists say. Such an effort would “help the economy and put tens of billions of dollars back in consumers’ pockets, the equivalent of a very long-term tax cut,” says real-estate economist Christopher Mayer of the Columbia Business School. “It also is likely to reduce foreclosures and benefit the U.S. government” because Freddie and Fannie, which guarantee most mortgages in the country, would have lower losses over the long run.

Freddie Mac’s trades, while perfectly legal, came during a period when the company was supposed to be reducing its investment portfolio, according to the terms of its government takeover agreement. But these trades escalate the risk of its portfolio, because the securities Freddie has purchased are volatile and hard to sell, mortgage securities experts say.

The financial crisis in 2008 was made worse when Wall Street traders made bets against their customers and the American public. Now, some see similar behavior, only this time by traders at a government-owned company who are using leverage, which increases the potential profits but also the risk of big losses, and other Wall Street stratagems. “More than three years into the government takeover, we have Freddie Mac pursuing highly levered, complicated transactions seemingly with the purpose of trading against homeowners,” says Mayer. “These are the kinds of things that got us into trouble in the first place.”

Freddie Mac is betting against, among others, Jay and Bonnie Silverstein. The Silversteins live in an unfinished development of cul-de-sacs and yellow stucco houses about 20 miles north of Philadelphia, in a house decorated with Bonnie’s orchids and their Rose Bowl parade pin collection. The developer went bankrupt, leaving orange plastic construction fencing around some empty lots. The community clubhouse isn’t complete.

“We’re in financial Jail”

The Silversteins have a 30-year fixed mortgage with an interest rate of 6.875 percent, much higher than the going rate of less than 4 percent.  They have borrowed from family members and are living paycheck to paycheck. If they could refinance, they would save about $500 a month. He says the extra money would help them pay back some of their family members and visit their grandchildren more often.

But brokers have told the Silversteins that they cannot refinance, thanks to a Freddie Mac rule.

The Silversteins used to live in a larger house 15 minutes from their current place, in a more upscale development. They had always planned to downsize as they approached retirement. In 2005, they made the mistake of buying their new house before selling the larger one. As the housing market plummeted, they couldn’t sell their old house, so they carried two mortgages for 2½ years, wiping out their savings and 401(k). “It just drained us,” Jay Silverstein says.

Finally, they were advised to try a short sale, in which the house is sold for less than the value of the underlying mortgage. They stopped making payments on the big house for it to go through. The sale was finally completed in 2009.

Such debacles hurt a borrower’s credit rating. But Bonnie has a solid job at a doctor’s office, and Jay has a pension from working for more than two decades for Johnson & Johnson. They say they haven’t missed a payment on their current mortgage.

But the Silversteins haven’t been able to get their refi. Freddie Mac won’t insure a new loan for people who had a short sale in the last two to four years, depending on their financial condition. While the company’s previous rules prohibited some short sales, in October 2010 the company changed its criteria to include all short sales. It is unclear whether the Silverstein mortgage would have been barred from a short sale under the previous Freddie rules.

Short-term, Freddie’s trades benefit from the high-interest mortgage in which the Silversteins are trapped. But in the long run, Freddie could benefit if the Silversteins refinanced to a more affordable loan. Freddie guarantees the Silversteins’ mortgage, so if the couple defaults, Freddie — and the taxpayers who own the company — are on the hook. Getting the Silversteins into a more affordable mortgage would make a default less likely.

If millions of homeowners like the Silversteins default, the economy would be harmed. But if they switch to loans with lower interest rates, they would have more money to spend, which could boost the economy.

“We’re in financial jail,” says Jay, “and we’ve never been there before.”

How Freddie’s investments work

Here’s how Freddie Mac’s trades profit from the Silversteins staying in “financial jail.” The couple’s mortgage is sitting in a big pile of other mortgages, most of which are also guaranteed by Freddie and have high interest rates. Those mortgages underpin securities that get divided into two basic categories.

Anatomy of a Deal

How Freddie Mac structured a deal in which it profited if homeowners stayed trapped in high-interest mortgages.

One portion is backed mainly by principal, pays a low return, and was sold to investors who wanted a safe place to park their money. The other part, the inverse floater, is backed mainly by the interest payments on the mortgages, such as the high rate that the Silversteins pay. So this portion of the security can pay a much higher return, and this is what Freddie retained.

In 2010 and ’11, Freddie purchased $3.4 billion worth of inverse floater portions — their value based mostly on interest payments on $19.5 billion in mortgage-backed securities, according to prospectuses for the deals. They covered tens of thousands of homeowners. Most of the mortgages backing these transactions have high rates of about 6.5 percent to 7 percent, according to the deal documents.

Between late 2010 and early 2011, Freddie Mac’s purchases of inverse floater securities rose dramatically. Freddie purchased inverse floater portions of 29 deals in 2010 and 2011, with 26 bought between October 2010 and April 2011. That compares with seven for all of 2009 and five in 2008.

In these transactions, Freddie has sold off most of the principal, but it hasn’t reduced its risk.

First, if borrowers default, Freddie pays the entire value of the mortgages underpinning the securities, because it insures the loans.

It’s also a big problem if people like the Silversteins refinance their mortgages. That’s because a refi is a new loan; the borrower pays off the first loan early, stopping the interest payments. Since the security Freddie owns is backed mainly by those interest payments, Freddie loses.

And these inverse floaters burden Freddie with entirely new risks. With these deals, Freddie has taken mortgage-backed securities that are easy to sell and traded them for ones that are harder and possibly more expensive to offload, according to mortgage market experts.

The inverse floaters carry another risk. Freddie gets paid the difference between the high mortgages rates, such as the Silversteins are paying, and a key global interest rate that right now is very low. If that rate rises, Freddie’s profits will fall.

It is unclear what kinds of hedging, if any, Freddie has done to offset its risks.

At the end of 2011, Freddie’s portfolio of mortgages was just over $663 billion, down more than 6 percent from the previous year. But that $43 billion drop in the portfolio overstates the risk reduction, because the company retained risk through the inverse floaters. The company is well below the cap of $729 billion required by its government takeover agreement.

How Freddie tightened credit

Restricting credit for people who have done short sales isn’t the only way that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have tightened their lending criteria in the wake of the financial crisis, making it harder for borrowers to get housing loans.

Some tightening is justified because, in the years leading up to the financial crisis, Freddie and Fannie were too willing to insure mortgages taken out by people who couldn’t afford them.

In a statement, Freddie contends it is “actively supporting efforts for borrowers to realize the benefits of refinancing their mortgages to lower rates.”

The company said in a statement: “During the first three quarters of 2011, we refinanced more than $170 billion in mortgages, helping nearly 835,000 borrowers save an average of $2,500 in interest payments during the next year.” As part of that effort, the company is participating in an Obama administration plan, called the Home Affordable Refinance Program, or HARP. But critics say HARP could be reaching millions more people if Fannie and Freddie implemented the program more effectively.

Indeed, just as it was escalating its inverse floater deals, it was also introducing new fees on borrowers, including those wanting to refinance. During Thanksgiving week in 2010, Freddie quietly announced that it was raising charges, called post-settlement delivery fees.

In a recent white paper on remedies for the stalled housing market, the Federal Reserve criticized Fannie and Freddie for the fees they have charged for refinancing. Such fees are “another possible reason for low rates of refinancing” and are “difficult to justify,” the Fed wrote.

A former Freddie employee, who spoke on condition he not be named, was even blunter: “Generally, it makes no sense whatsoever” for Freddie “to restrict refinancing” from expensive loans to ones borrowers can more easily pay, since the company remains on the hook if homeowners default.

In November, the FHFA announced that Fannie and Freddie were eliminating or reducing some fees. The Fed, however, said that “more might be done.”

The regulator as owner

The trades raise questions about the FHFA’s oversight of Fannie and Freddie. But the FHFA is not just a regulator. With the two companies in government conservatorship, the FHFA now plays the role of their board of directors and shareholders, responsible for the companies’ major decisions.

Under acting director DeMarco, the FHFA has emphasized that its main goal is to limit taxpayer losses by managing the two companies’ giant investment portfolios to make profits. To cover their previous losses and ongoing operations, Fannie and Freddie already had received $169 billion from taxpayers through the third quarter of last year.

The FHFA has frustrated the administration because the agency has made preserving the value of the companies’ investment portfolios a priority over helping homeowners in expensive mortgages. In 2010, President Barack Obama nominated a permanent replacement for acting director DeMarco, but Republicans in Congress blocked him. Obama has not nominated anyone else to replace DeMarco.

Even though Freddie is a ward of the state, top executives are highly compensated. Peter Federico, who’s in charge of the company’s investment portfolio, made $2.5 million in 2010, and he had target compensation of $2.6 million for last year, when most of these leveraged investments were made.

One of Federico’s responsibilities — tied to his bonuses —  is to “support and provide liquidity and stability in the mortgage market,” according to Freddie’s annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mortgage experts contend that the inverse floater trades don’t further that goal.

ProPublica and NPR made numerous attempts to reach Federico. A woman who answered his home phone said he declined to comment.

The FHFA knew about the trades before ProPublica and NPR approached the regulatory agency about them, according to an FHFA official. The FHFA has the power to approve and disapprove trades, though it doesn’t involve itself in day-to-day decisions. The official declined to comment on whether the FHFA knew about them as Freddie was conducting them or whether the FHFA had explicitly approved them.

Liz Day of ProPublica contributed to this story.

Mandelman sounds the Alert “Calling All Lawyers to 5,000,000 Crime Scenes”

 

It’s time for me to have an adult conversation with the experienced practicing attorneys in this country.  Other grown-ups are welcome to sit in as well, but it’s time for children to be in bed or occupied elsewhere, okay?

If there’s no money to be made solving something… no profit incentive… then for the most part, we don’t quite have a handle on to solving it.  For example, we’re not very good at cleaning up our oceans in general, and if there weren’t money to be made cleaning up oceans after oil spills, my guess would be that we wouldn’t be very good at doing that either.
To-date, however, BP has reportedly spent $21 billion cleaning up the Gulf of Mexico since its last mega-disaster, and guess what?  The Gulf of Mexico is pretty clean again… just two years later!  I remember hearing environmentalists predict that it could take 100 years to clean up the Gulf after the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe.  I guess they were underestimating just how much solution $21 billion can often buy.

Well, today we have a mammoth size foreclosure problem in this country, and it’s being talked about like it’s damn near an unsolvable problem… as if solving it would require determining the chemical origins of life, or figuring out whether black holes really do exist in space.

The foreclosure crisis, thank goodness, is not a black hole-type problem as many would have us believe.  It is a problem that, political constraints notwithstanding, exists at the juncture of economics and the rule of law.  In other words… it’s an oil spill… perhaps the worst oil spill of which the world has ever conceived… the Exxon Valdez meets Deepwater Horizon x 100, if you will… but it’s still just an oil spill.

It’s also important to note that as an economics problem alone, the foreclosure crisis is not a particularly challenging one to solve.  Some would rush to remind me that any proposed solution would be rife with “moral hazard,” and while that may be true, it doesn’t make the problem insoluble, by any means.

The elephant in the room is that what we’re facing in this country today is not just a foreclosure crisis, what we’re dealing with with is much better described as a FRAUDclosure crisis.

A couple of years ago, many would have said that my use of the word “fraud” before “closure,” is just hyperbole.  Today, however, anyone voicing that sort of opinion is selling something.  Even a cursory review of last year’s scathing “consent orders,” that federal regulators issued after months spent investigating mortgage servicers… or a quick perusal of the complaints filed against the servicers by attorneys general in Massachusetts, Nevada, Maryland, or Arizona… or by reading any number of published court decisions favoring homeowners… and one can only conclude that use of the word “fraud” is, if anything, understatement.

Additionally, this past year has been a turning point for the general public as far as FRAUDclosures are concerned.  Television’s most venerable news magazine, “60 Minutes,” along with newspaper-of-record, “The New York Times,” joined a long list of others documenting the many ways that banks and mortgage servicers are routinely breaking numerous laws in order to take advantage of homeowners in foreclosure.  It’s now widely understood to be something that’s occurring all over the country, and even though the banking industry continues to try to dismiss publicized instances as insignificant dalliances or “isolated incidents,” their sheer number has made such attempts laughable.  And the levels of wholesale anger and dissatisfaction with government felt among the populace are both palpable and rising fast.

Today, even forecasts from the likes of Goldman Sachs and Amherst Securities peg the number of foreclosures between 10.4 and 14 million by year-end 2014, and those numbers could easily go higher should home prices continue to fall… which they invariably will.  Add those numbers to the millions of foreclosures already water under the bridge, and were talking about a crisis that results in ONE IN FOUR Americans with mortgages losing their homes to foreclosure in the next handful of years.

What I’m describing will unquestionably devastate any hope for recovery in our broader economy for any number of reasons.  For one thing, as banks are forced to recognize their losses incurred on the mortgage-backed securities and CDOs that capitalize their balance sheets, they will become insolvent… and this time many will be forced to fail.  For another, home prices will continue falling pushing more and more homeowners underwater and consumer spending will continue to decline and that will lead to rising unemployment, which will in turn fuel further foreclosures.  And those hopelessly underwater will begin walking away en masse, which will further exacerbate the decline in prices and become impossible to combat.

All of these factors and more will combine to reduce future demand for residential real estate dramatically… perhaps by half, but in addition, with no secondary mortgage market… no ability to securitize debt… even those wanting to buy homes going forward will find credit to be tight and tighter, destroying any potential for recovery in the housing market.

And I’m no longer in a small group of people writing about this deteriorating situation as was the case three plus years ago.  Every day others are waking up to the fact that what we’ve been told about foreclosures to-date by our government and the financial services and related industries, has proven itself to be at best mistaken… at worst misdirection… or, not to put too fine a point on it, outright folderol.

As conservative columnist, Peggy Noonan, has pointed out recently, it’s simply impossible to imagine this sort of future without also seeing social unrest on a scale not seen in this country since at least the 1930s.  Writing recently about the Occupy Wall Street (“OWS”) movement, Noonan echoes my sentiments on the situation to a tee…

“OWS is an expression of American discontent, and others will follow.  Protests and social unrest are particularly likely if people feel they are unfairly losing their homes to support irresponsible, law-breaking institutions that have successfully disregarded the fundamental rules of capitalism and good citizenship.”

The harsh truth is that whatever is done in the future at state or federal levels to mitigate the damage caused by foreclosures, it’s simply too late to prevent our FRAUDclosure crisis from pretty much wiping out our nation’s middle class economy for more than a generation.  As a practical matter, the only real question we face today is how many are wounded and how many are killed… none of us is getting out unscathed.

There should be no question in anyone’s mind… there are only two paths ahead from which to choose.  Both involve fighting a war… but on one path the battle is fought by lawyers in our courts… on the other, by citizens in our streets.

Make no mistake about it… if we are to mitigate any of the  damage being caused, uphold the rule of law, and protect the rights of millions of homeowners… it should be obvious to anyone that WE NEED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF LAWYERS trained in foreclosure defense, loss mitigation and bankruptcy.  And yet, more than four years into the FRAUDclosure crisis, we don’t have anywhere near the number of trained, ethical attorneys required to meet the demand.

We’re all adults here, so let’s not kid ourselves about why that’s the case.  

We all know why we don’t have the lawyers we need to marshall a more effective defense of homeowners engulfed by the FRAUDclosure crisis… it’s because THERE’S NO MONEY IN IT.  Or, at least that’s what lawyers have been told they are supposed to believe.  Not only that, but the message has been that there  shouldn’t be any money in representing homeowners at risk of FRAUDclosure. It’s as if attorneys profiting from representing homeowners at risk of FRAUDclosure is somehow a bad thing.

AND THAT’S JUST 100% BANKER-INSPIRED B.S.

Don’t you see what’s happened here?  We’ve allowed the banks, and the government that’s been bailing them out, to essentially criminalize the profit potential in representing homeowners at risk of foreclosure… and wonder of wonders, miracles of miracles… here we sit with what appears to be an unsolvable problem.

Consider this… bankers say that they’ve been overwhelmed by the millions of homeowners unexpectedly seeking loan modifications and that’s why applying for a loan modification has been such a nightmare.  But, what about the number of foreclosures occurring in the same time frame?  Haven’t there been an unprecedented and unexpected number of foreclosures too?  So,why is it that the banks have no problems accommodating the millions of unexpected foreclosures, but the millions of unexpected loan modifications represent an unsolvable problem?

It’s simple… because on the foreclosure side of the equation, banks allow lawyers to be profitably compensated for handling foreclosures, and sure enough those law firms have figured out how to handle any number of foreclosures that come down the pike… in fact, the more the merrier, as they say.  On the loan modification side of the house, however, profits are a dirty word… and wouldn’t you know it, the problem is unsolvable.  Why am I not surprised?

Over the TWO YEARS following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP spent $21 billion to clean up the Gulf of Mexico.  In the FOUR YEARS since the tsunami of foreclosures began, we’ve spent roughly ten percent of what BP spent cleaning up the Gulf… $2.4 billion… and the vast majority of that amount paid to mortgage servicers… and we’re wondering why the problem can’t be solved?

 A MESSAGE TO OUR NATION’S LAWYERS…

It’s the biggest financial opportunity for the legal profession

SINCE THE REAR END COLLISION. 

The fact is… there is a HUGE OPPORTUNITY today to build a very profitable legal practice based on the ethical and effective representation of homeowners caught in the FRAUDclosure crisis.

From the very beginning of the mortgage meltdown, banks have tried to make sure that homeowners were not represented by attorneys when trying to save their homes from FRAUDclosure.   The reason is now apparent: Banks knew it was a FRAUDclosure crisis before the rest of us did because they’re the ones who put the FRAUD into FRAUDclosure.  From the earliest days of the crisis, the banks and the Obama Administration have been reinforcing TWO LIES:

  1. Homeowners at risk of foreclosure don’t need lawyers… they can just call their bank directly.  That’s like the police telling someone under arrest that he or she doesn’t need a lawyer because any questions can be answered by the District Attorney.  It’s a damn lie… homeowners DO NEED LAWYERS to help them save their homes because it’s not just a foreclosure crisis, it’s a FRAUDclosure crisis.
  2. A lawyer who charges a homeowner at risk of foreclosure up front… is a “SCAMMER.”  That is not only a LIE, but it’s a lie to achieve two key bank objectives.  One – It stopped many homeowners from seeking legal representation, thus allowing the banks to do whatever they wanted as related to foreclosing on their homes.  Two – It stopped countless attorneys from building a profitable practice based on representing homeowners at risk of foreclosure.

The California Example…

In California, the efforts to stop lawyers from representing homeowners have been more extreme than in any other state.  Here the campaign to malign the legal profession has been driven by legislative committees and supported by the California State Bar Association.  In October 2009, California’s SB 94 created a law that has effectively prevented lawyers from offering to represent homeowners who are seeking to avoid foreclosure through modification of their loans.  Under the guise of “charging up front makes you a scammer,” SB 94 has made it illegal for a lawyer to charge a homeowner an upfront retainer for legal fees.

Quite predictably, the law has made it difficult or even impossible for California homeowners to find quality legal representation related to seeking loan modifications, forcing those at risk of foreclosure who want to be represented by an attorney into either litigation or bankruptcy.  Writing for The New York Times in December 2010, David Streitfeld’s article titled, “Homes at Risk, and No Help from Lawyers,” described the situation in California related to SB 94.

In California, where foreclosures are more abundant than in any other state, homeowners trying to win a loan modification have always had a tough time. 

Now they face yet another obstacle: hiring a lawyer.

Sharon Bell, a retiree who lives in Laguna Niguel, southeast of Los Angeles, needs a modification to keep her home. She says she is scared of her bank and its plentiful resources, so much so that she cannot even open its certified letters inquiring where her mortgage payments may be. Yet the half-dozen lawyers she has called have refused to represent her.

“They said they couldn’t help,” said Ms. Bell, 63. “But I’ve got to find help, because I’m dying every day.”

Lawyers throughout California say they have no choice but to reject clients like Ms. Bell because of a new state law that sharply restricts how they can be paid. Under the measure, passed overwhelmingly by the State Legislature and backed by the state bar association, lawyers who work on loan modifications cannot receive any money until the work is complete. The bar association says that under the law, clients cannot put retainers in trust accounts.

To make matters worse, SB 94 has recently become controversial.  In late September 2011, Suzan Anderson, who is the supervising trial council of the state bar’s special team on loan modifications, made an unscheduled appearance at the bar’s annual conference, presenting what she purported to be the bar’s new interpretation of SB 94.  Literally hundreds of attorneys and legal scholars disagree, however, and litigation has recently been filed against the bar seeking declaratory relief, so we’ll soon see the courts decide the issue.

The core issue is about when a lawyer who represents a homeowner trying to get their loan modified can be compensated.  The bar claims the law requires an attorney to wait until the very end of the case, however, the actual language contained in SB 94 doesn’t say that… it says lawyers cannot be paid until completing “any and all services (the lawyer) has contracted to perform…” Up until Ms. Anderson’s presentation at the annual meeting, lawyers were dividing services into separate contractual arrangements and accepting payments from homeowners as discreet sets of services were completed.

Regardless of which side of the debate you’re on, the issue highlights how far the banking lobby will push a state legislature and state bar association in an attempt to prevent homeowners from being represented by legal council when trying to to avoid foreclosure, and it should come as absolutely no surprise that SB 94 was born in the state’s Senate Banking Committee, sponsored by Sen. Ron Calderon, who chairs that committee.

Advocates of SB 94 claim that it was needed to stop “scammers” who were preying on homeowners in distress from accepting up-front fees.  As quoted from Streitfeld’s article in The New York Times…

A spokesman for the Mortgage Bankers Association said it simply wanted to protect homeowners from fraud. “Be very careful about anyone who wants you to pay them to help you get a loan modification,” said the spokesman, John Mechem.

The evidence of any sort of army of lawyers-turned-scammers ripping off homeowners has always been thin, and by “thin” I mean nonexistant.  In the two years since the bill became law, the bar has taken some type of disciplinary action related to the representation of homeowners in foreclosure against two dozen lawyers, give or take a few.  In a state with more than 200,000 lawyers and 2 million homeowners in foreclosure, two dozen lawyers disciplined would hardly seem justification for a law that effectively prevents lawyers from helping homeowners get their loans modified.

Last December, Suzan Anderson, who heads up the bar’s task force on loan modifications, told The New York Times…

“I wish the law had worked,” Ms. Anderson said.

It’s also telling that no other state in the country has a law anything like SB 94, in fact, the rest of the states follow the FTC’s Mortgage Assistance Relief Services rule, MARS, which was adopted on January 30, 2011, and it does allow attorneys representing homeowners seeking loan modifications to accept funds in advance into their trust accounts.

The New York Times article also offered the perspective of several California homeowners seeking legal assistance in a post SB 94 world…

Mark Stone, a 56-year-old general contractor in Sierra Madre, feels differently. A few years ago, he got sick with hepatitis C. Unable to work full time, he began to miss mortgage payments. The drugs he was taking left him “a little confused,” he said.

Mr. Stone knew that his condition put him at a disadvantage in negotiations with his bank. So he hired Gregory Royston, a real estate lawyer in Redondo Beach. It took Mr. Royston nearly a year, but he restructured the loan.

 Without the lawyer, Mr. Stone said, “I’d be living under a bridge.
The legal bill, paid in advance, was $3,500. “Worth every penny,” said Mr. Stone, who is now back at work.
“This law,” Mr. Royston said, “took the wrong people out of the game.”

A Bleak Picture in California…

California’s approach to discouraging lawyers from representing homeowners at risk of foreclosure has not served the state or its residents well at all.  California is the “hardest hit” of all 50 states, accounting for one of every five foreclosures in the U.S.  Almost half of California’s homeowners are either underwater or effectively underwater today.  Since 2008, there have been 1.2 million foreclosures statewide, and that number is expected to exceed 2 million by the end of 2012.  And, according to the report published by the California Reinvestment Coalition…

The 2 million foreclosures expected by the end of this year are forecasted to cost the state and its residents $650 billion statewide.

Today, in California alone there are roughly TWO MILLION homeowners in foreclosure.  I don’t know exactly how many we have nationwide, estimates vary, but are in the 5 million range.  I do know that if two million people needed just 10 hours of legal assistance, it would take 20 million man hours.  Assuming a six hour work day and a 260 day work year… that’s just under 13,000 years assuming only one lawyer were involved.  To help two million people, assuming 10 hours each, at best would require more than 10,000 lawyers trained and working efficiently.

How many attorneys do we have  trained and ready to help loans get modified, represent homeowners in foreclosure defense matters and/or in bankruptcy.  Nowhere near 13,000 that’s for sure… in fact, we might not find 1300 either… and many would say the number could be closer to 130, and with the proliferating fraudulent documents… the abuses by servicers… the number of people who are foreclosed on illegally… its become easy to see the disease, and trained ethical lawyers would seem the only cure.

Mandelman out.

~~~

We need a literal army of experienced litigators, and Max Gardner’s Bankruptcy Boot Camp has trained close to 900 attorneys to protect the rights of homeowners in foreclosure.  I’ve attended Max’s Boot Camp… I could never recommend it strongly enough… and often do.  But, there’s more than legal training that’s required here… and if we’re going to attract the number of lawyers we need to fight this war…

The Answer is Money…

What Was Your Question?

Ohio’s former Attorney General Marc Dann is a highly experienced foreclosure defense attorney and a graduate of Max Gardner’s Boot Camp. He’s proven in his own successful practice that lawyers have the opportunity to DO GOOD… and DO WELL at the same time by learning the ins and outs of this, unfortunately, very fast growing and specialized field.  And he’s developed a comprehensive training and ongoing support program that allows experienced foreclosure defense attorneys to immediately access new clients and the right clients, improve operations within their firms, and yes… increase their profitability dramatically.

Marc understands our need for an experienced army of foreclosure defense lawyers, but he also understands the reality that lawyers have to make money in order to operate effectively.  In a phrase, a lawyer that can provide effective representation for homeowners at risk of foreclosure today, should not be worried about losing his or her own home to foreclosure because that benefits no one.

So, Marc has developed and employed best practices in building his own successful foreclosure defense practice, and now he’s teaching other attorneys how to make money in foreclosure defense so that ultimately he will have provided countless thousands of homeowners all over the country with access to highly capable, ethical and experienced attorneys.

Marc Dann’s LAW PROFITS program will take experienced and effective attorneys committed to foreclosure defense and protecting the rights of homeowners, and help transform them into vibrant, profitable firms or individual legal practices.  Some of the innovative solutions Marc will be delivering include:

  • How to cut through the noise created by scammers, reaching out to homeowners in a very honest and compelling way.
  • When and how to sue the bad modification company or bad lawyer.
  • Suing the foreclosure mills for fun and profits.
  • Using Fair Debt Collection Practices and State Consumer Protection.
  • Learn about the new practices available under Dodd Frank.
  • Harnessing TILA and RESPA inside and outside bankruptcy court.
  • Unconventional approaches stay one step ahead of servicer practices.
  • Billing structures, methodologies, and practice accounting.
  • Designing compensation programs that balance the needs of homeowners with the needs of your firm.  
  • Never lose clients – Ongoing communications program that’s turn-key and educates clients so they become fans.
  • Fee agreements – for contingency and hourly clients.
  • Become part of a highly visible network of top foreclosure defense attorneys, and strategic partners.
  • Communications strategies and tactics proven effective and unavailable anywhere else.

Making little or no money in foreclosure defense isn’t doing your clients any favors because you cannot be your best without it.  Marc Dann’s LAW PROFITS is not a pot of gold, or a winning lottery ticket, but it is a proven process and suite of best practices that makes a law practice profitable… essentially immediately.  It’s work, no question about it, but it’s important and gratifying work.

I wholeheartedly support Mar’c Dann’s LAW PROFITS initiative.  And I strongly urge all of the lawyers reading this to take action now by clicking the link below, so you can find out more about what his LAW PROFITS program for foreclosure defense and bankruptcy lawyers can do for you and your firm.  The FRAUDclosure crisis and its ancillary topics, I’m sorry to say, are going to be with us for a long time… a decade plus, if we’re lucky.  Longer if we’re not.  It’s time to settle in and start capitalizing on being one of the best at solving on of the worst case scenarios.

Click below to find out more about…

Marc Dann’s

LAW PROFITS

Chase Accused of Brazen Bankruptcy Fraud

English: Category:JPMorgan Chase
Image via Wikipedia


LOS ANGELES (CN) – JPMorgan Chase routinely fabricated documents to deceive bankruptcy judges, going so far as to Photoshop documents to “create the illusion” of standing “in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases,” according to a federal class action.

Lead plaintiff Ernest Michael Bakenie claims that Chase’s “pattern and practice of playing ‘hide-and-seek’ with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players” bore rich fruit: that Chase secured motions for relief of stay and proofs of claim in 95 percent of its cases.

“Through the use of fabricated assignments, endorsements and affidavits that purport to transfer deeds of trust, notes and the rights to all monies due under the terms of tens of thousands of non-negotiable promissory notes (the ‘MLNs’); Chase has demonstrated a pattern and practice of playing ‘hide-and-seek’ with debtors, judges and other bankruptcy players,” the complaint states.

“Chase intentionally conceals the identity of the true parties in interest entitled to enforce the tens of tens of thousands of residential non-negotiable promissory notes (the ‘MLNs’) for its own financial benefit, at the expense of the class and to the detriment of the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”

Bakenie says Chase used a network of attorneys to file more than 7,000 motions for relief from automatic stay in bankruptcy cases in the Central District of California, “wherein they falsely claim to be the party entitled to monies due under the terms of MLNs.”

Chase rewards attorneys based on how quickly they can secure the stays, and uses fabricated documents to establish chain of title on loans, according to the complaint.

“Rather than incur the cost of ‘proving up’ its own standing or the standing of its principal Mortgage Backed Security Trust, Chase systemically misrepresents Chase or a designated MBST to be a creditor in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases by utilizing manufactured documents,” the complaint states.

Bakenie claims: “That said practice is utilized for all mortgage loans originated by Chase, and other loan originators, including insolvent Washington Mutual Bank, whose assets were purchased by Chase.

“That said manufactured documents are fabrications intended to create the illusion of a valid transfers MLNs and support the assertion of standing in tens of thousands of bankruptcy cases. …

“That the aforementioned fabricated evidence is ‘photo-shopped’ and is highly persuasive and authentic in appearance so as to ensure legal victory in the bankruptcy courts.

“That said manufactured evidence is systemically utilized to deceive bankruptcy players and increase the profits of Chase, its agents and its principals through massive cost savings and the imposition of attorney fees upon class borrowers.

“As a direct result of this practice, over 95 percent of Chase’s motions for relief of stay and proofs of claim are granted without objection.

“That the use of the fabricated evidence has a chilling effect on class debtors and their attorneys. Said business practices discourages bankruptcy players from offering objections or from questioning the validity of Chase’s false claims based on standing.”

Bakenie adds: “That said practice allows Chase to dump defaulted loans that were never properly securitized by WAMU and other originators acquired by Chase into private mortgage backed security trusts by creating the illusion of a valid transfer.

“Said practice shifts the liability of defaulted loans not properly securitized by WAMU, from Chase to private mortgage backed security trusts. The practice allows Chase to effectively mitigate the millions of dollars in liability of the WAMU acquisition, where WAMU failed to transfer MLNs of its portfolio before its demise. Said practice shifts losses from WAMU toMBST bond investors.

“That after a non-judicial foreclosure sale, class members remain indebted to the true beneficiary for the unsecured note but without credit for the loss of the collateral to Chase’s designated assignee.

“Most egregiously, the network attorneys utilize the inducing documents to obtain attorney fees awards from by the bankruptcy judges ranging from $600-$1,000 for each successful motion for relief of stay.”

Bakenie concludes that “degradation of the integrity of our bankruptcy court system cannot be justified in the name of Chase’s cost savings and unjust enrichment.”

Bakenie seeks class certification, disgorgement, compensatory, statutory and punitive damages for unfair and deceptive trade, and “an order vacating all bankruptcy orders, claims and awards granted based on Chase’s misrepresentation and deceptive business practices”.

He is represented by Joseph Arthur Roberts of Newport Beach.

Foreclosure Cases 2011 in review California

Trustees Catherine Ripley and Ken Gibson
Image by dave.cournoyer via Flickr

California Cases – 2004 to Present
Including Federal cases interpreting California law
LISTED WITH MOST RECENT CASES FIRST
Go to cases 2000 – 2003

Lona v. Citibank     Docket
Cal.App. 6th Dist (H036140)  12/21/11TRUSTEE‘S SALES: The court reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action seeking to set aside a trustee’s sale on the basis that the loan was unconscionable. The court held that summary judgment was improper for two reasons:
1. The homeowner presented sufficient evidence of triable issues of material fact regarding unconscionability. Plaintiff asserted that the loan broker ignored his inability to repay the loan (monthly loan payments were four times his monthly income) and, as a person with limited English fluency, little education, and modest income, he did not understand many of the details of the transaction which was conducted entirely in English.
2. Plaintiff did not tender payment of the debt, which is normally a condition precedent to an action by the borrower to set aside the trustee’s sale, but defendants’ motion for summary judgment did not address the exceptions to this rule that defendant relied upon.

The case contains a good discussion of four exceptions to the tender requirement: 1. If the borrower’s action attacks the validity of the underlying debt, a tender is not required since it would constitute an affirmation of the debt. 2. A tender will not be required when the person who seeks to set aside the trustee’s sale has a counter-claim or set-off against the beneficiary. 3. A tender may not be required where it would be inequitable to impose such a condition on the party challenging the sale. 4. No tender will be required when the trustor is not required to rely on equity to attack the deed because the trustee’s deed is void on its face.Pioneer Construction v. Global Investment Corp.     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B225685)  12/21/11MECHANICS LIENS: The court held that:
1. A mechanics lien claimant who provided labor and materials prepetition to a debtor in bankruptcy can record a mechanics lien after the property owner files for bankruptcy without violating the automatic stay. (11 U.S.C. §362(b)(3).)
2. A mechanics lienor must, and defendant did, file a notice of lien in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings to inform the debtor and creditors of its intention to enforce the lien. (11 U.S.C. §546(b)(2).)
3. The 90-day period to file an action after recording a mechanics lien is tolled during the pendency of the property owner’s bankruptcy. Accordingly, an action to enforce the lien was timely when filed 79 days after a trustee’s sale by a lender who obtained relief from the automatic stay. (The property ceased to be property of the estate upon completion of the trustee’s sale.)Harbour Vista v. HSBC Mortgage Services     Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G044357)  12/19/11QUIET TITLE: Code of Civil Procedure Section 764.010 states that “[t]he court shall not enter judgment by default. . .” The court held that, while default may be entered, Section 764.010 requires that before issuing a default judgment the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing in open court, and that a defendant is entitled to participate in the hearing even when it has not yet answered the complaint and is in default. Normally, a defendant has no right to participate in the case after its default has been entered.Park v. First American Title Insurance Company     Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G044118)  11/23/11 (Pub. Order 12/16/11)TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale was delayed due to defendant’s error in preparing the deed of trust. However, the court held that plaintiff could not establish damages because she could not prove that a potential buyer was ready, willing and able to purchase the property when the trustee’s sale was originally scheduled. Such proof would require showing that a prospective buyer made an offer, entered into a contract of sale, obtained a cashier’s check, or took any equivalent step that would have demonstrated she was ready, willing, and able to purchase plaintiff’s property. Also, plaintiff would need to show that the prospective buyer was financially able to purchase the property, such as by showing that the prospective buyer had obtained financing for the sale, preapproval for a loan or had sufficient funds to purchase the property with cash.Bardasian v. Superior Court     Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C068488)  12/15/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Civil Code Section 2923.5 requires that before a notice of default can be filed, a lender must attempt to contact the borrower and explore options to prevent foreclosure. Where the trial court ruled on the merits that a lender failed to comply with Section 2923.5, it was proper to enjoin the sale pending compliance with that section, but it was not proper to require plaintiff to post a bond and make rent payments. Also, discussions in connection with a loan modification three years previously did not constitute compliance with the code section.Lang v. Roche     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B222885)  11/29/11SHERIFF’S SALES: Plaintiff sought to set aside a Sheriff’s sale arising from the execution on a judgment rendered in another action. Defendant had obtained that judgment by default after service by publication even though plaintiff was defendant’s next door neighbor and could easily be found. The court set the sale aside, holding that even though C.C.P. 701.780 provides that an execution sale is absolute and cannot be set aside, that statute does not eliminate plaintiff’s right of equitable redemption where the judgment is void due to lack of personal jurisdiction.Promenade at Playa Vista HOA v. Western Pacific Housing     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B225086)  11/8/11CC&R’S: In a construction defect action brought by a condominium homeowners association, the court held that a developer cannot compel binding arbitration of the litigation pursuant to an arbitration provision in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. CC&R’s are not a contract between the developer and the homeowners association. Instead, the provisions in the CC&R’s are equitable servitudes and can be enforced only by the homeowners association or the owner of a condominium, not by a developer who has sold all the units.Alpha and Omega Development v. Whillock Contracting     Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D058445)  11/2/11LIS PENDENS: This is a slander of title and malicious prosecution action brought after defendant’s unsuccessful action to foreclose a mechanics lien. Plaintiff’s slander of title allegation is based on defendant’s recordation of a lis pendens in the prior mechanics lien action. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s granting of defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and striking the slander of title cause of action, because recording a lis pendens is privileged under Civil Code Section 47(b)(4).Biancalana v. T.D. Service Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 6th Dist. (H035400)  10/31/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. filed 12/9/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Inadequacy of the sale price is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee’s sale of real property in the absence of any procedural errors. The unpaid balance of the loan secured by the subject deed of trust was $219,105. The trustee erroneously told the auctioneer to credit bid the delinquency amount ($21,894.17). Plaintiff was the successful bidder with a bid of $21,896. The court refused to set aside the sale because there were no procedural errors and the mistake was within the discretion and control of the trustee, who was acting as agent for the lender. The court distinguished Millennium Rock Mortgage, Inc. v. T.D. Service Co. because here the mistake was made by defendant in the course and scope of its duty as the beneficiary’s agent, not by the auctioneer as in Millennium Rock.

The case also contains a discussion of the rule that once the trustee’s deed has been delivered, a rebuttable presumption arises that the foreclosure sale has been conducted regularly and properly. But where the deed has not been transferred, the sale may be challenged on the grounds of procedural irregularity.First Bank v. East West Bank     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B226061)  10/17/11     Case complete 12/19/11RECORDING: Where two deeds of trust secured by the same real property were simultaneously time-stamped for recording by the County Recorder’s Office but were indexed at different times, the lenders have equal priority. The recording laws protect subsequent purchasers and neither bank was a subsequent purchaser. The court acknowledged that a subsequent purchaser (or lender) who records his interest before the prior interest is indexed has priority, but this rule does not apply when both deeds of trust were recorded simultaneously.Dollinger DeAnza Assoc. v. Chicago Title Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 6th Dist. (H035576)  9/9/11 (Pub. Order 10/6/11     Request for depublication filed 11/4/11TITLE INSURANCE: Plaintiff’s title insurance policy, which was issued in 2004, insured property that originally consisted of seven parcels, but which had been merged into a single parcel pursuant to a Notice of Merger recorded by the City of Cupertino in 1984. The policy did not except the Notice of Merger from coverage. Plaintiff filed this action after Chicago Title denied its claim for damages alleged to result from the inability to sell one of the parcels separately. The court ruled in favor of Chicago, holding:
1. While the notice of merger may impact Plaintiff’s ability to market the separate parcel, it has no affect on Plaintiff’s title to that parcel, so it does not constitute a defect in title. It does not represent a third person’s claim to an interest in the property.
2. Chicago is not barred by principals of waiver or estoppel from denying plaintiff’s claim, after initially accepting the claim, because 1) waiver only applies to insurers that do not reserve rights when accepting a tender of defense and 2) plaintiff failed to show detrimental reliance, which is one of the elements of estoppel.
3. Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be maintained where benefits are not due under plaintiff’s insurance policy.
4. Since the court held that the Notice of Merger was not a defect in title, it did not need to consider Chicago’s contention that the Notice of Merger was void because the County Recorder indexed it under the name of the City, rather than the name of the property owner.
[Ed. note: This case must have dealt with an ALTA 1992 policy. The ALTA 2006 policy made changes to the Covered Risks.]Sukut Construction v. Rimrock CA     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D057774)  9/30/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/11MECHANICS LIENS: Plaintiff could not establish a mining lien under Civil Code Section 3060 for removing rocks from a quarry because a quarry is not a mine and the rocks were not minerals. The court did not address whether plaintiff could establish a regular mechanics lien because it held that plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting that position after leading defendant to believe that it was asserting only a mining claim. UNPUBLISHED: First American Title Insurance Company v. Ordin     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B226671)  9/14/11     Case complete 11/17/11TITLE INSURANCE: An arbitrator found that defendants did not lose coverage under their title policy when they conveyed title to their wholly owned corporation, then to themselves as trustees of their family trust and finally to a wholly owned limited liability company. This conflicts with the holding in Kwok v. Transnation Title Insurance Company and this could have been an interesting case, except that whether the ruling was right or wrong was not before the court. The court held only that the arbitrator’s award could not be overturned, even if the the law was applied incorrectly, because there was no misconduct by the arbitrator.Calvo v. HSBC Bank     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 118 – 2nd Dist. (B226494)  9/13/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. filed 10/25/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Notice of the assignment of a deed of trust appeared only in the substitution of trustee, which was recorded on the same date as the notice of trustee’s sale, and which stated that MERS, as nominee for the assignee lender, was the present beneficiary. Plaintiff sought to set aside the trustee’s sale for an alleged violation of Civil Code section 2932.5, which requires the assignee of a mortgagee to record an assignment before exercising a power to sell real property. The court held that the lender did not violate section 2932.5 because that statute does not apply when the power of sale is conferred in a deed of trust rather than a mortgage.Robinson v. Countrywide Home Loans     Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 42 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E052011)  9/12/11     Case complete 11/15/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: The trial court properly sustained defendant lender’s demurrer without leave to amend because 1) the statutory scheme does not provide for a preemptive suit challenging MERS authority to initiate a foreclosure and 2) even if such a statutory claim were cognizable, the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to challenge the trustee’s authority to initiate a foreclosure.Hacienda Ranch Homes v. Superior Court (Elissagaray)     Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 1122 – 3rd Dist. (C065978)  8/30/11     Case complete 11/1/11ADVERSE POSSESSION: Plaintiffs (real parties in interest) acquired a 24.5% interest in the subject property at a tax sale. The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim of adverse possession under both 1) “color of title” because the tax deed by which they acquired their interest clearly conveyed only a 24.5% interest instead of a 100% interest, and 2) “claim of right” because plaintiffs’ claims of posting for-sale signs and clearing weeds 2 or 3 times a year did not satisfy the requirement of protecting the property with a substantial enclosure or cultivating or improving the property, as required by Code of Civil Procedure Section 325. The court also pointed out that obtaining adverse possession against cotenants requires evidence much stronger than that which would be required against a stranger, and plaintiffs failed to establish such evidence in this case.Gramercy Investment Trust v. Lakemont Homes Nevada, Inc.     Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 903 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E051384)  8/24/11     Case complete 10/27/11ANTIDEFICIENCY: After a judicial foreclosure, the lender obtained a deficiency judgment against a guarantor. The court held that the choice of law provision designating the law of New York was unenforceable because there were insufficient contacts with New York. California is where the contract was executed, the debt was created and guaranteed, the default occurred and the real property is located. Also, Nevada law does not apply, even though the guarantor was a Nevada corporation, because Nevada had no connection with the transaction. The court also held that the guarantor was not entitled to the protection of California’s antideficiency statutes because the guaranty specifically waived rights under those statutes in accordance with Civil Code Section 2856.Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners     Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 764 – 6th Dist. (H034931)  8/23/11     Case complete 10/25/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiff, who had entered into an easement agreement with defendant’s predecessor to maintain a billboard on a portion of defendant’s property, filed an action to prevent defendant from constructing a multi-unit building that would allegedly block the view of the billboard. Defendant asserted that the easement was unenforceable because it violated city and county building codes. The court held:
1. The easement was enforceable because the property’s use for advertising purposes is not illegal in and of itself. Although the instrumentality of that use, i.e., the billboard, may be illegal, that is not a bar to the enforcement of the agreement.
2. The easement agreement did not specifically state that it included the right to view the billboard from the street, but the parties necessarily intended the easement to include that right since viewing the billboard by passing traffic is the purpose of the easement.
3. Nevertheless, the trial court improperly denied a motion for a retrial to re-determine damages based on new evidence that the city had instituted administrative proceedings to have the billboard removed. The award of damages was based on plaintiff’s expected revenue from the billboard until 2037, and such damages will be overstated if the city forces plaintiff to remove the billboard.Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 256 – 1st Dist. (A130478)  8/11/11     Depublication request DENIED 11/30/11FORECLOSURE / MERS: Plaintiff alleged a foreclosure was unlawful because MERS made an invalid assignment of an interest in the promissory note and because the lender had breached an agreement to forbear from foreclosure. The appellate court held that the trial court properly sustained a demurrer to the fourth amended complaint without leave to amend. The court held that MERS had a right to assign the note even though it was not the beneficiary of the deed of trust because in assigning the note it was acting on behalf of the beneficiary and not on its own behalf. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to allege that the note was not otherwise assigned by an unrecorded document. The court also held that plaintiff failed to properly allege that the lender breached a forbearance agreement because plaintiff did not attach to the complaint a copy of a letter (which the court held was part of the forbearance agreement) that purportedly modified the agreement. Normally, a copy of an agreement does not have to be attached to a complaint, but here the trial court granted a previous demurrer with leave to amend specifically on condition plaintiff attach a copy of the entire forbearance agreement to the amended pleading.Boschma v. Home Loan Center     Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 230 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043716)  8/10/11     Case complete 10/11/11LOAN DISCLOSURE: Borrowers stated a cause of action that survived a demurrer where they alleged fraud and a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (B&PC 17200, et seq.) based on disclosures indicating that borrowers’ Option ARM loan may result in negative amortization when, in fact, making the scheduled payments would definitely result in negative amortization. However, the court also pointed out that at trial in order to prove damages plaintiffs will have to present evidence that, because of the structure of the loans, they suffered actual damages beyond their loss of equity. For every dollar by which the loan balances increased, plaintiffs kept a dollar to save or spend as they pleased, so they will not be able to prove damages if their “only injury is the psychological revelation . . . that they were not receiving a free lunch from defendant”.Thorstrom v. Thorstrom     Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1406 – 1st Dist. (A127888)  6/29/11     Case complete 8/30/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiffs were not able to preclude defendants’ use of a well on plaintiffs’ property. The historic use of the well by the common owner (the mother of the current owners) indicated an intent for the well to serve both properties, and an implied easement was created in favor of defendants when the mother died and left one parcel to each of her two sons. However, the evidence did not establish that defendants were entitled to exclusive use of the well, so both properties are entitled to reasonable use of the well consistent with the volume of water available at any given time.Herrera v. Deutsche Bank     Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1366 – 3rd Dist. (C065630)  5/31/11 (Cert. for pub. 6/28/11)     Case complete 8/30/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Plaintiffs sought to set aside a trustee’s sale, claiming that the Bank had not established that it was the assignee of the note, and that the trustee (“CRC”) had not established that it was properly substituted as trustee. To establish that the Bank was the beneficiary and CRC was the trustee, defendants requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the recorded Assignment of Deed of Trust and Substitution of Trustee, and filed a declaration by an employee of CRC referring to the recordation of the assignment and substitution, and stating that they “indicated” that the Bank was the assignee and CRC was the trustee. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the appellate court reversed. The Court acknowledged that California law does not require the original promissory note in order to foreclose. But while a court may take judicial notice of a recorded document, that does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein, so the recorded documents do not prove the truth of their contents. Accordingly, the Bank did not present direct evidence that it held the note.

Ed. notes: 1. It seems that the Bank could have avoided this result if it had its own employee make a declaration directly stating that the Bank is the holder of the note and deed of trust, 2. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court held that if the Bank is successful in asserting its claim to the Property, there is no recognizable legal theory that would require the Bank to pay plaintiffs monies they expended on the property for back taxes, insurance and deferred maintenance.Tashakori v. Lakis     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1003 – 2nd Dist. (B220875)  6/21/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/21/11EASEMENTS: The court granted plaintiffs an “equitable easement” for driveway purposes. Apparently, plaintiffs did not have grounds to establish a prescriptive easement. But a court can award an equitable easement where the court applies the “relative hardship” test and determines, as the court did here, that 1) the use is innocent, which means it was not willful or negligent, 2) the user will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted and 3) there is little harm to the underlying property owner.Conservatorship of Buchenau (Tornel v. Office of the Public Guardian)     Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1031 – 2nd Dist. (B222941)  5/31/11 (Pub. order 6/21/11)     Case complete 8/24/11CONTRACTS: A purchaser of real property was held liable for damages for refusing to complete the purchase contract, even though the seller deposited the deed into escrow 19 days after the date set for close of escrow. The escrow instructions did not include a “time is of the essence” clause, so a reasonable time is allowed for performance. The purchaser presented no evidence that seller’s delay of 19 days was unreasonable following a two-month escrow. Diamond Heights Village Assn. v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 290 – 1st Dist. (A126145)  6/7/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/21/11HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION LIENS:
1. A homeowner’s association recorded a notice of assessment lien, judicially foreclosed and obtained a judgment against the homeowners. However, it did not record an abstract of judgment, which would have created a judgment lien, nor did it record a writ of execution, which would have created an execution lien. The court held that a subsequently recorded deed of trust had priority because when an assessment lien is enforced through judicial action, the debt secured by the lien is merged into the judgment. The association’s previous rights were merged into the judgment, substituting in their place only such rights as attach to the judgment.
2. After defendant lender prevailed on summary judgment as to the single cause of action naming the lender, trial proceeded as to the owners of the property, including a cause of action for fraudulent conveyance of a 1/2 interest in the property pertaining to a transfer from the original owner to himself and his mother. The trial court ruled in favor of the Association on the fraudulent conveyance cause of action AND held that defendant lender’s deed of trust was set aside as to that 1/2 interest. The appellate court held that trial of those remaining claims was proper, including trial of the Association’s cause of action against the homeowners for fraudulent conveyance of their condominium unit. It was not proper, however, to void the lender’s security interest in the property (in whole or part) when the lender had not been joined as a party to the fraudulent conveyance cause of action, and final judgment had already been entered in its favor.Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI      Modification     Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 1602 – 2nd Dist. (B224896)  6/1/11     Case complete 8/17/11TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Plaintiff/borrower’s failure to disclose, in earlier bankruptcy proceedings, the existence of his breach of contract and fraud claims against the lender bars the borrower from litigating those claims now. The court distinguished several cases that permitted a debtor in bankruptcy from subsequently pursuing a cause of action that was not disclosed in the bankruptcy pleadings on the basis that in those cases the defendant was not a creditor in the bankruptcy and because the schedules specifically asked the debtor to disclose any offsets against the debts that were listed. This action against the lender amounts to an offset against the loan, so by listing the loan and failing to list this claim, the borrower’s bankruptcy schedules were inaccurate.
2. The borrower’s causes of action for breach of contract and fraud fail in any event because the borrower did not allege the essential fact of payment of sums due from the borrower (i.e. performance by the borrower) or set forth an excuse for performance.
3. The borrower cannot state a cause of action for violations of Civil Code Section 2923.5, which requires lenders to contact borrowers to explore options to avoid foreclosure, because the only remedy for such violations is postponement of the foreclosure sale, and borrower’s house has been sold.***DECERTIFIED***
Ferguson v. Avelo Mortgage     Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B223447)  6/1/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED & DECERTIFIED 9/14/11FORECLOSURE / MERS:
1. A Notice of Default was defective because it was signed by a trustee before recordation of the substitution of trustee substituting it in place of the original trustee. But the Notice of Sale was properly given because it recorded at the same time as the substitution and included the statutorily required affidavit attesting to the mailing of a copy of the substitution to all persons to whom an NOD must be mailed. Since the NOS was valid, the court held that the sale was merely voidable and not void. Therefore, unlike a void sale (such as where a substitution of trustee is not recorded until after the trustee’s sale is completed), where the sale is merely voidable the plaintiff must tender full payment of the debt in order to bring an action setting aside the sale. The plaintiff did not make such a tender, so the trial court properly refused to set aside the sale.
2. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as nominee of the original lender had the authority to assign the note and deed of trust to defendant, even if MERS does not possess the original note.Creative Ventures, LLC v. Jim Ward & Associates     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 1430 – 6th Dist. (H034883)  5/31/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/10/11USURY:
1. The real estate broker arranged loan exception to the Usury Law does not apply were a corporation was not licensed as a broker, even though the officer who negotiated the loan was licensed, where the officer was acting on behalf of the corporation and not on his own behalf.
2. The payee of the note assigned the note to multiple investors. In order to take free of the borrower’s defenses against the original payee, the assignees would have had to be holders in due course. They were not holders in due course because a) the original payee did not endorse the note and transfer possession of the note to the assignees, both of which are requirements for holder in due course status, and b) each investor was assigned a partial interest and partial assignees cannot be holders in due course.
3. The individual investors did not receive usurious interest because the interest rate itself was not usurious. But since the overall interest was usurious when the payee’s brokerage fee was included, the investors must refund the illegal interest each received.
4. The fact that the investors did not intend to violate the Usury Law is irrelevant because the only intent required is the intent to receive payment of interest.
5. An award of treble damages is within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion not to award treble damages because the conduct of defendants was not intentional.Ribeiro v. County of El Dorado     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 354 – 3rd Dist. (C065505)  5/10/111     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/24/11TAX SALES: “Caveat emptor” applies to tax sales. Accordingly, plaintiff/tax sale purchaser could not rescind the tax sale and obtain his deposit back where he was unaware of the amount of 1915 Act bond arrearages and where the County did not mislead him.The Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC     Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 1044 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043569)  4/27/11     Case complete 6/27/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiff sought to establish a prescriptive easement for parking and access. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff because it had not paid taxes on the easement. The appellate court reversed because, while payment of property taxes is an element of a cause of action for adverse possession, payment of taxes is not necessary for an easement by prescription, unless the easement has been separately assessed. A railway easement over the same area was separately assessed, but that is irrelevant because the railway easement and the prescriptive easement were not coextensive in use.Liberty National Enterprises v. Chicago Title Insurance Company     Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 839 – 2nd Dist. (B222455)  4/6/11 (pub. order 4/26/11)     Case complete 6/28/11NOTE: This case is not summarized because it deals with disqualification of a party’s attorney, and not with issues related to title insurance. It is included here only to point out that fact.Barry v. OC Residential Properties     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 861 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043073)  4/26/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/13/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Under C.C.P. 729.035 a trustee’s sale to enforce a homeowners association lien is subject to a right of redemption for 90 days after the sale, and under C.C.P. 729.060 the redemption price includes reasonable amounts paid for maintenance, upkeep and repair. Defendant purchased plaintiff’s interest in a common interest development at a foreclosure sale of a homeowners association lien. Plaintiff sought to redeem the property and defendant included certain repair costs in the redemption amount. Plaintiff asserted that the costs were not for reasonable maintenance, upkeep and repair. The court held that the costs were properly included because the person seeking to redeem has the burden of proof, and plaintiff failed to carry that burden in this case. Plaintiff also asserted that she should not have to pay the repair costs because the work was performed by an unlicensed contractor. The court held that the cost of the repair work was properly included because plaintiff would receive a windfall if she did not have to reimburse those costs and because this is not an action in which a contractor is seeking compensation.McMackin v. Ehrheart     Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 128 – 2nd Dist. (B224723)  4/8/11     Case complete 6/9/11CONTRACTS / PROBATE: This case involves a “Marvin” agreement, which is an express or implied contract between nonmarital partners. Plaintiff sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement with a decedent to leave plaintiff a life estate in real property. The court held that since the agreement was for distribution from an estate, it is governed by C.C.P. Section 366.3, which requires the action to be commenced within one year after the date of death. But the court further concluded that, depending on the circumstances of each case, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to preclude a party from asserting the statute of limitations set forth in section 366.3 as a defense to an untimely action where the party’s wrongdoing has induced another to forbear filing suit.Ferwerda v. Bordon     Docket
193 Cal. App. 4th 1178 – 3rd Dist. (C062389)  3/25/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/11CC&R’s
In the published portion of the opinion, the court held:
1. The following language in the CC&R’s gave the Homeowners Association the authority to adopt new design standards pertaining to development of lots in the subdivision: “in the event of a conflict between the standards required by [the Planning] Committee and those contained herein, the standards of said Committee shall govern”; and
2. The Planning Committee could not adopt a rule that allowed for attorney’s fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit because such a provision was not contained in the CC&R’s. Adopting the rule was an attempt by the committee to insert a new provision that binds homeowners without their approval.

In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court held that the Planning Committee acted properly in denying the plaintiff’s building plans. (The details are not summarized here because that part of the opinion is not certified for publication.)Capon v. Monopoly Game LLC     Docket
193 Cal. App. 4th 344 – 1st Dist. (A124964)  3/4/11     Case complete 5/5/11HOME EQUITY SALES CONTRACT ACT: In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to damages under the Home Equity Sales Contract Act because the purchaser was subject to the Act and the purchase contract did not comply with it. There is an exception in the Act for a purchaser who intends to live in the property. The principal member of the LLC purchase asserted that he intended to live in the property, but the court held the exception does not apply because the purchaser was the LLC rather than the member, so his intent was irrelevant.Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans     Docket     Cal. Sup.Ct. Docket     U.S. Supreme Ct. Docket
192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D057005)  2/18/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/18/11, Petition for a writ of certiorari DENIED 10/11/11FORECLOSURE / MERS: A borrower brought an action to restrain a foreclosure of a deed of trust held by MERS as nominee for the original lender. A Notice of Default had been recorded by the trustee, which identified itself as an agent for MERS. The court held that 1) There is no legal basis to bring an action in order to determine whether the person electing to sell the property is duly authorized to do so by the lender, unless the plaintiff can specify a specific factual basis for alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party; and 2) MERS has a right to foreclose because the deed of trust specifically provided that MERS as nominee has the right to foreclose.Schuman v. Ignatin     Docket
191 Cal. App. 4th 255 – 2nd Dist. (B215059)  12/23/10     Case complete 2/23/11CC&R’s: The applicable CC&R’s would have expired, but an amendment was recorded extending them. Plaintiff filed this action alleging that defendant’s proposed house violated the CC&R’s. The trial court held that the amendment was invalid because it was not signed by all of the lot owners in the subdivision. Since the CC&R’s had expired, it did not determine whether the proposed construction would have violated them. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the defect in the amendment rendered it voidable, not void, and it could no longer be challenged because the four-year statute of limitations contained in C.C.P. 343 had run.Schelb v. Stein     Docket
190 Cal. App. 4th 1440 – 2nd Dist. (B213929)  12/17/10     Case complete 2/16/11MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: In a previous divorce action, in order to equalize a division of community property, the husband was ordered to give the wife a note secured by a deed of trust on property awarded to the husband. In this case (many years later), the court held that under the Marketable Record Title Act, the deed of trust had expired. (Civil Code Section 882.020.) However, under Family Code Section 291, the underlying family law judgment does not expire until paid, so it is enforceable as an unsecured judgment.Vuki v. Superior Court     Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 791 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043544)  10/29/10     Case complete 1/3/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Unlike section 2923.5 as construed by this court in Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208, neither Section 2923.52 or Section 2923.53 provides any private right of action, even a very limited one as this court found in Mabry. Civil Code section 2923.52 imposes a 90-day delay in the normal foreclosure process. But Civil Code section 2923.53 allows for an exemption to that delay if lenders have loan modification programs that meet certain criteria. The only enforcement mechanism is that a violation is deemed to be a violation of lenders license laws. Section 2923.54 provides that a violation of Sections 2923.52 or 2923.53 does not invalidate a trustee’s sale, and plaintiff also argued that a lender is not entitled to a bona fide purchaser protection. The court rejected that argument because any noncompliance is entirely a regulatory matter, and cannot be remedied in a private action.Abers v. Rounsavell     Mod Opinion     Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 348 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040486)  10/18/10     Case complete 12/20/10LEASES: Leases of residential condominium units required a re-calculation of rent after 30 years based on a percentage of the appraised value of the “leased land”. The term “leased land” was defined to consist of the condominium unit and an undivided interest in the common area of Parcel 1, and did not include the recreational area (Parcel 2), which was leased to the Homeowners Association. The Court held that the language of the leases was clear. The appraisals were to be based only on the value of the lessees’ interest in Parcel 1 and not on the value of the recreational parcel.UNPUBLISHED: Residential Mortgage Capital v. Chicago Title Ins. Company     Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A125695)  9/20/10     Case complete 11/23/10ESCROW: An escrow holder released loan documents to a mortgage broker at the broker’s request in order to have the borrowers sign the documents at home. They were improperly backdated and the broker failed to provide duplicate copies of the notice of right to rescind. Due these discrepancies, the lender complied with the borrower’s demand for a rescission of the loan, and filed this action against the escrow holder for amounts reimbursed to the borrower for finance charges and attorney’s fees. The Court held that the escrow holder did not breach a duty to the lender because it properly followed the escrow instructions, and it is common for escrow to release documents to persons associated with the transaction in order for them to be signed elsewhere.Starr v. Starr     Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 277 – 2nd Dist. (B219539)  9/30/10     Case complete 12/16/10COMMUNITY PROPERTY: In a divorce action the Court ordered the husband to convey title to himself and his former wife. Title had been taken in the husband’s name and the wife executed a quitclaim deed. But Family Code Section 721 creates a presumption that a transaction that benefits one spouse was the result of undue influence. The husband failed to overcome this presumption where the evidence showed that the wife executed the deed in reliance on the husband’s representation that he would subsequently add her to title. The husband was, nevertheless, entitled to reimbursement for his separate property contribution in purchasing the property.Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp.     Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 968 – 2nd Dist. (B221470)  9/23/10     Case complete 11/23/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: After plaintiff stipulated to a judgment in an unlawful detainer action, she could not challenge the validity of the trustee’s sale in a subsequent action because the subsequent action is barred by collateral estoppel. Because the action was barred, the court did not reach the question of the validity of the trustee’s sale based on the substitution of trustee being recorded after trustee’s sale proceedings had commenced and based on assignments of the deed of trust into the foreclosing beneficiary being recorded after the trustee’s deed.Lee v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 583 – 1st Dist. (A124730)  9/16/10     Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/1/10TITLE INSURANCE:
1. The insureds could have reasonably expected that they were buying a title insurance policy on APN 22, and not just APN 9, where both the preliminary report and policy included a reference to APN 22, listed exclusions from coverage that were specific to APN 22, and attached an assessor’s parcel map with an arrow pointing to both APN 9 and 22.
2. A preliminary report is merely an offer to issue a title policy, but an insured has the right to expect that the policy will be consistent with the terms of the offer.
3. There was a triable issue of fact as to whether a neighbor’s construction of improvements on APN 22 was sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations, where the insureds testified that they did not know the precise location of APN 22 and assumed that the neighbors constructed the improvements on their own property.
4. There was a triable issue of fact as to whether Fidelity National Title Insurance Company acted as escrow holder or whether the escrow was conducted by its affiliate, Fidelity National Title Company (only the insurance company was named as a defendant).Chicago Title Insurance Company v. AMZ Insurance Services     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 401 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041188)  9/9/10     Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/15/10ESCROW: A document entitled “Evidence of Property Insurance” (“EOI”) constitutes a binder under Insurance Code Section 382.5(a). In this case an EOI was effective to obligate the insurer to issue a homeowner’s policy even though the escrow failed to send the premium check. In order to cancel the EOI the insured has to be given notice pursuant to Insurance Code Section 481.1, which the insurer did not do. The escrow holder paid the insured’s loss and obtained an assignment of rights. The court held that the escrow holder did not act as a volunteer in paying the amount of the loss, and is entitled to be reimbursed by the insurance company under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.Vanderkous v. Conley     Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 111 – 1st Dist (A125352)  9/2/10     Case complete 11/3/10QUIET TITLE: 1) In a quiet title action the court has equitable powers to award compensation as necessary to do complete justice, even though neither party’s pleadings specifically requested compensation. 2) Realizing that the court was going to require plaintiff to compensate defendant in exchange for quieting title in plaintiff’s favor, plaintiff dismissed the lawsuit. However, the dismissal was invalid because it was filed following trial after the case had been submitted to the court.Purdum v. Holmes     Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 916 – 2nd Dist. (B216493)  7/29/10     Case complete 10/22/10NOTARIES: A notary was sued for notarizing a forged deed. He admitted that he knew the grantor had not signed the deed, but the lawsuit was filed more than six years after the deed was signed and notarized. The court held that the action was barred by the six-year limitation period in C.C.P. 338(f)(3) even though plaintiff did not discover the wrongful conduct until well within the six year period.Perlas v. GMAC Mortgage     Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 429 – 1st Dist. (A125212)  8/11/10     Case complete 10/10/10DEEDS OF TRUST: Borrowers filed an action against a lender to set aside a deed of trust, setting forth numerous causes of action. Borrowers’ loan application (apparently prepared by a loan broker) falsely inflated the borrowers’ income. In the published portion of the opinion. The court held in favor of the lender, explaining that a lender is not in a fiduciary relationship with borrowers and owes them no duty of care in approving their loan. A lender’s determination that the borrowers qualified for the loan is not a representation that they could afford the loan. One interesting issue in the unpublished portion of the opinion was the court’s rejection of the borrowers’ argument that naming MERS as nominee invalidated the deed of trust because, as borrower argued, the deed of trust was a contract with MERS and the note was a separate contract with the lender.Soifer v. Chicago Title Company     Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 365 – 2nd Dist. (B217956)  8/10/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/27/10TITLE INSURANCE: A person cannot recover for errors in a title company’s informal communications regarding the condition of title to property in the absence of a policy of title insurance or the purchase of an abstract of title. There are two ways in which an interested party can obtain title information upon which reliance may be placed: an abstract of title or a policy of title insurance. Having purchased neither, plaintiff cannot recover for title company’s incorrect statement that a deed of trust in foreclosure was a first lien.In re: Hastie (Weinkauf v. Florez)     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 1285 – 1st Dist. (A127069)  7/22/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. filed late and DENIED 9/21/10DEEDS: An administrator of decedent’s estate sought to set aside two deeds on the basis that the grantees were the grandson and granddaughter of decedent’s caregiver. Defendant did not dispute that the transfers violated Probate Code Section 21350, which prohibits conveyances to a fiduciary, including a caregiver, or the fiduciary’s relatives, unless specified conditions are met. Instead, defendant asserted only that the 3-year statute of limitations had expired. The court held that the action was timely because there was no evidence indicating that the heirs had or should have had knowledge of the transfer, which would have commenced the running of the statute of limitations.Bank of America v. Stonehaven Manor, LLC     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 719 – 3rd Dist. (C060089)  7/12/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/20/10ATTACHMENT: The property of a guarantor of a debt–a debt which is secured by the real property of the principal debtor and also that of a joint and several co-guarantor–is subject to attachment where the guarantor has contractually waived the benefit of that security (i.e. waived the benefit of Civil Code Section 2849).Jackson v. County of Amador     Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 514 – 3rd Dist. (C060845)  7/7/10     Depublication request DENIED 9/15/10RECORDING LAW: An owner of two rental houses sued the county recorder for recording a durable power of attorney and two quitclaim deeds that were fraudulently executed by the owner’s brother. The superior court sustained the recorder’s demurrer without leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the legal insufficiency of the power of attorney did not provide a basis for the recorder to refuse to record the power of attorney under Government Code Section 27201(a) and the recorder did not owe the owner a duty to determine whether the instruments were fraudulently executed because the instruments were notarized.Luna v. Brownell     Docket
185 Cal. App. 4th 668 – 2nd Dist. (B212757)  6/11/10     Case complete 8/17/10DEEDS: A deed transferring property to the trustee of a trust is not void as between the grantor and grantee merely because the trust had not been created at the time the deed was executed, if (1) the deed was executed in anticipation of the creation of the trust and (2) the trust is in fact created thereafter. The deed was deemed legally delivered when the Trust was established.Mabry v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
185 Cal. App. 4th 208 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G042911)  6/2/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/18/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: The court answered, and provided thorough explanations for, a laundry list of questions regarding Civil Code Section 2923.5, which requires a lender to explore options for modifying a loan with a borrower prior to commencing foreclosure proceedings.
1. May section 2923.5 be enforced by a private right of action?  Yes.
2. Must a borrower tender the full amount of the mortgage indebtedness due as a prerequisite to bringing an action under section 2923.5?  No.
3. Is section 2923.5 preempted by federal law?  No.
4. What is the extent of a private right of action under section 2923.5?  It is limited to obtaining a postponement of a foreclosure to permit the lender to comply with section 2923.5.
5. Must the declaration required of the lender by section 2923.5, subdivision (b) be under penalty of perjury?  No.
6. Does a declaration in a notice of default that tracks the language of section 2923.5(b) comply with the statute, even though such language does not on its face delineate precisely which one of three categories applies to the particular case at hand?  Yes.
7. If a lender forecloses without complying with section 2923.5, does that noncompliance affect the title acquired by a third party purchaser at the foreclosure sale?  No.
8. Did the lender comply with section 2923.5?  Remanded to the trial court to determine which of the two sides is telling the truth.
9. Can section 2923.5 be enforced in a class action in this case?  Not under these facts, which are highly fact-specific.
10. Does section 2923.5 require a lender to rewrite or modify the loan? No.612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership     Docket
184 Cal. App. 4th 1270 – Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D056646)  5/25/10     Case complete 7/26/10ASSESSMENT BOND FORECLOSURE:
1. Recordation of a Notice of Assessment under the Improvement Act of 1911 imparted constructive notice even though the notice did not name the owner of the subject property and was not indexed under the owner’s name. There is no statutory requirement that the notice of assessment be indexed under the name of the property owner.
2. A Preliminary Report also gave constructive notice where it stated: “The lien of special tax for the following municipal improvement bond, which tax is collected with the county taxes. . .”
3. A property owner is not liable for a deficiency judgment after a bond foreclosure because a property owner does not have personal liability for either delinquent amounts due on the bond or for attorney fees incurred in prosecuting the action.Tarlesson v. Broadway Foreclosure Investments     Docket
184 Cal. App. 4th 931 – 1st Dist. (A125445)  5/17/10     Case complete 7/20/10HOMESTEADS: A judgment debtor is entitled to a homestead exemption where she continuously resided in property, even though at one point she conveyed title to her cousin in order to obtain financing and the cousin subsequently conveyed title back to the debtor. The amount of the exemption was $150,000 (later statutorily changed to $175,000) based on debtor’s declaration that she was over 55 years old and earned less than $15,000 per year, because there was no conflicting evidence in the record.UNPUBLISHED: MBK Celamonte v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041605)  4/28/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/21/10TITLE INSURANCE / ENCUMBRANCES: A recorded authorization for a Mello Roos Assessment constitutes an “encumbrance” covered by a title policy, even where actual assessments are conditioned on the future development of the property.Plaza Home Mortgage v. North American Title Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
184 Cal. App. 4th 130 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D054685)  4/27/10     Depublication request DENIED 8/11/10ESCROW / LOAN FRAUD: The buyer obtained 100% financing and managed to walk away with cash ($54,000) at close of escrow. (Actually, the buyer’s attorney-in-fact received the money.) The lender sued the title company that acted as escrow holder, asserting that it should have notified the lender when it received the instruction to send the payment to the buyer’s attorney-in-fact after escrow had closed. The court reversed a grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the escrow, pointing out that its decision is narrow, and holding only that the trial court erred when it determined the escrow did not breach the closing instructions contract merely because escrow had closed. The case was remanded in order to determine whether the escrow breached the closing instructions contract and if so, whether that breach proximately caused the lender’s damages.Garcia v. World Savings     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
183 Cal. App. 4th 1031 – 2nd (B214822)  4/9/10     Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/23/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A lender told plaintiffs/owners that it would postpone a trustee’s sale by a week to give plaintiffs time to obtain another loan secured by other property in order to bring the subject loan current. Plaintiffs obtained a loan the following week, but the lender had conducted the trustee’s sale on the scheduled date and the property was sold to a third party bidder. Plaintiffs dismissed causes of action pertaining to setting aside the sale and pursued causes of action for breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure and promissory estoppel. The court held that there was no consideration that would support the breach of contract claim because plaintiffs promised nothing more than was due under the original agreement. Plaintiffs also could not prove a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure because that cause of action requires that the borrower tender funds to pay off the loan prior to the trustee’s sale. However, plaintiffs could recover based on promissory estoppel because procuring a high cost, high interest loan by using other property as security is sufficient to constitute detrimental reliance.LEG Investments v. Boxler     Docket
183 Cal. App. 4th 484 – 3rd Dist. (C058743)  4/1/10     Certified for Partial Publication     Case complete 6/2/10PARTITION: A right of first refusal in a tenancy in common agreement does not absolutely waive the right of partition. Instead, the right of first refusal merely modifies the right of partition to require the selling cotenant to first offer to sell to the nonselling cotenant before seeking partition. [Ed. note: I expect that the result would have been different if the right of partition had been specifically waived in the tenancy in common agreement.]Steiner v. Thexton     Docket
48 Cal. 4th 411 – Cal. Supreme Court (S164928)  3/18/10OPTIONS: A contract to sell real property where the buyer’s performance was entirely conditioned on the buyer obtaining regulatory approval to subdivide the property is an option. Although plaintiffs’ promise was initially illusory because no consideration was given at the outset, plaintiffs’ part performance of their bargained-for promise to seek a parcel split cured the initially illusory nature of the promise and thereby constituted sufficient consideration to render the option irrevocable.Grotenhuis v. County of Santa Barbara     Docket
182 Cal. App. 4th 1158 – 2nd Dist. (B212264)  3/15/10     Case complete 5/18/10PROPERTY TAXES: Subject to certain conditions, a homeowner over the age of 55 may sell a principle residence, purchase a replacement dwelling of equal or lesser value in the same county, and transfer the property tax basis of the principal residence to the replacement dwelling. The court held that this favorable tax treatment is not available where title to both properties was held by an individual’s wholly owned corporation. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the corporation was their alter ego because that concept is used to pierce the corporate veil of an opponent, and not to enable a person “to weave in and out of corporate status when it suits the business objective of the day.”Clear Lake Riviera Community Assn. v. Cramer     Docket
182 Cal.App. 4th 459 – 1st Dist. (A122205)  2/26/10     Case complete 4/29/10HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Defendant homeowners were ordered to bring their newly built house into compliance with the homeowners association’s guidelines where the house exceed the guidelines’ height restriction by nine feet. Even though the cost to the defendants will be great, they built the house with knowledge of the restriction and their hardship will not be grossly disproportionate to the loss the neighbors would suffer if the violation were not abated, caused by loss in property values and loss of enjoyment of their properties caused by blocked views. The height restriction was contained in the associations guidelines and not in the CC&R’s, and the association did not have records proving the official adoption of the guidelines. Nevertheless, the court held that proper adoption was inferred from the circumstantial evidence of long enforcement of the guidelines by the association.Forsgren Associates v. Pacific Golf Community Development     Docket     Sup. Ct. Docket
182 Cal.App. 4th 135 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E045940)  2/23/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/17/10MECHANIC’S LIENS: 1. Owners of land are subject to mechanic’s liens where they were aware of the work being done by the lien claimant and where they failed to record a notice of non-responsibility.
2. Civil Code Section 3128 provides that a mechanic’s lien attaches to land on which the improvement is situated “together with a convenient space about the same or so much as may be required for the convenient use and occupation thereof”. Accordingly, defendant’s land adjacent to a golf course on which the lien claimant performed work is subject to a mechanic’s lien, but only as to the limited portions where a tee box was located and where an irrigation system was installed.
3. The fact that adjacent property incidentally benefits from being adjacent to a golf course does not support extending a mechanic’s lien to that property.
4. The owners of the adjacent property were liable for interest, but only as to their proportionate share of the amount of the entire mechanic’s lien.Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles      Docket
47 Cal.4th 1298 – Cal. Supreme Court (S158007)  2/4/10PROPERTY TAXES: A “change in ownership”, requiring a property tax reassessment, occurs upon the death of a trust settlor who transferred property to a revocable trust, and which became irrevocable upon the settlor’s death. The fact that one trust beneficiary was entitled to live in the property for her life, and the remaining beneficiaries received the property upon her death, did not alter the fact that a change in ownership of the entire title had occurred.Kuish v. Smith     Docket
181 Cal.App.4th 1419 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040743)  2/3/10     Case complete 4/12/10CONTRACTS: 1. Defendants’ retention of a $600,000 deposit designated as “non-refundable” constituted an invalid forfeiture because a) the contract did not contain a valid liquidated damages clause, and b) plaintiff re-sold the property for a higher price, so there were no out-of-pocket damages. 2. The deposit did not constitute additional consideration for extending the escrow because it was labeled “non-refundable” in the original contract.Kendall v. Walker (Modification attached)     Docket
181 Cal.App.4th 584 – 1st Dist. (A105981)  12/30/09     Case complete 3/29/10WATER RIGHTS: An owner of land adjoining a navigable waterway has rights in the foreshore adjacent to his property separate from that of the general public. The court held that the boundary in the waterway between adjacent parcels of land is not fixed by extending the boundary lines into the water in the direction of the last course ending at the shore line. Instead, it is fixed by a line drawn into the water perpendicular to the shore line. Accordingly, the court enjoined defendants from allowing their houseboat from being moored in a manner that crossed onto plaintiffs’ side of that perpendicular boundary line.Junkin v. Golden West Foreclosure Service     Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 1150 – 1st Dist. (A124374)  1/5/10     Case complete 3/12/10USURY: The joint venture exception to the Usury Law, which has been developed by case law, provides that where the relationship between the parties is a bona fide joint venture or partnership, an advance by a joint venturer is an investment and not a loan, making the Usury Law inapplicable. The court applied the exception to a loan by one partner to the other because instead of looking at the loan in isolation, it looked at the entire transaction which it determined to be a joint venture. The case contains a good discussion of the various factors that should be weighed in determining whether the transaction is a bona fide joint venture. The presence or absence of any one factor is not, alone, determinative. The factors include whether or not: 1) there is an absolute obligation of repayment, 2) the investor may suffer a loss, 3) the investor has a right to participate in management, 4) the subject property was purchased from a third party and 5) the parties considered themselves to be partners.Banc of America Leasing & Capital v. 3 Arch Trustee Services     Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 1090 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041480)  12/11/09     Case complete 3/8/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A judgment lien creditor is not entitled to receive a notice of default, notice of trustee’s sale or notice of surplus sale proceeds unless the creditor records a statutory request for notice. The trustee is required to disburse surplus proceeds only to persons who have provided the trustee with a proof of claim. The burden rests with the judgment creditor to keep a careful watch over the debtor, make requests for notice of default and sales, and to submit claims in the event of surplus sale proceeds.Park 100 Investment Group v. Ryan     Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 795 – 2nd Dist. (B208189)  12/23/09     Case complete 2/26/10LIS PENDENS: 1. A lis pendens may be filed against a dominant tenement when the litigation involves an easement dispute. Although title to the dominant tenement would not be directly affected if an easement right was shown to exist, the owner’s right to possession clearly is affected

2.A recorded lis pendens is a privileged publication only if it identifies an action previously filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right of possession of real property. If the complaint does not allege a real property claim, or the alleged claim lacks evidentiary merit, the lis pendens, in addition to being subject to expungement, is not privileged.Millennium Rock Mortgage v. T.D. Service Company     Modification     Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 804 – 3rd Dist. (C059875)  11/24/09     Case complete 1/26/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale auctioneer erroneously read from a script for a different foreclosure, although the correct street address was used. The auctioneer opened the bidding with the credit bid from the other foreclosure that was substantially less than the correct credit bid. The errors were discovered after the close of bidding but prior to the issuance of a trustee’s deed. The court held that the errors constituted an “irregularity” sufficient to give the trustee the right to rescind the sale.

The court distinguished 6 Angels v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, in which the court held that a beneficiary’s negligent miscalculation of the amount of its credit bid was not sufficient to rescind the sale. In 6 Angelsthe error was totally extrinsic to the proper conduct of the sale itself. Here there was inherent inconsistency in the auctioneer’s description of the property being offered for sale, creating a fatal ambiguity in determining which property was being auctioned.Fidelity National Title Insurance Company v. Schroeder     Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 834 – 5th Dist. (F056339)  11/24/09     Case complete 1/25/10JUDGMENTS: A judgment debtor transferred his 1/2 interest in real property to the other cotenant prior to the judgment creditor recording an abstract of judgment. The court held that if the trial court on remand finds that the transfer was intended to shield the debtor’s property from creditors, then the transferee holds the debtor’s 1/2 interest as a resulting trust for the benefit of the debtor, and the creditor’s judgment lien will attach to that interest. The court also held that the transfer cannot be set aside under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because no recoverable value remained in the real property after deducting existing encumbrances and Gordon’s homestead exemption.

The case contains a good explanation of the difference between a resulting (“intention enforcing”) and constructive (“fraud-rectifying”) trust. A resulting trust carries out the inferred intent of the parties; a constructive trust defeats or prevents the wrongful act of one of them.Zhang v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E047207) 10/29/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. GRANTED 2/10/10INSURANCE / BAD FAITH: Fraudulent conduct by an insurer does not give rise to a private right of action under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (Insurance Code section 790.03 et seq.), but it can give rise to a private cause of action under the Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.).Presta v. Tepper     Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 909 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040427)  10/28/09     Case complete 1/25/10TRUSTS: An ordinary express trust is not an entity separate from its trustee, like a corporation is. Instead, a trust is merely a relationship by which one person or entity holds property for the benefit of some other person or entity. Consequently, where two men entered into partnership agreements as trustees of their trusts, the provision of the partnership agreement, which required that upon the death of a partner the partnership shall purchase his interest in the partnership, was triggered by the death of one of the two men.Wells Fargo Bank v. Neilsen      Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 602 – 1st Dist. (A122626)  10/22/09 (Mod. filed 11/10/09)     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/10/10CIRCUITY OF PRIORITY: The Court follows the rule in Bratcher v. Buckner, even though Bratcher involved a judgment lien and two deeds of trust and this case involves three deeds of trust. The situation is that A, B & C have liens on the subject property, and A then subordinates his lien to C’s lien. The problem with this is that C appears to be senior to A, which is senior to B, which is senior to C, so that each lien is senior and junior to one of the other liens.

The Court held that the lien holders have the following priority: (1) C is paid up to the amount of A’s lien, (2) if the amount of A’s lien exceeds C’s lien, A is paid the amount of his lien, less the amount paid so far to C, (3) B is then paid in full, (4) C is then paid any balance still owing to C, (5) A is then paid any balance still owing to A.

This is entirely fair because A loses priority as to the amount of C’s lien, which conforms to the intent of the subordination agreement. B remains in the same position he would be in without the subordination agreement since his lien remains junior only to the amount of A’s lien. C steps into A’s shoes only up to the amount of A’s lien.

NOTE: The odd thing about circuity of priority cases is that they result in surplus proceeds after a foreclosure sale being paid to senior lienholders. Normally, only junior lienholders and the foreclosed out owner are entitled to share in surplus proceeds, and the purchaser takes title subject to the senior liens.Schmidli v. Pearce     Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 305 – 3rd Dist. (C058270)  10/13/09      Case complete 12/15/09MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: This case was decided under the pre-2007 version of Civil Code Section 882.020, which provided that a deed of trust expires after 10 years if the maturity date is “ascertainable from the record”. The court held that this provision was not triggered by a Notice of Default, which set forth the maturity date and which was recorded prior to expiration of the 10-year period. NOTE: In 2007, C.C. Section 882.020 was amended to make it clear that the 10-year period applies only where the maturity date is shown in the deed of trust itself.Nielsen v. Gibson     Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 318 – 3rd Dist. (C059291)  10/13/09     Case complete 12/15/09ADVERSE POSSESSION: 1. The “open and notorious” element of adverse possession was satisfied where plaintiff possessed the subject property by actual possession under such circumstances as to constitute reasonable notice to the owner. Defendant was charged with constructive knowledge of plaintiff’s possession, even though defendant was out of the country the entire time and did not have actual knowledge.

2. The 5-year adverse possession period is tolled under C.C.P. Section 328 for up to 20 years if the defendant is “under the age of majority or insane”. In the unpublishedportion of the opinion the court held that although the defendant had been ruled incompetent by a court in Ireland, there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s condition met the legal definition of “insane”.Ricketts v. McCormack     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 1324 – 2nd Dist. (B210123)  9/27/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/17/09RECORDING LAW: Civil Code Section 2941(c) provides in part, “Within two business days from the day of receipt, if received in recordable form together with all required fees, the county recorder shall stamp and record the full reconveyance or certificate of discharge.” In this class action lawsuit against the County recorder, the court held that indexing is a distinct function, separate from recording a document, and is not part of section 2941(c)’s stamp-and-record requirement.

The court distinguished indexing, stamping and recording:
Stamping: The “stamping” requirement of Section 2941(c) is satisfied when the Recorder endorses on a reconveyance the order of receipt, the day and time of receipt and the amount of fees paid.
Recording: The reconveyance is “recorded” once the Recorder has confirmed the document meets all recording requirements, created an entry for the document in the “Enterprise Recording Archive” system, calculated the required fees and confirmed payment of the correct amount and, finally, generated a lead sheet containing, among other things, a bar code, a permanent recording number and the words “Recorded/Filed in Official Records.”
Indexing: Government Code Section 27324 requires all instruments “presented for recordation” to “have a title or titles indicating the kind or kinds of documents contained therein,” and the recorder is “required to index only that title or titles captioned on the first page of a document.Starlight Ridge South Homeowner’s Assn. v. Hunter-Bloor     Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 440 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E046457)  8/14/09 (Pub. Order 9/3/09)     Case complete 10/19/09CC&R’s: Under Code Civ. Proc. Section 1859, where two provisions appear to cover the same matter, and are inconsistent, the more specific provision controls over the general provision. Here the provision of CC&R’s requiring each homeowner to maintain a drainage ditch where it crossed the homeowners’ properties was a specific provision that controlled over a general provision requiring the homeowner’s association to maintain landscape maintenance areas.First American Title Insurance Co. v. XWarehouse Lending Corp.     Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 106 – 1st Dist. (A119931)  8/28/09      Case complete 10/30/09TITLE INSURANCE: A loan policy provides that “the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage” becomes an insured under the loan policy. Normally, this means that an assignee becomes an insured. However, where the insured lender failed to disburse loan proceeds for the benefit of the named borrower, an indebtedness never existed, and the warehouse lender/assignee who disbursed money to the lender did not become an insured. The court pointed out that the policy insures against defects in the mortgage itself, but not against problems related to the underlying debt.

NOTE: In Footnote 8 the court distinguishes cases upholding the right of a named insured or its assignee to recover from a title insurer for a loss due to a forged note or forged mortgage because in those cases, and unlike this case, moneys had been actually disbursed or credited to the named borrower by either the lender or its assignee.Wells Fargo v. D & M Cabinets     Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 59 – 3rd Dist. (C058486)  8/28/09     Case complete 10/28/09JUDGMENTS: A judgment creditor, seeking to sell an occupied dwelling to collect on a money judgment, may not bypass the stringent requirements of C.C.P. Section 704.740 et seq. when the sale is conducted by a receiver appointed under C.C.P Section 708.620. The judgment creditor must comply with Section 704.740, regardless of whether the property is to be sold by a sheriff or a receiver.Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
176 Cal.App.4th 1270 – 1st Dist. (A120049)  8/21/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/2/09PREEMPTION: A County ordinance professing to implement the state mobilehome conversion statutes was preempted for the following reasons: (1) Gov. Code Section 66427.5 expressly preempts the power of local authorities to inject other factors when considering an application to convert an existing mobilehome park from a rental to a resident-owner basis, (2) the ordinance is impliedly preempted because the Legislature has established a dominant role for the state in regulating mobilehomes, and has indicated its intent to forestall local intrusion into the particular terrain of mobilehome conversions and (3) the County’s ordinance duplicates several features of state law, a redundancy that is an established litmus test for preemption.Citizens for Planning Responsibly v. County of San Luis Obispo     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
176 Cal.App.4th 357 – 2nd Dist (B206957)  8/4/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/14/09PREEMPTION: The court held that the State Aeronautics Act, which regulates the development and expansion of airports, did not preempt an initiative measure adopted by the voters because none of the following three factors necessary to establish preemption was present: (1) The Legislature may so completely occupy the field in a matter of statewide concern that all, or conflicting, local legislation is precluded, (2) the Legislature may delegate exclusive authority to a city council or board of supervisors to exercise a particular power over matters of statewide concern, or (3) the exercise of the initiative power would impermissibly interfere with an essential governmental function.Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto Club of So. Cal.     Docket
47 Cal.4th 302 – Cal. Supreme Court (S155129)  8/3/09INSURANCE / BAD FAITH: The case is not as relevant to title insurance as the lower court case, which held that an insurance company acted in bad faith as a matter of law where a potential for coverage was apparent from the face of the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on the meaning of “accident” in a homeowner’s policy, and holding that an insured’s unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense does not turn the resulting intentional act of assault and battery into “an accident” within the policy’s coverage clause. Therefore, the insurance company had no duty to defend its insured in the lawsuit brought against him by the injured party.1538 Cahuenga Partners v. Turmeko Properties     Docket
176 Cal.App.4th 139 – 2nd Dist. (B209548)  7/31/09     Case complete 10/7/09RECONVEYANCE: [This is actually a civil procedure case that it not of much interest to title insurance business, but it is included here because the underlying action sought to cancel a reconveyance.] The court ordered that a reconveyance of a deed of trust be cancelled pursuant to a settlement agreement. The main holding was that a trial court may enforce a settlement agreement against a party to the settlement that has interest in the subject matter of the action even if the party is not named in the action, where the non-party appears in court and consents to the settlement.Lee v. Lee     Docket
175 Cal.App.4th 1553 – 5th Dist. (F056107)  7/29/09     Case complete 9/28/09DEEDS / STATUTE OF FRAUDS:
1. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to an executed contract, and a deed that is executed by the grantor and delivered to the grantee is an executed contract. The court rejected defendants’ argument that the deed did not reflect the terms of sale under a verbal agreement.
2. While the alteration of an undelivered deed renders the conveyance void, the alteration of a deed after it has been delivered to the grantee does not invalidate the instrument as to the grantee. The deed is void only as to the individuals who were added as grantees after delivery.White v. Cridlebaugh     Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 506 – 5th Dist. (F053843)  7/29/09  (Mod. 10/20/09)     Case complete 12/21/09MECHANIC’S LIENS: Under Business and Professions Code Section 7031, a property owner may recover all compensation paid to an unlicensed contractor, in addition to not being liable for unpaid amounts. Furthermore, this recovery may not be offset or reduced by the unlicensed contractor’s claim for materials or other services.Linthicum v. Butterfield     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
175 Cal.App.4th 259 – 2nd Dist. (B199645)  6/24/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/9/09NOTE: This is a new opinion following a rehearing. The only significant changes from the original opinion filed 4/2/09 (modified 4/8/09) involve the issue of a C.C.P. 998 offer, which is not a significant title insurance or escrow issue.
EASEMENTS: The court quieted title to an easement for access based on the doctrine of “balancing conveniences ” or “relative hardship”. Prohibiting the continued use of the roadway would cause catastrophic loss to the defendants and insignificant loss to the plaintiffs. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine the width of the easement, which should be the minimal width necessary. The court reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded a utility easement to the defendants because they did not seek to quiet title to an easement for utilities, even though they denied the material allegations of that cause of action.United Rentals Northwest v. United Lumber Products     Docket
174 Cal.App.4th 1479 – 5th Dist. (F055855)  6/18/09     Case complete 8/18/09MECHANIC’S LIENS: Under Civil Code Section 3106, a “work of improvement” includes the demolition and/or removal of buildings. The court held that lumber drying kilns are “buildings” so the contractor who dismantled and removed them was entitled to a mechanic’s lien.People v. Shetty     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
174 Cal.App.4th 1488 – 2nd Dist. (B205061)  6/18/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/30/09HOME EQUITY SALES CONTRACT ACT: This case is not significant from a title insurance standpoint, but it is interesting because it is an example of a successful prosecution under the Home Equity Sales Contract Act (Civil Code Section 1695 et seq.).Strauss v. Horton     Modification     Docket
46 Cal.4th 364 – Cal. Supreme Court (S168047)  5/26/09SAME SEX MARRIAGE: The California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8, which amended the California State Constitution to provide that: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” Proposition 8 thereby overrode portions of the ruling of In re Marriage Cases, which allowed same-sex marriages. But the Court upheld the marriages that were performed in the brief time same-sex marriage was legal between June 17, 2008 (In re Marriage Cases) through November 5, 2008 (Proposition 8).In re Marriage of Lund     Docket
174 Cal.App.4th 40 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040863)  5/21/09     Case complete 7/27/09COMMUNITY PROPERTY: An agreement accomplished a transmutation of separate property to community property even though it stated that the transfer was “for estate planning purposes”. A transmutation either occurs for all purposes or it doesn’t occur at all.St. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park, etc.     Docket
46 Cal.4th 282 – Cal. Supreme Court (S159319)  5/14/09OPEN SPACE DEDICATION: Property granted to a Regional Park District is not “actually dedicated” under Public Resources Code Section 5540 for open space purposes until the district’s Board of Directors adopts a resolution dedicating the property for park or open space purposes. Therefore, until the Board of Directors adopts such a resolution, the property may be sold by the District without voter or legislative approval.Manhattan Loft v. Mercury Liquors     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
173 Cal.App.4th 1040 – 2nd Dist. (B211070)  5/6/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/12/09LIS PENDENS: An arbitration proceeding is not an “action” that supports the recordation of a notice of pendency of action. The proper procedure is for a party to an arbitration agreement to file an action in court to support the recording of a lis pendens, and simultaneously file an application to stay the litigation pending arbitration.Murphy v. Burch     Docket
46 Cal.4th 157 – Cal. Supreme Court (S159489)  4/27/09EASEMENT BY NECESSITY: This case contains a good discussion of the law of easements by necessity, which the court held did not apply in this case to provide access to plaintiff’s property. This means plaintiff’s property is completely landlocked because the parties had already stipulated that a prescriptive easement could not be established.

An easement by necessity arises by operation of law when 1) there is a strict necessity as when a property is landlocked and 2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity. The second requirement, while not categorically barred when the federal government is the common grantor, requires a high burden of proof to show 1) the intent of Congress to establish the easement under federal statutes authorizing the patent and 2) the government’s lack of power to condemn the easement. Normally, a reservation of an easement in favor of the government would not be necessary because the government can obtain the easement by condemnation.

The court pointed out that there is a distinction between an implied grant and implied reservation, and favorably quotes a treatise that observes: “an easement of necessity may be created against the government, but the government agency cannot establish an easement by necessity over land it has conveyed because its power of eminent domain removes the strict necessity required for the creation of an easement by necessity.”Abernathy Valley, Inc. v. County of Solano     Docket
173 Cal.App.4th 42 – 1st Dist. (A121817)  4/17/09     Case complete 6/22/09SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: This case contains a very good history of California’s Subdivision Map Act statutes. The court held that parcels shown on a 1909 map recorded pursuant to the 1907 subdivision map law are not entitled to recognition under the Subdivision Map Act’s grandfather clause (Government Code Section 66499.30) because the 1907 act did not regulate the “design and improvement of subdivisions”. The court also held that a local agency may deny an application for a certificate of compliance that seeks a determination that a particular subdivision lot complies with the Act, where the effect of issuing a certificate would be to effectively subdivide the property without complying with the Act.Linthicum v. Butterfield     Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
172 Cal.App.4th 1112 – 2nd Dist. (B199645)  4/2/09
SEE NEW OPINION FILED 6/24/09
EASEMENTS: The court quieted title to an easement for access based on the doctrine of “balancing conveniences ” or “relative hardship”. Prohibiting the continued use of the roadway would cause catastrophic loss to the defendants and insignificant loss to the plaintiffs. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine the width of the easement, which should be the minimal width necessary. The court reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded a utility easement to the defendants because they did not seek to quiet title to an easement for utilities, even though they denied the material allegations of that cause of action.McAvoy v. Hilbert     Docket
172 Cal.App.4th 707 – 4th Dist., Div 1 (D052802)  3/24/09     Case complete 5/27/09ARBITRATION: C.C.P. Section 1298 requires that an arbitration provision in a real estate contract be accompanied by a statutory notice and that the parties indicate their assent by placing their initials on an adjacent space or line. The court held that a listing agreement that is part of a larger transaction for the sale of both a business and real estate is still subject to Section 1298, and refused to enforce an arbitration clause that did not comply with that statute.Peak-Las Positas Partners v. Bollag     Modification     Docket
172 Cal.App.4th 101 – 2nd Dist. (B205091)  3/16/09     Case complete 5/27/09ESCROW: Amended escrow instructions provided for extending the escrow upon mutual consent which “shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed”. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the seller’s refusal to extend escrow was unreasonable. The court pointed out the rule that equity abhors a forfeiture and that plaintiff had paid a non-refundable deposit of $465,000 and spent $5 million in project costs to obtain a lot line adjustment that was necessary in order for the property to be sold.Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn     Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
171 Cal.App.4th 1356 6th Dist. (H031127)  2/19/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/13/09CC&R’s: The court upheld the validity of recorded CC&R’s containing an affordable housing restriction that required property to remain affordable to buyers with low to moderate income. The court reached several conclusions:
1. Constructive notice of recorded CC&R’s is imparted even if they are not referenced in a subsequent deed,
2. CC&R’s may describe an entire tract, and do not need to describe individual lots in the tract,
3. An affordable housing restriction is a reasonable restraint on alienation even if it is of indefinite duration,
4. Defendants had a duty as sellers to disclose the existence of the CC&R’s. Such disclosure was made if plaintiffs were given, prior to close of escrow, preliminary reports that disclosed the CC&R’s.
5. The fact that a victim had constructive notice of a matter from public records is no defense to fraud. The existence of such public records may be relevant to whether the victim’s reliance was justifiable, but it is not, by itself, conclusive.
6. In the absence of a claim that defendants somehow prevented plaintiffs from reading the preliminary reports or deeds, or misled them about their contents, plaintiffs cannot blame defendants for their own neglect in reading the reports or deeds. Therefore, the date of discovery of alleged fraud for failing to disclose the affordable housing restriction would be the date plaintiffs received their preliminary reports or if they did not receive a preliminary report, the date they received their deeds.Kwok v. Transnation Title Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 1562 – 2nd Dist. (B207421)  2/10/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/29/09TITLE INSURANCE: Plaintiffs did not succeed as insureds “by operation of law” under the terms of the title insurance policy after transfer of the property from a wholly owned limited liability company, of which appellants were the only members, to appellants as trustees of a revocable family trust. This case highlights the importance of obtaining a 107.9 endorsement, which adds the grantee as an additional insured under the policy.Pro Value Properties v. Quality Loan Service Corp.     Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 579 – 2nd Dist. (B204853)  1/23/09     Case complete 3/27/09TRUSTEE’S SALES: A Trustee’s Deed was void because the trustee failed to record a substitution of trustee. The purchaser at the sale was entitled to a return of the money paid plus interest. The interest rate is the prejudgment interest rate of seven percent set forth in Cal. Const., Art. XV, Section 1. A trustee’s obligations to a purchaser are based on statute and not on a contract. Therefore, Civil Code Section 3289 does not apply, since it only applies to a breach of a contract that does not stipulate an interest rate.Sixells v. Cannery Business Park     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 648 – 3rd Dist. (C056267)  12/29/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/25/09CONTRACTS: The Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, Section 66410 et seq.) prohibits the sale of a parcel of real property until a final subdivision map or parcel map has been filed unless the contract to sell the property is “expressly conditioned” upon the approval and filing of a final map (66499.30(e)). Here, the contract satisfied neither requirement because it allowed the purchaser to complete the purchase if, at its election, the subject property was made into a legal parcel by recording a final map or if the purchaser “waived” the recording of a final map. Therefore the contract was void.Patel v. Liebermensch     Docket
45 Cal.4th 344 – Cal. Supreme Court (S156797)  12/22/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: The material factors required for a  written contract are the seller, the buyer, the price to be paid, the time and manner of payment, and the property to be transferred, describing it so it may be identified. Here, specific performance of an option was granted even though it was not precise as to the time and manner of payment because where a contract for the sale of real property specifies no time of payment, a reasonable time is allowed. The manner of payment is also a term that may be supplied by implication.In re Marriage of Brooks and Robinson     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
169 Cal.App.4th 176 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E043770)  12/16/08     Request for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/25/09COMMUNITY PROPERTY: The act of taking title to property in the name of one spouse during marriage with the consent of the other spouse effectively removes that property from the general presumption that the property is community property. Instead, there is a presumption that the parties intended title to be held as stated in the deed. This presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of a contrary agreement, and not solely by tracing the funds used to purchase the property or by testimony of an intention not disclosed at the time of the execution of the conveyance. Because the court found that there was no agreement to hold title other than as the separate property of the spouse who acquired title in her own name, it did not reach the issue of whether a purchaser from that spouse was a BFP or would be charged with knowledge of that the seller’s spouse had a community property interest in the property.The Formula, Inc. v. Superior Court     Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 1455 – 3rd Dist. (C058894)  12/10/09     Case complete 2/10/09LIS PENDENS: A notice of litigation filed in another state is not authorized for recording under California’s lis pendens statutes. An improperly filed notice of an action in another state is subject to expungement by a California court, but not under the authority of C.C.P. Section 405.30, and an order of expungement is given effect by being recorded in the chain of title to overcome the effect of the earlier filing.Ekstrom v. Marquesa at Monarch Beach HOA     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 1111 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038537)  12/1/08     Depublication request DENIED 3/11/09CC&R’s: A provision in CC&R’s requiring all trees on a lot to be trimmed so as to not exceed the roof of the house on the lot, unless the tree does not obstruct views from other lots, applies to palm trees even though topping a palm tree will kill it. All trees means “all trees”, so palm trees are not exempt from the requirement that offending trees be trimmed, topped, or removed.Spencer v. Marshall     Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 783 – 1st Dist. (A119437)  11/24/08     Case complete 1/26/09HOME EQUITY SALES: The Home Equity Sales Contract Act applies even where the seller is in bankruptcy and even where the seller’s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plan allows the seller to sell or refinance the subject property without further order of the court.Kachlon v. Markowitz     Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 316 – 2nd Dist. (B182816)  11/17/08     Case complete 1/27/09TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. The statutorily required mailing, publication, and delivery of notices in nonjudicial foreclosure, and the performance of statutory nonjudicial foreclosure procedures, are privileged communications under the qualified, common-interest privilege, which means that the privilege applies as long as there is no malice. The absolute privilege for communications made in a judicial proceeding (the “litigation privilege”) does not apply.
2. Actions seeking to enjoin nonjudicial foreclosure and clear title based on the provisions of a deed of trust are actions on a contract, so an award of attorney fees under Civil Code Section 1717 and provisions in the deed of trust is proper.
3. An owner is entitled to attorney fees against the trustee who conducted trustee’s sale proceedings where the trustee did not merely act as a neutral stakeholder but rather aligned itself with the lender by denying that the trustor was entitled to relief.Hines v. Lukes     Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 1174 – 2nd Dist. (B199971)  10/27/08     Case complete 12/31/08EASEMENTS: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The underlying dispute concerns an easement but the case involves only civil procedure issues pertaining to the enforcement of a settlement agreement.Satchmed Plaza Owners Association v. UWMC Hospital Corp.     Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 1034 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038119)  10/23/08     Case complete 12/23/08RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The underlying dispute concerns a right of first refusal but the case involves only civil procedure issues pertaining to a party’s waiver of its right to appeal where it has accepted the benefits of the favorable portion of judgment.Gray v. McCormick     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 1019 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G039738)  10/23/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/14/09EASEMENTS: Exclusive easements are permitted under California law, but the use by the owner of the dominant tenement is limited to the purposes specified in the grant of easement, not all conceivable uses of the property.In re Estate of Felder     Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 518 – 2nd Dist.   (B205027)  10/9/08     Case complete 12/11/08CONTRACTS: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The case held that an estate had the right to retain the entire deposit upon a purchaser’s breach of a sales contract even though the estate had only a 1/2 interest in the subject property.Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan Trust     Order Modifying Opinion     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 544 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G039065)  10/9/08, Modified 11/3/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/17/08LOAN MODIFICATION: Because a note and deed of trust come within the statute of frauds, a Forbearance Agreement also comes within the statute of frauds pursuant to Civil Code section 1698. Making the downpayment required by the Forbearance Agreement was not sufficient part performance to estop Defendants from asserting the statute of frauds because payment of money alone is not enough as a matter of law to take an agreement out of the statute, and the Plaintiffs have legal means to recover the downpayment if they are entitled to its return. In addition to part performance, the party seeking to enforce the contract must have changed position in reliance on the oral contract to such an extent that application of the statute of frauds would result in an unjust or unconscionable loss, amounting in effect to a fraud.FDIC v. Dintino     Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 333 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D051447)  9/9/08 (Pub. Order 10/2/08)     Case complete 12/2/08TRUST DEEDS: A lender who mistakenly reconveyed a deed of trust could not sue under the note because it would violate the one action rule. However, the lender prevailed on its unjust enrichment cause of action. The applicable statute of limitations was the 3-year statute for actions based on fraud or mistake, and not the 4-year statute for actions based on contract. Nevertheless, the action was timely because the statute did not begin to run until the lender reasonably discovered its mistake, and not from the date of recordation of the reconveyance. Finally, the court awarded defendant attorney’s fees attributable to defending the contract cause of action because defendant prevailed on that particular cause of action even though he lost the lawsuit.California Coastal Commission v. Allen     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 322 – 2nd Dist. (B197974)  10/1/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/14/09HOMESTEADS:
1. The assignees of a judgment properly established their rights as assignees by filing with the clerk of the court an acknowledgement of assignment of judgment.
2. The subject property was not subject to a homestead exemption because the debtor transferred the property to a corporation of which he was the sole shareholder. The homestead exemption only applies to the interest of a natural person in a dwelling.
3. The debtor could not claim that he was only temporarily absent from a dwelling in order to establish it as his homestead where he leased it for two years. This is true even though the debtor retained the right to occupy a single car section of the garage and the attic.In re Marriage of Holtemann     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
162 Cal.App.4th 1175 – 2nd Dist. (B203089)  9/15/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/10/08COMMUNITY PROPERTY: Transmutation of separate property to community property requires language which expressly states that the characterization or ownership of the property is being changed. Here, an effective transmutation occurred because the transmutation agreement clearly specified that a transmutation was occurring and was not negated by arguably confusing language in a trust regarding the parties’ rights to terminate the trust. The court also stated that it was not aware of any authority for the proposition that a transmutation can be conditional or temporary. However, while questioning whether a transmutation can be conditional or temporary, the court did not specifically make that holding because the language used by the parties was not conditional.Mission Shores Association v. Pheil     Docket
166 Cal.App.4th 789 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E043932)  9/5/08     Case complete 11/7/08CC&R’s: Civil Code Section 1356 allows a court to reduce a super-majority voting requirement to amend CC&R’s where the court finds that the amendment is reasonable. Here the court reduced the 2/3 majority requirement to a simple majority for an amendment to limit rentals of homes to 30 days or more.Zanelli v. McGrath     Docket
166 Cal.App.4th 615 – 1st Dist. (A117111)  9/2/08     Case complete 11/4/08EASEMENTS:
1. The doctrine of merger codified in Civil Code Sections 805 and 811 applies when “the right to the servitude,” and “the right to the servient tenement” are not vested in a single individual, but in the same persons;

2. The doctrine of merger applies regardless of whether the owners held title as joint tenants or tenants in common. Also, the fact that one owner held his interest in one of the properties as trustee for his inter vivos revocable trust does not preclude merger because California law recognizes that when property is held in this type of trust the settlor has the equivalent of full ownership of the property. (If he had held title only in a representative capacity as a trustee for other beneficiaries under the terms of an irrevocable trust, then his ownership might not result in extinguishment by merger because he would only hold the legal title for the benefit of others.) The court cites Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331, stating that a revocable inter vivos trust is recognized as simply a probate avoidance device, but does not prevent creditors of the settlers from reaching trust property.

(3) After being extinguished by merger, an easement is not revived upon severance of the formerly dominant and servient parcels unless it is validly created once again.Ritter & Ritter v. The Churchill Condominium Assn.     Docket
166 Cal.App.4th 103 – 2nd Dist. (B187840) 7/22/08  (pub. order 8/21/08)     Case complete 10/21/08HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS: A member of a condominium homeowners’ association can recover damages from the association which result from a dangerous condition negligently maintained by the association in the common area. However, the court found in favor of the individual directors because a greater degree of fault is necessary to hold unpaid individual board members liable, and such greater degree of fault was not present here.Kempton v. City of Los Angeles     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 1344 – 2nd Dist. (B201128) 8/13/08     Request for Depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/12/08NUISANCE: A private individual may bring an action against a municipality to abate a public nuisance when the individual suffers harm that is specially injurious to himself, or where the nuisance is a public nuisance per se, such as blocking a public sidewalk or road. The court held that plaintiff’s assertions that neighbors’ fences were erected upon city property, prevent access to plaintiff’s sidewalk area, and block the sightlines upon entering and exiting their garage were sufficient to support both a public nuisance per se and specific injury.Claudino v. Pereira     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 1282 – 3rd Dist. (C054808) 8/12/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/12//08SURVEYS: Determining the location of a boundary line shown on a plat recorded pursuant to the 1867 Townsite Acts requires an examination of both the plat and the surveyor’s field notes. Here, the plat showed the boundary as a straight line, but the court held that the boundary followed the center line of a gulch because the field notes stated that the boundary was “down said gulch”.Zack’s, Inc. v. City of Sausalito     Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 1163 – 1st Dist. (A118244) 8/11/08     Case complete 10/14/08TIDELANDS / PUBLIC STREETS: A statute authorizing the City’s lease of tidelands does not supersede other state laws establishing procedures for the abandonment of public streets. Because the City failed to follow the normal procedure for abandonment of the portion of the street upon which it granted a lease, the leasehold was not authorized and can therefore be deemed a nuisance.Gehr v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 660 – 2nd Dist. (B201195) 7/30/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/16/08NUISANCE: Plaintiff purchased from Defendant real property that was contaminated, and Defendant had begun the remediation process. The 3-year statute of limitations for suing under a permanent nuisance theory had expired. So Plaintiff sued for nuisance damages under a continuing nuisance theory, seeking interest rate differential damages based on the difference in the interest rate between an existing loan and a loan that plaintiff could have obtained if not for the contamination.

The court held that plaintiff’s claim for interest rate differential damages is actually a claim for diminution in value, which may not be recovered under a continuing nuisance theory. Damages for diminution in value may only be recovered for permanent, not continuing, nuisances. When suing for a continuing nuisance, future or prospective damages are not allowed, such as damages for diminution in the value of the subject property. A nuisance can only be considered “continuing” if it can be abated, and therefore a plaintiff suing under this theory may only recover the costs of abating the nuisance.

If the nuisance has inflicted a permanent injury on the land, the plaintiff generally must bring a single lawsuit for all past, present, and future damages within three years of the creation of the nuisance. But if the nuisance is one which may be discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing in character and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for damages until the nuisance is abated. Recovery is limited, however, to actual injury suffered prior to commencement of each action.Witt Home Ranch v. County of Sonoma     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 543 – 1st Dist. (A118911) 7/29/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/28/08SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: This case contains a good history of California’s Subdivision Map Act statutes. The court held that the laws governing subdivision maps in 1915 did not regulate the “design and improvement of subdivisions,” as required by the grandfather clause of Government Code Section 66499.30. The subdivision map in this case was recorded in 1915 and no lots were subsequently conveyed, so the map does not create a valid subdivision.T.O. IX v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 140 – 2nd Dist. (B203794) 7/24/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/10/08MECHANIC’S LIENS: A mechanic’s lien claimant recorded a mechanic’s lien against each of the nine parcels in a project, each lien for the full amount due under the contract. The court held that defendant could record a single release bond under Civil Code Section 3143 to release all of the liens.Kassir v. Zahabi     Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 1352 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038449) 3/5/08 (Pub. Order 4/3/08, Received 7/16/08)     Case complete 5/9/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: The trial court ordered Defendant to specifically perform his contract to sell real property to Plaintiff, and further issued a judgment ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff for rents accruing during the time Defendant was able to perform the agreement but refused to do so. The court held that because the property was overencumbered, Defendant would have received nothing under the agreement and no offset was required.

The court explained that because execution of the judgment in a specific performance action will occur later than the date of performance provided by the contract, financial adjustments must be made to relate their performance back to the contract date, namely: 1) when a buyer is deprived of possession of the property pending resolution of the dispute and the seller receives rents and profits, the buyer is entitled to a credit against the purchase price for the rents and profits from the time the property should have been conveyed to him, 2) a seller also must be treated as if he had performed in a timely fashion and is entitled to receive the value of his lost use of the purchase money during the period performance was delayed, 3) if any part of the purchase price has been set aside by the buyer with notice to the seller, the seller may not receive credit for his lost use of those funds and 4) any award to the seller representing the value of his lost use of the purchase money cannot exceed the rents and profits awarded to the buyer, for otherwise the breaching seller would profit from his wrong.Grant v. Ratliff     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 1304 – 2nd Dist. (B194368) 7/16/08     Request for depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/1/08PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: The plaintiff/owner of Parcel A sought to establish a prescriptive easement to a road over Parcel B. In order to establish the requisite 5-year period of open and notorious possession, the plaintiff needed to include the time that the son of the owner of Parcel B spent living in a mobile home on Parcel A. The court held that the son’s use of Parcel A was not adverse but was instead a matter of “family accommodation” and, therefore, a prescriptive easement was not established. The court also discussed: 1) a party seeking to establish a prescriptive easement has the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence and 2) once the owner of the dominant tenement shows that use of an easement has been continuous over a long period of time, the burden shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to show that the use was permissive, but the servient tenement owner’s burden is a burden of producing evidence, and not a burden of proof.SBAM Partners v. Wang     Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 903 – 2nd Dist. (B204191) 7/9/08     Case complete 9/10/08HOMESTEADS: Under C.C.P. Section 704.710, a homestead exemption is not allowed on property acquired by the debtor after the judgment has been recorded unless it was purchased with exempt proceeds from the sale, damage or destruction of a homestead within the six-month safe harbor period.Christian v. Flora     Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 539 – 3rd Dist. (C054523) 6/30/08     Case complete 9/2/08EASEMENTS: Where parcels in a subdivision are resubdivided by a subsequent parcel map, the new parcel map amends the provisions of any previously recorded parcel map made in compliance with the Map Act. Here, although the deeds to plaintiffs referred to the original parcel map, since the intent of the parties was that the easement shown on the amended parcel map would be conveyed, the grantees acquired title to the easement shown on the amended map.Lange v. Schilling     Docket
163 Cal.App.4th 1412 – 3rd Dist. (C055471) 5/28/08; pub. order 6/16/08     Case Complete 8/18/08REAL ESTATE AGENTS: The clear language of the standard California real estate purchase agreement precludes an award of attorney’s fees if a party does not attempt mediation before commencing litigation. Because plaintiff filed his lawsuit before offering mediation, there was no basis to award attorney’s fees.Talbott v. Hustwit     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 148 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037424) 6/20/08     Petition for review and depublication DENIED by Cal Supreme Ct. 9/24/08GUARANTEES:
1. C.C.P. 580a, which requires an appraisal of the real property security before the court may issue a deficiency judgment, does not apply to an action against a guarantor.
2. A lender cannot recover under a guaranty where there the debtor and guarantor already have identical liability, such as with general partners or trustees of a revocable trust in which the debtor is the settlor, trustee and primary beneficiary. Here, however, a  guarantee signed by the trustees of the debtors’ trust is enforceable as a “true guarantee” because, although the debtors were the settlors, they were a) secondary, not primary, beneficiaries and b) were not the trustees.Mayer v. L & B Real Estate     Sup.Ct. Docket
43 Cal.4th 1231 – Cal. Supreme Court (S142211) 6/16/08TAX SALES: The one-year statute of limitations for attacking a tax sale does not begin to run against a property owner who is in “undisturbed possession” of the subject property until that owner has actual notice of the tax sale. Ordinarily, a property owner who has failed to pay property taxes has sufficient knowledge to put him on notice that a tax sale might result. However, in this case the property owners did not have notice because they purchased a single piece of commercial property and received a single yearly tax bill. They had no reason to suspect that due to errors committed by the tax assessor, a small portion of their property was being assessed separately and the tax bills were being sent to a previous owner.

NOTE: This creates a hazard for title companies insuring after a tax sale in reliance on the one-year statute of limitations in Revenue and Taxation Code Section 3725.California Golf v. Cooper     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
163 Cal.App.4th 1053 – 2nd Dist. (B195211) 6/9/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/17/08TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. A bidder at a trustee’s sale may not challenge the sale on the basis that the lender previously obtained a decree of judicial foreclosure because the doctrine of election of remedies benefits only the trustor or debtor.
2. A lender’s remedies against a bidder who causes a bank to stop payment on cashier’s checks based on a false affidavit asserting that the checks were lost is not limited to the remedies set forth in CC Section 2924h, and may pursue a cause of  action for fraud against the bidder.
(The case contains a good discussion (at pp. 25 – 26) of the procedure for stopping payment on a cashier’s check by submitting an affidavit to the issuing bank.)Biagini v. Beckham     Docket
163 Cal.App.4th 1000 – 3rd Dist. (C054915) 6/9/08     Case complete 8/11/08DEDICATION:
1. Acceptance of a dedication may be actual or implied. It is actual when formal acceptance is made by the proper authorities, and implied when a use has been made of the property by the public 1) of an  intensity that is reasonable for the nature of the road and 2) for such a length of time as will evidence an intention to accept the dedication. BUT the use in this case was not sufficient because the use was by neighbors whose use did not exceed what was permitted pursuant to a private easement over the same area.
2. A statutory offer of dedication can be revoked as to the public at large by use of the area that is inconsistent with the dedication, but the offer remains open for formal acceptance by the public entity to which the offer was made. Steiner v. Thexton     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C054605) 5/28/08     REVERSED by Cal. Supreme Ct.OPTIONS: A contract to sell real property where the buyer’s performance was entirely conditioned on the buyer obtaining regulatory approval to subdivide the property is an option. An option must be supported by consideration, but was not here, where the buyer could back out at any time. Buyer’s promise to deliver to seller copies “of all information, reports, tests, studies and other documentation” was not sufficient consideration to support the option.In re Marriage Cases     Docket
43 Cal.4th 757 – Cal. Supreme Court (S147999) 5/15/08MARRIAGE: The language of Family Code Section 300 limiting the designation of marriage to a union “between a man and a woman” is unconstitutional and must be stricken from the statute, and the remaining statutory language must be understood as making the designation of marriage available both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.Harvey v. The Landing Homeowners Association     Docket
162 Cal.App.4th 809 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D050263) 4/4/08 (Cert. for Pub. 4/30/08)     Case complete 6/30/08HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS: The Board of Directors of an HOA has the authority to allow owners to exclusively use common area accessible only to those owners where the following provision of the CC&R’s applied: “The Board shall have the right to allow an Owner to exclusively use portions of the otherwise nonexclusive Common Area, provided that such portions . . . are nominal in area and adjacent to the Owner’s Exclusive Use Area(s) or Living Unit, and, provided further, that such use does not unreasonably interfere with any other Owner’s use . . .” Also, this is allowed under Civil Code Section 1363.07(a)(3)(E).Salma v. Capon     Docket
161 Cal.App.4th 1275 – 1st Dist. (A115057) 4/9/08     Case complete 6/11/08HOME EQUITY SALES: A seller claimed he sold his house for far less than it was worth “due to the duress of an impending trustee’s sale and the deceit of the purchasers”. The case involves procedural issues that are not relevant to this web site. However, it is included here because it demonstrates the kind of mess that can occur when you are dealing with property that is in foreclosure. Be careful, folks.Aviel v. Ng     Docket
161 Cal.App.4th 809 – 1st Dist. (A114930) 2/28/08; pub. order 4/1/08     Case complete 5/6/08LEASES / SUBORDINATION: A lease provision subordinating the lease to “mortgages” also applied to deeds of trust because the two instruments are functionally and legally the same. Therefore a foreclosure of a deed of trust wiped out the lease.People v. Martinez     Docket
161 Cal.App.4th 754 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E042427) 4/1/08     Case complete 6/2/08FORGERY: This criminal case involves a conviction for forgery of a deed of trust. [NOTE: The crime of forgery can occur even if the owner actually signed the deed of trust. The court pointed out that “forgery is committed when a defendant, by fraud or trickery, causes another to execute a document where the signer is unaware, by reason of such trickery, that he is executing a document of that nature.”Pacific Hills Homeowners Association v. Prun     Docket
160 Cal.App.4th 1557 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038244) 3/20/08     Case complete 5/27/08CC&R’s: Defendants built a gate and fence within the setback required by the CC&R’s. 1) The court held that the 5-year statute of limitations of C.C.P. 336(b) applies to unrecorded as well as recorded restrictions, so that the shorter 4-year statute of limitations of C.C.P. 337 is inapplicable. 2) The court upheld the trial court’s equitable remedy of requiring the HOA to pay 2/3 of the cost of relocation defendant’s gate based upon the HOA’s sloppiness in not pursuing its case more promptly.Nicoll v. Rudnick     Docket
160 Cal.App.4th 550 – 5th Dist. (F052948) 2/27/08     Case complete 4/28/08WATER RIGHTS: An appropriative water right established in a 1902 judgment applied to the entire 300 acre parcel so that when part of the parcel was foreclosed and subsequently re-sold, the water rights must be apportioned according to the acreage of each parcel, not according to the prior actual water usage attributable to each parcel. NOTE: This case contains a good explanation of California water rights law.Real Estate Analytics v. Vallas     Docket
160 Cal.App.4th 463 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049161) 2/26/08     Case complete 5/29/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance is appropriate even where the buyer’s sole purpose and entire intent in buying the property was to earn money for its investors and turn a profit as quickly as possible. The fact that plaintiff was motivated solely to make a profit from the purchase of the property does not overcome the strong statutory presumption that all land is unique and therefore damages were inadequate to make plaintiff whole for the defendant’s breach.Fourth La Costa Condominium Owners Assn. v. Seith     Docket
159 Cal.App.4th 563 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049276) 1/30/08     Case complete 4/1/08CC&R’s/HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: The court applied CC 1356(c)(2) and Corp. Code 7515, which allow a court to reduce the supermajority vote requirement for amending CC&R’s and bylaw because the amendments were reasonable and the balloting requirements of the statutes were met.02 Development, LLC v. 607 South Park, LLC     Docket
159 Cal.App.4th 609 – 2nd Dist. (B200226) 1/30/08     Case complete 4/3/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: 1) An assignment of a purchaser’s rights under a purchase agreement prior to creation of the assignee as an LLC is valid because an organization can enforce pre-organization contracts if the organization adopts or ratifies them. 2) A purchaser does not need to prove that it already had the necessary funds, or already had binding commitments from third parties to provide the funds, when the other party anticipatorily repudiates the contract. All that plaintiff needed to prove was that it would have been able to obtain the necessary funding (or funding commitments) in order to close the transaction on time.Richeson v. Helal     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
158 Cal.App.4th 268 – 2nd Dist. (B187273) 11/29/07; Pub. & mod. order 12/21/07 (see end of opinion)     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/20/08CC&R’s / MUNICIPALITIES: An Agreement Imposing Restrictions (“AIR”) and CC&R’s did not properly lend themselves to an interpretation that would prohibit the City from changing the permitted use or zoning and, were they so construed, the AIR and CC&R’s would be invalid as an attempt by the City to surrender its future right to exercise its police power respecting the property. Here, the AIR and CC&R’s did not prohibit the City from issuing a new conditional use permit allowing the continued use of the subject property as a neighborhood market.Bill Signs Trucking v. Signs Family Ltd. Partnership     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 1515 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D047861) 12/18/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/9/08LEASES / RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: A tenant’s right of first refusal under a commercial lease is not triggered by the conveyance of an interest in the property between co-partners in a family limited partnership that owns the property and is the landlord.Schweitzer v. Westminster Investments     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 1195 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049589) 12/13/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/26/08EQUITY PURCHASERS:
1) The bonding requirement of the Home Equity Sales Contracts Act (Civil Code Section 1695.17) is void for vagueness under the due process clause and may not be enforced. Section 1695.17 is vague because it provides no guidance on the amount, the obligee, the beneficiaries, the terms or conditions of the bond, the delivery and acceptance requirements, or the enforcement mechanisms of the required bond.
2) Although the bond requirement may not be enforced, the remainder of the statutory scheme remains valid because the bond provisions are severable from the balance of the enactment.
3) The court refused to set aside the deed in favor of the equity purchaser because, first, the notice requirements of Civil Code Section 1695.5 appear to have been met and, second, the seller’s right to rescind applies before the deed is recorded but the statute “does not specify that a violation of section 1695.5 provides grounds for rescinding a transaction after recordation of the deed”.Crestmar Owners Association v. Stapakis     Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 1223 – 2nd Dist. (B191049) 12/13/07     Case complete 2/15/07CC&R’s: Where a developer failed to convey title to two parking spaces as required by the CC&R’s, the homeowner’s association was able to quiet title even though more than 20 years had passed since the parking spaces should have been conveyed. The statute of limitations does not run against someone, such as the homeowner’s association here, who is in exclusive and undisputed possession of the property.Washington Mutual Bank v. Blechman     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 662 – 2nd Dist. (B191125) 12/4/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/19/08TRUSTEE’S SALES: The foreclosing lender and trustee are indispensable parties to a lawsuit which seeks to set aside a trustee’s sale. Therefore, a default judgment against only the purchaser at the trustee’s sale is subject to collateral attack.Garretson v. Post     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
156 Cal.App.4th 1508 – 4th Dist., Div.2 (E041858) 11/20/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/27/08TRUSTEE’S SALES: A cause of action for wrongful foreclosure does not fall within the protection of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuit against public participation).Murphy v. Burch     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A117051) 11/19/07
AFFIRMED by Cal Supreme Ct. 4/27/09EASEMENT BY NECESSITY: An easement by necessity arises by operation of law when 1) there is a strict necessity as when a property is landlocked and 2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity. However, the second requirement is not met when the properties were owned by the federal government because the Government has the power of eminent domain, rendering it unnecessary to resort to the easement by necessity doctrine in order to acquire easements.

The court attempts to distinguish Kellogg v. Garcia, 102 Cal.App.4th 796, by pointing out that in that case the issue of eminent domain did not arise because the dominant tenement was owned by a private party and the servient tenements by the federal government. [Ed. Note: the court does not adequately address the fact that the government does not always have the power of eminent domain. It only has that power if a public purpose is involved. Also, I do not think the court adequately distinguishes Kellogg, which seems to hold that common ownership by the federal government satisfies the requirement of common ownership.]Elias Real Estate v. Tseng     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
156 Cal.App.4th 425 – 2nd Dist. (B192857) 10/25/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/13/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Acts of a partner falling within Corp. Code 16301(1) (acts in ordinary course of business) are not subject to the statute of frauds. Acts of a partner falling within Corp. Code 16301(2) (acts not in the ordinary course of business) are subject to the statute of frauds. In this case, a sale of the partnership’s real property was not in the ordinary course of business, so it fell within Corp. Code 16301(2) and plaintiff could not enforce a contract of sale signed by only one partner.Strong v. State Board of Equalization     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
155 Cal.App.4th 1182 – 3rd Dist. (C052818) 10/2/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/3/08CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP: The statute that excludes transfers between domestic partners from property tax reassessment is constitutional.County of Solano v. Handlery     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
155 Cal.App.4th 566 – 1st Dist. (A114120) 9/21/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/12/07DEEDS: The County brought an action against grantors’ heirs to invalidate restrictions in a deed limiting the subject property to use as a county fair or similar public purposes. The court refused to apply the Marketable Record Title Act to eliminate the power of termination in favor of the grantors because the restrictions are enforceable under the public trust doctrine.Baccouche v. Blankenship     Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 1551 – 2nd Dist (B192291) 9/11/07     Case complete 11/16/07EASEMENTS: An easement that permits a use that is prohibited by a zoning ordinance is not void. It is a valid easement, but cannot be enforced unless the dominant owner obtains a variance. As is true with virtually all land use, whether a grantee can actually use the property for the purposes stated in the easement is subject to compliance with any applicable laws and ordinances, including zoning restrictions.WRI Opportunity Loans II LLC v. Cooper     Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 525 – 2nd Dist. (B191590) 8/23/07     Case complete 10/26/07USURY: The trial court improperly granted a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the loan was exempt from the usury law.

1. The common law exception to the usury law known as the “interest contingency rule” provides that interest that exceeds the legal maximum is not usurious when its payment is subject to a contingency so that the lender’s profit is wholly or partially put in hazard. The hazard in question must be something over and above the risk which exists with all loans – that the borrower will be unable to pay.
2. The court held that the interest contingency rule did not apply to additional interest based on a percentage of the sale price of completed condominium units because the lender was guaranteed additional interest regardless of whether the project generated rents or profits.
3. The loan did not qualify as a shared appreciation loan, permitted under Civil Code Sections 1917-1917.006, because the note guaranteed the additional interest regardless of whether the property appreciated in value or whether the project generated profits.
4. The usury defense may not be waived by guarantor of a loan. (No other published case has addressed this issue.)Archdale v. American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co.     Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 449 – 2nd Dist. (B188432) 8/22/07     Case complete 10/26/07INSURANCE: The case contains good discussions of 1) an insurer’s liability for a judgment in excess of policy limits where it fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer within policy limits and 2) the applicable statutes of limitation.REVERSED by Cal. Supreme Court 12/22/08
Patel v. Liebermensch
     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 373 – 4th, Div. 1 (D048582) 8/21/07REVERSED: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance of an option was denied where the parties never reached agreement on the amount of  the deposit, the length of time of the escrow or payment of escrow expenses if there were a delay. One judge dissented on the basis that the option contract was sufficiently clear to be specifically enforced and the court should insert reasonable terms in place of the uncertain terms.In Re Marriage of Ruelas     Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 339 – 2nd Dist. (B191655) 8/20/07     Case complete 10/26/07RESULTING TRUST: A resulting trust was created where a daughter acquired property in her own name and the evidence showed that she was acquiring the property for her parents who had poor credit.Stoneridge Parkway Partners v. MW Housing Partners     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 1373 – 3rd Dist. (C052082) 8/3/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/14/07USURY: The exemption to the usury law for loans made or arranged by real estate brokers applies to a loan in which the broker who negotiated the loan was an employee of an affiliate of the lender, but nevertheless acted as a third party intermediary in negotiating the loan. Kinney v. Overton     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 482 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037146) 7/18/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/10/07EASEMENTS: Former Civil Code Section 812 provided that

“[t]he vacation . . . of streets and highways shall extinguish all private easements therein claimed by reason of the purchase of any lot by reference to a map or plat upon which such streets or highways are shown, other than a private easement necessary for the purpose of ingress and egress to any such lot from or to a public street or highway, except as to any person claiming such easement who, within two years from the effective date of such vacation or abandonment . . . shall have recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which such vacated or abandoned streets or highways are located a verified notice of his claim to such easement . . .” [Emphasis added.]

The court held that cross-complainant could not maintain an action against the person occupying the disputed abandoned parcel because it was not necessary for access and he did not record the notice required by C.C. Section 812. The court specifically did not address the state of title to the disputed parcel or what interest, if any, cross-defendant may have in the parcel.Hartzheim v. Valley Land & Cattle Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 383 – 6th Dist. (H030053) 7/17/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/10/07LEASES / RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: A right of first refusal in a lease was not triggered by a partnership’s conveyance of property to the children and grandchildren of its partners for tax and estate planning purposes because it did not constitute a bona fide offer from any third party. The court considered three factors: 1) the contract terms must be reviewed closely to determine the conditions necessary to invoke the right, 2) where a right of first refusal is conditioned upon receipt of a bona fide third party offer to purchase the property, the right is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property to a third party and 3) the formalities of the transaction must be reviewed to determine its true nature.Berryman v. Merit Property Mgmt.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
152 Cal.App.4th 1544 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037156) 5/31/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme DENIED 10/10/07HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Fees charged by a homeowner’s association upon a transfer of title by a homeowner are limited by Civil Code Section 1368 to the association’s actual costs. The court held that this limitation does not apply to fees charged by a management company hired by the association.Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. v. Reed     Docket
152 Cal.App.4th 1308 – 2nd Dist. (B193014) 6/29/07     Case complete 8/29/07TRUSTEE’S SALES: After a trustee’s sale, the trustee deposited the surplus proceeds into court under CC 2924j in order to determine who was entitled to the excess proceeds. The court held that:
(1) The distribution of surplus proceeds to satisfy child and spousal support arrearages was proper because the County had properly recorded an abstract of support judgment,
(2) The trial court erred in distributing proceeds to the debtor’s former wife to satisfy her claims for a community property equalization payment and for attorney fees ordered in the dissolution proceeding, because no recorded lien or encumbrance secured those claims, which in any event were discharged in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding (because child and spousal support obligations are not dischargeable, but property settlement payments are dischargeable), and
(3) The trial court erred in distributing proceeds to the debtor’s former lawyer, who was retained to assist the debtor in the collection of proceeds from the trustee’s sale, because an attorney’s lien on the prospective recovery of a client must be enforced in a separate action.
(4) The debtor failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his claim that he was entitled to the $150,000 homestead exemption applicable when a debtor is physically disabled and unable to engage in substantial gainful employment (so he was entitled to only the standard $50,000 homestead exemption).Poseidon Development v. Woodland Lane Estates     Order Modifying Opinion     Docket
152 Cal.App.4th 1106 – 3rd Dist. (C052573) 6/28/07     Case complete 8/31/07PROMISSORY NOTES: A penalty that applied to late payments of installments did not apply to a late payment of the final balloon payment of principal. The penalty was 10% of the amount due, which made sense for regular installments, but bore no reasonable relationship to actual damages if applied to the balloon payment.Carr v. Kamins     Docket
151 Cal.App.4th 929 – 2nd Dist. (B191247) 5/31/07     Case complete 8/1/07QUIET TITLE: A quiet title judgment was set aside by defendant’s heir four years after being entered because the heir was not named and served. The plaintiff believed the defendant to be deceased, but made no effort to locate and serve the defendant’s heirs. [Even though this case contains some unique facts, the fact that a default judgment can be set aside four years after being entered demonstrates the danger of relying on default judgments and the need to closely examine the court file and surrounding circumstances before doing so.]Estate of Yool     Docket
151 Cal.App.4th 867 – 1st Dist. (A114787) 5/31/07     Case complete 7/31/07RESULTING TRUST: A decedent held title with her daughter for the purpose of facilitating financing and did not intend to acquire beneficial title. A probate court properly ordered the Special Administrator to convey title to the daughter based on the Resulting Trust Doctrine. It held that the four-year statute of limitations under C.C.P. 343 applied and not C.C.P. 366.2, which limits actions to collect on debts of the decedent to one year after the date of death.Kalway v. City of Berkeley     Docket
151 Cal.App.4th 827 – 1st Dist. (A112569) 5/31/07     Case complete 8/1/07SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: Plaintiff husband transferred title of a parcel to his wife in order to avoid merger under the Subdivision Map Act of a substandard parcel into their adjoining lot. The court held that plaintiffs could not evade the Map Act in this manner. It also held that the City had no authority to obtain an order canceling the deed, but that the wife also had no right to further transfer title to the substandard lot except back to her husband.Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto Club of So. Cal.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B191272) 6/25/07
REVERSED BY CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURTBAD FAITH: An insurance company acted in bad faith as a matter of law where a potential for coverage was apparent from the face of the complaint. The insured allegedly assaulted plaintiff and there was a potential for coverage because the insured may have acted in self defense. The case contains a thorough analysis of the duties of defense and indemnity.Blackmore v. Powell     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
150 Cal.App.4th 1593 – 2nd Dist. (B185326) 5/22/07     Request for depublication DENIED 8/29/07EASEMENTS: An easement “for parking and garage purposes” includes the exclusive right to build and use a garage. Granting an exclusive easement may constitute a violation under the Subdivision Map act, but here there is no violation because the exclusive use of the garage covers only a small portion of the easement and is restricted to the uses described in the easement deed. Amalgamated Bank v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
149 Cal.App.4th 1003 – 3rd Dist. (C052156, C052395) 4/16/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/8/07LIS PENDENS:
1. In deciding a writ petition from an order granting or denying a motion to expunge a lis pendens after judgment and pending appeal, an appellate court must assess whether the underlying real property claim has “probable validity”. This is the same test that is used before judgment. “Probable validity” post-judgment means that it is more likely than not the real property claim will prevail at the end of the appellate process.
2. A judicial foreclosure sale to a third party is absolute, subject only to the right of redemption, and may not be set aside, except that under C.C.P. Section 701.680(c)(1) the judgment debtor may commence an action to set aside the sale within 90 days only if the purchaser at the sale was the judgment creditor. Here, a potential bidder who was stuck in traffic and arrived too late to the sale could not set it aside because only the judgment debtor can do that and because a third party purchased at the sale. L&B Real Estate v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles     Docket
149 Cal.App.4th 950 – 2nd Dist. (B189740) 4/13/07     Case complete 6/13/07TAX DEEDS: Because public property is exempt from taxation, tax deeds purporting to convey such property for nonpayment of taxes are void. Two parcels were inadvertently not included in a deed to the State (subsequently conveyed to the Housing Authority of Los Angeles). Accordingly, the tax collector thought that those parcels were still owned by the seller and sold them at a tax sale after real estate taxes were not paid on them. The court also points out that plaintiff was not a good faith purchaser because it had constructive and actual knowledge of the fact that the Housing Authority’s low income housing was partially located on the two parcels sold at the tax sale.Ulloa v. McMillin Real Estate     Docket
149 Cal.App.4th 333 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D048066) 3/7/07 (Cert. for pub. 4/4/07)     Case complete 6/4/07STATUTE OF FRAUDS: The Statute of Frauds requires the authority of an agent who signs a sales agreement to be in writing if the agent signs on behalf of the party to be charged. However, a plaintiff purchaser whose agent signed her name with only verbal authorization is not precluded by the Statute of Frauds from bringing the action because the defendant is the party to be charged.Jordan v. Allstate Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
148 Cal.App.4th 1062 – 2nd Dist. (B187706) 3/22/07      Petition for review and depublication DENIED 6/27/07BAD FAITH: Where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability under the policy, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute. However, there can be bad faith liability where an insurer denies coverage but a reasonable investigation would have disclosed facts showing the claim was covered under other provisions of the policy. The court clarified that an insurer’s failure to investigate can result in bad faith liability only if there is coverage. If there is no coverage, then any failure to properly investigate cannot cause the insured any damage.Shah v. McMcMahon     Docket
148 Cal.App.4th 526 – 2nd Dist. (B188972) 3/12/07     Case complete 5/16/07LIS PENDENS: Plaintiffs could not appeal an order for attorney’s fees awarded in a hearing of a motion to expunge a lis pendens. The only remedy is to challenge the award by way of a petition for writ of mandate.Sterling v. Taylor     Docket
40 Cal.4th 757 – Cal. Supreme Court (S121676) 3/1/07STATUTE OF FRAUDS: If a memorandum signed by the seller includes the essential terms of the parties’ agreement (i.e. the buyer, seller, price, property and the time and manner of payment), but the meaning of those terms is unclear, the memorandum is sufficient under the statute of frauds if extrinsic evidence clarifies the terms with reasonable certainty. Because the memorandum itself must include the essential contractual terms, extrinsic evidence cannot supply those required terms, however, it can be used to explain essential terms that were understood by the parties but would otherwise be unintelligible to others. In this case, the memorandum did not set forth the price with sufficient clarity because it was uncertain whether it was to be determined by a multiplier applied to the actual rent role or whether the price specified was the agreed price even though it was based on the parties’ incorrect estimate of the rent role.Jet Source Charter v. Doherty     Docket
148 Cal.App.4th 1 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D044779) 1/30/07     (Pub. order and modification filed 2/28/07 – see end of opinion) Case complete 5/1/07PUNITIVE DAMAGES: Parts I, II, III and IV NOT certified for publication: Where the defendant’s conduct only involves economic damage to a single plaintiff who is not particularly vulnerable, an award which exceeds the compensatory damages awarded is not consistent with due process.Dyer v. Martinez     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
147 Cal.App.4th 1240 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037423) 2/23/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/13/07RECORDING: A lis pendens that was recorded but not indexed does not impart constructive notice, so a bona fide purchaser for value takes free of the lis pendens. The party seeking recordation must ensure that all the statutory requirements are met and the recorder is deemed to be an agent of the recording party for this purpose.Behniwal v. Mix     Docket
147 Cal.App.4th 621 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037200) 2/7/07     Case complete 4/13/07SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: In a specific performance action, a judgment for plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees cannot be offset against the purchase price that the successful plaintiff must pay defendant for the property. A judgment for attorneys’ fees is not an incidental cost that can be included as part of the specific performance judgment, and it is not a lien that relates back to the filing of the lis pendens. Instead, it is an ordinary money judgment that does not relate back to the lis pendens. So, while plaintiff’s title will be superior to defendant’s liens that recorded subsequent to the lis pendens, those liens are nevertheless entitled to be paid to the extent of available proceeds from the full purchase price.Castillo v. Express Escrow     Docket
146 Cal.App.4th 1301 – 2nd Dist. (B186306) 1/18/07     Case complete 3/20/07MOBILEHOME ESCROWS:
1) Health and Safety Code Section 18035(f) requires the escrow agent for a mobile home sale to hold funds in escrow upon receiving written notice of a dispute between the parties, even though the statute specifically states “unless otherwise specified in the escrow instructions” and even though the escrow instructions provided that escrow was to close unless “a written demand shall have been made upon you not to complete it”.
2) Section 18035(f) does not require the written notice of dispute to cite the code section, or to be in any particular form, or that the notice be addressed directly to the escrow holder, or that the notice contain an express request not to close escrow. The subdivision requires nothing more than that the escrow agent receive notice in writing of a dispute between the parties. So receiving a copy of the buyer’s attorney’s letter to the seller was sufficient to notify the escrow agent that a dispute existed.Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exchange     Docket
146 Cal.App.4th 831 – 2nd Dist (B184917) 1/11/07     Case complete 3/14/07INSURANCE: An insurer’s duty to accept reasonable settlement offers within policy limits applies only to third party actions and not to settlement offers from an insured. An insurer has a duty not to unreasonable withhold payments due under a policy. But withholding benefits under a policy is not unreasonable if there is a genuine dispute between the insurer and the insured as to coverage or the amount of payment due, which is what occurred in this case.In re: Rabin
BAP 9th Circuit 12/8/06BANKRUPTCY/HOMESTEADS: Under California law, the homestead exemption rights of registered domestic partners are identical to those of people who are married. Therefore, domestic partners are limited to a single combined exemption, in the same manner as people who are married. In the absence of a domestic partnership or marriage, each cotenant is entitled to the full homestead exemption.Wachovia Bank v. Lifetime Industries     Docket
145 Cal.App.4th 1039 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E037560) 12/15/06     Case complete 2/16/07OPTIONS:
1. When the holder of an option to purchase real property exercises the option and thereby obtains title to the property, the optionee’s title relates back to the date the option was given, as long as the optionee has the right to compel specific performance of the option. But where the optionee acquires title in a transaction unconnected with the option, such as where there has been a breach of the option agreement so that the optionee did not have the right to specific performance, the optionee takes subject to intervening interests just like any other purchaser.
2. Civil Code Section 2906 provides a safe harbor for a lender to avoid the rule against “clogging” the equity of redemption as long as the option is not dependent on the borrower’s default. But even if the lender falls outside the safe harbor because the exercise of the option is dependent upon borrower’s default, it does not automatically follow that the option is void. Instead, the court will analyze the circumstances surrounding the transaction and the intent of the parties to determine whether the option is either void or a disguised mortgage. Also, even if the transaction is a disguised mortgage the optionee (now mortgagee) has a right to judicially foreclose, which will wipe out intervening interests.Wright v. City of Morro Bay     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
144 Cal.App.4th 767, 145 Cal.App.4th 309a – 2nd Dist (B176929) 11/7/06     Modification of Opinion 12/6/06     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/21/07DEDICATION/ABANDONMENT: C.C.P. 771.010, which provides for termination of an offer of dedication if not accepted within 25 years, did not apply because 1) the statute cannot be applied retroactively to the City’s acceptance occurring more than 25 years after the offer of dedication and 2) the area covered by the dedicated road has never been used by anyone, so the requirement that the property be “used as if free of the dedication” was not met.State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank     Docket
143 Cal.App.4th 1098 – 1st Dist. (A111643) 10/10/06     Case complete 12/11/06The “superior equities rule” prevents an insurer, who is subrogated to the rights of the insured after paying a claim, from recovering against a party whose equities are equal or superior to those of the insurer. Thus, an insurer may not recover from an alleged tortfeasor where the tortfeasor’s alleged negligence did not directly cause the insured’s loss. The court questioned the continued vitality of the superior equities rule in California, but felt compelled to follow a 1938 Supreme Court case that applied the rule. The court suggests that the Supreme Court should re-address the issue in light of modern day fault principles.Corona Fruits & Veggies v. Frozsun Foods     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
143 Cal.App.4th 319 – 2nd Dist. (B184507) 9/25/06     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/20/06UCC: A UCC-1 financing statement filed in the name of Armando Munoz is not effective where the debtor’s true name was Armando Munoz Juarez.Warren v. Merrill     Docket
143 Cal.App.4th 96 – 2nd Dist. (B186698) 9/21/06     Case complete 11/21/06QUIET TITLE: The Court quieted title in plaintiff where title was taken in the real estate agent’s daughter’s name as part of a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the agent. This is not a significant title insurance case, but I posted it for reference since it involves quiet title.McKell v. Washington Mutual     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 1457 – 2nd Dist. (B176377) 9/18/06     Request for depublication DENIED 1/17/07RESPA: Washington Mutual (i) charged hundreds of dollars in “underwriting fees” when the underwriting fee charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to WAMU was only $20 and (ii) marked up the charges for real estate tax verifications and wire transfer fees. The court followed Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2d Cir. 2004) 383 F.3d 49, holding that marking up costs, for which no additional services are performed, is a violation of RESPA. Such a violation of federal law constitutes an unlawful business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and a breach of contract. Plaintiffs also stated a cause of action for an unfair business practice under the UCL based on the allegation that WAMU led them to believe they were being charged the actual cost of third-party services.Reilly v. City and County of San Francisco     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 480 – 1st Dist. (A109062) 8/29/06     Request for depublication DENIED 12/13/06PROPERTY TAX: A change in ownership of real property held by a testamentary trust occurs when an income beneficiary of the trust dies and is succeeded by another income beneficiary. Also, for purposes of determining change in ownership, a life estate either in income from the property or in the property itself is an interest equivalent in value to the fee interest.Markowitz v. Fidelity     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 508 – 2nd Dist. (B179923) 5/31/06     Publication ordered by Cal. Supreme Court 8/30/06ESCROW: Civil Code Section 2941, which permits a title insurance company to record a release of a deed of trust if the lender fails to do so, does not impose an obligation on an escrow holder/title company to record the reconveyance on behalf of the trustee. Citing other authority, the Court states that an escrow holder has no general duty to police the affairs of its depositors; rather, an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to faithful compliance with the parties’ instructions, and absent clear evidence of fraud, an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to compliance with the parties’ instructions. The fact that the borrower had an interest in the loan escrow does not mean that he was a party to the escrow, or to the escrow instructions.Cebular v. Cooper Arms Homeowners Association     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 106 – 2nd Dist. (B182555) 8/21/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/15/06; Request to publish Part III, Sec. B filed 10/24/06COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS: It is not unreasonable for CC&R’s to allocate dues obligations differently for each unit, along with the same allocation of voting rights, even though each unit uses the common areas equally. Although the allocation does not make much sense, courts are disinclined to question the wisdom of agreed-to restrictions.Bernard v. Foley     Docket
39 Cal.4th 794 – Cal. Supreme Court (S136070) (8/21/06)TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS: Under Probate Code Section 21350, “care custodians” are presumptively disqualified from receiving testamentary transfers from dependent adults to whom they provide personal care, including health services. The Court held that the term “care custodian” includes unrelated persons, even where the service relationship arises out of a preexisting personal friendship rather than a professional or occupational connection. Accordingly, the Court set aside amendments to decedent’s will that were made shortly before decedent’s death, which would have given most of the estate to the care providers.Regency Outdoor Advertising v. City of Los Angeles     Docket
39 Cal.4th 507 – Cal. Supreme Court (S132619) 8/7/06     Modification of Opinion 10/11/06ABUTTER’S RIGHTS: There is no right to be seen from a public way, so the city is not liable for damages resulting from the view of plaintiff’s billboard caused by planting trees along a city street. The court pointed out that a private party who blocks the view of someone’s property by obstructing a public way would be liable to someone in plaintiff’s position.Kleveland v. Chicago Title Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
141 Cal.App.4th 761 – 2nd Dist. (B187427) 7/24/06     Case complete 10/5/06     Request for depublication DENIED 10/25/06TITLE INSURANCE: An arbitration clause in a title policy is not enforceable where the preliminary report did not contain an arbitration clause and did not incorporate by reference the arbitration clause in the CLTA policy actually issued. (The preliminary report incorporated by reference the provisions of a Homeowner’s Policy of Title Insurance with a somewhat different arbitration clause, but a CLTA policy was actually issued.)Essex Insurance Company v. Five Star Dye House     Docket
38 Cal.4th 1252 – Cal. Supreme Court (S131992) 7/6/06INSURANCE: When an insured assigns a claim for bad faith against the insurer, the assignee may recover Brandt (attorney) fees. Although purely personal causes of action are not assignable, such as claims for emotional distress or punitive damages, Brandt fees constitute an economic loss and are not personal in nature.Peak Investments v. South Peak Homeowners Association     Docket
140 Cal.App.4th 1363 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035851) 6/28/06     Case complete 8/31/06HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Where CC&R’s require approval by more than 50 percent of owners in order to amend the Declaration, Civil Code Section 1356(a) allows a court, if certain conditions are met, to reduce the percentage of votes required, if it was approved by “owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in the association”. The Court held that the quoted phrase means a majority of the total votes in the HOA, not merely a majority of those votes that are cast.CTC Real Estate Services v. Lepe     Docket
140 Cal.App.4th 856 – 2nd Dist. (B185320) 6/21/06     Case complete 8/23/06TRUSTEE’S SALES: The victim of an identity theft, whose name was used to obtain a loan secured by a purchase money deed of trust to acquire real property, may, as the only claimant, recover undistributed surplus proceeds that remained after a trustee sale of the property and the satisfaction of creditors. The Court pointed out that a victim of theft is entitled to recover the assets stolen or anything acquired with the stolen assets, even if the value of those assets exceeds the value of that which was stolen.Slintak v. Buckeye Retirement Co.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
139 Cal.App.4th 575 – 2nd Dist. (B182875) 5/16/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/13/06MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
1) Under Civil Code Section 882.020(a)(1), a deed of trust expires after 10 years where “the final maturity date or the last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation is ascertainable from the record”. Here, the October 1992 Notice of Default was recorded and contained the due date of the subject note; thus, the due date is “ascertainable from the record” and the 10-year limitations period of section 882.020(a)(1) applies.

2) Under C.C. Section 880.260, if an action is commenced and a lis pendens filed by the owner to quiet or clear title, the running of the 10-year limitations period is reset and a new 10-year limitations period commences on the date of the recording of the lis pendens. After the expiration of the recommenced 10-year period, the power of sale in the trust deed expires. Preciado v. Wilde     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
139 Cal.App.4th 321 – 2nd Dist. (B182257) 5/9/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/16/06ADVERSE POSSESSION: Plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession against defendant, with whom they held title as tenants in common. Before title may be acquired by adverse possession as between cotenants, the occupying tenant must impart notice to the tenant out of possession, by acts of ownership of the most open, notorious and unequivocal character, that he intends to oust the latter of his interest in the common property. Such evidence must be stronger than that which would be required to establish title by adverse possession in a stranger. UNPUBLISHED Harbor Pipe v. Stevens
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035530) 4/4/06     Case complete 6/6/06JUDGMENTS: A judgment lien against the settlor of a revocable trust attached to trust property where the identity of the settlor is reflected in the chain of title, so a purchaser takes subject to the judgment lien. NOTE: In other words, title companies need to check the names of the settlors in the General Index when title is held in trust.Aaron v. Dunham     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
137 Cal.App.4th 1244 – 1st Dist. (A109488) 3/15/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/21/06PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: 1) Permission granted to an owner does not constitute permission to a successor. 2) Under Civil Code Section 1008, signs preventing prescriptive rights must be posted by an owner or his agent, so signs posted by a lessee without the knowledge of the owner, do not qualify.***DECERTIFIED***
Newmyer v. Parklands Ranch     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B180461) 3/23/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED; CA opinion DECERTIFIED 6/14/06EASEMENTS: The owner of the dominant tenement possessing over the servient tenement an access easement that includes the right to grant other easements for “like purposes” may convey to an owner of property adjoining the dominant tenement an enforceable easement for access over the servient tenement.Marion Drive LLC v. Saladino     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
136 Cal.App.4th 1432 – 2nd Dist. (B182727) 2/27/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/24/06ASSESSMENT LIEN: After a tax sale, the holder of a bond secured by a 1911 Act assessment lien has priority as to surplus tax sale proceeds over a subsequently recorded deed of trust. This is true even though the bond holder purchased the property from the tax sale purchaser. The Court rejected defendant’s argument that fee title had merged with the assessment lien.Barnes v. Hussa     Docket
136 Cal.App.4th 1358 – 3rd Dist. (C049163) 2/24/06     Case complete 4/26/06LICENSES / WATER RIGHTS: The Plaintiff did not overburden a license to run water in a pipeline across defendant’s property where he extended the pipeline to other property he owned because there was no increase in the burden on the servient tenement and no harm to defendants. A couple of interesting things pointed out by the Court are: 1) A person entitled to use water may use it elsewhere as long as others are not injured by the change, and 2) “An irrevocable license . . . is for all intents and purposes the equivalent of an easement.”***REVERSED***
Mayer v. L & B Real Estate
     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B180540) 2/14/06     REVERSED by Cal Supreme Ct. 6/16/08TAX SALES: The one-year statute of limitations for attacking a tax sale applies to preclude an action by a property owner who had actual notice of the tax sale, even where the tax collector’s conduct was egregious. The Court did not reach the question of whether the tax collector satisfied its due process obligations, but refers to a Supreme Court case which held that the limitations period is enforceable even if the defect is constitutional in nature. That case recognized a limited exception where an owner is in “undisturbed possession” such that the owner lacked any reasonable means of alerting himself to the tax sale proceedings.Wright Construction Co. v. BBIC Investors     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
136 Cal.App.4th 228 – 1st Dist. (A109876) 1/31/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/26/06MECHANICS’ LIENS: A mechanic’s lien is premature and invalid under Civil Code Section 3115 if it is recorded before the contractor “completes his contract”. A contract is complete for purposes of commencing the recordation period under section 3115 when all work under the contract has been performed, excused, or otherwise discharged. Here, because of the tenant’s anticipatory breach of the contract, plaintiff had “complete[d] [its] contract” within the meaning of section 3115 the day before the claim of lien was recorded, so the claim of lien was not premature. In a previous writ proceeding, the Court held that the landlord’s notice of nonresponsibility was invalid under the “participating owner doctrine” because the landlord caused the work of improvement to be performed by requiring the lessee to make improvements.Torres v. Torres     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
135 Cal.App.4th 870 – 2nd Dist. (B179146) 1/17/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/12/06POWER OF ATTORNEY: 1) A statutory form power of attorney is not properly completed where the principal marks the lines specifying the powers with an “X” instead of initials, as required by the form. However, the form is not the exclusive means of creating a power of attorney, so even though it is not valid as a statutory form, it is valid as regular power of attorney. 2) Under Probate Code Section 4264, an attorney in fact may not make a gift of the principal’s property unless specifically authorized to do so in the power of attorney. Here, the principal quitclaimed the property to himself, the other attorney in fact and the principal as joint tenants. However, the court refused to invalidate the conveyance because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the conveyance was not supported by consideration.Ung v. Koehler     Order Modifying Opinion     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
135 Cal.App.4th 186 – 1st Dist. (A109532) 12/28/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/12/06TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Expiration of the underlying obligation does not preclude enforcement of the power of sale under a deed of trust.
2. A power of sale expires after 60 years or, if the last date fixed for payment of the debt is ascertainable from the record, 10 years after that date.
3. In order to avoid a statutory absurdity, a notice of default that is recorded more than 10 years after “the last date fixed for payment of the debt” does not constitute a part of the “record” for purposes of Civil Code Section 882.020(a).Trust One Mortgage v. Invest America Mortgage     Docket
134 Cal.App.4th 1302 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035111) 12/15/05     Case complete 2/21/06TRUSTEE’S SALES/ANTI-DEFICIENCY: An indemnification agreement is enforceable after a non-judicial foreclosure where the indemnitor is not the same person as the obligor. If the indemnitor and obligor were the same, the indemnity would be void as an attempt to circumvent antideficiency protections.UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Citifinancial Mortgage Company v. Missionary Foundation     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd (B178664) 12/14/05     Case complete 2/16/06MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: (UNPUBLISHED OPINION) Under Civil Code Section 882.020(a)(1), a deed of trust becomes unenforceable 10 years after the final maturity date, or the last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation, if that date is ascertainable from the record. Here, the record showed via an Order Confirming Sale of Real Property that the obligation was due five years after close of escrow. The Court held that since “close of escrow” is an event, and not a date certain, Section 882.020(a)(1) did not apply in spite of the fact that escrow must have closed in order for the deed of trust to have been recorded.McElroy v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.     Docket
134 Cal.App. 4th 388 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034588) 11/1/05     Case complete 2/1/06TRUSTEE’S SALES: The Court refused to set aside a trustee’s sale where the lender foreclosed after the trustors tendered payment in the form of a “Bonded Bill of Exchange Order”. The Court determined that “the Bill is a worthless piece of paper, consisting of nothing more than a string of words that sound as though they belong in a legal document, but which, in reality, are incomprehensible, signifying nothing.”***DECERTIFIED***
The Santa Anita Companies v. Westfield Corporation     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
134 Cal.App.4th 77 – 2nd Dist. (B175820) 11/17/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED and DECERTIFIED 01/25/06DEEDS: The 3-year statute of limitations under C.C.P. 338(d) to seek relief on the ground of mistake does not begin to run until discovery of the mistake or receiving facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of the mistake. The fact that carefully reading the deed would have revealed the mistake is not sufficient to charge the plaintiff with notice, so the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff actually became aware of the error, and this action was therefore timely.Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Court     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1185 – 1st Dist. (A108615) 11/1/05     Case complete 1/4/06INDIANS: An employment agreement with an Indian tribe contained the following clause: “Any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to any provisions of this Agreement, or breach thereof, shall . . . be resolved by arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association in San Francisco, California, and judgment on any award by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having such jurisdiction”. The court held that the effect of the arbitration clause as limited to a consent to arbitrate and enforce any award in state court. But this clause was insufficient to waive the tribe’s immunity from a breach of contract action brought in state court. So plaintiffs are apparently free to bring the same breach of contract claims in an arbitration proceeding.Behniwal v. Mix     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1027 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034074) 9/30/05     Case complete 1/3/06STATUTE OF FRAUDS: A sales contract signed on the sellers’ behalf by their real estate agent did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds because the agent did not have written authority to sign for the sellers. However, a contract which must be in writing can be ratified if the ratification is also in writing. Here the sellers ratified the contract by a sufficient written ratification where they subsequently signed disclosure documents that specifically referred to the contract signed by the real estate agent.Behniwal v. Superior Court     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1048 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035299) 9/30/05     Case complete 1/3/06LIS PENDENS: (Related to Mix v. Superior Court, several cases below.) Having determined that the plaintiffs have at least a “probably valid” real property claim, the Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens. The lis pendens will therefore protect plaintiff’s claim until the time for appeal to the Supreme Court expires or unless the Supreme Court issues its own writ directing that the lis pendens be expunged.Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1013 – 6th Dist. (H028455) 9/30/05 (Mod. 10/28/05)     Case complete 12/28/05EASEMENTS:
PUBLISHED PORTION: The Solar Shade Control Act provides that “. . . no person owning, or in control of a property shall allow a tree or shrub to be placed, or, if placed, to grow on such property, subsequent to the installation of a solar collector on the property of another so as to cast a shadow greater than 10 percent of the collector absorption area”. The County is exempt from the Act because it adopted an ordinance pursuant to a statute allowing cities and counties to exempt themselves from the Act. The Court did not address the issue of whether the act applies where a tree is not “placed” by a property owner.

UNPUBLISHED PORTION: A common law easement for light and air generally may be created only by express written instrument. A statutory “solar easement” under Civil Code Section 801.5 may be created only by an instrument containing specified terms. The Court held that the County did not have an obligation to trim trees to avoid shading plaintiff’s solar panels, rejecting several theories asserted by plaintiff.Fishback v. County of Ventura     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 896 – 2nd Dist. (B177462) 10/26/05     Case complete 1/9/06SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: Under the 1937 and 1943 Subdivision Map Acts, “subdivision” was defined as “any land or portion thereof shown on the last preceding tax roll as a unit or as contiguous units which is divided for the purpose of sale . . . into five or more parcels within any one year period.” The Court makes numerous points interpreting those statutes, some of the most significant being: 1) Once the fifth parcel is created within a one-year period, all the parcels created within that year constitute a subdivision; 2) Even though a unit of land is defined as a unit as shown on the last tax roll preceding the division, that does not mean the unit shown on the last preceding tax roll is a legal parcel, and legal parcels cannot be created by dividing that illegal parcel; and 3) If land is divided for the purpose of sale, it is irrelevant that the retained parcel is not held for the purpose of sale. Thus, for example, if the owner of a unit of land divides it in half, the unit is divided for the purpose of sale even if the owner intends to sell only one half and keep the other.Attorney General Opinion No. 04-1105
10/3/05ASSESSOR’S RECORDS: County Assessors maintain parcel boundary map data, which is detailed geographic information used to describe and define the precise geographic boundaries of assessor’s parcels. When maintained in electronic format, Assessors must make copies in electronic format available to the public. The fee charged for producing the copy is limited to the direct cost of producing the copy in electronic format, and may not include expenses associated with the county’s initial gathering of the information, with initial conversion of the information into electronic format, or with maintaining the information.Villacreses v. Molinari     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 1223 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034719) 9/26/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/05ARBITRATION: Section 1298 requires that an arbitration provision in a real estate contract be accompanied by a statutory notice and that the parties indicate their assent by placing their initials on an adjacent space or line. The arbitration notice, standing alone, does not constitute an arbitration provision. So the Defendants could not compel arbitration where the contract contained only the notice, but did not contain a separate arbitration provision.

The Court has a good sense of humor. The opinion contains the following memorable quotes:

1. “If the first rule of medicine is ‘Do no harm,’ the first rule of contracting should be ‘Read the documents’.”

2. “. . . to paraphrase the immortal words of a former President of the United States, the applicability of this purported arbitration agreement to the instant dispute ‘depends upon what the meaning of the word “it” is.'”Campbell v. Superior Court (La Barrie)     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 904 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D046064) 9/14/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/05LIS PENDENS: A cause of action for a constructive trust or an equitable lien does not support a lis pendens where it is merely for the purpose of securing a judgment for money damages. [Ed. Note: The Court in this and similar cases make the absolute statement that “an equitable lien does not support a lis pendens”, and explain that the lien is sought merely to secure a money judgment. But it is unclear whether the Court would reach the same conclusion in a pure equitable lien case. For example, where a loan is paid off with the proceeds of a new loan, but the new mortgage accidentally fails to be recorded, an action to impose an equitable lien seeks more than a mere money judgment. It seeks to allow the new lender to step into the shoes of the old lender and, in my opinion, a lis pendens should be allowed.]Fripp v. Walters Docket     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 656 – 3rd Dist. (C046733) 9/7/05 (ONLY PART I CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/16/05BOUNDARIES / SURVEYS: A conveyance referring to a parcel map cannot convey more property than the creator of the parcel map owned. The Court rejected Defendant’s claim that the recorded parcel map was a “government sanctioned survey” which precludes a showing that the boundaries established by the parcel map are erroneous. The court explained that the rule cited by Defendants applies only to official survey maps that create boundaries. Boundary lines cannot be questioned after the conveyance of public land to a private party, even if they are inaccurate.Title Trust Deed Service Co. v. Pearson     Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 168 – 2nd Dist (B175067) 8/25/05     Case complete 10/28/05HOMESTEADS: A declared homestead exemption applies to surplus proceeds from a trustee’s sale. [Comment: Applying the declared homestead exemption to trustee’s sales is fine. But the Court also seems to want to pay surplus proceeds to the debtor up to the amount of the exemption before paying the holder of a junior trust deed. This should be wrong since the homestead exemption does not apply to voluntary liens. I think the Court does not adequately address what appears to me to be a circuity of priority problem: The homestead exemption is senior to the judgment lien, which in this case happens to be senior to a junior TD, which is senior to the homestead exemption.]In re Marriage of Benson     Docket
36 Cal.4th 1096 – Cal. Supreme Court (S122254) 8/11/05COMMUNITY PROPERTY: The doctrine of partial performance, which is an exception to the Statute of Frauds, is not an exception to the requirement of Family Code Section 852 that an agreement to transmute property be in writing. The concurring opinion points out that the Court does not decide what statutory or equitable remedy would be available to make whole a spouse who has been disadvantaged by an illusory oral promise to transmute property, or what sanction may be employed against a spouse who has used section 852(a) as a means of breaching his or her fiduciary duty and gaining unjust enrichment.First Federal Bank v. Fegen     Docket
131 Cal.App.4th 798 – 2nd Dist. (B174252) 7/29/05     Case complete 9/29/05JUDGMENTS: The Court dismissed an appeal as being moot where the debtor did not post a bond after a sheriff’s sale of real property. C.C.P. Section 917.4 provides that an appeal of an order directing the sale of real property does not stay enforcement of the order. A sheriff’s sale is final, except that the debtor can commence an action within 90 days to set aside the sale if the judgment creditor is the successful bidder. Here, the debtor failed to file an action within 90 days so the sale is final.Bear Creek Master Association v. Edwards     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
130 Cal.App.4th 1470 – 4th Dist. Div. 2 (E034859) 7/13/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/19/05CONDOMINIUMS: The definition of “condominium” in Civil Code Section 1351(f) does not require that an actual structure has been built; rather it only requires that it be described in a recorded condominium plan. (Note, however, that under CC 1352 the condominium does not come into existence until a condominium unit has been conveyed.) The case also contains an extensive discussion of the procedural requirements for foreclosing on an assessment lien recorded by the homeowner’s association.Woodridge Escondido Property Owners Assn. v. Nielsen     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
130 Cal.App.4th 559 – 4th Dist. Div. 1 (D044294) 5/25/05 (pub. order 6/16/05)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/31/05CC&R’s: A provision in CC&R’s that prohibited construction of a permanent structure in an easement area applied to a deck because it was attached to the house and had supporting posts that were buried in the ground, such that it was designed to continue indefinitely without change and was constructed to last or endure.Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort     Docket
129 Cal.App.4th 1458 – 3rd Dist. (C045691) 6/8/05     Case complete 8/8/05EASEMENTS: California Civil Code Section 805 provides that a servitude cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement. The Court held that the term “owner” under Section 805 means the owner of the full fee title, both legal and equitable, such that a property owner who owns less than full title may validly create easements in his own favor on his land. Here, the Court held that the grantor could reserve an easement over property conveyed to a time-share trustee where the grantor held all beneficial interest in the trust and the grantee held just bare legal title.Bank of America v. La Jolla Group     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
129 Cal.App.4th 706 – 5th Dist. (F045318) 5/19/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/7/05TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale, which was accidentally held after the owner and lender agreed to reinstate the loan, is invalid. The conclusive presumptions in Civil Code Section 2924 pertain only to notice requirements, not to every defect or inadequacy. The Court points out that the advantages of being a bona fide purchaser are not limited to the presumptions set forth in Section 2924, but does not discuss it further because the defendant did not argue that its bona fide purchaser status supports its position in any way other than the statutory presumptions.Zabrucky v. McAdams     Docket
129 Cal.App.4th 618 – 2nd Dist. (B167590) 5/18/05     Case complete 7/20/05COVENANTS, CONDITIONS & RESTRICTIONS: The Court interpreted a provision in CC&R’s to prohibit an addition to a house which would unreasonably obstruct a neighbor’s view. The Court painstakingly nit-picked through the provisions of the CC&R’s and compared the provisions and the facts to other cases where courts have done the same. The main conclusion I draw is that these cases are each unique and it is very difficult to determine in advance what a court will do. In fact, one judge dissented in this case. This means it can be very dangerous to issue endorsements such as CLTA Endorsement No. 100.6 or 100.28, insuring against this kind of provision in CC&R’s.Anolik v. EMC Mortgage Corp.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C044201) 4/29/05 (Mod. 5/26/05)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED and DECERTIFIED 8/10/05***DECERTIFIED***
TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. To be valid, a notice of default must contain at least one correct statement of a breach, and it must be substantial enough to authorize use of the drastic remedy of nonjudicial foreclosure.
2. An assertion in a notice of default of one or more breaches qualified with the words “if any” does not satisfy the requirements of section 2924 because it indicates that the lender has no clue as to the truth or falsity of the assertion.
3. It is not proper to declare a payment in default when the time for imposing a late fee on that payment has not expired because the default is not sufficiently substantial at that point.
4. Under Civil Code Section 2954, a lender cannot force impound payments for property taxes until the borrower has failed to pay two consecutive tax installments.Kangarlou v. Progressive Title Company     Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 1174 – 2nd Dist. (B177400) 4/28/05     Case complete 6/29/05ESCROW: 1. Under Civil Code Section 1717, plaintiff can recover attorney’s fees after prevailing in an action against the escrow holder, even though the escrow instructions limited attorney’s fees to actions to collect escrow fees.
2. Under Business and Professions Code Section 10138, an escrow holder has a duty to obtain evidence that a real estate broker was regularly licensed before delivering compensation.Paul v. Schoellkopf     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 147 – 2nd Dist. (B170379) 4/5/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/15/05ESCROW: A provision for attorneys’ fees in escrow instructions limited to fees incurred by the escrow company in collecting for escrow services does not apply to other disputes between the buyer and seller.Knight v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 14 – 3rd Dist. (C048378) 4/4/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/29/05DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS: Family Code Section 308.5, enacted by Proposition 22, 3/7/00, states: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” This statute did not prohibit the legislature from enacting California’s Domestic Partnership Law, Family Code Section 297, et seq., because Section 308.5 pertains only to marriages, not to other relationships.Estate of Seifert     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 64 – 3rd Dist. (C046456) 4/4/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/22/05ADVERSE POSSESSION: A fiduciary, including an executor, may not acquire title by adverse possession against the heirs. Once the executor was appointed, the statutory period for his adverse possession of the subject property ceased to run.Melendrez v. D & I Investment     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 1238 – 6th Dist. (H027098) 3/29/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/22/05 TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale cannot be set aside where the purchaser at the sale is a bona fide purchaser (“BFP”). The elements of being a BFP are that the buyer 1) purchase the property in good faith for value, and 2) have no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of another. The value paid may be substantially below fair market value. Also, the buyer’s sophistication and experience in purchasing at trustee’s sales does not disqualify him from being a BFP, although in evaluating whether the buyer is a BFP, the buyer’s foreclosure sale experience may be considered in making the factual determination of whether he had knowledge or notice of the conflicting claim.Radian Guaranty v. Garamendi     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 1280 – 1st Dist. (A105789) 3/29/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/20/05TITLE INSURANCE: Radian’s Lien Protection Policy constitutes title insurance pursuant to Insurance Code Section 12340.1. Because Radian does not possess a certificate of authority to transact title insurance, it is not authorized to sell the policy in California or anywhere else in the United States, pursuant to California’s monoline statutes: Ins. Code Section 12360 (title insurance) and Ins. Code Section 12640.10 (mortgage guaranty insurance).Gardenhire v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 426a – 6th Dist. (H026601) 3/22/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/05TRUSTS: A trust can be revoked by a will where the trust provided for revocation by “any writing” and the will expressed a present intent to revoke the trust. The Court pointed out that a will, which is inoperative during the testator’s life, can nevertheless have a present and immediate effect upon delivery, such as notice of intent to revoke.Jones v. Union Bank of California     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 542 – 2nd Dist. (B173302) 3/11/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/05When a lender successfully defends an action to set aside or enjoin a foreclosure sale, the antideficiency provisions of C.C.P. Section 580d do not prohibit an award of attorney fees. In addition, Civil Code sections 2924c and 2924d do not limit the amount of fees the court may award.O’Toole Company v. Kingsbury Court HOA     Docket
126 Cal.App.4th 549 – 2nd Dist. (B172607) 2/3/05     Case complete 4/8/05HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: In a suit to enforce a judgment, the trial court properly appointed a receiver and levied a special emergency assessment when defendant-homeowners association failed to pay. The Court pointed out that regular assessments are exempt from execution, but not special assessments.State of California ex rel. Bowen v. Bank of America     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
126 Cal.App.4th 225 – 2nd Dist. (B172190) 1/31/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/18/05ESCHEAT: This is a qui tam action filed on behalf of the State Controller. The court held that unused reconveyance fees do not need to be escheated because the obligation to return a specific sum of money is neither certain nor liquidated under Civil Code Section 2941 or under the provisions of the deeds of trust. This case was against lenders and I believe it would not apply in the context of escrow and title insurance.Van Klompenburg v. Berghold     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
126 Cal.App.4th 345 – 3rd Dist. (C045417) 1/31/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/11/05EASEMENTS: Where the grant of easement states that the right of way shall be “kept open” and “wholly unobstructed”, the normal rule does not apply, which would otherwise allow the owner of the servient estate to erect a locked gate as long as the owner of the dominant estate is given a key and the gate does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement.State of California v. Old Republic Title Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
125 Cal.App.4th 1219 – 1st Dist. (A095918) 1/20/05     NOTE: request for order directing republication of court of appeal opinion DENIED 8/16/06.
Overruled in part on issue not significant to title insurance – SEE BELOW.
TITLE INSURANCE: Old Republic was found liable for 1) failing to escheat unclaimed funds in escrow accounts, 2) failing to return fees collected for reconveyances which were not used and 3) failing to pay interest collected on escrow funds to the depositing party.

Of particular interest, the Court stated:
“Insurance Code Section 12413.5 provides that interest on escrow funds must be paid to the depositing party ‘unless the escrow is otherwise instructed by the depositing party . . . .’ Any title company is free to draft escrow instructions that, with full disclosure to and agreement from the depositing party, direct that the arbitrage interest differential be paid to the company. It is a matter of disclosing the pertinent costs and benefits to the customer.”

State of California v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers
39 Cal.4th 1220 – Cal. Supreme Court (S131807) 8/31/06

FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A political subdivision may not bring an action under Government Code section 12652, subdivision (c), to recover funds on behalf of the state or another political subdivision.Frei v. Davey     Docket
124 Cal.App.4th 1506 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G033682) 12/17/04     Case complete 2/22/05CONTRACTS: Under the most recent version of the CAR purchase contract, the prevailing party is barred from recovering attorney fees if he refused a request to mediate.Mix v. Superior Court     Docket      Sup.Ct. Docket
124 Cal.App.4th 987 – 4th Dist., Div. 3  12/7/04  (G033875)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/16/05LIS PENDENS: (Related to Behniwal v. Superior Court, several cases above.) After the claimant loses at trial, the trial court must expunge a lis pendens pending appeal unless claimant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. Claimants will rarely be able to do this because it requires a trial court to determine that its own decision will probably be reversed on appeal. The court points out that this strict result is tempered by claimant’s ability to petition the appellate court for a writ of mandate, so that the appellate court can make its own determination of the probability of the trial court’s decision being reversed on appeal.D’Orsay International Partners v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 836 – 2nd Dist. 10/29/04 (B174411)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/26/05MECHANIC’S LIENS: The court ordered the release of a mechanic’s lien because there was no actual visible work on the land or the delivery of construction materials. The criteria applicable to a design professional’s lien do not apply where the claimant filed a mechanic’s lien. The court specifically did not address the question of whether a contractor performing design services or employing design professionals may assert a design professionals’ lien.Gibbo v. Berger     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 396 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 10/22/04 (E035201)     Case complete 12/27/04    Req. for Depublication by Cal. Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/16/05USURY: The usury exemption for loans arranged by real estate brokers does not apply where the broker functioned as an escrow whose involvement was limited to preparing loan documents on the terms provided by the parties, ordering title insurance, and dispersing funds, all in accordance with the parties’ instructions. In order to “arrange a loan” the broker must act as a third party intermediary who causes a loan to be obtained or procured. Such conduct includes structuring the loan as the agent for the lender, setting the interest rate and points to be paid, drafting the terms of the loan, reviewing the loan documents, or conducting a title search.Knapp v. Doherty     Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 76 – 6th Dist. 9/20/04 (H026670)     Case complete 12/21/04TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Civil Code Section 2924 requires the trustee to give notice of sale only “after the lapse of the three months” following recordation of the notice of default. The Notice of Sale technically violated this requirement because it was served by mail on the property owner several days prior to the end of three months. However, this did not invalidate the sale because the owner did not suffer prejudice from the early notice.
2. Incorrectly stating the date of the default in the Notice of Default did not invalidate the sale because the discrepancy was not material.Royal Thrift and Loan v. County Escrow     Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 24 – 2nd Dist. 10/15/04 (B165006)     Case complete 12/16/04TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Postponements of a trustee’s sale during an appeal were reasonable, so they do not count toward the 3-postponement limit of Civil Code Section 2924g(c)(1). The postponements fall under the “stayed by operation of law” exception. However, the Court recognized that the better course would have been to re-notice the trustee’s sale after the appeal.
2. The court indicated that an appeal from an action to quiet title against a deed of trust should stay the trustee’s sale proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure Section 916 pending the appeal. However, the court did not formally make that holding because the owner did not appeal and the issues involving the appellants (escrow holder and bonding company) did not require a holding on that issue.Tesco Controls v. Monterey Mechanical Co.     Docket
124 Cal.App.4th 780 – 3rd Dist. 12/6/04 (C042184) (Opinion on rehearing)     Case complete 2/7/05MECHANIC’S LIENS: A mechanic’s lien release that waives lien rights up to the date stated in the release is effective to waive lien rights up to that date, even if the progress payments did not fully compensate the lien claimant.Gale v. Superior Court     Docket
122 Cal.App.4th 1388 – 4th Dist., Div. 3  10/6/04 (G033968) (Mod. 10/22/04)     Rehearing Denied 10/22/04; Case Complete 12/10/04LIS PENDENS / DIVORCE
1. The automatic stay contained in a divorce summons does not apply to the sale by the husband, as managing member of a family-owned management company, of real property vested in the management company.
2. A petition for dissolution of marriage which does not allege a community interest in specific real property does not support the filing of a lis pendens.Nwosu v. Uba     Docket
122 Cal.App.4th 1229 – 6th Dist. 10/1/04 (H026182)     Case complete 12/01/04The court held that a transaction was a bona fide sale and not an equitable mortgage. The complicated facts provide little of interest to the title insurance business, other than to note the fact that a deed can be held to be a mortgage if the deed was given to secure a debt. The case contains a good discussion of the distinction between legal claims, for which there is a right to a jury trial, and equitable claims, for which there is no right to a jury trial.Moores v. County of Mendocino     Docket
122 Cal.App.4th 883 – 1st Dist. 9/24/04 (A105446)     Case complete 11/24/04SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: The enactment of an ordinance requiring the County to record notices of merger did not result in the unmerger of parcels that had previously merged under the County’s previous automatic merger ordinance. The County properly sent a subsequent notice under Gov. Code Section 66451.302 notifying property owners of the possibility of a merger. Accordingly, plaintiff’s parcels remain merged.Larsson v. Grabach     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
121 Cal.App.4th 1147 – 5th Dist. 8/25/04 (F042675)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/15/04EASEMENTS: An easement by implication can be created when an owner of real property dies intestate and the property is then divided and distributed to the intestate’s heirs by court decree.Felgenhauer v. Soni     Docket
121 Cal.App.4th 445 – 2nd Dist. 8/5/04 (B157490)     Case complete 10/8/04PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: To establish a claim of right, which is one of the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant does not need to believe he is entitled to use of the easement. The phrase “claim of right” has caused confusion because it suggests the need for an intent or state of mind. But it does not require a belief that the use is legally justified; it simply means that the property was used without permission of the owner of the land.Jonathan Neil & Assoc. v. Jones     Docket
33 Cal.4th 917 – Cal. Supreme Court (S107855) 8/5/04 (Mod. 10/20/04)INSURANCE: A tort action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists only in regard to the issues of bad faith payment of claims and unreasonable failure to settle. It does not pertain to the general administration of an insurance policy or to other contract settings. In this case, a tort cause of action does not lie for the insurer’s bad faith conduct in setting an unfairly high insurance premium.Bello v. ABA Energy Corporation     Docket
121 Cal.App.4th 301 – 1st Dist. 8/2/04 (A102287)     Case complete 10/6/04RIGHTS OF WAY: A grant of a public right of way includes uses made possible by future development or technology, which are not in existence at the time of the grant. Here, the Court held that a right of way included the right to install a pipeline to transport natural gas.California National Bank v. Havis     Docket
120 Cal.App.4th 1122 – 2nd Dist. 7/23/04 (B167152)     Case complete 9/22/04DEEDS OF TRUST: A bank holding a deed of trust holder was paid outside of escrow with a check. The bank sent a letter to escrow stating that it had “received payoff funds . . . it is our policy to issue the Full Reconveyance 10 days after receipt of the payoff check. Therefore, a Full Reconveyance will be sent to the County Recorder on or about August 5, 2002”. The escrow relied on the letter and closed escrow without paying off the lender. The check bounced and the lender began foreclosure.

The Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the letter did not constitute a payoff demand statement binding on the bank under CC 2943. The Court determined that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the parties could reasonably have relied on the letter. [Ed. note: The Court exhibited a scary lack of understanding of real estate transactions, and could not come to grips with the fact that reconveyances from institutional lenders never record at close of escrow.]Kirkeby v. Sup. Ct. (Fascenelli)     Docket
33 Cal.4th 642 – Cal. Supreme Court 7/22/04 (S117640)LIS PENDENS: An action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance supports the recording of a lis pendens. The court stated that “[b]y definition, the voiding of a transfer of real property will affect title to or possession of real property”. (Ed. note: Several appellate court decisions have held that actions to impose equitable liens and constructive trusts do not support a lis pendens. The Supreme Court did not deal with those issues but it seems that, using the court’s language, it could similarly be said that “by definition imposing an equitable lien or constructive trust will affect title to or possession of real property.”)Tom v. City and County of San Francisco     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
120 Cal.App.4th 674 – 1st Dist. 6/22/04 (A101950)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/13/04TENANCY IN COMMON AGREEMENTS: In order to evade burdensome regulations for converting apartments to condominiums, it has become a common practice in San Francisco for a group of people to acquire a multi-unit residential building and enter into a tenancy in common agreement establishing an exclusive right of occupancy for each dwelling unit. Seeking to end this practice, the People’s Republic of San Francisco enacted an ordinance prohibiting exclusive right of occupancy agreements. The Court held that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the right of privacy set forth in Article I, section I of the California Constitution.California Attorney General Opinion No. 03-1108
6/9/04RECORDING: A memorandum of lease is a recordable instrument.Yeung v. Soos     Docket
119 Cal.App.4th 576 – 2nd Dist. 6/16/04 (B165939) (Mod. 7/2/04)     Case complete 9/10/04QUIET TITLE: A default judgment after service by publication is permissible in a quiet title action. However, the judgment may not be entered by the normal default prove-up methods; the court must require evidence of the plaintiff’s title, including live witnesses and complete authentication of the underlying real property records. Nevertheless, the judgment is not rendered void because the default prove-up method was used rather than an evidentiary hearing.Villa de Las Palmas HOA v. Terifaj     Docket
33 Cal.4th 73 – Cal. Supreme Court 6/14/04 (S109123)RESTRICTIONS: Use restrictions in amended declarations are binding on owners who purchased prior to recordation of the amendment. They are also subject to the same presumption of validity as the original declaration.In re Marriage of Gioia     Docket
119 Cal.App.4th 272 – 2nd Dist. 6/9/04 (B166803)     Case complete 8/11/04BANKRUPTCY: A bankruptcy trustee’s notice of abandonment of property was effective even though it was ambiguous because it did not specifically state that the trustee will be deemed to have abandoned the property 15 days from the date of mailing of the notice. The court also states that an abandonment is irrevocable even if the property later becomes more valuable.Dieckmeyer v. Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 248 – 4th Dist., Div. 3  2/28/05 (G031869) (2nd Opinion)     Case complete 5/5/05DEEDS OF TRUST: Where a deed of trust secures both payment of a promissory note and performance of contractual obligations (CC&R’s in this case), the trustor is not entitled to reconveyance of the deed of trust after the note is paid off, but before the contractual obligations are satisfied.Textron Financial v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.     Docket      Sup.Ct. Docket
118 Cal.App.4th 1061 – 4th Dist., Div. 3  5/20/04 (G020323) (Mod. 6/18/04)     Req. for rev. and depub. by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/15/04INSURANCE / PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
1. The amount of attorney’s fees incurred by an insured in obtaining policy benefits and recoverable under Brandt v. Sup. Ct. are limited to the fees under the contingency fee agreement between the insured and its counsel, and not a higher figure based on the reasonable value of the attorney’s services.
2. Punitive damages must be based on compensatory damages awarded for tortious conduct, including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, excluding the sum recovered on the breach of contract claim.
3. When compensatory damages are neither exceptionally high nor low, and the defendant’s conduct is neither exceptionally extreme nor trivial, the outer constitutional limit on the amount of punitive damages is approximately four times the amount of compensatory damages.
4. The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.Blackburn v. Charnley     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
117 Cal.App.4th 758 – 2nd Dist. 4/8/04 (B166080)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/21/04SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance is available even though the contract referred to lots which had not yet been subdivided. This violation of the Subdivision Map Act made the contract voidable at the option of the buyer, who chose to enforce the contract instead. The requirement in the standard CAR contract to mediate in order to collect attorney’s fees does not apply where an action is filed in order to record a lis pendens and where mediation was conducted pursuant to the court’s own practices.Hedges v. Carrigan     Docket
117 Cal.App.4th 578 – 2nd Dist. 4/6/04 (B166248)     Case complete 6/11/04ARBITRATION: The Federal Arbitration Act preempts C.C.P. Section 1298, which requires that an arbitration clause in a real estate contract contain a specified notice and be in a specified type size. Preemption requires that the transaction affect interstate commerce, which the court found existed because the anticipated financing involved an FHA loan, and the purchase agreement was on a copyrighted form that stated it could only be used by members of the National Association of Realtors. [Ed. note: the form does not say that!] However, in the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court held that the arbitration clause could not be enforced because it required that the parties initial it in order to acknowledge their agreement to arbitration, and they did not all do so. [Ed. note: the concurring opinion makes much more sense than the majority opinion!]Kapner v. Meadowlark Ranch Assn.     Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 1182 – 2nd Dist. 3/17/04 (B163525)     Case complete 5/25/04ADVERSE POSSESSION / PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: A prescriptive easement cannot be established where the encroacher’s use is exclusive. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order requiring the property owner to sign an encroachment agreement or remove the encroachment.Harrison v. Welch     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 1084 – 3rd Dist. 3/12/04 (C044320)     Request for depublication DENIED 6/23/04ADVERSE POSSESSION / PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS:
1) In the uncertified Part I of the opinion, the court rejected Defendant’s claim of adverse possession because real property taxes were not paid on any area outside of Defendant’s lot. The court rejected defendant’s creative argument that real property taxes were paid on all land within the setback area where defendant’s house was 3-1/2 feet from the property line, and a zoning ordinance required a 5-foot setback.
2) A prescriptive easement cannot be established where the encroacher’s use is exclusive. The opinion contains an excellent discussion of the case law on this issue.
3) The 5-year statute of limitations in C.C.P. Sections 318 and 321, within which a plaintiff must bring an action to recover real property, does not commence until the encroacher’s use of the property has ripened into adverse possession.Brizuela v. CalFarm Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 578 – 2nd Dist. 3/3/04 (B160875)     Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/9/04INSURANCE: Where an insurance policy requires an insured who has filed a claim to submit to an examination under oath, that obligation is a condition precedent to obtaining benefits under the policy. The insurer is entitled to deny the claim without showing it was prejudiced by the insured’s refusal.Hanshaw v. Long Valley Road Assn.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 471 – 3rd Dist. 3/2/04 (C041796)     Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/19/04PUBLIC STREETS: An offer of dedication of a public street that is not formally accepted may, nevertheless, be accepted by subsequent public use. This is known as common law dedication. However, counties have a duty to maintain only those roads that are “county roads”, and a public road does not become a county road unless specifically accepted as such by the appropriate resolution of the Board of Supervisors.Miner v. Tustin Avenue Investors     Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 264 – 4th Dist., Div.3  2/27/04 (G031703)     Case complete 5/4/04LEASES / ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATES: A lease contained an option to renew for 5 years, but the tenant signed an estoppel certificate stating that the lease was in full force and effect, and that the tenant had no options except the following: (blank lines that followed were left blank). The Court held that the tenant was not bound by the estoppel certificate because it was ambiguous as to whether it referred only to options outside of the lease or whether the tenant had somehow given up his option rights.Tremper v. Quinones     Docket
115 Cal.App.4th 944 – 2nd Dist. 2/17/04 (B165218)     Case complete 5/3/04GOOD FAITH IMPROVER: Attorney’s fees and costs may be included in the calculation of damages awarded against a person bringing an action as a good faith improver under C.C.P. Section 871.3, regardless of whether the costs and fees were incurred in prosecuting a complaint or defending against a cross complaint, and even where the good faith improver issues are part of a quiet title action which would not ordinarily support an award of attorney’s fees and costs.Kertesz v. Ostrovsky     Docket
115 Cal.App.4th 369 – 4th Dist., Div.3  1/28/04 (G030640)     Case complete 4/2/04JUDGMENTS / BANKRUPTCY: The time for renewing a judgment was 10 years from entry of the judgment, plus the amount of time between the debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy petition and the date of the Bankruptcy Court’s order of nondischargeability, plus an additional 30 days under Bankruptcy Code Section 108(c). The court reached this conclusion even though the judgment was entered before the bankruptcy petition was filed, and the 10-year period for renewing the judgment expired long after the bankruptcy was closed.

NOTE: I believe the judge misunderstood the automatic stay and Bankruptcy Code Section 108(c). I do not believe the automatic stay applies when a period of time for taking an action commences prior to bankruptcy, and expires after the bankruptcy case is closed.Rancho Santa Fe Association v. Dolan-King     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
115 Cal.App.4th 28 – 4th Dist., Div.1  1/7/04 (D040637/D041486)     Pet. for Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/28/04HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Regulations adopted and interpreted by a Homeowner’s Association must be reasonable from the perspective of the entire development, not by determining on a case-by-case basis the effect on individual homeowners.Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich v. Vigilant Insurance Co.     Docket
114 Cal.App.4th 1185 – 4th Dist., Div.1  1/12/04 (D041811)     Case complete 3/15/04INSURANCE: Civil Code Section 2860(c) provides for the arbitration of disputes over the amount of legal fees or the hourly billing rate of Cumis counsel, but does not apply to other defense expenses.

Go to cases 2000 – 2003

The Trustee sale can be set aside

Bank of America, N.A. v. La Jolla Group II, 129 Cal. App. 4th 706, 15 710,717 (5th Dist. 2005) (void foreclosure sale required rescission of trustee’s deed returning title to the status quo prior to the foreclosure sale); Dimock v. Emerald Properties, 81 Cal. App. 4th 868, 874 (4th Dist. 2000) (sale under deed of trust by former trustee void, and tender of the amount due is unnecessary).

THE COURT MUST STRICTLY ENFORCE

THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A FORECLOSURE.

The harshness of non-judicial foreclosure has been recognized. “The exercise of the power of sale is a harsh method of foreclosing the rights of the grantor.” Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 6 215, citing to System Inv. Corporation v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 153.  The statutory requirements are intended to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of his property Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; accord, Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 503; Lo Nguyen v. Calhoun (6th District 2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 440, and a valid foreclosure by the private power of sale requires strict compliance with the requirements of the statute. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.179; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211 (3d Dist. 1989), reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Bisno v. Sax (2d Dist. 1959) 175 Cal. App. 2d 714, 720.

It has been a cornerstone of foreclosure law that the statutory requirements, intending to protect the Trustor and or Grantor from a wrongful or unfair loss of the property, must be complied with strictly. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182.   “Close” compliance does not count. As a result, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Default is invalid (emphasis added). Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3dDist. 1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash, Door & Mill Co.(3d Dist. 1931) 118 Cal. App. 379.

Additionally, any Trustee’s Sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Trustee Sale is invalid.  Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3d Dist. 1989) 11 208 Cal.App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989). The California Sixth District Court of Appeal observed, “Pursuing that policy [of judicial interpretation], the courts have fashioned rules to protect the debtor, one of them being that the notice of default will be strictly construed and must correctly set forth the amounts required to cure the default.” Sweatt v. The Foreclosure Co., Inc. (1985 – 6th District) 166 Cal.App.3d 273 at 278, citing to Miller v. Cote (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 888, 894 and SystemInv. Corp. v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-153.

The same reasoning applies even to a Notice of Trustee’s Sale.  Courts will set aside a foreclosure sale when there has been fraud, when the sale has been improperly, unfairly, or unlawfully conducted, or when there has been such a mistake that it would be inequitable to let it stand. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Reidy (1940) 15 Cal. 2d 243, 248; Whitman v. Transtate Title Co.(4th Dist. 1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 312, 322-323; In re Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1228.  See also Smith v. Williams (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 617, 621; Stirton v. Pastor (4th Dist. 1960) 177 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234; Brown v. Busch (3d Dist. 1957) 152 Cal.App. 2d 200, 203-204.

English: Foreclosure auction 2007
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Challenge Your Lender… Now!

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Challenge Your Lender… Now!

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My name is Timothy McCandless, and I’m here to tell you what most banks and mortgage loan servicers don’t want you to know: More than 65 million homes in the US may not be subject to foreclosure after all, and your home is very likely one of the “safe” homes. The reason these homes are not technically subject to foreclosure is because the lenders, mortgage companies, mortgage servicers, and title companies broke the law throughout the process of managing your loan, both at the inception of your loan and throughout the life of the loan. Because of their fraudulent actions, they are unable to produce a title for, or show ownership of, your property. This causes what we call a “defect of title”, and legally prohibits your lender or servicer from foreclosing, regardless of whether or not your loan is current.

This situation is all over the news, and now, starting today, you can learn how to protect yourself from unlawful foreclosure.

WE CAN TRAIN YOU HOW TO CHALLENGE YOUR LENDER

Most Mortgage Assignments are Illegal

In a major ruling in the Massachusetts Supreme Court today, US Bank National Association and Wells Fargo lost the “Ibanez case”, meaning that they don’t have standing to foreclose due to improper mortgage assignment. The ruling is likely to send shock waves through the entire judicial system, and seriously raise the stakes on foreclosure fraud. Bank stocks plummeted after this ruling. These assignments are what people need to challenge in their own mortgages.

I am prepared to show you the most amazing information on how you can actually Challenge Your Lender. Once you opt in for our free ebook (just enter your email address above and to the right), you’ll get immediate access to our first, very informative webinar, as well as to our free ebook. You’ll learn more about the Challenge Your Lender program, and more importantly, how the US mortgage system is rigged to take advantage of you and how to can fight back. My program will show you exactly how to get a copy of your loan documents that your lender or loan servicer currently has in their possession, and then how to begin examining these documents to learn more about how your lender, as well as other parties involved, has used your name and credit to make millions of dollars. Analyzing your loan documents is a crucial first step in beginning the Challenge Your Lender process.


Save your home from foreclosure

The information that you will be receiving in my free material and webinar will further your knowledge on what most lenders are doing to homeowners, and how you can save yourself from foreclosure. You will have the opportunity to acquire a free copy of my Challenge Your Lender workbook and learn how to begin building the paper trail that you will need to defend yourself and to prove the wrongdoings of your lender and loan servicer. Once you go through the workbook and listen in on the free webinar, you will be on top of your Challenge and ready to begin the program.

The Challenge Your Lender program will help put you in a position of power and control over your loan, and will allow you to decide what you would like to do with your property. This leverage will be advantageous when you begin negotiating your foreclosure. Most importantly, your lender or loan servicer should not be able to foreclose on you once you notify them that you have identified fraudulent activity. My program is your first step in saving your property from foreclosure.

Don’t wait – opt in today. Every day counts in the battle against your lender.

Best regards,
Tim

Foreclosure Fraud in a Nutshell why its FRAUD

Freddie Mac
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and How Newt Gingrich Abetted the Theft of Average Joe’s Home – by Bill ButlerThe untold story in the foreclosure crisis unfolding across America is that, following a foreclosure perpetrated by one of the October 2008 Bailout Banks (e.g. Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo) Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac suddenly appear as the record owner of Average Joe’s home. These federal government sponsored entities then go into local housing court and get a court order authorizing them to evict Joe. If Joe resists, these supposedly charitable institutions obtain a writ ordering the local sheriff to forcibly remove Joe from his home.

Newt Gingrich recently admitted to accepting $1.8 million from Freddie Mac ($25,0000 to $30,000 a month during one span of time) for advising this proto-fascist entity. Gingrich claims that he supports Fannie and Freddie because he believes the federal government “should have programs to help low income people acquire the ability to buy homes.” But Fannie and Freddie don’t do this and never have. When government “helps” someone by subsidizing the purchase of something (through easy credit or lower-than-market rates), it makes that something more expensive. Helping someone buy something that is overpriced because of your help is not help. Fannie/Freddie subsidies not only hurt the low income people they intend to help, they hurt everyone by subsidizing, and therefore distorting, the entire housing market. Fannie/Freddie’s charity has now taken a dark turn. Like their Depression-era New Deal predecessor the Regional Agricultural Credit Corp., Fannie/Freddie are now repossessing homes at an increasing and alarming rate.

Mr. Gingrich either does not understand economics – government subsidies make things more expensive, not less expensive, and therefore hurt their intended beneficiaries – or he is a vain, selfish, and cynical man with no interest in actually helping his neighbor.

You decide.

THE OCTOBER 2008 BAILOUT PAID OFF THE HOLDERS OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITES AND DERIVATIVE INSUREDS

The facts indicate that the Federal Reserve “printed” at least 16 trillion dollars as part of the 2008 bailouts. The bigger questions, however, who got it, why and what did the Fed get in return? The Fed doesn’t just print money. It prints money to buy stuff. Most often this is U.S. Treasuries. That changed in October of 2008. In and after October 2008 the Fed printed new money to buy mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that were defaulting at a rapid rate. Want proof? Here is a link to the Federal Reserve balance sheet which shows that the Fed is holding over a trillion dollars in mortgage backed securities that it began acquiring in 2008.

Why is the Federal Reserve holding all these MBS? Because when “the market” collapsed in September of 2008, what really collapsed is the Fannie/Freddie/Wall Street mortgage “daisy chain” securitization scheme. As increasing numbers of MBS went into default, the purchasers of derivatives (naked insurance contracts betting on MBS default) began filing claims against the insurance writers (e.g. AIG) demanding payment. This started in February 2007 when HSBC Bank announced billions in MBS losses, gained momentum in June of 2007 when Bear Stearns announced $3.8 billion in MBS exposure in just one Bear Stearns fund, and further momentum with the actual collapse of Bear Stears in July and August of 2007. By September of 2008, the Bear Stearns collapse proved to be the canary in the coal mine as the claims on off-balance sheet derivatives became the cascading cross defaults that Alan Greenspan warned could collapse the entire Western financial system.

Part of what happened in October 2008 is that the Federal Reserve paid AIG’s and others’ derivative obligations to the insureds (pension funds, hedge funds, major banks, foreign banks) who held the naked insurance contracts guaranteeing Average Joe’s payments. To understand this, imagine that a cataclysmic event occurred in the U.S. that destroyed nearly every car in the U.S. and further that Allstate insured all of these cars. That is what happened to AIG. When the housing market collapsed and borrowers began defaulting on their securitized loans, AIG’s derivative obligations exceeded its ability (or willingness) to pay. So the Fed stepped in as the insurer of last resort and bailed out AIG (and probably others). When an insurer pays on a personal property claim, it has “subrogation” rights. This means when it pays it has the right to demand possession of the personal property it insured or seek recovery from those responsible for the loss. In Allstate’s case this is wrecked cars. In the case of AIG and the Fed, it is MBS. That is what the trillions of MBS on the Fed’s balance sheet represent: wrecked cars that Fannie and Freddie are now liquidating for scrap value.

Thank you Mr. Gingrich. Great advice.

BUT FANNIE/FREDDIE WASN’T MY LENDER AND WASN’T MY MORTGAGEE, SO HOW CAN THEY TAKE MY HOUSE?

To understand how it came to be that the Fed has paid Average Joe’s original actual lender (the MBS purchaser) and now Fannie and Freddie are trying to take Joe’s home, you first have to understand some mortgage law and securitization basics.

The Difference Between Notes and Mortgages

When you close on the purchase of your home, you sign two important documents. You sign a promissory note that represents your legal obligation to pay. You sign ONE promissory note. You sign ONE promissory note because it is a negotiable instrument, payable “to the order of” the “lender” identified in the promissory note. If you signed two promissory notes on a $300,000 loan from Countrywide, you could end up paying Countrywide (or one of its successors) $600,000.

At closing you also sign a Mortgage (or a Deed of Trust in Deed of Trust States). You may sign more than one Mortgage. You may sign more than one Mortgage because it does not represent a legal obligation to pay anything. You could sign 50 Mortgages relating to your $300,000 Countrywide loan and it would not change your obligation. A Mortgage is a security instrument. It is security and security only. Without a promissory note, a mortgage is nothing. Nothing.

You “give” or “grant” a mortgage to your original lender as security for the promise to pay as represented by the promissory note. In real estate law parlance, you “give/grant” the “mortgage” to the “holder” of your “promissory note.”

If you question my bona fides in commenting on the important distinction between notes and mortgages, I know what I am talking about. I tried and won perhaps the first securitized mortgage lawsuit ever in the country in First National Bank of Elk River v. Independent Mortgage Services, 1996 WL 229236 (Minn. Ct. App. No. DX-95-1919).

In FNBER v. IMS a mortgage assignee (IMS) claimed the ownership of two mortgages relating to loans (promissory notes) held by my client, the First National Bank of Elk River (FNBER). After a three-day trial where IMS was capably represented by a former partner of the international law firm Dorsey & Whitney, my client prevailed and the Court voided the recorded mortgage assignments to IMS. My client prevailed not because of my great skill but because it had actual, physical custody of the original promissory notes (payable to the order of my client) and had been “servicing” (receiving payments on) the loans for years notwithstanding the recorded assignment of mortgage. The facts at trial showed that IMS rejected the loans because they did not conform to their securitization parameters. In short, IMS, as the “record owner” of the mortgages without any provable connection to the underlying notes, had nothing. FNBER, on the other hand, had promissory notes payable to the order of FNBER but did not have “record title” to the mortgages. FNBER was the winner because its possession of and entitlement to enforce the notes made it the “legal owner” of the mortgages.

The lesson: if you have record title to a mortgage but cannot show that you have possession of and/or entitlement to enforce the promissory notes that the mortgage secures, you lose.

This is true for 62 million securitized loans.

Securitization – The Car That Doesn’t Go In Reverse

There is nothing per se illegitimate about securitization. The law has for a long time recognized the rights of a noteholder to sell off pro-rata interests in the note. So long as the noteholder remains the noteholder he has the right to exercise rights in a mortgage (take the house) when there is a default on the note. Securitization does not run afoul of traditional real estate and foreclosure law when the mortgage holder can prove his connection to the noteholder.

But modern securitization doesn’t work this way.

The “securitization” of a “mortgage loan” today involves multiple parties but the most important parties and documents necessary for evaluating whether a bank has a right to foreclose on a mortgage are:

(1) the Borrower (Average Joe);

(2) the Original Lender (Mike’s Baitshop and Mortgages or Bailey Savings & Loan – whoever is across the closing table from Joe);

(3) the Original Mortgagee (could be Mike’s B&M, but could be anyone, including Fannie’s Creature From the Black Lagoon, the mortgagee “nominee” MERS);

(4) the “Servicer” of the loan as identified in the PSA (usually a Bank or anyone with “servicer” in its name, the entity to whom Joe makes his payments);

(5) the mortgage loan “pooling and servicing agreement” (PSA) and the PSA Trust created by the PSA;

(6) the “PSA Trust” is the “special purpose entity” created by the PSA. The PSA Trust is the heart of the PSA. It holds all securitized notes and mortgages and also sells MBS securities to investors; and

(7) the “Trustee” of the PSA Trust is the entity responsible for safekeeping of Joe’s promissory note and mortgage and the issuer of MBS.

The PSA Servicer is essentially the Chief Operating Officer and driver of the PSA. Without the Servicer, the securitization car does not go. The Servicer is the entity to which Joe pays his “mortgage” (really his note, but you get it) every month. When Joe’s loan gets “sold” multiple times, the loan is not actually being sold, the servicing rights are. The Servicer has no right, title or interest in either the promissory note or the mortgage. Any right that the Servicer has to receive money is derived from the PSA. The PSA, not Joe’s Note or Joe’s Mortgage, gives the Servicer the right to take droplets of cash out of Joe’s monthly payments before distributing the remainder to MBS purchasers.

The PSA Trustee and the sanctity of the PSA Trust are vitally important to the validity of the PSA. The PSA promoters (the usual suspects, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Bros., Merrill, Deutchebank, Barclays, etc.) persuaded MBS purchasers to part with trillions of dollars based on the idea that they would ensure that Joe’s Note would be properly endorsed by every person or entity that touched it after Joe signed it, that they would place Joe’s Note and Joe’s Mortgage in the vault-like PSA Trust and the note and mortgage would remain in the PSA Trust with a green-eyeshade, PSA Trustee diligently safekeeping them for 30 years. Further, the PSA promoters hired law firms to persuade the MBS purchasers that the PSA Trust, which is more than100 percent funded (that is, oversold) by the MBS purchasers, was the real owner of Joe’s Note and Joe’s Mortgage and that the PSA Trust, using other people’s money, had purchased or soon would purchase thousands of similar notes and mortgages in a “true sale” in accordance with FASB 140.

The PSA does not distribute pool proceeds that can be tracked pro rata to identifiable loans. In this respect, in the wrong hands (e.g. Countrywide’s Angelo Mozilo) PSAs have the potential to operate like a modern “daisy chain” fraud whereby the PSA oversells the loans in the PSA Trust, thus defrauding the MBS investors. The PSA organizers also do not inform Joe at the other end of the chain that they have sold his $300,000 loan for $600,000 and that the payout to the MBS purchasers (and other derivative side-bettors) when Joe defaults is potentially multiples of $300,000.

The PSA organizers can cover the PSA’s obligations to MBS purchasers through derivatives. Derivatives are like homeowners’ fire insurance that anyone can buy. If everyone in the world can bet that Joe’s home is going to burn down and has no interest in preventing it, odds are that Joe’s home will burn down. This is part of the reason Warren Buffet called derivatives a “financial weapon of mass destruction.” They are an off-balance sheet fiat money multiplier (the Fed stopped reporting the explosive expansion of M3 in 2006 most likely because of derivatives and mortgage loan securitization fraud), and create incentive for fraud. On the other end of the chain, Joe has no idea that the “Lender” across the table from him has no skin in the game and is more than likely receiving a commission for dragging Joe to the table.

A serious problem with modern securitization is that it destroys “privity.” Privity of contract is the traditional notion that there are two parties to a contract and that only a party to the contract can enforce or renegotiate that contract. Put simply, if A and B have a contract, C cannot enforce B’s rights against A (unless A expressly agrees or C otherwise shows a lawful agency relationship with B). The frustration for Joe is that he cannot find the other party to his transaction. When Joe talks to his “bank” (really his Servicer) and tries to renegotiate his loan, his bank tells him that a mysterious “investor” will not approve. He can’t do this because they don’t exist, have been paid or don’t have the authority to negotiate Joe’s loan.

Joe’s ultimate “investor” is the Fed, as evidenced by the trillion of MBSs on its balance sheet. Although Fannie/Freddie purportedly now “own” 80 percent of all U.S. “mortgage loans,” Fannie/Freddie are really just the Fed’s repo agents. Joe has no privity relationship with Fannie/Freddie. Fannie, Freddie and the Fed know this. So they are using the Bailout Banks to frontrun the process – the Bailout Bank (who also have no cognizable connection to the note and therefore no privity relationship with Joe) conducts a fraudulent foreclosure by creating a “record title” right to foreclose and, when the fraudulent process is over, hands the bag of stolen loot (Joe’s home) to Fannie and Freddie.

Record Title and Legal Title

Virtually all 62 million securitized notes define the “Noteholder” as “anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payment under this Note…” Very few of the holders of securitized mortgages can establish that they both hold (have physical possession of) the note AND are entitled to receive payments on the notes. For whatever reason, if a Bailout Bank has possession of an original note, it is usually endorsed payable to the order of some other (often bankrupt) entity.

If you are a Bailout Bank and you have physical possession of an original securitized note, proving that you are “entitled to receive payment” on the note is nearly impossible. First, you have to explain how you obtained the note when it should be in the hands of a PSA Trustee and it is not endorsed by the PSA Trustee. Second, even if you can show how you obtained the note, explaining why you are entitled to receive payments when you paid nothing for it and when the Fed may have satisfied your original creditors is a very difficult proposition. Third, because a mortgage is security for payments due to the noteholder and only the noteholder, if you cannot establish legal right to receive payments on the note but have a recorded mortgage all you have is “record” title to the mortgage. You have the “power” to foreclose (because courts trust recorded documents) but not necessarily the legal “right” to foreclose. Think FNBER v. IMS.

The “robosigner” controversy, reported by 60 Minutes months ago, is a symptom of the banks’ problem with “legal title” versus “record title.” The 60 Minutes reports shows that Bailout Banks are hiring 16 year old, independent contractors from Backwater, Georgia to pose as vice presidents and sign mortgage assignments which they “record” with local county recorders. This is effective in establishing the Bailout Banks’ “record title” to the “mortgage.” Unlike real bank vice presidents subject to Sarbanes-Oxley, Backwater 16-year olds have no reason to ask: “Where is the note?”; “Is my bank the noteholder?”; or “Is my Bank entitled to receive payments on the note?”

The Federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision agree with this analysis. In April of 2011 the OCC and OTS reprimanded the Bailout Banks for fraudulently foreclosing on millions of Average Joe’s:

…without always ensuring that the either the promissory note or the mortgage document were properly endorsed or assigned and, if necessary, in the possession of the appropriate party at the appropriate time…

The OCC and OTS further found that the Bailout Banks “failed to sufficiently oversee outside counsel and other third-party providers handling foreclosure-related services.”

Finally, Bailout Banks consented to the OCC and OTS spanking by admitting that they have engaged in “unsafe and unsound banking practices.”

In these “Order and Consent Decrees,” the OCC and the OTS reprimanded all of the usual suspects: Bank of America, Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, MetLife, MERSCorp, PNC Bank, US Bank, Wells Fargo, Aurora Bank, Everbank, OneWest Bank, IMB HoldCo LLC, and Sovereign Bank.

Although the OCC and OTS Orders are essentially wrist slaps for what is a massive fraud, these orders at least expose some truth. In response to the OCC Order, the Fannie/Freddie-created Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), changed its rules (see Rule 8) to demand that foreclosing lawyers identify the “noteowner” prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings.

NEWT’S FANNIE/FREDDIE ENDGAME: PLANTATION USA

Those of us fighting the banks began to see a disturbing trend starting about a year ago. Fannie and Freddie began showing up claiming title and seeking to evict homeowners from their homes.

The process works like this, using Bank of America as an example. Average Joe had a securitized loan with Countrywide. Countrywide, which might as well have been run by the Gambino family with expertise in “daisy chain” fraud, never followed the PSA, did not care for the original notes and almost never deposited the original notes in the PSA Trust. Countrywide goes belly up. Bank of America (BOA) takes over Countrywide in perhaps the worst deal in the history of corporate America, acquiring more liabilities than assets. Bank of America realizes that it has acquired a big bag of dung (no notes = no mortgages = big problem) and so sets up an entity called “BAC Home Loans LLP” whose general partner is another BOA entity.

The purpose of these BOA entities is to execute the liquidation the Countrywide portfolio as quickly as possible and, at the same time, isolate the liability to two small BOA subsidiaries. BOA uses BAC Home Loans LLP to conduct the foreclosure on Joe’s home. BAC Home Loans LLP feeds local foreclosure lawyers phony, robosigned documents that establish an “of record” transfer of the Countrywide mortgage to BAC Home Loans LLP. BAC Home Loans LLP, “purchases” Joe’s home at a Sheriff’s sale by bidding Joe’s debt owed to Countrywide. BAC Home Loans LLP does not have and cannot prove any connection to Joe’s note so BAC Home Loans LLP quickly deeds Joe’s property to Fannie and Freddie.

When it is time to kick Joe out of his home, Fannie Mae shows up in the eviction action. When compelled to show its cards, Fannie will claim title to Joe’s house via a “quit claim deed” or an assignment of the Sheriff’s Certificate of sale. Adding insult to injury, while Joe may have spent years trying to get BOA to “modify” his loan, and may have begged BOA for the right to pay BOA $1000 a month if only BOA will stop the foreclosure, Fannie now claims that BOA deeded Joe’s property to Fannie for nothing. That right, nothing. All county recorders require that a real estate purchaser claim how much they paid for the property to determine the tax value. Fannie claims on these recorded documents that it paid nothing for Joe’s home and, further, falsely claims that it is exempt because it is a US government agency. It isn’t. It is a government sponsored entity that is currently in conservatorship and run by the US government.

Great advice Newt.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the US government is so broke that it will do anything to pay its bills, including stealing Average Joe’s home.

That’s change that both Barack Obama and Newt Gingrich can believe in.

APPENDIX

More and more courts are agreeing that the banks “inside” the PSA do not have legal standing (they have no skin in the game and so cannot show the necessary “injury in fact”), are not “real parties in interest” (they cannot show that they followed the terms of the PSA or are otherwise “entitled to enforce” the note) and that there are real questions of whether any securitized mortgage can ever be properly perfected.

The banks’ weakness is exposed most often in bankruptcy courts because it is there that they have to show their cards and explain how they claim a legal right, rather than the “of record” right, to foreclose the mortgage. More and more courts are recognizing that, without proof of ownership of the underlying note, holding a mortgage means nothing.

The most recent crack in the Banks’s position is evidenced by the federal Eight Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in In Re Banks, No. 11-6025 (8th Cir., Sept. 13, 2011). In Banks, a bank attempted to execute a foreclosure within a bankruptcy case. The bank had a note payable to the order of another entity; that is, the foreclosing bank was “Bank C” but had a note payable to the order of “Bank B” and endorsed in blank by Bank B. The bank, Bank C, alleged that, because the note was endorsed in blank and “without recourse,” that it had the right to foreclose. The Court held that this was insufficient to show a sufficient chain of title to the note, reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded for findings regarding when and how Bank C acquired the note.

See also, In Re Aagard, No. 810-77338-reg (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., Feb. 10, 2011) (Judge Grossman slams MERS as lacking standing, working as both principal and agent in same transaction, and exposes MERS’ alleged principal US Bank as unable to produce or provide evidence that it is in fact the holder of the note); In Re Vargas, No. 08-17036SB (Bankr. C.D. Cal., Sept. 30, 2008) (Judge Bufford correctly applied rules of evidence and held that MERS could not establish right to possession of the 83-year old Mr. Vargas’ home through the testimony of a low-level employee who had no foundation to testify about the legal title to the original note); In Re Walker, Bankr. E.D. Cal. No. 10-21656-E-11 (May 20, 2010) (holding that neither MERS nor its alleged principal could show that they were “real parties in interest” because neither could provide any evidence of the whereabouts of, much less legal title to, the original note); Landmark v.Kesler, 216 P.2d 158 (Kan. 2009) (in this case the Kansas Supreme Court provides the most cogent state court analysis of the problem created by securitization – the “splitting” of the note and the mortgage and the real party in interest and standing problems that the holder of the mortgage has when it cannot also show that it has clean and clear legal title to the note); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 NE 40 (Mass. 2011), (the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied two banks’ attempts to “quiet title” following foreclosure because the banks’ proffered evidence did not show ownership of the mortgages – or for that matter, the notes – prior to the Sheriff’s sale); and Jackson v. MERS, 770 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. 2009) (this federal-gun-to-the-head – certified question from federal court asking for state court blessing of its already decided ruling – to the Minnesota Supreme Court is most notable for the courageous dissent of NFL Hall of Fame player and only popularly elected Justice Alan Page who opined that MERS should pound sand and obey state recording standards).

November 28, 2011

Bill Butler [send him mail] is a Minneapolis attorney and the owner of Butler Liberty Law.

Copyright © 2011 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.

Clouds on Title

 

 

ALTA Counsel Discusses Recourse for Homeowners in Foreclosure Scandal

 

Many homeowners who lost their homes over the past few years are wondering what the robo-signing scandal means for them. Steve Gottheim, ALTA’s Legislative Counsel, tells a reporter at NBC News that homeowners who purchased a house at a foreclosure sale should have obtained an Owner’s Title Insurance Policy.

 

The statements by Steve Gottheim, ALTA’s Legislative Counsel, are not doubt the last thing the four surviving major commercial members of the title insurance industry wanted publicly stated by a major player in that industry. In prior correspondence with the group and others we have expressed the potential affect and concerns the ongoing mortgage fraud foreclosure crisis has had upon the title insurance industry. The issue first appeared in a DIRT discussion relating to “insuring title to foreclosed properties in the face of litigation” back in mid-May of this year. It confirms what we had previously then stated. To which Ms. Charney replied (i) “the knowledge of the defects are open, notorious and obvious to all, the defect may be fatally defective . . . so egregious as to render the title serving as the underlying security for the debt to be defective and pass no insurable interest whatsoever along to the alleged assignee.” Professor Whitman then chimed in stating: “Bill – actually, I think you are right on target. There have been many questionable foreclosures, and in some cases the defects are doubtless sufficient to make the foreclosure either void or voidable (the latter meaning that the sale won’t be set aside if the property has passed to a BFP). Moreover, since the defects in many cases are a matter of public record, it could be very difficult for a buyer to satisfy a court that he is a BFP. To which he added (iii) “In time many of these sales are going to come back and bite the title insurers who insured them. Obviously, the industry would rather not call attention to this likelihood, but it is there all the same.” And again, (iv) “if the defect is curable, it is important the curing documents be placed of record for the benefit of future title examiners”. To which both I and the recent Report of the ACS concluded (v) “the burden of proving the right to foreclose must be placed on the foreclosing party; i.e., if a remote assignee or securitization trustee claims the right to foreclose, it must prove the legal basis for that claim. It cannot be the case that a remote party can claim the right to foreclose, with the property owner then forced to disprove its entitlement to that action.

 

The statements of the ALTA Legislative Counsel only confirm our prior warning. They

may be found at Questions for Homeowners in Foreclosure Scandal, NBC News | November 17, 2011.

Fighting Foreclosure in California

Using the Courts to Fight a California or Other Non-Judicial Foreclosure – 3-Stage Analysis – including a Homeowner Action to “Foreclose” on the Bank’s Mortgage Security Interest – rev.

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California real property foreclosures are totally different from foreclosures in New York and many other states. The reason is that more than 99% of the California foreclosures take place without a court action, in a proceeding called a “non-judicial foreclosure”. Twenty-one states do not have a non-judicial foreclosure. [These states are CT, DE, FL, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, NE, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, PA, SC, UT, VT. – Source: realtytrac.com] In California, the lending institution can go through a non-judicial foreclosure in about 4 months from the date of the filing and recording of a “Notice of Default”, ending in a sale of the property without any court getting involved. The California homeowner can stop the sale by making full payment of all alleged arrears no later than 5 days prior to the scheduled sale. Unlike a judicial foreclosure, the homeowner will have no right to redeem the property after the sale (“equity of redemption”, usually a one-year period after judicial foreclosure and sale). For a visual presentation of the timeline for California and other state non-judicial foreclosures, go to Visual Timeline for California Non-Judicial Foreclosures.

A 50-state analysis of judicial and non-judicial foreclosure procedures is available at 50-State Analysis of Judicial and Non-Judicial Foreclosure Procedures.]

The problem I am going to analyze and discuss is under what circumstances can a homeowner/mortgagor go into court to obtain some type of judicial relief for wrongful or illegal conduct by the lender or others relating to the property and mortgage. My discussion applies as to all states in which non-judicial foreclosures are permitted.

There are three distinct stages that need to be separately discussed. These stages are the borrower’s current situation. The three stages are:

 

  • Homeowner is not in any mortgage arrears [declaratory judgment action]
  • Homeowner is behind in mortgage payments – at least 5 days before auction [injunction action, which could even be called an action by a homeowner to “foreclose” upon or eliminate the lending institution’s mortgage security interest]
  • Property was sold at auction [wrongful foreclosure action]

 

I. Homeowner Is Not in any Mortgage Arrears [Declaratory Judgment Action]

As long as a homeowner keeps making the mortgage payments, and cures any occasional short-term default, the homeowner is in a position to commence an action in federal or state court for various types of relief relating to the mortgage and the obligations thereunder. One typical claim is a declaratory judgment action to declare that the mortgage and note are invalid or that the terms are not properly set forth. There are various other types of claims, as well. The filing of such an action would not precipitate a non-judicial foreclosure. Compare this to a regular foreclosure, in which the homeowner stops paying on the mortgage, gets sued in a foreclosure action, and then is able in the lawsuit to raise the issues (as “defenses”) which the California homeowner would raise as “claims” or “causes of action” in the lawsuit being discussed for this first stage.

II. Homeowner Is Behind in Mortgage Payments – at Least 5 Days before Auction [Injunction Action seeking TRO and Preliminary Injunction, which you might say is a homeowner’s own “foreclosure proceeding against the bank and its mortgage interest”]

This is the most difficult of the three stages for making use of the courts to oppose foreclosure. The reasons are: foreclosure and sale is apt to take place too quickly; the cost of seeking extraordinary (injunctive) relief is higher because of the litigation papers and hearing that have to be done in a very short period of time to obtain fast TRO and preliminary injunctive relief to stop the threatened sale; the cost of this expensive type of injunctive litigation is probably much higher for many homeowners than just keeping up the mortgage payments; and, finally, you would have to show a greater probability of success on the merits of the action than you would need to file a lawsuit as in Stage 1, so that the homeowner’s chances of prevailing (and getting the requested injunction) are low and the costs and risks are high.

Nevertheless, when the facts are in the homeowner’s favor, the homeowner should consider bringing his plight to the attention of the court, to obtain relief from oppressive lending procedures. The problem with most borrower-homeowners is that they do not have any idea what valid bases they may have to seek this kind of relief. What anyone should do in this case is talk with a competent lawyer as soon as possible, to prevent any further delay from causing you to lose an opportunity to fight back. You need to weigh the cost of commencing a court proceeding (which could be $5,000 more or less to commence) against the loss of the home through non-judicial foreclosure.

 

III. Property Was Sold at Auction [Wrongful Foreclosure Action]

If the property has already been sold, you still have the right to pursue your claims, but in the context of a “wrongful foreclosure” lawsuit, which has various legal underpinnings including tort, breach of contract and statute. This type of suit could not precipitate any foreclosure and sale of the property because the foreclosure and sale have already taken place. Your remedy would probably be monetary damages, which you would have to prove. You should commence the action as soon as possible after the wrongful foreclosure and sale, and particularly within a period of less than one year from the sale. The reason is that some of your claims could be barred by a short, 1-year statute of limitations.

If you would like to talk about any possible claims relating to your mortgage transaction, please give me a call. There are various federal and state statutes and court decisions to consider, with some claims being substantially better than others. I am available to draft a complaint in any of the 3 stages for review by your local attorney, and to be counsel on a California or other-state action “pro hac vice” (i.e., for the one case) when associating with a local lawyer.

Fannie Mae Foreclosure Lawyers Acted Improperly

Thumbnail image for Foreclosure.jpgHomeowners in Northern California have questioned the practices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in foreclosure proceedings. If you are facing a foreclosure, you may be able to keep the property by filing for bankruptcy. You should consult with an attorney regarding your legal options.

After news reports in mid-2010 began to describe the dubious practices, like the routine filing of false pleadings in bankruptcy courts, Fannie Mae’s overseer started to scrutinize the conduct of its attorneys. The inspector general of the Federal Housing Finance Agency severely criticized the FHFA’s oversight of Fannie Mae and the practices of its foreclosure attorneys in a report issued Tuesday. “American homeowners have been struggling with the effects of the housing finance crisis for several years, and they shouldn’t have to worry whether they will be victims of foreclosure abuse,” Inspector General Steve Linick told the New York Times. “Increased oversight by F.H.F.A. could help to prevent these abuses.”

According to the New York Times, the report is the second in two weeks in which the inspector general has outlined lapses at both the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the companies it oversees Federal National Mortgage Assn (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp (Freddie Mac). The agency has acted as conservator for the companies since they were taken over by the government in 2008. Its duty is to ensure that their operations do not pose additional risk to the taxpayers who now own them. The companies have tapped the taxpayers to cover mortgage losses totaling about $160 billion. The new report from the inspector general tracks Fannie Mae’s dealings with the law firms handling its foreclosures from 1997, when the company created its so-called retained attorney network. At the time, Fannie Mae was a highly profitable and powerful institution, and it devised the legal network to ensure that borrower defaults would be resolved with efficiency and speed.

The law firms in the network agreed to a flat-rate fee structure and pricing model based on the volume of foreclosures they completed. The companies that serviced the loans for Fannie Mae, were supposed to monitor the law firms’ performance and practices, the report noted

After receiving information from a shareholder in 2003 about foreclosure abuses by its law firms, Fannie Mae assigned its outside counsel to investigate, according to the report. That law firm concluded in a 2006 analysis that “foreclosure attorneys in Florida are routinely filing false pleadings and affidavits,” and that the practice could be occurring elsewhere. “It is axiomatic that the practice is improper and should be stopped,” the law firm said.

The inspector general’s report said that it could not be determined whether Fannie Mae had alerted its regulator, then the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, to the legal improprieties identified by its internal investigation.

The inspector general said that both Fannie Mae and its regulator appear to have ignored other signs of problems in their foreclosure operations. For example, the Federal Housing Finance Agency did not respond to borrower complaints about improper actions taken by law firms in foreclosures received as early as August 2009, even though foreclosure abuse poses operational and financial risks to Fannie Mae.

The report cited a media report from early 2008 detailing foreclosure abuses by law firms doing work for Fannie Mae. Nevertheless, a few months later and just before its takeover by the government, Fannie Mae began requiring the banks that serviced its loans to use only those law firms that were in its network. By then, 140 law firms in 31 jurisdictions were in the group. Fannie Mae, the mortgage finance giant, learned as early as 2003 of extensive foreclosure abuses among the law firms it had hired to remove troubled borrowers from their homes. But the company did little to correct the firms’ practices,.

Finally last fall, after an outcry over apparently forged foreclosure documents and other improprieties, the Federal Housing Finance Agency began investigating the company’s process. In a report issued early this year, it determined that Fannie Mae’s management of its network of lawyers did not meet safety and soundness standards. Among the reasons: the company’s controls to prevent or detect foreclosure abuses were inadequate, as was the company’s monitoring of the law firms. “If a law firm self-reported no issues as it processed cases,” the inspector general said, “then Fannie Mae presumed the firm was doing a good job.” The agency is still deciding how to handle the lawyer network, the inspector general said.

Officials at the housing agency have agreed with the recommendations in the inspector general’s report. Corinne Russell, a spokeswoman for F.H.F.A. said the agency was concluding its supervisory work in this area and would direct Fannie Mae to take necessary action when the work was completed.

In a response, the agency said that by Sept. 29, 2012, it would review its existing supervisory practices and act to resolve “deficiencies in the management of risks associated with default-related legal services vendors.”

If you are having problems with a loan or foreclosure, we provide free legal consultations for bankruptcy in San Francisco County, Sacramento County, Alameda County, Contra Costa County, San Mateo County, Santa Clara County, Stanislaus County, San Joaquin County, Marin County, Solano County and throughout Northern California. Contact us for a free legal consultation today.925-957-9797

Forget Mass Joinder just use Consumer Legal Remedies Act Civil Code 1750

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE
SECTION 1750 et seq
Consumers Legal Remedies Act

1750. This title may be cited as the Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

1751. Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.

1752. The provisions of this title are not exclusive. The remedies provided herein for violation of any section of this title or for conduct proscribed by any section of this title shall be in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation or conduct provided for in any other law.
Nothing in this title shall limit any other statutory or any common law rights of the Attorney General or any other person to bring class actions. Class actions by consumers brought under the specific provisions of Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1770) of this title shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1780); however, this shall not be construed so as to deprive a consumer of any statutory or common law right to bring a class action without resort to this title. If any act or practice proscribed under this title also constitutes a cause of action in common law or a violation of another statute, the consumer may assert such common law or statutory cause of action under the procedures and with the remedies provided for in such law.

1753. If any provision of this title or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the title and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

1754. The provisions of this title shall not apply to any transaction which provides for the construction, sale, or construction and sale of an entire residence or all or part of a structure designed for commercial or industrial occupancy, with or without a parcel of real property or an interest therein, or for the sale of a lot or parcel of real property, including any site preparation incidental to such sale.

1755. Nothing in this title shall apply to the owners or employees of any advertising medium, including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines, broadcast stations, billboards and transit ads, by whom any advertisement in violation of this title is published or disseminated, unless it is established that such owners or employees had knowledge of the deceptive methods, acts or practices declared to be unlawful by Section 1770.

1756. The substantive and procedural provisions of this title shall only apply to actions filed on or after January 1, 1971.

1760. This title shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.

1761. As used in this title:

  • (a) “Goods” means tangible chattels bought or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, including certificates or coupons exchangeable for these goods, and including goods which, at the time of the sale or subsequently, are to be so affixed to real property as to become a part of real property, whether or not severable therefrom.
  • (b) “Services” means work, labor, and services for other than a commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods.
  • (c) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or other group, however organized.
  • (d) “Consumer” means an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.
  • (e) “Transaction” means an agreement between a consumer and any other person, whether or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making of, and the performance pursuant to, that agreement.
  • (f) “Senior citizen” means a person who is 65 years of age or older.
  • (g) “Disabled person” means any person who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities.
    • (1) As used in this subdivision, “physical or mental impairment” means any of the following:
      • A. Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss substantially affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; muscoloskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; or endocrine.
      • B. Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. The term “physical or mental impairment” includes, but is not limited to, such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairment, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, and emotional illness.
    • (2) “Major life activities” means functions such as caring for one’ s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.
  • (h) “Home solicitation” means any transaction made at the consumer’ s primary residence, except those transactions initiated by the consumer. A consumer response to an advertisement is not a home solicitation.

1770.

  • (a) The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer are unlawful:
    • (1) Passing off goods or services as those of another.
    • (2) Misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services.
    • (3) Misrepresenting the affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another. (MERS)and Securitization
    • (4) Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services.
    • (5) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he or she does not have.
    • (6) Representing that goods are original or new if they have deteriorated unreasonably or are altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand.
    • (7) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.
    • (8) Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact.
    • (9) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.
    • (10) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity.
    • (11) Advertising furniture without clearly indicating that it is unassembled if that is the case.
    • (12) Advertising the price of unassembled furniture without clearly indicating the assembled price of that furniture if the same furniture is available assembled from the seller.
    • (13) Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions.
    • (14) Representing that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law.
    • (15) Representing that a part, replacement, or repair service is needed when it is not.
    • (16) Representing that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not. Sign this transaction now and when the option ARM adjusts we will refinance at no cost to you
    • (17) Representing that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other economic benefit, if the earning of the benefit is contingent on an event to occur subsequent to the consummation of the transaction.
    • (18) Misrepresenting the authority of a salesperson, representative, or agent to negotiate the final terms of a transaction with a consumer.
    • (19) Inserting an unconscionable provision in the contract.
    • (20) Advertising that a product is being offered at a specific price plus a specific percentage of that price unless (1) the total price is set forth in the advertisement, which may include, but is not limited to, shelf tags, displays, and media advertising, in a size larger than any other price in that advertisement, and (2) the specific price plus a specific percentage of that price represents a markup from the seller’s costs or from the wholesale price of the product. This subdivision shall not apply to in-store advertising by businesses which are open only to members or cooperative organizations organized pursuant to Division 3 (commencing with Section 12000) of Title 1 of the Corporations Code where more than 50 percent of purchases are made at the specific price set forth in the advertisement.
    • (21) Selling or leasing goods in violation of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1797.8) of Title 1.7.
    • (22)
      • (A) Disseminating an unsolicited prerecorded message by telephone without an unrecorded, natural voice first informing the person answering the telephone of the name of the caller or the organization being represented, and either the address or the telephone number of the caller, and without obtaining the consent of that person to listen to the prerecorded message.
      • (B) This subdivision does not apply to a message disseminated to a business associate, customer, or other person having an established relationship with the person or organization making the call, to a call for the purpose of collecting an existing obligation, or to any call generated at the request of the recipient.
    • (23) The home solicitation, as defined in subdivision (h) of Section 1761, of a consumer who is a senior citizen where a loan is made encumbering the primary residence of that consumer for the purposes of paying for home improvements and where the transaction is part of a pattern or practice in violation of either subsection (h) or (i) of Section 1639 of Title 15 of the United States Code or subsection (e) of Section 226.32 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
      A third party shall not be liable under this subdivision unless (1) there was an agency relationship between the party who engaged in home solicitation and the third party or (2) the third party had actual knowledge of, or participated in, the unfair or deceptive transaction. A third party who is a holder in due course under a home solicitation transaction shall not be liable under this subdivision.

(b)

    • (1) It is an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a mortgage broker or lender, directly or indirectly, to use a home improvement contractor to negotiate the terms of any loan that is secured, whether in whole or in part, by the residence of the borrower and which is used to finance a home improvement contract or any portion thereof. For purposes of this subdivision, “mortgage broker or lender” includes a finance lender licensed pursuant to the California Finance Lenders Law (Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) of the Financial Code), a residential mortgage lender licensed pursuant to the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (Division 20 (commencing with Section 50000) of the Financial Code), or a real estate broker licensed under the Real Estate Law (Division 4 (commencing with Section 10000) of the Business and Professions Code).
    • (2) This section shall not be construed to either authorize or prohibit a home improvement contractor from referring a consumer to a mortgage broker or lender by this subdivision. However, a home improvement contractor may refer a consumer to a mortgage lender or broker if that referral does not violate Section 7157 of the Business and Professions Code or any other provision of law. A mortgage lender or broker may purchase an executed home improvement contract if that purchase does not violate Section 7157 of the Business and Professions Code or any other provision of law. Nothing in this paragraph shall have any effect on the application of Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 1801) of Title 2 to a home improvement transaction or the financing thereof.

1780.

  • (a) Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 may bring an action against such person to recover or obtain any of the following:
    • (1) Actual damages, but in no case shall the total award of damages in a class action be less than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
    • (2) An order enjoining such methods, acts, or practices.
    • (3) Restitution of property.
    • (4) Punitive damages.
    • (5) Any other relief which the court deems proper.
  • (b) Any consumer who is a senior citizen or a disabled person, as defined in subdivisions (f) and (g) of Section 1761, as part of an action under subdivision (a), may seek and be awarded, in addition to the remedies specified therein, up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) where the trier of fact (1) finds that the consumer has suffered substantial physical, emotional, or economic damage resulting from the defendant’s conduct, (2) makes an affirmative finding in regard to one or more of the factors set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 3345, and (3) finds that an additional award is appropriate. Judgment in a class action by senior citizens or disabled persons under Section 1781 may award each class member such an additional award where the trier of fact has made the foregoing findings.
  • (c) An action under subdivision (a) or (b) may be commenced in the county in which the person against whom it is brought resides, has his or her principal place of business, or is doing business, or in the county where the transaction or any substantial portion thereof occurred.
    If within any such county there is a municipal or justice court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, established in the city and county or judicial district in which the person against whom the action is brought resides, has his or her principal place of business, or is doing business, or in which the transaction or any substantial portion thereof occurred, then such court is the proper court for the trial of such action. Otherwise, any municipal or justice court in such county having jurisdiction of the subject matter is the proper court for the trial thereof.
    In any action subject to the provisions of this section, concurrently with the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall file an affidavit stating facts showing that the action has been commenced in a county or judicial district described in this section as a proper place for the trial of the action. If a plaintiff fails to file the affidavit required by this section, the court shall, upon its own motion or upon motion of any party, dismiss any such action without prejudice.
  • (d) The court shall award court costs and attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed pursuant to this section. Reasonable attorney’s fees may be awarded to a prevailing defendant upon a finding by the court that the plaintiff’s prosecution of the action was not in good faith.

1781.

  • (a) Any consumer entitled to bring an action under Section 1780 may, if the unlawful method, act, or practice has caused damage to other consumers similarly situated, bring an action on behalf of himself and such other consumers to recover damages or obtain other relief as provided for in Section 1780.
  • (b) The court shall permit the suit to be maintained on behalf of all members of the represented class if all of the following conditions exist:
    • (1) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court.
    • (2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual members.
    • (3) The claims or defenses of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.
    • (4) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
  • (c) If notice of the time and place of the hearing is served upon the other parties at least 10 days prior thereto, the court shall hold a hearing, upon motion of any party to the action which is supported by affidavit of any person or persons having knowledge of the facts, to determine if any of the following apply to the action:
    • (1) A class action pursuant to subdivision (b) is proper.
    • (2) Published notice pursuant to subdivision (d) is necessary to adjudicate the claims of the class.
    • (3) The action is without merit or there is no defense to the action.
      A motion based upon Section 437c of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not be granted in any action commenced as a class action pursuant to subdivision (a).
    • (d) If the action is permitted as a class action, the court may direct either party to notify each member of the class of the action.
      The party required to serve notice may, with the consent of the court, if personal notification is unreasonably expensive or it appears that all members of the class cannot be notified personally, give notice as prescribed herein by publication in accordance with Section 6064 of the Government Code in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the transaction occurred.
    • (e) The notice required by subdivision (d) shall include the following:
      • (1) The court will exclude the member notified from the class if he so requests by a specified date.
      • (2) The judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion.
      • (3) Any member who does not request exclusion, may, if he desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
    • (f) A class action shall not be dismissed, settled, or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal, settlement, or compromise shall be given in such manner as the court directs to each member who was given notice pursuant to subdivision (d) and did not request exclusion.
    • (g) The judgment in a class action shall describe those to whom the notice was directed and who have not requested exclusion and those the court finds to be members of the class. The best possible notice of the judgment shall be given in such manner as the court directs to each member who was personally served with notice pursuant to subdivision (d) and did not request exclusion.

1782.

  • (a) Thirty days or more prior to the commencement of an action for damages pursuant to the provisions of this title, the consumer shall do the following:
    • (1) Notify the person alleged to have employed or committed methods, acts or practices declared unlawful by Section 1770 of the particular alleged violations of Section 1770.
    • (2) Demand that such person correct, repair, replace or otherwise rectify the goods or services alleged to be in violation of Section 1770.
      Such notice shall be in writing and shall be sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to the place where the transaction occurred, such person’s principal place of business within California, or, if neither will effect actual notice, the office of the Secretary of State of California.
  • (b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), no action for damages may be maintained under the provisions of Section 1780 if an appropriate correction, repair, replacement or other remedy is given, or agreed to be given within a reasonable time, to the consumer within 30 days after receipt of such notice.
  • (c) No action for damages may be maintained under the provisions of Section 1781 upon a showing by a person alleged to have employed or committed methods, acts or practices declared unlawful by Section 1770 that all of the following exist:
    • (1) All consumers similarly situated have been identified, or a reasonable effort to identify such other consumers has been made.
    • (2) All consumers so identified have been notified that upon their request such person shall make the appropriate correction, repair, replacement or other remedy of the goods and services.
    • (3) The correction, repair, replacement or other remedy requested by such consumers has been, or, in a reasonable time, shall be, given.
    • (4) Such person has ceased from engaging, or if immediate cessation is impossible or unreasonably expensive under the circumstances, such person will, within a reasonable time, cease to engage, in such methods, act, or practices.
  • (d) An action for injunctive relief brought under the specific provisions of Section 1770 may be commenced without compliance with the provisions of subdivision (a). Not less than 30 days after the commencement of an action for injunctive relief, and after compliance with the provisions of subdivision (a), the consumer may amend his complaint without leave of court to include a request for damages. The appropriate provisions of subdivision (b) or (c) shall be applicable if the complaint for injunctive relief is amended to request damages.
  • (e) Attempts to comply with the provisions of this section by a person receiving a demand shall be construed to be an offer to compromise and shall be inadmissible as evidence pursuant to Section 1152 of the Evidence Code; furthermore, such attempts to comply with a demand shall not be considered an admission of engaging in an act or practice declared unlawful by Section 1770. Evidence of compliance or attempts to comply with the provisions of this section may be introduced by a defendant for the purpose of establishing good faith or to show compliance with the provisions of this section.

1783. Any action brought under the specific provisions of Section 1770 shall be commenced not more than three years from the date of the commission of such method, act, or practice.

1784. No award of damages may be given in any action based on a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 if the person alleged to have employed or committed such method, act, or practice

  • (a) proves that such violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures adopted to avoid any such error and
  • (b) makes an appropriate correction, repair or replacement or other remedy of the goods and services according to the provisions of subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 1782.

 


KISS: KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID from Garfield

Finality versus good and evil. In the battlefield it isn’t about good and evil. It is about winner and losers. In military battles around the world many battles have been one by the worst tyrants imaginable.

Just because you are right, just because the banks did bad things, just because they have no right to do what they are doing, doesn’t mean you will win. You might if you do it right, but you are up against a superior army with a dubious judge looking on thinking that this deadbeat borrower wants to get out of paying.

The court system is there to mediate disputes and bring them to a conclusion. Once a matter is decided they don’t want it to be easy to reopen a bankruptcy or issues that have already been litigated. The court presumably wants justice to prevail, but it also wants to end the dispute for better or for worse.

Otherwise NOTHING would end. Everyone who lost would come in with some excuse to have another trial. So you need to show fundamental error, gross injustice or an error that causes more problems that it solves.

These are the same issues BEFORE the matter is decided in court. Foreclosures are viewed as a clerical act or ministerial act. The outcome is generally viewed as inevitable.

And where the homeowner already admits the loan exists (a mistake), that the lien is exists and was properly filed and executed (a mistake) and admits that he didn’t make payments — he is admitting something he doesn’t even know is true — that there were payments due and he didn’t make them, which by definition puts him in default.

It’s not true that the homeowner would even know if the payment is due because the banks refuse to provide any accounting on the third party payments from bailout, insurance CDS, and credit enhancement.

That’s why you need reports on title, securitization, forensic reviews for TILA compliance and loan level accounting. If the Judges stuck to the law, they would require the proof first from the banks, but they don’t. They put the burden on the borrowers —who are the only ones who have the least information and the least access to information — to essentially make the case for the banks and then disprove it. The borrowers are litigating against themselves.

In the battlefield it isn’t about good and evil, it is about winners and losers. Name calling and vague accusations won’t cut it.

Sure you want to use the words surrogate signing, robo-signing, forgery, fabrication and misrepresentation. You also want to show that the court’s action would or did cloud title in a way that cannot be repaired without a decision on the question of whether the lien was perfected and whether the banks should be able to say they transferred bad loans to investors who don’t want them — just so they can foreclose.

But you need some proffers of real evidence — reports, exhibits and opinions from experts that will show that there is a real problem here and that this case has not been heard on the merits because of an unfair presumption: the presumption is that just because a bank’s lawyer says it in court, it must be true.

Check with the notary licensing boards, and see if the notaries on their documents have been disciplined and if not, file a grievance if you have grounds. Once you have that, maybe you have a grievance against the lawyers. After that maybe you have a lawsuit against the banks and their lawyers.

But the primary way to control the narrative or at least trip up the narrative of the banks is to object on the basis that counsel for the bank is referring to things not in the record. That is simple and the judge can understand that.

Don’t rely on name-calling, rely on the simplest legal requirements that you can find that have been violated. Was the lien perfected?

If the record shows that others were involved in the original transaction with the borrowers at the inception of the deal, then you might be able to show that there were only nominees instead of real parties in interest named on the note and mortgage.

Without disclosure of the principal, the lien is not perfected because the world doesn’t know who to go to for a satisfaction of that lien. If you know the other parties involved were part of a securitization scheme, you should say that — these parties can only be claiming an interest by virtue of a pooling and servicing agreement. And then make the point that they are only now trying to transfer what they are calling a bad loan into the pool that the investors bought — which is expressly prohibited for multiple reasons in the PSA.

This is impersonation of the investor because the investors don’t want to come forward and get countersued for the bad and illegal lending practices that were used in getting the borrower’s signature.

Point out that the auction of the property was improperly conducted where you can show that to be the case. Nearly all of the 5 million foreclosures were allowed to be conducted with a single bid from a non-creditor.

If you are not a creditor you must bid cash, put up a portion before you bid, and then pay the balance usually within 24-72 hours.

But instead they pretended to be the creditor when their own documents show they were supposed to be representing the investors who were not part of the lawsuit nor the judgment.

SO they didn’t pay cash and they didn’t tender the note. THEY PAID NOTHING. In Florida the original note must actually be filed with the court to make sure that the matter is actually concluded.

There is a whole ripe area of inquiry of inspecting the so-called original notes and bringing to the attention the fraud upon the court in submitting a false original. It invalidates the sale, by operation of law.

JUDGES: ASSUME THE BORROWER IS WRONG

So you have denied the claims of the pretenders and put that in issue. You have even alleged fraud, forgery and fabrication and the catch-word “robosigning”. But the Judge, alleging that he did not want to “make new law” (which wasn’t true) or allegedly because he didn’t want to start an avalanche of litigation interfering with judicial economy (and therefore allowing fraud and theft on the largest scale ever known to human history) has not only denied your claims and motions, but refused to even put the matter at issue, thus enabling you to at least use discovery to prove your point.

So the pretenders have their way: no evidence has been introduced into the record. You have proffered, they have proffered, but somehow their proffer means something more than your proffer even though no proffer is evidence.

Attorneys recognize this as low hanging fruit on appeal, where the trial judge is going to get the case back on remand with instructions to listen to the evidence and allow each side to produce real evidence, not proffers from counsel, and allow each side to conduct discovery. It’s not guaranteed but it is very likely. And the pretenders know that if it ever gets down to real evidence as opposed to arguments of counsel, they are dead in the water, subject to sanctions and liability for slander of title and other claims.

So they have come up with this strategy of setting supersedeas bond higher and higher so that the order appealed from goes into effect and they are able to kick the can down the road with a foreclosure sale, more transfers etc in the title chain, thus enabling them to argue the deed is done and the “former” homeowner must be relegated to only claiming damages, not the home itself. People can be kicked out by eviction proceedings that typically are conducted in courts of limited jurisdiction where in most states you are not allowed to even allege that the title is not real or that it was illegally obtained.

Initially supersedeas bond was set at levels that could be met by homeowners — sometimes as little as $500 or a monthly amount equal to a small fraction of the former monthly payment. Now, Judges who are heavily influenced by banks and large law firms, especially chief Judges who stick their noses into cases not assigned to them, are making sure that the case does NOT go to jury trial and essentially influencing the presiding Judge ex parte, to set a high supersedeas bond thus preventing the homeowner from obtaining a stay of execution on the eviction or the final judgment regarding title.

Of course it is wrong. But it is happening. You counter this by (1) making the record on appeal as to the merits of the appeal (2) adding to the record actual affidavits and testimony as to value, rental value etc. and (3) of course demanding and evidential hearing on the proper amount of the bond. Here you want to search out and produce the bond set in similar cases in the county in which your case is pending. Make sure you have a court reporter and a transcript on appeal and that the record on appeal is complete. It is not uncommon for certain documents to get “lost” or allegedly not “introduced” so when the appellate court gets it you can be met with the question of “what document?”

The other reason they are increasing supersedeas bond is because of a misconception by many pro se litigants and even some attorneys. They have the impression that the appeal is over if the bond is NOT posted with the clerk. And they have the impression that they can’t challenge the amount of bond set, or even go to the appellate court just on that issue and ask the appellate court to set bond — something they might not do but when they remand it, it is usually with instructions to the trial judge to hear evidence on the relevant issues — again something the pretenders don’t want.

Supersedeas bond ONLY applies to execution of the order or judgment that you are appealing. You can AND should continue with the appeal and if you win, the Judgment might be overturned — which means by operation of law you probably get your house back.

All these things are technical matters. Listening to other pro se litigants or even relying upon this other sites intended to help you is neither wise nor helpful. Before you act or fail to act, you should be in close contact with an attorney licensed in the jurisdiction in which your property is located. Local rules can sometimes spell the difference between the life or death of your case.

SAY NO TO LENDERS FRAUD!

Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

Dear Homeowner,

It’s been widely reported around the country, via internet, blogs and newspapers, how the lenders used the foreclosure mills and other legal ways, to fabricate fraudulent documents to record in the county recorder offices and pretend they have legal standing to initiate the foreclosure procedure.

Neil Garfield in his blog http://www.livinglies.com, The Huffington Post, The New York Times, Steve Vondran in his website http://www.foreclosuredefenseresourcecenter.com, Tim McCandless in his blog https://timothymccandless.wordpress.com and many others have been advocating for the homeowners trying to raise awareness in the courts so that justice can be served.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

A few years ago, when the Mortgage Debacle started, these lenders went after the Mortgage Brokers after they found themselves in trouble for the many defaulted loans. They filed civil and criminal lawsuits convicting these brokers for fabricating documents and forging signatures to fund the loans. The legal system, judges and General Attorneys were prompt to convict “these so called criminals”.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

Today the tables have turned 180 degrees and we have discovered how these entities have been widely practicing what they accused others of. Today the lenders are fabricating documents, forging signatures and filing fraudulent documents with the government agencies to weasel their way into owning the homeowners’ properties.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

The fact that judges preceding the Unlawful Detainer hearings are not educated enough about the matter and don’t want to take the time to hear the attorneys defending the homeowners, does not help to make this wrong right. Securitization is a very complicated subject that cannot be taught in an Unlawful Detainer hearing or even in a Wrongful Foreclosure hearing. The way judges have been manipulating the information provided by the homeowners in their lawsuits to rule in favor of the lenders is despicable!Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

That’s why it’s so important to have all your property recorded documents used to foreclose on your home, been researched and analyzed by an expert that can identify all the issues that can be used in a Court of Law to fight for your home.

When you go in front of a Judge with enough evidence to prove that fraud was committed by the lender when the lender fabricated documents used to foreclose, you have a good chance to get the Judge’s attention. Fraud is a subject they know, it’s a crime and they can rule in your favor. It would be very difficult for a Judge to justify this fraudulent behavior on the part of the lender.

Later on, once you have successfully received an injunction, you can bring the securitization argument in your complaint and make the lender prove their innocence.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

The documents used to initiate the foreclosure of your home have been fraudulently fabricated by either the Trustee or the Lender.

Some attorneys who have explored this cause of action in their civil lawsuits, have been able to get relief for the homeowners by getting the in Temporary Restraining Order and the Injunction granted.

Below please find proof of a very common practice within these entities when they fabricate documents. They use the name of one person who becomes an officer of many entities and the signature is very different in different documents. This has happened in your case too.

This is a portion of our report after thoroughly performing research and discovery for one of our clients: (testimonial letters can be provided upon request after signing a confidentiality agreement).

SIGNED BY: LINDA GREEN AS VICE PRESIDENT FOR AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. AS SUCCESOR IN INTEREST TO OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION

TOO MANY JOBS

For this report, over 500 mortgage assignments were examined.

Each Assignment was filed by Docx, a mortgage servicing company in Alpharetta, GA; each was notarized in Fulton County, GA.

Many of these Assignments have been used in foreclosure actions to prove that the lender has the legal right to file the foreclosure actions.

The name of Linda Green, frequently appears on Docx documents. The following list summarizes some of the many job titles used by Green.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

JOB TITLES HELD BY LINDA GREEN

11-11-2004 & 06-22-2006

Vice President, Loan Documentation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo

Home Mortgage, Inc.

08-11-2008 & 08-14-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

08-27-2008

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

09-19-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

09-30-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

09-30-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

10-08-2009

Vice President & Asst. Secretary, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer for Ameriquest Mortgage Corporation

10-16-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

10-17-2008, 11-20-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

11-20-2008

Vice President, Option One Mortgage Corporation

12-08-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

12-15-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for HLB Mortgage

12-24-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

12-26-2008

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc

01-13-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Family Lending Services, Inc

01-15-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

02-03-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Broker Conduit

02-24-2009

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

02-25-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N A

02-27-2009

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

03-02-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

03-04-2009

Vice President, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC by Citi Residential Lending Inc., attorney-in-fact

03-06-2009 & 03-20-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

04-15-2009, 04-17-2009, 04-20-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

05-11-2009, 07-06-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

07-14-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

07-30-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

08-12-2009

Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation

08-28-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.

09-03-2009

Asst. Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation formerly known as Option One Mortgage Corporation

09-03-2009

Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

09-04-2009

Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

09-08-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

09-21-2009 & 09-22-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

ATTACHED TO THIS DOCUMENT OTHER DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY LINDA GREEN THAT SHOW THE VARIATIONS OF HER SIGNATURE

IT APPEARS AS IF THE SIGNATURE OF MS. GREEN COULD BE A FORGERY.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

A forgery is a writing which falsely purports to be writing for another and is executed with the intent to defraud. Ordinarily a forged instrument cannot carry title.

THE SIGNATURE BELOW IS THE SIGNATURE IN THIS ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST:Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES ARE FROM DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS RECORDEDIN DIFFERENT COUNTIES:

THIS WHOLE SYSTEM IS A FARCE. A BROKEN DOWN, FRAUDULENT, SHAKY, DISHONEST AND TERRIFYINGLY CORRUPT SYSTEM.

The press and the general public is starting to pick up on these major systemic issues that judges, attorneys and other insiders have known about for some time…when the whole system collapses we’ve all got a real mess on our hands.

As we all struggle to unravel this monstrous mess, breaking down capacity will be a key focus in the problem. We’re all going to be searching around to determine who to sue and where to sue them, but because the courts failed to enforce the most basic pleading requirement….i.e. specifically identify who the parties to the lawsuit are, this is going to be most difficult.

One of the persistent and most pervasive problems in the whole foreclosure crisis is the inability of any party to get reliable or credible information about what is owed on a mortgage, who that phantom amount is owed to and what negotiated amount a lender, servicer or other party involved in the transaction might accept to modify or short sale the underlying loan.

A very concerning issue is the publication on the MERS website of information that identifies who the servicer on a loan is and who the investor in that loan is. But, neither the servicer or investor matches up to the information in many cases.

When you combine all this information with the depositions of Robo signers that are posted on many website, you’ll understand that in a large number of cases, the only connection between the plaintiff foreclosing and the mortgage being foreclosed is a sloppy and hastily executed Assignment signed by an officer that has no corporate authority and has no personal knowledge of the information contained on those documents.

It’s simply not okay to use the “robosigning” practice in the non judicial foreclosure states because these foreclosure cases don’t have to go to court.

The following are some of the most clear legal reasons why the Robo-Signer Controversy should entitle hundreds of thousands of homeowners wrongfully foreclosed and evicted to sue in non judicial foreclosure states. Robo Signers are illegal because fraud cannot be the basis of clear title, trustee’s deeds following Robo Signed sales should be void as a matter of law, notarization is a recording requirement for many of the documents, which was often botched, and most importantly because robo signed falsifications are meant for use in court, including unlawful detainers and bankruptcy matters.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

CALIFORNIA

1. Clear Title May Not Derive from a Fraud (including a bona fide purchaser for value).

In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Trout, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 stated:

“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:

“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).

If forged signatures are used to obtain the foreclosure it makes a difference!

2. Any apparent sale based on Robosigned documents or forged signatures should be void and without any legal effect.

In Bank of America v. LaJolla Group II, the California Court of Appeals held that if a trustee is not contractually empowered under the Deed of Trust to hold a sale, it is totally void. Voidness, as opposed to voidability, means that it is without legal effect. Title does not transfer. No right to evict arises. The property is not sold.

In turn, California Civil Code 2934a requires that the beneficiary execute, notarize and record a substitution for a valid Substitution of Trustee to take effect. Thus, if the Assignment of Deed of Trust, the Substitution of Trustee or the Notice of Default are Robo-Signed, the sale should be void.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

3. These documents are not recordable without good notarization.

In California, the reason these documents are notarized in the first place is because otherwise they will not be accepted by the County recorder. Moreover, a notary who helps commit real estate fraud is liable for $25,000 per offense.

Once the document is recorded, however, it is entitled to a “presumption of validity”, which is what spurned the falsification trend in the first place. California Civil Code Section 2924. Therefore, the notarization of a false signature not only constitutes fraud, but is every bit intended as part of a larger conspiracy to commit fraud on the court.

4. The documents are intended for court eviction proceedings.

A necessary purpose for these documents, after the non judicial foreclosure, is the eviction of the rightful owners afterward. Even in California, eviction is a judicial process, albeit summary and often sloppily conducted by judges who don’t really believe they can say no to the pirates taking your house. However, as demonstrated below, once these documents make it into court, the bank officers and lawyers become guilty of felonies:

California Penal Code section 118 provides (a) Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

This subdivision is applicable whether the statement, or the testimony, declaration, deposition, or certification is made or subscribed within or without the State of California.

Penal Code section 132 provides: Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.

The Doctrine of Unclean Hands provides: plaintiff’s misconduct in the matter before the court makes his hands “unclean” and he may not hold with them the pristine remedy of injunctive relief. California Satellite Sys. v Nichols (1985) 170 CA3d 56, 216 CR 180. California’s unclean hands rule requires that the Plaintiff don’t cheat, and behave fairly. The plaintiff must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v Superior Court (1999) 76 CA4th 970, 978, 90 CR2d 743. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact. CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v Jacobson (1998) 65 CA4th 631, 639, 76 CR2d 615.

5. Robo Signed Documents Are Intended for Use in California Bankruptcy Court Matters. One majorly overlooked facet of California is our extremely active bankrtupcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove “standing” to proceed with a foreclosure. If they are not signed by persons with the requisite knowledge, affidavits submitted in bankruptcy court proceedings such as objections to a plan and Relief from Stays are perjured.

The documents in support are often falsified evidence.

CONCLUSION

Verified eviction complaints, perjured motions for summary judgment, and all other eviction paperwork after robo signed non judicial foreclosures in California and other states are illegal and void. The paperwork itself is void. The sale is void. But the only way to clean up the hundreds of thousands of effected titles is through litigation, because even now the banks will simply not do the right thing. And that’s why robo signers count in non-judicial foreclosure states. Victims of robosigners in California may seek declaratory relief, damages under the Rosenthal Act; an injunction and attorneys fees for Unfair Business practices, as well as claims for slander of title; abuse of process, civil theft, and conversion.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

MERS in California

From LivingLies:
I think that everyone is missing the #1 problem MERS has in CA.
MERS is a Non-Authorized Agent and cannot legally assign the Promissory Note, making any foreclosure by other than the original lender wrongful, for the following reasons.
1) Under established and binding Ca law, a Nominee can’t assign the Note. Born V. Koop 1962 200 C. A. 2d 519[200 CalApp2d Page 527, 528
2) On most Notes, the term Nominee is not included and MERS never takes ownership, making it unenforceable and unassignable by MERS.
Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association, 265 F. 2d 643 [647,648
3) Ca Civil Code §2924, et seq. is exhaustive and a Nominee is never included as an acceptable form of “authorized agent” in a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure.
Finally, GOMES V. COUNTRYYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, IS FLAWED!
a) The Gomes case simply failed to address and apply the established and binding definition of a nominee.
b) The first thing the Deed of Trust does is (i) take away MERS right to payments and (ii) take away the right to enforce the Note.
c) REGARDLESS WHAT A BORROWER AGREES TO, a borrower cannot legally grant MERS the right to assign the note or any of the rights of the note owner.
________________________________________
MERS Fatal Flaws
MERS cannot legally assign a Promissory Note because, MERS is a Non-Authorized Agent under Established and Binding California Real Property Law and the borrower can’t provide that power to MERS.
First, a Nominee is someone who is nominated potentially for a future position. Much like being nominated for President, yet a Presidential Nominee doesn’t receive any powers until the person actually becomes President.
Second, in the Deed of Trust MERS is identified “Solely as a Nominee” and as the Beneficiary. Which is logically and legally impossible, because a party can only be either the nominated Beneficiary or the Beneficiary. You can’t “not be” and “be” the beneficiary at the same time.
Third, Ca Civil Code §2924, et seq. is exhaustive and a Nominee is never included as an acceptable form of “authorized agent” in a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure.
Fourth, MERS acts “Solely as a Nominee” for lenders, and under Established California Law a “Nominee” is a “Non-Authorized” form of agent, which fails to comply with California Civil Code §§ 2924 through 2924k, as a nominee inherently lacks the right to enforce or assign, the Note or real property ownership rights, per the following case.
“In Cisco v. Van Lew, 60 Cal.App.2d 575, 583-584, 141 P.2d 433, 438., Cisco could not enforce the land sale contract because he was not a party to it, the court, at pages 583-584, said: “The word ‘nominee’ in its commonly accepted meaning connotes the delegation of authority to the nominee in a representative or nominal capacity only, and does not connote the transfer or assignment to the nominee of any property in or ownership of the rights of the person nominating him.”
Born V. Koop 1962 200 C. A. 2d 519[200 CalApp2d Page 527, 528], see file below
Fifth, in addition to MERS’ inherit lack of authority, MERS is not a party to the Note and the Note fails to use the words, for example “ Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB or Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB Nominee”.
“The purpose of the document in question here was to offer an obligation to Harold L. Shaw alone and not to his nominee or any other person whomsoever.”
Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association, 265 F. 2d 643 [647,648], see file below
Finally, GOMES V. COUNTRYYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, IS FLAWED!
a) The Gomes case simply failed to address and apply the established and binding definition of a nominee.
b) The first thing the Deed of Trust does is (i) take away MERS right to payments and (ii) take away the right to enforce the Note.
c) REGARDLESS WHAT A BORROWER AGREES TO, a “Borrower” cannot legally grant MERS the right to assign the note or any of the rights of the note owner.
“It is no defense to deceit that false statement was made pursuant to some statutory scheme such as statutory procedures for trustee’s sale (§ 2924 et seq.).” Block v. Tobin (App. 1 Dist. 1975) 119 Cal.Rptr. 288, 45 Cal.App.3d 214.

“It is true, as Defendants repeatedly assert, that California Civil Code § 2924, et seq. authorizes non-judicial foreclosure in this state. It is not the case, however, that the availability of a non-judicial foreclosure process somehow exempts lenders, trustees, beneficiaries, servicers, and the numerous other (sometimes ephemeral) entities involved in dealing with Plaintiffs from following the law.” Sacchi vs. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. US Central District Court of California CV 11-1658 AHM (CWx), June 24, 2011
Therefore, without an endorsement on the Note and an assignment directly from the original lender, assignments by MERS; the substitution of the Trustee; and trustee sale are unlawful and void.

“The assignment of the lien without a transfer of the debt was a nullity in law.” (Polhemus v. Trainer, 30 Cal. 685; Peters v. Jamestown Box Co., 5 Cal. 334; Hyde v. Mangan, 88 Cal. 319;
Jones on Pledges, secs. 418, 419; Van Ewan v. Stanchfield, 13 Minn. 75.)
“A lien is not assignable unless by the express language of the statute.”
(Jones on Liens, sec. 982; Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. 343; Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468; Wing v. Griffin, 1 Smith, E.D. 162; Holly v. Hungerford, 8 Pick. 73; Daubigny v. Duval, 5 Tenn. 604.)
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, DAVIS, BELAU & CO. V. NATIONAL SUR. CO., 139 CAL 223, 224 (1903)

“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.”
CARPENTER V. LONGAN, 83 U. S. 271 (1872), U.S. Supreme Court
“California courts have repeatedly allowed parties to pursue additional remedies for misconduct arising out of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale when not inconsistent with the policies behind the statutes”
California Golf, L.L.C. v. Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1053,1070
“(2) Whenever a court becomes aware that a contract is illegal, it has a duty to refrain from entertaining an action to enforce the contract. (3) Furthermore the court will not permit the parties to maintain an action to settle or compromise a claim based on an illegal contract”
Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc., 201 Cal.App.3d 832 (1988)

On April 11th, 2011,
The Honorable Judge Margaret M. Mann made very clear the following,
based upon California Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme court cases:
• Assignments must be recorded before the foreclosure sale
• Recorded assignments are necessary despite MERS’ role
• MERS’s system is not an alternative to statutory foreclosure law
Bankruptcy No: 10-17456-MM13 re: Eleazar Salazar,

see attached below Mann_order_salazar.pdf

2) Nothing under California Civil Code §§ 2924 through 2924k applies, unless there is a legal chain of title for the Deed of Trust with the Note from the original lender to MERS, and then to the foreclosing party.

The First Fatal Flaw – MERS never takes ownership of the underlying Note, Voiding the “Original” Deed of Trust.
Under California Law, the named Beneficiary on the Deed of Trust must have ownership of the underlying Note. MERS consistently claims to be only “Holding the Note” as a Nominee for the original lender, never “Owning the Note”.

Why MERS doesn’t have ownership of the Note:
1. There is no assignment or indorsement of the Note from the original lender to MERS.
2. The Deed of Trust is not a substitute for an Assignment or legal transfer of the Note from the Original lender to MERS.
“It is well established law in the Ninth Circuit that the assignment of a trust deed does not assign the underlying promissory note and right to be paid, and that the security interest is incident of the debt.” Rickie Walker case, see attached
3. MERS is a mortgage exchange not unlike a stock exchange. It allows banks to buy and sell home mortgages much like stock. Stock exchanges don’t own the stock on their exchange, only the investors do.
4. A Nominee in California cannot own the Note,
“The word “nominee” in its commonly accepted meaning, connotes the delegation of authority to the nominee in a representative or nominal capacity only, and does not connote the transfer or assignment to the nominee of any property in or ownership of the rights of the person nominating him.”
Cisco v. Van Lew, 60 Cal.App.2d 575, 583-584, 141 P.2d 433, 438.
5. In California, a Note payable to the original lender is not a bearer instrument, the original lender must indorse or assign the Note to MERS.
See Cal Com. Code §§3109,3201,3203,3204. and Rickie Walker case Order, and P&A pg6 attached below
6. MERS requires that the owner of the Note never claim MERS as a “Note-Owner”
MERS Membership Rule 8 Foreclosure, Section 2(a)(i), page 25, 26, see attached below
7. MERS consistently argues in court that it does not own the promissory notes,
MERS v. NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE No. S-04-786, see attached below
8. Finally, Moeller v. Lien and CCC § 2924 DOES NOT “EXPRESSLY” EXCLUDE
OR SUPERCEDE CA Comercial Code § 3301, OR ANY OTHER CA LAWS!
In the case of California Golf, L.L.C. v. Cooper, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 153, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 850 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008), the Appellate Court held that the remedies of 2924h were not exclusive.
9. U.S. Supreme Court decision, Carpenter v. Longan (Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 21 L.Ed. 313 [1873])):
“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity. Case law in virtually every state follows Carpenter.”

Deed of Trust is also void, without a recorded assignment of the Deed of Trust for each transfer of the Note:
1. MERS Involvement in the loan effectively stripped the deed of trust lien from the land and a foreclosure is not legally possible, Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619 (Mo.App. E.D.,2009), attached below
2. Any assignment of the Deed of Trust & Note from MERS to a successor is void and fraudulent.
RICKIE WALKER CASE, see attached below
Therefore, MERS definition of “Holding the Note” is not the legal equivalent of “Owning the Note”;
California Civil Code section 2924 for foreclosure only applies if MERS owned the note.

The Second Fatal Flaw – MERS tracking system is not a legal chain of title and the debt may be uncollectible.
When a Note is sold, it has to be indorsed the same way you basically sign a check for deposit or cashing.

Under California Law the Note is not a bearer instrument, but an instrument payable only to a specifically identified person, per California Commercial Code §3109; any transfer of the Note requires a legal Negotiation, Endorsement and a physical delivery of the note to the transferee to perfect the transfer, per California Commercial Codes §§3201, 3203, 3204.
see attached Rickie Walker Order.

“MERS Basics “Registration vs. Recording. (PPT Slide)
o MERS is not a system of legal record nor a replacement for the public land records.
o Mortgages must be recorded in the county land records.
o MERS is a tracking system. No interests are transferred on the MERS® System, only tracked.”,
MERS Southeast Legal Seminar – MERS Basics slide 7,
see attached below. or http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=63&table=DownloadFile

“A mortgage note holder can sell a mortgage note to another in what has become a gigantic secondary market. . . . For these servicing companies to perform their duties satisfactorily, the note and mortgage were bifurcated.”
MERSCORP President and CEO, R.K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, Prob.& Prop., Aug. 1997, at p.16, see attached below

Clear Title May Not Derive From A Fraud (including a bona fide purchaser for value).
In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Taylor, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 made as much plain:
“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:
“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).

In Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1231 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 900 P.2d 601], the California Supreme Court concluded that:
“ ‘the antideficiency laws were not intended to immunize wrongdoers from the consequences of their fraudulent acts’ ” and that, if the court applies a proper measure of damages, “ ‘fraud suits do not frustrate the antideficiency policies because there should be no double recovery for the beneficiary.’ ” (Id. at p. 1238.)
Great Article source: http://www.exclusiveforeclosures.net/real-estate-foreclosures/doan-on-%E2%80%9Cproduce-the-note%E2%80%9D/

Therefore, any attempt to collect by other than the original lender may be impossible without a legal chain of title, because MERS tracking system is not a legal chain of title.

Source: https://sites.google.com/site/mersfatalflawsincalifornia/

________________________________________
MERS Defense Flaw
Legal Disclaimer: All information contained on this website is alleged and general in nature, and should not be construed as legal advice or a substitute for legal advice. It was not written by an attorney and should only be reviewed by an attorney.

MERS alleged status as of November 18th, 2010

PROTECTION FROM VOIDABILITY IS ONLY PROVIDED FOR THE YEARS TAXES ARE PAID.

On July 21, 2010 MERS registered with the California Secretary of State.
MERS registration was necessary, and not retroactive for the following reasons:
1. MERS needed to register with the State of California, because MERS is Not a Foreign Lending Institution nor claims to be, therefore California Corporate Code § 191(d) does not exempt MERS from California Corporate Code §2105.
“the court cannot conclude that MERS falls within any of the five enumerated examples of “foreign lending institutions,” and the court declines to address sua sponte whether MERS otherwise satisfies subsection (d).”. . . “the enforcement of any loans by trustee’s sale, judicial process or deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise. . .” “Accordingly, section 191(c)(7) does not exempt MERS’s activity.”
CHAMPLAIE v. BAC, No. 2:09-cv-01316-LKK-DAD (E.D.Cal. 10-22-2009) pg23,24, attached below
As a result of MERS intentional failure from obtaining a certificate of qualification from the California Secretary of State as a “Beneficiary”, including filing returns and paying taxes, MERS is not allowed the right to defend a lawsuit when named as or defending its actions in a “Beneficiary” capacity, pursuant to California Revenue & Taxation Code Section §§ 23301, 23301.6, 23304.1.
“A suspended corporation is not allowed to exercise the powers and privileges of a corporation in good standing, including the right to sue or defend a lawsuit while its taxes remain unpaid”
PERFORMANCE PLASTERING v. RICHMOND AM. HOMES, 153 Cal.App.4th 659 (2007) 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 537
2. MERS must first produce a Certificate of Relief from Voidability for the time prior to July 21, 2010, California Revenue & Tax Code 23305.1 and file with this Superior Court Clerk receipt of payment to the California Secretary of State for taxes and penalties, California Corporations Code §2203(c).
“UMML qualified to transact intrastate business, but failed to pay the necessary fees, penalties and taxes.
The trial court correctly dismissed the complaint without prejudice.”
United Medical Management Ltd. v. Gatto, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1732 – Cal: Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate
“we will dismiss a nonqualified foreign corporation’s appeal if we determine the nonqualified foreign corporation transacted
intrastate business in California.9 (Corp. Code, §§ 2105, 2203.) We believe this approach advances the policies of preventing tax evasion through the even-handed administration of the tax laws, while encouraging qualification of foreign corporations by prohibiting a delinquent corporation from enjoying the privileges of a going concern.”

“9 Pursuant to Corporations Code § 2203, subdivision (c), and as recognized in United Medical, supra, and Mediterranean Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, a nonqualified foreign corporation is prohibited from maintaining an action in state court only until it complies with Corporations Code section 2105, pays to the Secretary of State a penalty of $250 and the fees for filing the required statement, and files with the court clerk receipts substantiating payment of such fees and franchise taxes and any other business taxes. Since the tax liability will be the issue presented to us, we will allow a nonqualified foreign corporation to maintain an action before us if it presents evidence substantiating it has qualified with the Secretary of State and paid the $250 penalty pursuant to Corporations Code section 2203, subdivision (c).”
In the Matter of the Appeal of Reitman Atlantic Corporation, 2001-SBE-002-A, See attached below

3. MERS will very likely cite one of these two cases:
United Medical Management Ltd. v. Gatto 49 Cal.App.4th 1732 (1996),
or Perlas v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Systems, Inc., 2010 WL 3079262 * 7, an unpublished case as of 10/18/2010
Both of which are based upon this case:
“A nonqualified corporation subject to a misdemeanor prosecution and on conviction to a heavy fine for doing business without complying with the law, is permitted to qualify, be restored to full legal competency and have its prior transactions given full effect.” (Tucker v. Cave Springs Min. Corp. (1934) 139 Cal. App. 213, 217 [33 P.2d 871].
So demand MERS filing of receipts and that Certificate of Relief from Voidability!
191 CHAMPLAIE_v_BAC_HOME_LOANS_SERVICING_LP_E_D_Cal_10-22-2009
atto, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1732 – Cal_ Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate Dist., 5th Div. 1996 – Google Scholar
bellistri-v-ocwen

Joseph Born v. Koop
mann-order_salazar
MERS RULES(June2009)
MERS Southeast Legal Seminar (11.10.04) final

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC v. NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE – NE Supreme Court

Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association
Perlas v. MERS
R.K. Arnold, MERS Admits Bifurcation
Reitman Atlantic Corporation BOE
Reitman Atlantic Corporation BOE
Rickie_Walker_P_and_A
RickieWalkerOrder

David and Goliath as court overturns case dissmissal

A Bakersfield homeowner is taking on a bank, in a battle that could have sweeping implications for people facing foreclosure.

Mark Demucha wants Wells Fargo to prove it owns his home loan. And, if his lawsuit is successful, it could set a legal precedent that slows or even stops foreclosures across the state.

“Filled out the same paperwork over and over again.”

Mark Demucha says all he wanted was to keep his house. “Sent it to them over and over again. I couldn’t give you the exact time frame, but it’s ridiculous,” he said.

But, after a year of trying to get a loan modification from Wells Fargo… “I had to do something to protect my family. to protect my home.”

He felt all washed up. “Not yes, not no, not anything. They didn’t respond.”

Demucha turned to family friend Michael Finley who happens to be a lawyer.

“A company that does not have a legal right to collect mortgage payments should not have the right to foreclose,” said Finley.

Now, in a case that could have far-reaching implications, Demucha and Finley say they have one simple request. “If they are going to take my house, I should be able to see they have a legal right to take it from me,” said Demucha. “They come to me and want me to have every single piece of paper I was ever supposed to have. But, when I say ‘hey where is my promissory note?’ they look at me like I’m a thief.”

That’s because Wells Fargo didn’t loan Demucha the money to buy his house. Another company called CTX Mortgage, did.

Banks, at the time, seemed like they were almost using the housing market as a roulette wheel or a craps table. They were shoving debt around like it was a card game.

Like so many millions of homeowners, Demucha’s loan was sold to another lender, a common practice because it’s profitable to the banks.

In the old days, any time ownership of a property and its loan changed hands, it would be recorded at the Hall of Records at a cost of $18. For the mortgage industry, that took too long and on a large scale cost too much money. So they privatized it by creating the mortgage electronic registration system, a company headquartered in Reston, Virginia.

The sole purpose of MERS was to cut out the county clerk, allowing one mortgage company to quickly and electronically transfer a loan to another mortgage company.

On Tuesday, a spokeswoman told 17 News, MERS holds title to about 60% of the country’s home mortgages or about 32 million loans. MERS is basically an electronic handshake between banks, saying we have a deal.

But, MERS has turned into a headache for some lenders as homeowners across the country have successfully challenged the company’s legal standing in court. Others like Demucha are demanding their lender produce loan documents which may have been lost or even destroyed in the MERS shuffle.

“Why should the bank not still be required to possess a single piece of paper that they are the right place to home the consumer should make the payments?”

Earlier this month, a state appellate court agreed, overturning a Kern County judge’s ruling that Wells Fargo could foreclose on the home.

The case is headed back to our county where the same judge will have to decide if Wells Fargo can prove it legitimately holds title to the Demucha’s home.

“I wish I were David and they were Goliath. This would have been an easier fight. They are like an army of Goliaths and I’m like David with his hands tied behind his back,” said Demucha.

Wells Fargo spokesman Tom Goyda couldn’t comment on the specifics of this case but acknowledged the appellate court had sent the case back to the Kern County trial court to rule on several issues. Goyda noted the appeals court did not actually rule on the case and that Wells Fargo would continue to try the case in court.

A spokeswoman for MERS said her company said she couldn’t comment because they are not part of this lawsuit. Demucha and his attorney are basically asking for Wells Fargo to go away and to restore the couple’s credit.

“Wells Fargo essentially ignored them until the fifth district appellate court said Wells Fargo you can’t ignore Mark and Sherry Demucha any more,” said Finley.

The appellate court ruling has arrived back here in Kern County but a hearing has not yet been scheduled.

pending lawsuits and homeowners winnning

Barry Fagan v Wells Fargo Bank and The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) FOIA COVER-UP

http://www.scribd.com/doc/57585259/OCC-Letter-Re-Fagan-v-Wells-Fargo-Bank-Denial-of-Documents-through-FOIA

Ten pages are being withheld by the authority of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(2) and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(8) and 12 C.F.R. 4.12(b)(8), relating to a record contained in or related to an examination,…

Is the notary responsible or at least negligent or at least negligent per se !!!

(1) Notaries Public § 1–Disciplinary Proceedings–Time for Instituting.

Disciplinary action taken by the Secretary of State against a notary public was not barred by the fact that the proceeding was instituted more than three years after the notary’s alleged improper act and more than one year after its discovery. Statutes of limitation barring civil actions brought by aggrieved parties are inapplicable to a disciplinary proceeding of a state administrative agency and there is no specific time limitation statute pertaining to the revocation or suspension of a notary’s commission.

(2a , 2b) Notaries Public § 1–Disciplinary Proceedings–Suspension of Commission–Failure to Faithfully Perform Duties–Gross Negligence.

The Secretary of State properly suspended the commission of a notary public under Gov. Code, § 8214.1, subd. (d), for failure to fully and faithfully perform her duties as a notary public in that she had certified the personal appearance and acknowledgment of a man who in fact did not appear before her. The notary’s attempted characterization of her error as “clerical” was unavailing since she had completely failed to read the certificate before signing it. Such failure was gross negligence and consequently a failure to faithfully perform her notarial duty as a matter of law.

[See Cal.Jur.3d, Notaries Public and Commissioners of Deeds, § 5; Am.Jur.2d, Notaries Public, § 13.]

(3) Statutes § 44–Construction–Aids–

Contemporaneous Administrative Construction.

Though the ultimate interpretation of a statute is a judicial function, a court must accord great respect to the views of the expert administrative body charged with enforcing a particular statute.

(4) Notaries Public § 1–Disciplinary Proceedings–Suspension of Commission–Failure to Maintain Records.

The Secretary of State properly imposed a one-month suspension of a notary public’s commission (to run concurrently with another suspension) for failure to maintain a record of transactions as required by former Gov. Code, § 8206. Retention by the title company that employed the notary of photographic copies of the instruments she certified in a file to which she had access was not a substitute for her obligation to personally maintain separate records. Reasonably interpreted, the former statute required a readily accessible, separate log of official transactions by date rather than the mere retention of photographic copies of all instruments certified or proved.

MERS and invalid assignments

Brand New, Hot Off The Presses MERS Policy Bulletin

July 24th, 2011 | Author:

After years of claiming that assignments don’t matter and the date of assignment certainly doesn’t matter, the MERS Monster has finally changed its tune, effective July 21, 2011:

The Certifying Officer must execute the assignment of the Security Instrument from MERS before initiating foreclosure proceedings or filing Legal Proceedings and promptly send the assignment of the Security Instrument for recording in the applicable public land records

Well, harumph says I…what of all those damn post filing assignments?  What about all them specious arguments made in courtrooms all across this country that said the date of assignment didn’t matter?  What about the absurd argument that an “equitable assignment” had already occurred? (despite the fact that neither the pooling and servicing a agreement nor law permit such assignments)  For foreclosure cases already adjudged this is problematic and for all those hundreds of thousands still pending, this change in policy is exhibit #1 in the argument that a post filing assignment cannot confer standing.

This certainly ain’t “Ding Dong The Witch Is Dead”, it’s just another stanza in “Humpty Dumpty Sat on A Wall”

And all the kings horses and all the kings men couldn’t put Humpty Dumpty back together again.

Humpty Dumpty is our real property recording system that was developed over hundreds of years in this country.  A key read is Hernando Desoto’s “The Mystery of Capital” for a long explanation that our country’s success is tied largely to our real property record system that has been completely obliterated in just a few short years by all this mortgage madness.  What is most astonishing (and the biggest indictment of the whole MERS madness) is the fact that no law, legislation or court decision was ever rendered to justify the MERS system prior to its widespread implementation.  It was merely spread all across this country like a virulent virus that was transmitted and lay dormant in the property records impacting millions of homes all across America.

MERS Policy Bulletin

Ask for a 402 hearing and then dissmiss the eviction !!!

If the court follows the rules of evidence (and they do) if proper objections are filed. No eviction of a secuitized loan should ever prevail on an eviction; they cannot produce the foundation to authenticate the Trustees Deed it is based upon preliminary facts that they are unable and unwilling to bring to court. The Assignments Civil code 2932.5 , The Servicer, The Accounting, The Trustee, MERS, The Robo signer, The person that purportedly contacted the Borrower Trustor, The compliance documents with Civil Code 2924, all these are preliminary facts upon which the admission of the Trustees Deed depend Evidence code 400,401,402,403. Check out this motion !!

Timothy L. McCandless, Esq.  (SBN 147715)

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

Attorney for Defendant,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SOLANO

SOLANO COURT/ LIMITED JURISDICTION

FANNIE MAE et al,

Plaintiff,

v.

Defendant.

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)Case No.:

 

DEFENDANT’S IN LIMINE MOTION TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE (RE:FACIALLY INVALID DEED OF TRUST)

TRIAL DATE:  Tues., June 15, 2010 ) 

To the Court, to Plaintiff FANNIE MAE, and its attorney of record:

            PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on Tuesday, June 15, 2010, at 8:30 AM, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, Defendant, MICHELLE CABESAS, will in limine judicii move the court, and hereby does move, for an order excluding from trial all evidence proffered by Plaintiff FANNIE MAE.

          The motion will be heard in Department  26, at 1:30 p.m. in front of the Honorable Judge Davis  of the Solano Court of the above-captioned court.

The motion will be brought pursuant to Evidence Code sections 353 and 400 et seq., Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(b), and related decisional law.

The ground of the motion will be that the Unlawful Detainer Complaint, together with the publicly-filed “Deed of Trust” that is necessarily incorporated into it, is facially invalid because the  Beneficiary did not have the power of sale. Such irregularities should constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the entire non-judicial foreclosure process. Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale should not be admitted as no lawful basis exists for its execution. Additionally, the Notice of Default, and Notice of Default Declaration should be excluded.

The failure of Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent to perform a condition precedent pursuant to Civil Code Section 2923.5 is fatal. The Notice of Default Declaration fails is several regards, (1) the language of the Notice does not comply with the statute because it does not set forth facts of how the statute was performed; (2) the Declaration is not sworn under penalty of perjury; (3) the only date of the Declaration is the date of execution which is one day prior to the Notice of Default which was recorded only five days later, thus, thirty days did not pass from the date of execution of the Declaration and the date of recordation. As such, under Section 2923.5, the Notice of Default Declaration is void and could not support the recordation of the Notice of Default.  Because the non-judicial foreclosure process is subject to strict scrutiny, and given the material failure of a condition precedent by Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent, the entire non-judicial foreclosure process is invalid.  Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale cannot be admitted into evidence, as no lawful foundation can be laid.

//

DATED:  June 14, 2010.                  ________________________________________

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

By: Timothy P. McCandless, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The court’s records for this case will show that Plaintiff FANNIE MAE filed its Complaint on or about  August 4, 2009.   The apparent foreclosing beneficiary was plaintiff, FANNIE MAE.  [See attachment to Unlawful Detainer Complaint entitled “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale.”]

This motion ensued in its present form, because sufficient time did not remain before trial, in order to permit Defendant CABESAS to bring a regularly-noticed general demurrer or “motion for judgment on the pleadings”.

II.

THE COURT HAS POWER TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE FROM TRIAL, ON GROUNDS ANALOGOUS TO A GENERAL DEMURRER.

            The court has power to consider and grant an objection to all evidence under Evidence Code sections 353 and 400 et seq.  If no cause of action or defense is stated by the respective pleading, then no “factual issue” any longer exists, and therefore no evidence may be admitted on grounds of “relevance” under Evidence Code sections 400 et seq.

It is well established that a party may bring an in limine objection in order to exclude all evidence, as a sort of general demurrer or “motion for judgment on the pleadings”.  “Although not in form a motion, this method of attacking the pleading is identical in purpose to a general demurrer and motion for judgment on the pleadings and is governed by the same rules.  [Citations.]”  5 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd page 386, “Pleading” at §953.  See also 6 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd pages 571-573, “Proceedings Without Trial” at §§272-273.

According to 5 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd page 340, “Pleading” at §899, a “general” demurrer concerns only the defense that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense.  That is precisely what defendant contends here: the Unlawful Detainer Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

III.

THE COURT MUST STRICTLY ENFORCE

THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A FORECLOSURE.

            The harshness of non-judicial foreclosure has been recognized. “The exercise of the power of sale is a harsh method of foreclosing the rights of the grantor.” Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 6 215, citing to System Inv. Corporation v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 153.  The statutory requirements are intended to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of his property Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; accord, Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 503; Lo Nguyen v. Calhoun (6th District 2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 440, and a valid foreclosure by the private power of sale requires strict compliance with the requirements of the statute. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.179; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211 (3d Dist. 1989), reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Bisno v. Sax (2d Dist. 1959) 175 Cal. App. 2d 714, 720.

It has been a cornerstone of foreclosure law that the statutory requirements, intending to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of the property, must be complied with strictly. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182.   “Close” compliance does not count. As a result, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Default is invalid (emphasis added). Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3dDist. 1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash, Door & Mill Co.(3d Dist. 1931) 118 Cal. App. 379.

Additionally, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Trustee Sale is invalid.  Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3d Dist. 1989) 11 208 Cal.App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989). The California Sixth District Court of Appeal observed, “Pursuing that policy [of judicial interpretation], the courts have fashioned rules to protect the debtor, one of them being that the notice of default will be strictly construed and must correctly set forth the amounts required to cure the default.” Sweatt v. The Foreclosure Co., Inc. (1985 – 6th District) 166 Cal.App.3d 273 at 278, citing to Miller v. Cote (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 888, 894 and SystemInv. Corp. v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-153.

The same reasoning applies even to a notice of a trustee’s sale.  Courts will set aside a foreclosure sale when there has been fraud, when the  sale has been improperly, unfairly, or unlawfully conducted, or when there has  been such a mistake that it would be inequitable to let it stand. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Reidy (1940) 15 Cal. 2d 243, 248; Whitman v. Transtate Title Co.(4th Dist. 1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 312, 322-323; In re Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1228.  See also Smith v. Williams (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 617, 621; Stirton v. Pastor (4th Dist. 1960) 177 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234; Brown v. Busch (3d Dist. 1957) 152 Cal.App. 2d 200, 203-204.

If somehow these foreclosing predecessor-in-interest can establish this standing, or right, to extrajudicially foreclose, still it should be prevented from pursuing this eviction action, because such an action, if successful, would result in a wrongful foreclosure, due to the predecessor-in-interest’s exercise of a non-existent extrajudicial power.

IV.

PLAINTIFF, OR PLAINTIFF’S PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST,

DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXTRAJUDICIALLY FORECLOSE

The foreclosing predecessor-in-interest simply did not have the right to foreclose under the subject trust deed, because the notice of default  facially invalid.

The reason why the security instrument is not valid, is because it is facially void        !  A copy of the subject trust deed – a public record!! — is attached hereto.  Further, the trueness of the copy is readily verifiable, since it is a publicly-recorded document.  Clear as daylight, contact with the trustor 30 days prior to the notice was imjpossible. The was no lender MERS is not a lender Plaintiff  did not get the assignment  till 7/8/2009  . The notice of default was recorded 7/31/2009 only 23 days after the assignment.

A trust deed adds a third party, of sorts, namely the beneficiary.  It has been observed that a trust deed naming a purely fictitious person as beneficiary may be void.  Woodward v. McAdam (1894), 101 Cal. 438.  It has been held that a trust deed might be void for uncertainty, where the deed of trust does not name or describe any of the beneficiaries, but only classified them by reference to a common attribute.  Watkins v. Bryant (1891), 91 Cal. 492.  There seems to be no common-sense reason why the same principle should not apply to the designation of the grantee/ trustee, even were the law of deeds not generally applicable to trust deeds.

Beneficiary did not have the power of sale. Such irregularities should constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the entire non-judicial foreclosure process. Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale should not be admitted as no lawful basis exists for its execution. Additionally, the Notice of Default, and Notice of Default Declaration should be excluded.

The failure of Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent to perform a condition precedent pursuant to Civil Code Section 2923.5 is fatal. The Notice of Default Declaration fails is several regards, (1) the language of the Notice does not comply with the statute because it does not set forth facts of how the statute was performed; (2) the Declaration is not sworn under penalty of perjury; (3) the only date of the Declaration is the date of execution which is one day prior to the Notice of Default which was recorded only five days later, thus, thirty days did not pass from the date of execution of the Declaration and the date of recordation. As such, under Section 2923.5, the Notice of Default Declaration is void and could not support the recordation of the Notice of Default.  Because the non-judicial foreclosure process is subject to strict scrutiny, and given the material failure of a condition precedent by Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent, the entire non-judicial foreclosure process is invalid.  Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale cannot be admitted into evidence, as no lawful foundation can be laid.

CONCLUSION

          The Plaintiff’s entire case rests upon the “facial” or “on the public record” legitimacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure by its predecessor-in-interest.  The foreclosure was facially void.  The case should be dismissed, upon the court’s determination that no factual “issue” remains.

Respectfully submitted,

DATED:  June 14, 2010             _______________________________________

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

By: Timothy P. McCandless

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

Judicial Notice ?? not so fast

 All banks love to use judicial notice to establish their position but with all the robo signing the evidence is being excluded.

ROBERT HERRERA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
DEUTSCHE
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BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. C065630.
 Court of Appeals of California, Third District, El Dorado.Filed May 31, 2011.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
 MURRAY, J.
SUMMARY
 Plaintiffs Robert and Gail Herrera lost their house in South Lake Tahoe to a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.They brought suit to set aside that sale. They challenge whether the parties that conducted the sale,defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (the Bank) and California Reconveyance Company(CRC), were in fact the beneficiary and trustee, respectively, under a deed of trust secured by theirproperty, and thus had authority to conduct the sale. Plaintiffs also contend that they are entitled to berepaid for the expenses they incurred in repairing and insuring the property and paying back taxes if defendants are successful in establishing their interest in the property.Defendants moved for summary judgment. In support of their motion, they requested that the trialcourt take judicial notice of recorded documents, including an Assignment of Deed of Trust and aSubstitution of Trustee. Defendants asserted that these documents established the authority of theBank and CRC to conduct the foreclosure sale. Defendants also provided a declaration by a custodian of records for CRC, in which the custodian did not expressly declare that the Bank was the beneficiary andCRC the trustee. Instead, she merely
declared that an Assignment of Deed of Trust and a Substitutionof Trustee had been recorded
and these recorded documents indicated the Bank had been assigned thedeed of trust and that CRC had been substituted as trustee.Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment after the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. They contend defendants failed to carry their burden in moving for summary judgment andthe trial court erred in taking judicial notice of and accepting as true the contents of certain recordeddocuments. We agree and reverse the judgment in part. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the judgment as to the fourth cause of action, plaintiffs’ claim of unjust enrichment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 In June of 2008, plaintiffs purchased the property at 739 Alameda Avenue, South Lake Tahoe (theProperty) at a foreclosure sale. On February 27, 2009, CRC recorded a “Notice of Default and Election toSell [the Property] Under Deed of Trust.” On May 29, 2009, CRC recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale. OnJuly 6, 2009, CRC recorded a Trustee’s Deed upon Sale, showing the Property had been conveyed to theBank, as foreclosing beneficiary. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Bank, CRC and others to set aside thesale, cancel the trustee’s deed, quiet title to the Property, and for unjust enrichment.In the first cause of action, plaintiffs sought to set aside the trustee’s sale. Plaintiffs alleged theypurchased “this run-down, filthy, distressed property” at a foreclosure sale, rehabilitated and repairedthe Property and paid over $4,000 in back property taxes. They had no idea there might be a deed of trust from 2003, as it did not appear in the title search. About a year later, after plaintiffs had completed repair work on the Property, the Bank, “some mega-too-big-to-fail recipient of billions of tax payer dollars” asserted an ownership interest in the Property. The Bank claimed to be the owner of the Property by virtue of a trustee’s deed recorded “by an entity purporting to be the trustee.”
In seeking to set aside the trustee’s sale, plaintiffs alleged that during the year they were the owners of the Property, they never received any notices of assignment of trustee’s deeds or notices of deficiency,nor did they receive any notices of trustee’s sale or trustee’s deeds. They alleged, on information and belief, that “CRC may be, or have been the Trustee, on a purported Trustee’s sale of the subjectproperty, to an entity which may have transferred whatever interest may have been acquired in the trustee’s sale to Defendant Deutsch[e].” Plaintiffs alleged CRC was not the trustee and had no authority to conduct a trustee’s sale, and believed no such sale had taken place. They further alleged any promissory note supporting the 2003 deed of trust was “time barred by the statute” and the maker, if any, “was lulled into believing that no action would be taken to enforce the 2003 [deed of trust] becauseno collection actions were taken within a reasonable time and no legally required notices of deficiency were sent or recorded.”In the second cause of action, plaintiffs sought to cancel the trustee’s deed. Plaintiffs alleged the original promissory note and deed of trust no longer existed and the Bank’s deed was invalid “as it is based solely upon purported copies which have no force and effect.”The third cause of action was to quiet title to the Property. Plaintiffs alleged defendants had no original,verifiable promissory note or deed of trust and had no standing to foreclose. They further alleged all rights, title and interest asserted by defendants “were sublimated into a non-functional `security’ instrument that gives no one entity rights in individual notes and deeds of trust.” No defendant had aninterest in the Property, but they had placed a cloud upon plaintiffs’ title.In the fourth cause of action, entitled unjust enrichment, plaintiffs alleged they had paid back taxes,insured the Property, and repaired deferred maintenance. If defendants were successful in claiming an interest in the Property, plaintiffs wanted to be repaid for their expenditures.The Bank and CRC moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication on each cause of action,contending there was no triable issue of fact as to any of plaintiffs’ claims. They claimed the undispute devidence showed that the loan was in default, the Bank was the beneficiary under the deed of trust and CRC was the trustee. The default was not cured and CRC properly noticed the trustee’s sale. Notice of the sale was sent to plaintiffs and California law did not require the original promissory note to foreclose. The Bank and CRC further contended that to quiet title, plaintiffs must allege tender, or anoffer of tender, of the amount owed. They also contended there was no evidence of unjust enrichment.In support of their motion, defendants requested that the court take judicial notice of certain documents pursuant to Evidence Code sections 451, subdivision (f) and 452, subdivisions (d), (g) and (h).These documents were:(1) the Trustee’s Deed upon Sale recorded August 13, 2008, under which plaintiffs took title to theProperty;(2) a Grant Deed recorded December 13, 2002, showing the transfer of the Property to Sheryl Kotz;(3) the Deed of Trust recorded April 30, 2003, with Sheryl Kotz as trustor and Long Beach MortgageCompany as trustee and beneficiary (the 2003 deed of trust);(4) an Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded February 27, 2009, assigning all interest under the 2003deed of trust to the Bank by JPMorgan Chase Bank, as successor in interest to Washington Mutual Bank,successor in interest to Long Beach Mortgage Company;(5) a Substitution of Trustee recorded February 27, 2009, under which the Bank substituted CRC astrustee under the 2003 deed of trust;(6) a “Notice of Default and Election to Sell [the Property] Under Deed of Trust” recorded February 27,2009;(7) a Notice of Trustee’s Sale under the 2003 deed of trust recorded May 29, 2009; and(8) a Trustee’s Deed upon Sale recorded July 6, 2009, under which the Bank, as foreclosing beneficiary,was the grantee of the Property.
To support their motion, defendants also provided the declaration of Deborah Brignac. Brignac was avice-president of CRC and a custodian of records for CRC. She was one of the custodians of records forthe loan that was the subject of plaintiffs’ complaint. She declared that the CRC loan records were madein the ordinary course of business by persons with a duty to make such records and were made aboutthe time of the events reflected in the records. In April of 2003, “Shelia” [sic] Kotz 2
obtained a $340,000loan from Long Beach Mortgage Company, and the loan was secured by a deed of trust on the Property.The 2003 deed of trust provided for a power of sale if the borrower defaulted and failed to cure thedefault. It also provided that successor trustees could be appointed.Brignac further declared that as of February 26, 2009, $10,970.50 was “owed” on the note.
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An assignment of the 2003 deed of trust was recorded February 27, 2009, indicating the transfer of all interest in the 2003 deed of trust to the Bank. A Substitution of Trustee was recorded the same date.According to Brignac’s declaration, the Bank’s substitution “substitutes the original trustee, Long Beach Mortgage Company for [CRC].”Brignac further declared that a Notice of Default and Election to Sell under Deed of Trust was recorded on February 27, 2009, and copies were sent to plaintiffs on March 4, 2009, as shown in the affidavits of mailing attached to her declaration. A Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded on May 29, 2009. Copies of this notice were mailed to plaintiffs, as shown in the attached affidavits of mailing.
4
The loan was not reinstated. The Property was sold at a trustee’s sale on June 25, 2009. At the time of sale, the total unpaid debt was $336,328.10. At no time before the trustee’s sale did plaintiffs tender the unpaid debt.The Bank and CRC filed a separate statement of undisputed facts setting forth the facts as stated in Brignac’s declaration.In response, plaintiffs admitted the description of the Property and that they purchased it on June 24,2008, at a foreclosure sale; they disputed all of the remaining facts. They asserted that the Brignac declaration was without foundation and contained hearsay and that all of the recorded documents contained hearsay.In their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs began with a diatribe against the”Foreclosure Industry,” asserting the industry operated “as if the Evidence Code, the law of contracts,assignments, deeds of trust and foreclosure are merely optional.” They contended defendants failed tomeet their burden of proof for summary judgment because their request for judicial notice and Brignac’sdeclaration were inadmissible hearsay. They further contended the notice of default and the notice of trustee’s sale failed to meet statutory requirements of California law. Finally, they asserted defendants lacked standing to foreclose because they had not produced even a copy of the promissory note.Plaintiffs moved to strike the declaration of Brignac as lacking foundation and containing hearsay. They also opposed the request for judicial notice. They argued the recorded documents were all hearsay.Citing only the Federal Rules of Evidence and federal case law grounded on the federal rules, plaintiffs argued a court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in a hearsay document. Plaintiffs disputed “virtually everything” in the recorded documents, arguing one can record anything, regardless of its accuracy or correctness.The trial court overruled plaintiffs’ hearsay objections, denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Brignac declaration, granted defendants’ request for judicial notice, and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding no triable issue of material fact. Judgment was entered in favor of the Bankand CRC.
DISCUSSION
I. Law of Summary Judgment and Standard of Review
 A defendant “may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that theaction has no merit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) “A defendant . . . has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of thecause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete
defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to theplaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action ora defense thereto.”(Id.,subd. (p)(2).) “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all thepapers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party isentitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Id.,subd.(c).)”When the defendant moves for summary judgment, in those circumstances in which the plaintiff wouldhave the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must present evidencethat would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that it was more likely than not that thematerial fact was true [citation], or the defendant must establish that an element of the claim cannot beestablished, by presenting evidence that the plaintiff `does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain,needed evidence.'” (Kahn v. EastSide Union High School Dist.(2003)31 Cal.4th 990, 1003.) A defendantmoving for summary judgment must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff doesnot possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001)25Cal.4th 826, 854, fn. omitted.)We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. (Bussv. Superior Court(1997)16 Cal.4th 35, 60.) “Inundertaking our independent review of the evidence submitted, we apply the same three-step analysisas the trial court. [Citation.] First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, we determinewhether the moving party has established facts justifying judgment in its favor. Finally, if the movingparty has carried its initial burden, we decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated theexistence of a triable, material fact issue. [Citation.]”((2002)103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 431-1432 (Bono).)
II. First, Second and Third Causes of Action
 While plaintiffs’ complaint is hardly a model of clarity, it seeks to undo the foreclosure sale. The firstthree causes of action  to set aside the sale, cancel the trustee’s deed and quiet title  claim, amongother things, that the Bank and CRC had no authority to conduct the foreclosure sale. On this point,plaintiffs allege the Bank claims to be the owner of the Property by virtue of a trustee’s deed recorded”by an entity purporting to be the trustee.” They further allege CRC was not the trustee and had noauthority to conduct the sale; the sale did not take place or was improperly held. The first three causesof action of plaintiffs’ complaint are based on the allegations that the Bank had no interest in theProperty and CRC was not the trustee and had no authority to conduct a trustee’s sale. Thus, initialissues framed by the pleadings are whether the Bank was the beneficiary under the 2003 deed of trustand whether CRC was the trustee under that deed of trust. The fourth cause of action for unjustenrichment raises different issues and will be discussed separately in part III. of the Discussion, post.
 Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs’ allegations were not supported bythe undisputed facts. They asserted CRC was the trustee pursuant to the Substitution of Trustee recorded by the Bank as beneficiary under the 2003 deed of trust.To establish that CRC was the trustee and thus had authority to conduct the trustee’s sale, defendants requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the recorded Assignment of Deed of Trust, which showed the Bank was the beneficiary. Defendants also requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the recorded Substitution of Trustee, which showed the Bank, as beneficiary, had substituted CRC as trustee.Matters that may be judicially noticed can support a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (b)(1).) However, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of thedisputed facts contained within the recorded documents. We agree.”`Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.'” (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell , Green, Pekich, Cruz&McCort (2001)91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)
“Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law.” (Evid.Code, §450.) “Matters that are subject to judicial notice are listed in Evidence Code sections 451 and 452. Amatter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute. [Citation.]”(Fremont Indemnity Co. v.Fremont General Cor p.(2007)148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.)”Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or acceptinga particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage(1986)184 Cal.App.3d 369,374.) While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of mattersstated therein. (Love v. Wol f(1964)226 Cal.App.2d 378, 403.) “When judicial notice is taken of adocument, . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.” (StorMedia,Inc. v. Superior Court(1999)20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9 (StorMedia).)This court considered the scope of judicial review of a recorded document in Poseidon Development , Inc.v. Woodland Lane Estates , LLC(2007)152 Cal.App.4th 1106(Poseidon ). “[T]he fact a court may take judicial notice of a recorded deed, or similar document, does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein. [Citation.] For example, the First Substitution recites that Shanley `is thepresent holder of beneficial interest under said Deed of Trust.’ By taking judicial notice of the FirstSubstitution, the court does not take judicial notice of this fact, because it is hearsay and it cannot beconsidered not reasonably subject to dispute.” (Id.
at p. 1117.)The same situation is present here. The Substitution of Trustee recites that the Bank “is the presentbeneficiary under” the 2003 deed of trust. As in Poseidon, this fact is hearsay and disputed; the trialcourt could not take judicial notice of it. Nor does taking judicial notice of the Assignment of Deed of Trust establish that the Bank is the beneficiary under the 2003 deed of trust. The assignment recites thatJPMorgan Chase Bank, “successor in interest to WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, SUCCESSOR IN INTERESTTO LONG BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY” assigns all beneficial interest under the 2003 deed of trust tothe Bank. The recitation that JPMorgan Chase Bank is the successor in interest to Long Beach MortgageCompany, through Washington Mutual, is hearsay. Defendants offered no evidence to establish thatJPMorgan Chase Bank had the beneficial interest under the 2003 deed of trust to assign to the Bank. Thetruthfulness of the contents of the Assignment of Deed of Trust remains subject to dispute (StorMedia,supra,20 Cal.4th at p. 457, fn. 9), and plaintiffs dispute the truthfulness of the contents of all of therecorded documents.Judicial notice of the recorded documents did not establish that the Bank was the beneficiary or thatCRC was the trustee under the 2003 deed of trust. Defendants failed to establish “facts justifying judgment in [their] favor” (Bono ,supra,103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1432), through their request for judicialnotice.Defendants also relied on Brignac’s declaration, which declared that the 2003 deed of trust permittedthe beneficiary to appoint successor trustees. Brignac, however, did not simply declare the identity of the beneficiary and the new trustee under the 2003 deed of trust. Instead, she declared that anAssignment of Deed of Trust and a Substitution of Trustee were recorded on February 27, 2009. Thesefacts add nothing to the judicially noticed documents; they establish only that the documents wererecorded.Brignac further declared that “[t]he Assignment of Deed of Trust indicatesthat JPMorgan Bank [sic],successor in interest to Washington Mutual Bank, successor in interest to Long Beach MortgageCompany, transfers all beneficial interest in connection with the [deed of trust] to Deutsche BankNational Trust Company as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-4.” (Italics added.) Thisdeclaration is insufficient to show the Bank is the beneficiary under the 2003 deed of trust. A supportingdeclaration must be made on personal knowledgeand “show affirmatively that the affiant is competentto testify to the matters stated.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d).) Brignac’s declaration does notaffirmatively show that she can competently testify the Bank is the beneficiary under the 2003 deed of trust. At most, her declaration shows she can testify as to what the Assignment of Deed of Trust
 But the factual contents of the assignment are hearsay and defendants offered no exception to the hearsay rule prior to oral argument to make these factual matters admissible.At oral argument, defendants contended that the recorded documents were actually business records and admissible under the business record exception. We note that Brignac did not provide any information in her declaration establishing that the sources of the information and the manner and time of preparation were such as to indicate trustworthiness. (Evid.Code, § 1271, subd. (d).)5
Information concerning this foundational element was conspicuously lacking.
6
Yet, this information was critical in light of the evidentiary gap establishing the purported assignments from Long Beach Mortgage Company to Washington Mutual Bank to JP Morgan Chase Bank. The records used to generate theinformation in the Assignment of Deed of Trust, if they exist, were undoubtedly records not prepared byCRC, but records prepared by Long Beach Mortgage Company, Washington Mutual and JP Morgan Chase. Defendants have not shown how Brignac could have provided information about the source of that information or how those documents were prepared. (See
Cooley v. Superior Court(2006)140Cal.App.4th 1039[district attorney unable to attest to attributes of subpoenaed records in hispossession relevant to their authenticity and trustworthiness]; Evid.Code, § 1561.) Moreover, the timingof those purported assignments relative to the recording of those events on the Assignment of Deed of Trust cannot be found in the Brignac declaration or anywhere else in the record.We also note that Brignac did not identify either the February 27, 2009 Assignment of Deed of Trust, oranother key document, the February 27, 2009 Substitution of Trustee, as business records in herdeclaration. Rather, she referenced both documents in her declaration by stating that “[a] recordedcopy” was attached as an exhibit. In light of the request for judicial notice, we take this statement tomean that the exhibits represented copies of records on file at the county recorder’s office.
7
On amotion for summary judgment, the affidavits or declarations of the moving party are strictly construedagainst the moving party. (Mann v. Cracchiolo(1985)38 Cal.3d 18, 35 (Mann).) Of course, had thedocuments reflecting the assignments and the substitution been offered as business records, therewould have been no need to request that the court take judicial notice of them. Accordingly, we rejectdefendants’ newly advanced theory.Brignac’s declaration is lacking in yet another way. It is confusing as to the effect of the Substitution of Trustee. She declares, “The Substitution by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for LongBeach Mortgage Loan Trust 2003-4 substitutes the original trustee, Long Beach Mortgage Company forCalifornia Reconveyance Company.” Brignac’s declaration (and defendants’ statement of undisputedfacts) can be read to state that the Bank substituted Long Beach Mortgage Company for CRC as trustee,rather than that CRC was substituted for Long Beach Mortgage Company. We must strictly construe thisstatement against the moving party. (Mann,supra,38 Cal.3d at p. 35.) Even if we were to construeBrignac’s declaration to state that the Bank substituted CRC as trustee under the 2003 deed of trust, itwould be insufficient to establish CRC is the trustee. A declaration that the Substitution of Trustee bythe Bank made CRC trustee would require admissible evidence that the Bank was the beneficiary underthe 2003 deed of trust and thus had the authority to substitute the trustee. As explained ante, defendants failed to provide admissible evidence that the Bank was the beneficiary under the 2003 deedof trust.At oral argument, defendants asserted that plaintiffs’ hearsay objections to their separate statement of facts did not comply with the California Rules of Court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b).) Fromthis, defendants impliedly suggest those objections should be ignored by this court. Whether theobjections complied with the rules of court is of no moment at this juncture. The trial court ruled onthose objections in its order granting summary judgment, stating “Plaintiffs’ hearsay objections areoverruled.” The wording of the court’s order (drafted by defendants) suggests the ruling was made onsubstantive evidentiary grounds, not procedural grounds, and there is no evidence in the record to thecontrary.
Because defendants failed to present facts to establish that the Bank was beneficiary and CRC wastrustee under the 2003 deed of trust, and therefore had authority to conduct the foreclosure sale,triable issues of material fact remain as to the first three causes of action. The trial court erred ingranting summary judgment and it would be error to grant summary adjudication as to any of thosecauses of action.
III. Fourth Cause of Action
 Defendants moved for summary judgment or, alternatively, for summary adjudication as to each causeof action. Accordingly, we consider whether summary adjudication was proper as to the fourth cause of action.The fourth cause of action is entitled “Unjust Enrichment.” Plaintiffs allege that, in the event the Bank issuccessful in asserting its claim to the Property, defendants should pay plaintiffs all monies theyexpended on the Property for back taxes, insurance and deferred maintenance. In their motion forsummary judgment or summary adjudication, defendants contend there can be no claim of unjustenrichment because the Bank had a right to protect its security interest in the Property and it is”inconceivable” CRC was unjustly enriched once plaintiffs defaulted on their obligation.”There is no cause of action for unjust enrichment. Rather, unjust enrichment is a basis for obtainingrestitution based on quasi-contract or imposition of a constructive trust. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law(10th ed. 2005) Contracts, §§ 1015, 1016, pp. 1104-1105.)” (McKell v. Washington Mutual , Inc.(2006)142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1490.) Plaintiffs fail to plead a basis for restitution; they allege only that theyspent money on the Property and they would like the money back if they lose the Property.The fourth cause of action pleads no recognizable legal claim and thus is subject to summaryadjudication. “The procedure for resolving a summary judgment motion  presupposes
that the pleadings are adequate to put in issue a cause of action or defense thereto. [Citation.] However a pleading may be defective in failing to allege an element of a cause of action or in failing to intelligibly identify a defense thereto. In such a case, the moving party need not address a missing element or, obviously, respond to assertions which are unintelligible or make out no recognizable legal claim. The summary judgment proceeding is thereby necessarily transmuted into a test of the pleadings and the summary judgment motion into a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In these circumstances it has been said that adefendant’s `motion for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint and as such is in legal effect a motion for judgment on the pleadings.’ [Citation.]”(FPIDevelopment , Inc. v. Nakashima(1991)231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382.)Since plaintiffs failed to properly plead a right to restitution on the basis of unjust enrichment, the trialcourt did not err in granting summary adjudication as to the fourth cause of action.
DISPOSITION
 The judgment is reversed with directions to vacate the order granting summary judgment and to enter anew order denying summary judgment, and granting defendants summary adjudication of the fourthcause of action only. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule8.278(a)(3).)We concur:RAYE, P. J.NICHOLSON, J.
Footnotes
1. The name of defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company was misspelled “Deutsch” by plaintiffs in the complaint and other filings. We use the correct spelling in our opinion.
Back to Reference
 

One West False statements

False Statements

06/28/2011

California Bankruptcy Judge Laura Stuart Taylor has joined the ranks of judges who will not tolerate fraudulent documents produced by banks to foreclose. Judge Taylor entered an Order To Show Cause why OneWest Bank, FSB, should not incur “a significant coercive sanction intended to deter any future tender of misleading evidence to any court of this district.” Judge Taylor ordered OneWest to appear before her on July 29, 2011, to show cause as to why it should not be subject to compensatory and/or coercive sanctions, in the case In re Jessie M. Arizmendi, Bk. No. 09-19263-PB13, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of California. The case involves a motion for relief from stay filed by OneWest supported with a declaration of Brian Burnett, who declared under penalty of perjury that OneWest was the real party in interest in connection with the Motion because OneWest was the current beneficiary under the terms of a promissory note and Deed of Trust.

According to the Burnett declaration, OneWest received its interest in the Trust Deed pursuant to an Assignment from MERS. The assignment of the Trust Deed and the Note showed the transfer from MERS as nominee for the original lender directly to OneWest in 2010.

At trial, however, OneWest’s witness, Charles Boyle, testified that the beneficiary of the loan was actually Freddie Mac. Based on this conflict, the Court required post-trial briefings.

According to the Court, “OneWest, in its post-trial brief, provided a standing argument based on a new version of the Note, which attached an allonge dated July 24, 2007 evidencing a transfer from Original Lender to IndyMac Bank, FSB and bore an endorsement in blank from IndyMac Bank, FSB. This was new information not presented in the OneWest Declaration and this note was not identical to the note authenticated by the OneWest Declaration and attached to the OneWest Proof of Claim.

This Court is concerned, thus, that OneWest provided false or misleading evidence to the Court and that OneWest did so willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, and/or for an inappropriate purpose.”

According to research by Fraud Digest, Brian Burnett has used many different job titles when signing mortgage-related documents for OneWest, often using different titles on the same day, including:

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Acoustic Home Loans;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Aegis Wholesale Corporation;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for American Brokers Conduit;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Beach First National Bank;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Credit Suisse Financial Corp.;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for CTX Mortgage Company, LLC;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd.;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Express Capital Lending;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Finasure Home Loans, LLC;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for First Magnus Financial Corporation;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for First Meridian Mortgage;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Flick Mortgage Investors, Inc.;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Home Loan Center, Inc. d/b/a LendingTree Loans;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Impac Funding Corp., d/b/a Impac Lending Group;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for IndyMac Bank, FSB;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for LoanCity;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for MortgageIt, Inc.;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for NetBank, a Federal Savings Bank;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for New American Funding, a California Corporation;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Opteum Financial Services, LLC;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for OneWest Bank, FSB;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Quicken Loans, Inc.;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Sloan Mortgage Group, Inc.;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for Taylor, Bean & Whitaker;

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for TM Capital, Inc.

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for d/b/a Fedfirst Mortgage Corporation; and

– Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as Nominee for UBS AG.

July 29, 2011, may be the day that Brian Burnett and OneWest are held accountable for the thousands of mortgage assignments – with false statements regarding the history and ownership of mortgages – presented to courts to foreclose.

What’s an Allonge anyway ??? thanks Jake

Do We Have a Fraud Problem? The Case of the Mysteriously Appearing Allonge posted by Adam Levitin I have generally been willing to give mortgage servicers, servicer support shops (like LPS), and foreclosure attorneys the benefit of the doubt when it comes to documentation irregularities (to put it mildly) in foreclosures. My working assumption up to this point has been that the documentation problems have been a function of corner cutting with securitization based on the assumptions that (1) the loans would perform better than they did and (2) those that defaulted would result in default judgments in foreclosure, so no one would ever notice the problems. I’ve also assumed that lack of capacity has played a critical role in problems in the default management chain–the system is held together by Scotch tape at this point. In other words, the problems in the system weren’t caused by malice.

I got some grief about this from people down in the trenches when I posted a comment about this a couple of weeks ago. And I was tempted to write it off as a function of litigants being too close to their cases. But a document I read today is making me rethink these assumptions. Here is an order from a Florida court that makes me start to wonder if we might have a serious fraud problem going on with blank endorsements and allonges.

To be sure, one data point isn’t an epidemic, but servicing is an industry where things tend to happen en masse. As Obi-Wan Kenobi

explains:

Obi-Wan: “A fighter that size couldn’t get this deep into space on its own.”

Luke: “Yeah, he must have gotten lost, been part of a convoy or something.”

Han: “Well, he ain’t going to be around long enough to tell anyone about us.”

Luke: “Look at him. He’s headed for that small moon.”

Han: “I think I can get him before he gets there. He’s almost in range.”

Obi-Wan: “That’s no moon. It’s a space station.”

Han: “It’s too big to be a space station.”

Luke: “I have a very bad feeling about this.”

Obi-Wan: “Turn the ship around.”

Han: “Yeah, I think your right. Full reverse! Chewie, lock in the auxiliary power.”

To start with, let me explain endorsements and allonges. And endorsement (or indorsement) is a signature on an instrument for the purpose of transferring rights in the instrument. (See UCC 3-204 for more details.) They work the same with notes as with checks and are governed by the same law. There are three types of endorsements. There are endorsements in blank–just your signature, nothing more (e.g., Adam J. Levitin), and special endorsements (Adam J. Levitin to Katherine Porter), and restrictive endorsements (Adam J. Levitin, for deposit only in Safe’n’Sound Bank).

A blank endorsement (by the instrument’s payee, of course) turns the instrument into bearer paper. That means it’s like cash. Whoever physically possesses the note, including a theif, can enforce it against the maker. And as a recent 9th Circuit BAP opinion, In re Veal (about which I hope to blog more) noted (fn 25), bearer paper has long had lots of nefarious associations (I would add Godfather III to the bearer bonds movie list in that note). In contrast, a special endorsement limits who can enforce the note; only the specially noted endorsee has rights in that note and can enforce it (they could transfer it to someone else, but that’s another matter).

Now allonges.  An allonge isn’t a delicious throat-soothing lozenge from Switzerland. It’s a piece of paper that goes a-long with the note. The allonge is basically an overflow sheet for extra endorsements. Frankly, no one should ever be using an allonge if there is room for an endorsement on the original note. Yes, it’s easier to print on the allonge, but allonges create evidentiary problems, namely that it can be difficult to tell when the endorsement on the allonge was done or if the allonge is even meant to go with that particular note. And I’m not sure what the evidentiary weight of an affidavit or testimony on this point could possibly be. Unless the affiant or witness has some basis for knowing that this particular allonge goes with this particular note (“I distinctly remember the peculiar coffee stain on both pieces of paper–it looked like Karl Malden’s nose”), then there’s little probative value from the affidavit or testimony.

The law on allonges is not particularly well-developed. The 1951 version of the UCC, in force in NY and South Carolina (I think), covers them in section 3-202, but the current version does not. The old version of the UCC required that allonges be “firmly attached.”

That requirement seems to have been fulfilled via pasting or gluing and maybe stapling. Query whether paper clip or rubber band or simply in the same folder will suffice. I’m not sure why any of them would.

None of these methods answers the question of when the allonge was created. I can paste or rubberband the day of trial. There’s a smidgen of state law on this, but it hasn’t been a major issue previously.

Which brings us to BONY v. Faulk. In this case, the foreclosure filing included a 3 page note. The note lacked endorsements connecting the originator to BONY as trustee for the foreclosing securitziation trust. This set up a motion to dismiss on the grounds that BONY didn’t have any right to do anything–it had no connection with the note.

But wait!  Suddenly BONY’s attorney tells the court that she is in possession of the fourth page of the note, which includes a blank endorsement. Puhlease…  What a ridiculous deus ex machina ending.

Are we do believe that this attorney filed 3 pages of the note, but not the 4th? If so, I sure hope she’s not billing for that screw up.

But here’s what perplexes me. Suppose that an allonge is produced. How are we going to know when that allonge was created or that it even relates to the note in question? (Just so everyone’s clear–if the endorsement were created later, then BONY as trustee for CWABS 2006-13 trust had no standing at the time the action was filed because the trust didn’t own the note at that time.) How do we know that this attorney isn’t engaged in fraud on the court (and a host of other violations of state and federal law)?

And this isn’t even getting into the question of whether the PSA at issue requires specific endorsements, not endorsements in blank. As it turns out that’s a problem in this particular case. Here’s the PSA for CWABS 2006-13 trust.  Section 2.01(g)(1) provides that the Depositor deliver to the trustee:

the original Mortgage Note, endorsed by manual of facsimile signature in blank in the following form: “Pay to the order of _______ without recourse”, with all intervening endorsements that show a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the Person endorsing the Mortgage Note…

As an aside, let me point out that “endorsement…in blank” does not mean endorsed in blank in the UCC sense. In the UCC sense, endorsed in blank simply means the endorser’s signature, just as you might put on the back of a check before depositing it. Here, it means endorsed with a blank for the endorsee’s name.  Critically, this PSA requires a complete chain of endorsement with all intervening endorsements. A single endorsement in blank ain’t gonna do it if this PSA means anything. And there were a lot of MBS investors who assumed that it was going to be followed.

I think this PSA just puts the attorney in an even worse place. The only way there should be a separate blank endorsement page is if there was non-compliance with the PSA. Are we really to believe that happened? (Well, yes, but the attorney can’t really argue that BONY generally doesn’t comply with its duties as trustee, now can she?)

We’ve already seen pretty shocking evidence of documentation fraud in foreclosures.  Remember that the robosigning scandal was the by-product of depositions that aimed to show backdating of assignments to trusts. The shame of the robosigning press coverage was that it focused on some shmucks signing 10,000 assignments in a month–which didn’t necessarily produce any harm itself, just carpal tunnel syndrome–and overlooked the really quite serious criminal problem of the backdating of assignments. The depositions showed pretty clearly that there was backdating–the notarizations were by notaries who didn’t have their commissions until a couple of years subsequent or were done on Christmas Day, etc.

Document fraud in the mortgage industry is nothing new. It’s appeared in all flavors and sizes for centuries. The laws of negotiability are first and foremost evidentiary laws meant to protect against fraud.

Negotiable instruments are reified obligations–the instrument itself is the right to payment (UCC 3-203, cmt. 1).  That means that one can sue on either the instrument or on the underlying contract (but Statute of Frauds might require some writing for enforceability). I hope that courts will recognize that real serious potential for fraud that exists when one combines endorsements in blank with allonges and start demanding (1) that the complete note be filed with the original filing and (2) that anyone using an allonge prove that the allonge goes with the note in question. I think we’ve passed the point were there can be any assumptions of good faith and fair dealing.

I’d be curious to hear if any foreclosure defense attorneys have been pushing on the evidentiary status of allonges–namely what proof beyond a staple or the like is there that an allonge goes with a particular mortgage and wasn’t just photocopied from another one.

And yes, this sort of evidentiary scrutiny adds huge costs to the system. But it would be pretty easily avoided if PSAs had been followed in the first place–there was a reason that they required complete, unbroken chains of endorsement.

June 16, 2011 at 8:43 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity

Adam J. Levitin

Associate Professor of Law

A.B. Harvard; A.M., M.Phil. Columbia; J.D. Harvard

Address:

600 New Jersey Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20001-2075

Office Location:  Hotung 6022

Office Phone:  202.662.9234

Office Fax:  202.662.4030

e-mail (preferred contact method): adam.levitin<at>law.georgetown.edu

(replace the <at> with the @ sign in the e-mail)

Assistant:  Terican Gross

Phone:  202.662.9485

Blog:  http://www.creditslips.org

*Please note that I do not provide personal legal advice, including on credit card and mortgage foreclosure issues.*

Biography

Professor Levitin specializes in bankruptcy, commercial law, and financial regulation.  His research focuses on consumer and housing finance, payments, and debt restructuring.

Before joining the Georgetown faculty, Professor Levitin practiced in the Business Finance & Restructuring Department of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in New York and served as law clerk to the Honorable Jane Richards Roth on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  While at Georgetown, he has served as Special Counsel to the Congressional Oversight Panel and as the Robert Zinman Scholar in Residence at the American Bankruptcy Institute.

Professor Levitin holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, an M.Phil and an A.M. from Columbia University, and an A.B. from Harvard College, all with honors.

Jake Naumer

Resolution Advisors

3187 Morgan Ford

St Louis Missouri 63116

314 961 7600

Fax Voice Mail 314 754 9086

current rulings on wrongful foreclosure

20.  TIME:  9:00   CASE#: MSC11-00162

 CASE NAME: CHRISTINA PENNES  vs.  PNC MORTGAGE

 HEARING ON DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of PENNES

 FILED BY PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

* TENTATIVE RULING: *

 

 

Defendant PNC Bank, N.A.’s Demurrer to each cause of action within the Complaint is sustained with leave to amend in part and without leave to amend in part. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., section 430.10, subd. (e).)

 

1st cause of action for Cancellation of Instruments (Assignment of Deed of Trust), 2nd cause of action for Cancellation of Instruments (Notice of Default), and  3rd cause of action for Cancellation of Instruments (Notice of Default), sustained with leave to amend. Actions to remove a cloud on title, under Civil Code section 3412, are equitable in nature, and differ from actions to quiet title in that they are aimed at a particular instrument or piece of evidence. Reiner v. Danial (1989) 211 Cal. App. 3d 682, 689.  To state a cause of action to remove a cloud, instead of pleading in general terms that the defendant claims an adverse interest, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, facts showing actual invalidity of the apparently valid instrument or piece of evidence. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, sections 671-674, pp. 97-99.) Plaintiffs have not met this burden. See Complaint par 20, Ex D. See also, Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 1154-55 [under Civ C  section 2924(a)(1), a trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents, may initiate the foreclosure process. Nowhere, however, does the statute provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized, and the court saw no ground for implying such an action, which would have been inconsistent with the policy behind nonjudicial foreclosure of providing a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy.]

 

4th cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, sustained with leave to amend. The elements of a common-law cause of action for damages for wrongful foreclosure are:  (1) Trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of real property; (2) pursuant to a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed of trust; and (3) the Trustor or mortgagor sustained damages. (Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7; see 4 Witkin, Sum. Of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Secured Transactions in Real Property, §168.)

The Plaintiffs  do not allege that the foreclosure sale has taken place. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to plead a necessary element of this cause of action.

 

5th cause of action for violation of UCL,  and 8th caused of action for violation of Rosenthal Debt Collection Practices Act [Civ C section 1788], sustained without leave to amend. California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice. (B&P Code section 17200.)  The broad scope of the statute encompasses both anti-competitive business practices and practices injurious to consumers. (Cel‑Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.)

This cause of action is based in part upon the 8th cause of action for violation of the Rosenthal Debt Collection Practices Act [Civ C § 1788.]

The Rosenthal Debt Collection Practices Act [RDCPA] prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive and unfair practices in the collection of consumer debts.  (Civ. Code  section 1788, et. Seq.)  Consumer debt is statutorily defined as money, property or the equivalent owed by reason of a consumer credit transaction, which in turn is defined as a transaction in which property, etc. is acquired on credit for personal, family or household purposes. Cal. Civ. Code  section 1788.2(b), (e)-(f), (h).  There are no California State Court opinions to date applying this statute to the enforcement of deeds of trust or to foreclosure proceedings.

 

6th cause of action for quiet title, sustained with leave to amend:

To state a claim for quiet title,  the complaint shall be verified. CCP section 761.020.  The Complaint is not verified.  Additionally, in order to quiet title, plaintiff  must tender the entire outstanding principal.  See, e.g., Aguilar v. Bocci (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 475, 477 [Plaintiff cannot quiet title without discharging his debt; the cloud upon his title persists until the debt is paid.]

 

7th cause of action for rescission, sustained without leave to amend. To state a claim for contract rescission, plaintiff must allege some grounds for rescission-fraud, mistake, coercion, etc. (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b).) plaintiffs do not meet hits pleading burden.

Plaintiffs Opposition does not address this cause of action, therefore, they concede that it has no merit.

 

9th cause of action for  violation of Civ C § 2923.5, sustained with leave to amend:

Actual contact is not required. See, Civil Code section 2923.59(g). Additionally, the only remedy for a Section 2923.5 violation is a postponement of the foreclosure sale to enable the defendants to comply with the requirements of the statute — not a claim for damages. (Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 235.)

The Plaintiffs do not allege that a foreclosure sale date has been noticed.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted. (Evid. Code, section 452(c)[public records].

 

In light of the ruling on the general demurrer, the special demurrer is moot. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., section 430.10, subd. (f).)

 
 21.  TIME:  9:00   CASE#: MSC11-00162

 CASE NAME: CHRISTINA PENNES  vs.  PNC MORTGAGE

 HEARING ON MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT

 FILED BY PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

* TENTATIVE RULING: *

 

In llight of the ruling on the general demurrer, the Motion to Strike is moot.

 

Wrongful foreclosure and California Judge Firmat

Orange County (Cali) Superior Court Judge Firmat posted these notes on
the law and motion calendar to assist attorneys pleading various
theories in wrongful foreclosure cases etc.  Some interesting
points….

FOOTNOTES TO DEPT. C-15 LAW AND MOTION CALENDARS

Note 1 – Cause of Action Under CCC § 2923.5, Post Trustee’s Sale –
There is no private right of action under Section 2923.5 once the
trustee’s sale has occurred.  The “only remedy available under the
Section is a postponement of the sale before it happens.”  Mabry v.
Superior  Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 235 (2010).

Note 2 – Cause of Action Under CCC § 2923.6 – There is no private
right of action under Section 2923.6, and it does not operate
substantively.  Mabry v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208,
222-223 (2010).  “Section 2923.6 merely expresses the hope that
lenders will offer loan modifications on certain terms.”  Id. at 222.

Note 3 – Cause of Action for Violation of CCC §§ 2923.52 and / or
2923.53 – There is no private right of action.  Vuki v. Superior
Court, 189 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795 (2010).

Note 4 –  Cause of Action for Fraud, Requirement of Specificity – “To
establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must
prove: (1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an
important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the
defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant
made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and
without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the
plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably
relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and, (7)
the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representation was a
substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. Each element
in a cause of action for fraud must be factually and specifically
alleged. In a fraud claim against a corporation, a plaintiff must
allege the names of the persons who made the misrepresentations, their
authority to speak for the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they
said or wrote, and when it was said or written.”  Perlas v. GMAC
Mortg., LLC, 187 Cal. App. 4th 429, 434 (2010) (citations and
quotations omitted).

Note 5 –Fraud – Statute of Limitations- The statute of limitations for
fraud is three years.  CCP § 338(d).  To the extent Plaintiff wishes
to rely on the delayed discovery rule, Plaintiff must plead the
specific facts showing (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2)
the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable
diligence.”  Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 808
(2005).

Note 6 – Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation – “The
elements of negligent misrepresentation are (1) the misrepresentation
of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for
believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance
on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.  While there is some
conflict in the case law discussing the precise degree of
particularity required in the pleading of a claim for negligent
misrepresentation, there is a consensus that the causal elements,
particularly the allegations of reliance, must be specifically
pleaded.”  National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge
Integrated Services Group, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 35, 50 (2009)
(citations and quotations omitted).

Note 7 – Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Lender –
“Absent special circumstances a loan transaction is at arm’s length
and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and
lender. A commercial lender pursues its own economic interests in
lending money. A lender owes no duty of care to the borrowers in
approving their loan. A lender is under no duty to determine the
borrower’s ability to repay the loan. The lender’s efforts to
determine the creditworthiness and ability to repay by a borrower are
for the lender’s protection, not the borrower’s.”  Perlas v. GMAC
Mortg., LLC, 187 Cal. App. 4th 429, 436 (2010) (citations and
quotations omitted).

Note 8 – Cause of Action for Constructive Fraud – “A relationship need
not be a fiduciary one in order to give rise to constructive fraud.
Constructive fraud also applies to nonfiduciary “confidential
relationships.” Such a confidential relationship may exist whenever a
person with justification places trust and confidence in the integrity
and fidelity of another. A confidential relation exists between two
persons when one has gained the confidence of the other and purports
to act or advise with the other’s interest in mind. A confidential
relation may exist although there is no fiduciary relation ….”
Tyler v. Children’s  Home Society, 29 Cal. App. 4th 511, 549 (1994)
(citations and quotations omitted).

Note 9 – Cause of Action for an Accounting – Generally, there is no
fiduciary duty between a lender and borrower.  Perlas v. GMAC Mortg.,
LLC, 187 Cal. App. 4th 429, 436 (2010).  Further, Plaintiff (borrower)
has not alleged any facts showing that a balance would be due from the
Defendant lender to Plaintiff.  St. James Church of Christ Holiness v.
Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 2d 352, 359 (1955).  Any other duty to
provide an accounting only arises when a written request for one is
made prior to the NTS being recorded.  CCC § 2943(c).

Note 10 – Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing – “[W]ith the exception of bad faith insurance
cases, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing permits
a recovery solely in contract.  Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood
Apartments, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1054 (2009).  In order to state a
cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing, a valid contract between the parties must be alleged.
The implied covenant cannot be extended to create obligations not
contemplated by the contract.  Racine & Laramie v. Department of Parks
and Recreation, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1031-32 (1992).

Note 11 – Cause of Action for Breach of Contract – “A cause of action
for damages for breach of contract is comprised of the following
elements: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages
to plaintiff. It is elementary that one party to a contract cannot
compel another to perform while he himself is in default. While the
performance of an allegation can be satisfied by allegations in
general terms, excuses must be pleaded specifically.”  Durell v. Sharp
Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1367 (2010) (citations and
quotations omitted).

Note 12 – Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief – Injunctive relief is
a remedy and not a cause of action.  Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC,
179 Cal. App. 4th 1177, 1187 (2009).

Note 13 – Cause of Action for Negligence – “Under the common law,
banks ordinarily have limited duties to borrowers. Absent special
circumstances, a loan does not establish a fiduciary relationship
between a commercial bank and its debtor. Moreover, for purposes of a
negligence claim, as a general rule, a financial institution owes no
duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the
loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as
a mere lender of money. As explained in Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank
Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 334, 277 Cal.Rptr.
753, “[a] commercial lender is not to be regarded as the guarantor of
a borrower’s success and is not liable for the hardships which may
befall a borrower. It is simply not tortious for a commercial lender
to lend money, take collateral, or to foreclose on collateral when a
debt is not paid. And in this state a commercial lender is privileged
to pursue its own economic interests and may properly assert its
contractual rights.”  Das v. Bank of America, N.A., 186 Cal. App. 4th
727, 740-741 (2010) (citations and quotations omitted).

Note 14 – Cause of Action to Quiet Title – To assert a cause of action
to quiet title, the complaint must be verified and meet the other
pleading requirements set forth in CCP § 761.020.

Note 15 – Causes of Action for Slander of Title – The recordation of
the Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee’s Sale are privileged
under CCC § 47, pursuant to CCC § 2924(d)(1), and the recordation of
them cannot support a cause of action for slander of title against the
trustee.  Moreover, “[i]n performing acts required by [the article
governing non-judicial foreclosures], the trustee shall incur no
liability for any good faith error resulting from reliance on
information provided in good faith by the beneficiary regarding the
nature and the amount of the default under the secured obligation,
deed of trust, or mortgage. In performing the acts required by [the
article governing nonjudicial foreclosures], a trustee shall not be
subject to [the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act].”  CCC §
2924(b).

Note 16 – Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code § 1632 – Section
1632, by its terms, does not apply to loans secured by real property.
CCC § 1632(b).

Note 17 – Possession of the original promissory note – “Under Civil
Code section 2924, no party needs to physically possess the promissory
note.” Sicairos v. NDEX West, LLC, 2009 WL 385855 (S.D. Cal. 2009)
(citing CCC § 2924(a)(1); see also Lomboy v. SCME Mortgage Bankers,
2009 WL 1457738 * 12-13 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Under California law, a
trustee need not possess a note in order to initiate foreclosure under
a deed of trust.”).

Note 18 – Statute of Frauds, Modification of Loan Documents – An
agreement to modify a note secured by a deed of trust must be in
writing signed by the party to be charged, or it is barred by the
statute of frauds.  Secrest v. Security Nat. Mortg. Loan Trust 2002-2,
167 Cal. App. 4th 544, 552-553 (2008).

Note 19 – Statute of Frauds, Forebearance Agreement – An agreement to
forebear from foreclosing on real property under a deed of trust must
be in writing and signed by the party to be charged or it is barred by
the statute of frauds.  Secrest v. Security Nat. Mortg. Loan Trust
2002-2, 167 Cal. App. 4th 544, 552-553 (2008).

Note 20 – Tender – A borrower attacking a voidable sale must do equity
by tendering the amount owing under the loan.  The tender rule applies
to all causes of action implicitly integrated with the sale.  Arnolds
Management Corp. v. Eischen, 158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 579 (1984).

Note 21 – Cause of Action for Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 –
“The UCL does not proscribe specific activities, but broadly prohibits
any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising. The UCL governs
anti-competitive business practices as well as injuries to consumers,
and has as a major purpose the preservation of fair business
competition. By proscribing “any unlawful business practice,” section
17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful
practices that the unfair competition law makes independently
actionable.  Because section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it
establishes three varieties of unfair competition-acts or practices
which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent. In other words, a
practice is prohibited as “unfair” or “deceptive” even if not
“unlawful” and vice versa.”  Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.,
160 Cal. App. 4th 638, 643-644 (2008) (citations and quotations
omitted).

“Unfair” Prong

[A]ny finding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 [must]
be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some
actual or threatened impact on competition. We thus adopt the
following test: When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury
from a direct competitor’s “unfair” act or practice invokes section
17200, the word “unfair” in that section means conduct that threatens
an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or
spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or
the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly
threatens or harms competition.

Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.,
20 Cal. 4th 163, 186-187 (1999).

“Fraudulent” Prong

The term “fraudulent” as used in section 17200 does not refer to the
common law tort of fraud but only requires a showing members of the
public are likely to be deceived. Unless the challenged conduct
targets a particular disadvantaged or vulnerable group, it is judged
by the effect it would have on a reasonable consumer.

Puentes, 160 Cal. App. 4th at 645 (citations and quotations
omitted).

“Unlawful” Prong

By proscribing “any unlawful” business practice, Business and
Professions Code section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and
treats them as unlawful practices that the UCL makes independently
actionable. An unlawful business practice under Business and
Professions Code section 17200 is an act or practice, committed
pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by
law. Virtually any law -federal, state or local – can serve as a
predicate for an action under Business and Professions Code section
17200.

Hale v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 1382-1383 (2010)
(citations and quotations omitted).

“A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes
must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the
statutory elements of the violation.”  Khoury v. Maly’s of California,
Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 619 (1993) (citations and quotations
omitted).

Note 22 – Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress –  Collection of amounts due under a loan or restructuring a
loan in a way that remains difficult for the borrower to repay is not
“outrageous” conduct.  Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d
465, 486 (1989).

Note 23 – Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress – Emotional distress damages are not recoverable where the
emotional distress arises solely from property damage or economic
injury to the plaintiff.  Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux, 134 Cal. App. 4th
1220, 1229 (2005).

Note 24 – Cause of Action for Conspiracy – There is no stand-alone
claim for conspiracy.  Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia
Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 510-511 (1994).

Note 25 – Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief – A claim for
declaratory relief is not “proper” since the dispute has crystallized
into COA under other theories asserted in other causes of actions in
the complaint.  Cardellini v. Casey, 181 Cal. App. 3d 389, 397-398
(1986).

Note 26 – Cause of Action for Violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Acts – Foreclosure activities are not considered “debt
collection” activities.  Gamboa v. Trustee Corps, 2009 WL 656285, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. March 12, 2009).

Note 27 – Duties of the Foreclosure Trustee – The foreclosure
trustee’s rights, powers and duties regarding the notice of default
and sale are strictly defined and limited by the deed of trust and
governing statutes.  The duties cannot be expanded by the Courts and
no other common law duties exist.  Diediker v. Peelle Financial Corp.,
60 Cal. App. 4th 288, 295 (1997).

Note 28 – Unopposed Demurrer – The Demurrer is sustained [w/ or w/o]
leave to amend [and the RJN granted].  Service was timely and good and
no opposition was filed.
Failure to oppose the Demurrer may be construed as having abandoned
the claims.  See, Herzberg v. County of Plumas, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1,
20 (2005) (“Plaintiffs did not oppose the County’s demurrer to this
portion of their seventh cause of action and have submitted no
argument on the issue in their briefs on appeal.  Accordingly, we deem
plaintiffs to have abandoned the issue.”).

Note 29 – Responding on the Merits Waives Any Service Defect – “It is
well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion
and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of
any defects or irregularities in the notice of the motion.”  Tate v.
Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 3d 925, 930 (1975) (citations omitted).

Note 30 – Unargued Points – “Contentions are waived when a party fails
to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority.”
Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 1215
(2003).

Note 31 – Promissory Estoppel – “The doctrine of promissory estoppel
makes a promise binding under certain circumstances, without
consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given
in exchange. Under this doctrine a promisor is bound when he should
reasonably expect a substantial change of position, either by act or
forbearance, in reliance on his promise, if injustice can be avoided
only by its enforcement. The vital principle is that he who by his
language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise
have done shall not subject such person to loss or injury by
disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. In such a case,
although no consideration or benefit accrues to the person making the
promise, he is the author or promoter of the very condition of affairs
which stands in his way; and when this plainly appears, it is most
equitable that the court should say that they shall so stand.”  Garcia
v. World Sav., FSB, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1039-1041 (2010)
(citations quotations and footnotes omitted).

Note 32 – Res Judicata Effect of Prior UD Action – Issues of title are
very rarely tried in an unlawful detainer action and moving party has
failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that the title issue was
fully and fairly adjudicated in the underlying unlawful detainer.
Vella v. Hudgins, 20 Cal. 3d 251, 257 (1977).  The burden of proving
the elements of res judicata is on the party asserting it.  Id. The
Malkoskie case is distinguishable because, there, the unlimited
jurisdiction judge was convinced that the title issue was somehow
fully resolved by the stipulated judgment entered in the unlawful
detainer court.  Malkoskie v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 188 Cal. App.
4th 968, 972 (2010).

Note 33 – Applicability of US Bank v. Ibanez – The Ibanez case, 458
Mass. 637 (January 7, 2011), does not appear to assist Plaintiff in
this action.  First, the Court notes that this case was decided by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, such that it is persuasive authority, and
not binding authority.  Second, the procedural posture in this case is
different than that found in a case challenging a non-judicial
foreclosure in California.  In Ibanez, the lender brought suit in the
trial court to quiet title to the property after the foreclosure sale,
with the intent of having its title recognized (essentially validating
the trustee’s sale).  As the plaintiff, the lender was required to
show it had the power and authority to foreclose, which is
established, in part, by showing that it was the holder of the
promissory note.  In this action, where the homeowner is in the role
of the plaintiff challenging the non-judicial foreclosure, the lender
need not establish that it holds the note.

Note 34 – Statutes of Limitations for TILA and RESPA Claims – For TILA
claims, the statute of limitations for actions for damages runs one
year after the loan origination.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).  For actions
seeking rescission, the statute of limitations is three years from
loan origination.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).  For RESPA, actions brought
for lack of notice of change of loan servicer have a statute of
limitation of three years from the date of the occurrence, and actions
brought for payment of kickbacks for real estate settlement services,
or the conditioning of the sale on selection of certain title services
have a statute of limitations of one year from the date of the
occurrence.  12 U.S.C. § 2614.

linda green robo signer notary fraud complaint

If Linda Green or any of the other docx companies signed any of your assignments or substitution of trustee this might be your complaint:

mccandlessrobosignercomplaintlindagreenrobo signer

Timothy L. McCandless, Esq. SBN 147715

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

1881 Business Center Drive, Ste. 9A

San Bernardino, CA 92392

Tel:  909/890-9192

Fax: 909/382-9956

Attorney for Plaintiffs

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

COUNTY OF ____________

___________________________________,

And ROES 1 through 5,000,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAND CANYON CORPORATION f/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION; AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2; DOCX, LLC; and PREMIER TRUST DEED SERVICES and all persons unknown claiming any legal or  equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest  in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on Plaintiff’s  title thereto, Does 1 through 10, Inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR QUIET TITLE, DECLARATORY RELIEF, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNTION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION, CANCELATION OF INSTRUMENT AND FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM:

SLANDER OF TITLE; TORTUOUS

VIOLATION OF STATUTE [Penal

Code § 470(b) – (d); NOTARY FRAUD;

///

///

///

///

Plaintiffs ___________________________ allege herein as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

            1.         Plaintiffs ___________ (hereinafter individually and collectively referred to as “___________”), were and at all times herein mentioned are,  residents of the County of _________, State of California and the lawful owner of a parcel of real property commonly known as: _________________, California _______ and the legal description is:

Parcel No. 1:

A.P.N. No. _________ (hereinafter “Subject Property”).

2.         At all times herein mentioned, SAND CANYON CORPORATION f/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION (hereinafter SAND CANYON”), is and was, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of California and claims an interest adverse to the right, title and interests of Plaintiff in the Subject Property.

3.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter “AMERICAN”), is and was, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, and at all times herein mentioned was conducting ongoing business in the State of California.

4.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2 (hereinafter referred to as “WELLS FARGO”), is and was, a member of the National Banking Association and makes an adverse claim to the Plaintiff MADRIDS’ right, title and interest in the Subject Property.

5.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant DOCX, L.L.C. (hereinafter “DOCX”), is and was, a limited liability company existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Georgia, and a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation.

6.         At all times herein mentioned, __________________, was a company existing by virtue of its relationship as a subsidiary of __________________.

7.         Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES I through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiffs’ title, or any cloud on Plaintiffs’ title thereto. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint as required to allege said Doe Defendants’ true names and capacities when such have been fully ascertained. Plaintiffs further allege that Plaintiffs designated as ROES 1 through 5,000, are Plaintiffs who share a commonality with the same Defendants, and as the Plaintiffs listed herein.

8.         Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, were the agent and employee of each of the remaining Defendants.

9.         Plaintiffs allege that each and every defendants, and each of them, allege herein ratified the conduct of each and every other Defendant.

10.       Plaintiffs allege that at all times said Defendants, and each of them, were acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment.

11.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that circa July 2004, DOCX was formed with the specific intent of manufacturing fraudulent documents in order create the false impression that various entities obtained valid, recordable interests in real

properties, when in fact they actually maintained no lawful interest in said properties.

12.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that as a regular and ongoing part of the business of Defendant DOCX was to have persons sitting around a table signing names as quickly as possible, so that each person executing documents would sign approximately 2,500 documents per day. Although the persons signing the documents claimed to be a vice president of a particular bank of that document, in fact, the party signing the name was not the person named on the document, as such the signature was a forgery, that the name of the person claiming to be a vice president of a particular financial institution was not a “vice president”, did not have any prior training in finance, never worked for the company they allegedly purported to be a vice president of, and were alleged to be a vice president simultaneously with as many as twenty different banks and/or lending institutions.

13.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that the actual signatories of the instruments set forth in Paragraph 12 herein, were intended to and were fraudulently notarized by a variety of notaries in the offices of DOCX in Alpharetta, GA.

14.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that for all purposes the intent of Defendant DOCX was to intentionally create fraudulent documents, with forged signatures, so that said documents could be recorded in the Offices of County Recorders through the United States of America, knowing that such documents would forgeries, contained false information, and that the recordation of such documents would affect an interest in real property in violation of law.

15.       Plaintiffs allege that on or about, ____________, that they conveyed a first deed of  trust (hereinafter “DEED”) in favor of Option One Mortgage, Inc. with an interest of

approximately $_________________.

16.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that Option One Mortgage sold interest in the aforementioned DEED to unknown parties as a derivative security, who then repeatedly resold their respective interests, if any, in said DEED on at least six different occasions.

17.       Plaintiffs allege that pursuant to California Civil Code section 2932.5, an assignee may effectuate the power of sale provided the assignment is properly acknowledged and recorded. Plaintiffs further allege that due to acts and/or omissions of Defendants, and each of them, that none of the named Defendants herein are holders in due course and do not maintain an interest in the Subject Property, including but, not limited to: there are no lawful records connecting Defendants to this property other that Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation, and the interest of Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation was long ago sold-off to unrelated third parties for which there is no proper “paper trail” to establish the true holder in due course. Plaintiffs allege that as will be seen hereinafter that Defendants, and each of them, resorted to forged instruments in an attempt to create the appearance that Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee of the Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT2.

18.       Plaintiffs allege that due to certain acts and/or omissions once the DEED was “assigned” to various parties the DEED was detrimentally affected in a number ways, including but, not limited to: that the power of sale inherent in the DEED was severed, because the subsequent parties were no longer holders in due course as a matter of law.

19.       On April 3, 2011, on the national program “60 Minutes”, two former employees of DOCX made admissions which entirely support the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 12 and 13, herein. During said program, former employee, Chris Pendley [sic] stated that he personally drafted the name of “Linda Green” on thousands and thousands of assignments, although he was not Linda Green, that he was signing in excess of 2,500 documents per day, and that he was paid the sum of ten ($10.00) per hour to forge the name of “Linda Green” and that he made no inspection of any documents to determine whether the execution of the assignment was lawful, had no training to make an inspection of documents to determine if the assignment was lawful, and was told by his superiors that his execution of the name Linda Green was lawful.

20.       On April 3, 2011, Linda Green, a former employee of DOCX, appeared on the aforementioned “60 Minutes” program and stated that she worked in the mailroom of DOCX and

eventually signed some documents, that although she was listed as a vice president of several

companies, that she had no connection with those companies, and that she was aware that her signature was being used by several other persons on assignments because her name was short and easy to spell.

21.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that Linda Green, acting in her capacity as an employee of DOCX allowed her name to forged upon literally thousands of purported assignments, although Linda Green never executed those assignments, never inspected those assignments, and that DOCX simply listed that Linda Green was a vice president at various

Banks and lending institutions, however, Linda Green was not lawfully a vice president, and the assertion that Linda Green was a vice president was an artifice. Plaintiffs further allege that Linda Green’s name fraudulent appeared on documents for the following institutions: 11-11-2004 & 06-22-2006 Vice President, Loan Documentation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.; 08-11-2008 & 08-14-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 08-27-2008 Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation; 09-19-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 09-30-2008;

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home

Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 09-30-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 10-08-2009 Vice President & Asst. Secretary, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer for Ameriquest Mortgage Corporation; 10-16-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 10-17-2008, 11-20-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American

Brokers Conduit; 11-20-2008 Vice President, Option One Mortgage Corporation; 12-08-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 12-15-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for HLB Mortgage; 12-24-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 12-26-2008 Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.; 01-13-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Family Lending Services, Inc.; 01-15-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for

American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 02-03-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 02-05-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for

American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 02-24-2009 Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation;

02-25-2009 Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.; 02-27-2009 Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation;

03-02-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage; 03-04-2009 Vice President, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC by Citi Residential Lending Inc., attorney-in-fact; 03-06-2009 & 03-20-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home

Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 04-15-2009, 04-17-2009, 04-20-2009 Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.; 05-11-2009, 07-06-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 07-14-2009 Vice

President, Bank of America, N.A.; 07-15-2009 Vice President & Asst. Secretary, American

Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for, Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. asset-backed pass through certificates, series 2004-R7, under the pooling and servicing agreement dated July 1, 2004; 07-30-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home

Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 08-12-2009 Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation; 08-28-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 09-03-2009

Asst. Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation formerly known as Option One Mortgage

Corporation; 09-03-2009 Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage; 09-04-2009 Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage;

09-08-2009 Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.; 09-21-2009 & 09-22-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc. Plaintiffs further allege that Linda Green was never lawfully the vice president of any entity, more particularly the foregoing listed entities.

22.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that Defendant DOCX was a continuing criminal enterprise whose sole function was to create and forge fraudulent assignments which would purport to convey interests in real property and the entities listed in Paragraph 21 hereinabove, were complicate in Defendants’ fraud.

23.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe from beginning circa 2007 and continuing until sometime in 2010, DOCX produced thousands upon thousands of false and fraudulent assignments which were recorded in the Offices of the County Recorders of the State of

California, and several other States in the United States of America as well.

24.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that during the “60 Minutes” program on April 3, 2011, another former DOCX employee, Savonna Krite [sic] acted as a notary public and notarized that the signatures of Linda Green and others, were valid, however, she admitted that the notarizations were not that of Linda Green. Savonna Krite [sic] further admitted that she was told by officers of DOCX that it was “alright” for her to notarize signatures as being valid. Savonna Krite [sic] also admitted as of the program that she now understands that her notarizations of said assignments were “not alright.”

25.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that because the entire company structure of DOCX was to manufacture forged assignments by the thousands per day, without any consideration whatsoever that the information contained on those assignments was valid, and that the notarizations were in fact fraudulent, that no reasonable expectation can be made that any of the assignments executed by DOCX employees were or are valid.

26.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that circa _______,

Defendants, and each of them, utilized the services of DOCX in order to manufacture a fraudulent assignment from Defendant AMERICAN to WELLS FARGO, because WELLS FARGO could not find documents which would demonstrate that it owned an interest in the Plaintiffs’ subject property.

27.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that WELLS FARGO never had a lawful interest in the Plaintiffs’ subject property, either in its own capacity or as that as Trustee for the SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2.

28.       Plaintiffs allege that they fully tendered all mortgage payments which were

lawfully due under the DEED, and that they are not in default of their payments, having lawfully

tendered all amounts due and owing.

29.       Plaintiffs allege that WELLS FARGO made demands for payment as against the DEED, however, Plaintiffs allege that WELLS FARGO was not a lawful holder in due course, that SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2 was not a lawful holder in due course, and that neither party had any lawful right, title and interest in the DEED.

30.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that on or about, _______________, Defendant DOCX at the request of Defendants, and each of them, forged an instrument (hereinafter “FORGED ASSIGNMENT”) with the name “Linda Green” which was notarized by

“Ellis Simmons.”

31.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that on or about, _______________, an unknown employee of DOCX, in the course and scope of their employment, signed the name “Linda Green” and that such document had a notary stamp placed upon the FORGED ASSIGNMENT which purported to be lawfully notarized by “Ellis Simmons.”

32.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that the FORGED

ASSIGNMENT was then sent by DOCX through the United States Postal Service or transmitted by facsimile over the telephone and telegraph wires of the United States of America to Defendants, and each of them, in order that such FORGED ASSIGNMENT would be recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of the County of _______________.

32.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that on or about _______________, that Defendants, and each of them, their employees and/or agents, caused the FORGED ASSIGNMENT which unlawfully affected Plaintiffs’ subject property to be recorded in the Office of the Country Recorder of the County of _______________ as Instrument No. _______________. A true and correct copy of the assignment set forth in Paragraphs 30 – 31, is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, and is incorporated by this reference.

33.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that the sole claim of Defendants, and each of them, as to their right, title and/or interest in the Plaintiffs’ Subject Property is the  FORGED ASSIGNMENT.

34.       Plaintiffs allege that the FORGED ASSIGNMENT as a matter of law is void and that it did not constitute a conveyance of an interest to Defendants, or to anyone at all, and that the FORGED ASSIGNMENT is a legal nullity.

35.       Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, and each of them, are presently relying upon the FORGED ASSIGNMENT and are knowingly and intentionally prosecuting a non-judicial foreclosure based solely upon the recordation of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT, necessitating the instant action.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Slander of Title As Against All Defendants)

            36.       Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 35 of the General Allegations as though such have been fully set forth herein.

37.       Plaintiffs allege that on or about, _______________, Defendants, and each of them, in some measure actively, directly, indirectly, openly and secretly contributed to the preparation of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT and the recordation of said Instrument in the Official Records of the Office of the County Recorder of _______________ County.

38.       Plaintiffs allege that the recordation of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT, by Defendants and each of them, rendered Plaintiffs’ title to the Subject Property as unmarketable.

39.       Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, and each of them, recorded the FORGED

ASSIGNMENT without privilege, knowledge and/or consent of Plaintiffs, the information contained in said FORGED ASSIGNMENT is false in that no lawful conveyance ever existed between the parties thereto, and said FORGED ASSIGNMENT when recorded published the information therein which disparaged Plaintiffs’ title as would lead a reasonable man to falsely assume that Defendants, and each of them, in some measure actually maintained some right, title and interest in Plaintiffs’ Subject Property, whereas, some of the information contained in the FORGED ASSIGNMENT is false. A true and correct copy of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT  is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, and is incorporated by this reference.

40.       Plaintiffs allege that they actually and proximately suffered damages due to the planning, preparation and recordation of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT in an amount the totality of which has not been fully ascertained, but in no event less than the jurisdictional limitations of this court.

41.       Plaintiffs allege that the slander of the Subject Properties title was intentional,

fraudulent, malicious, oppressive and burdensome and deserving the imposition of punitive

damages in an amount sufficient that such conduct will not be repeated.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Tortuous Violation of Statute Penal Code §§ 470(b), 470(d)

As Against Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation;

American Home Mortgage Services, Inc.; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee

for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT2; DOCX, LLC)

42.       Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 35 of the General Allegations and Paragraphs 36 through 41 of the First Cause of Action as though such have been fully set forth herein.

43.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that circa July 2004, Defendants, and each of them, contrived a scheme to replace missing documents which purported to assert interests in real properties through-out the United States of America.

44.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that by August 2008, Defendants, and each of them, had in some measure participated in the request for production of forged instruments from DOCX, as well as other document forgery mills, the purpose of which was to effect title to real properties through-out the United States of America.

45.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that on or about, August 8, 2008, the agents and/or employees of Defendants and each of them, knowingly and intentionally with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs’ interest in the Subject Property, prepared the FORGED ASSIGNMENT and caused said FORGED ASSIGNMENT to be recorded in the Official Records of the Office of the Recorder of the County of _______________ as Instrument No. _______________. A true and correct copy of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT, is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, and is incorporated by this reference.

46.       Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, and each of them, tortuously forged the

signature of Linda Green, on the FORGED ASSIGNMENT, with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs, and such forgery directly affected Plaintiffs’ interest in the Subject Property in tortuous violation of California Penal Code sections 470(b) and 470(d).

47.       Plaintiffs allege that they actually and proximately suffered damages due to the planning, preparation and recordation of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT in an amount the totality of which has not been fully ascertained, but in no event less than the jurisdictional limitations of this court.

48.       Plaintiffs allege that the tortuous violation of Penal Code sections 470(b) and 470(d), by and through the preparation of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT, and subsequent recordation thereof was in willful disregard for Plaintiffs’ right, title and interest in the Subject Property,  intentional, fraudulent, malicious, oppressive and burdensome and deserving the imposition of punitive damages in an amount sufficient that such conduct will not be repeated.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Notary Fraud  As Against DOCX, LLC and Defendants 1 through 10, Inclusive)

49.       Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 35 of the General Allegations, Paragraphs 35 through 41 and Paragraphs 42 through 48 of  the First and Second Causes of Action as though such have been fully set forth herein.

50.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that circa July 2004, Defendants, and each of them, contrived a scheme to replace missing documents which purported to assert interests in real properties through-out the United States of America.

51.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that by August 2008, Defendants, and each of them, had in some measure participated in the request for production of forged instruments from DOCX, as well as other document forgery mills, the purpose of which

was to effect title to real properties through-out the United States of America.

52.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that on or about, _____________, the agents and/or employees of Defendants and each of them, knowingly and

intentionally with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs’ interest in the Subject Property, prepared the FORGED ASSIGNMENT and caused said FORGED ASSIGNMENT to be recorded in the Official Records of the Office of the Recorder of the County of _______________ as Instrument No. _______________. A true and correct copy of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT, is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, and is incorporated by this reference.

53.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that the FORGED ASSIGNMENT contained knowingly false statements including, but not limited to: that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT2, that Linda Green was a vice president of American Home Mortgage Services, Inc., and that Ellis Simmons lawfully notarized the FORGED ASSIGNMENT.

54.       Plaintiffs allege that they actually and proximately suffered damages due to the planning, preparation and recordation of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT in an amount the totality of which has not been fully ascertained, but in no event less than the jurisdictional limitations of this court.

55.       Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, and each of them, committed notary fraud by and through the preparation and notarization of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT, and subsequent recordation thereof was in willful disregard for Plaintiffs’ right, title and interest in the Subject Property, intentional, fraudulent, malicious, oppressive and burdensome and deserving the imposition of punitive damages in an amount sufficient that such conduct will not be repeated.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Cancellation of Instrument As Against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee for

  Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT2 and Defendants 1 through 10, Inclusive)

56.       Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 35 of the General

Allegations, Paragraphs 35 through 41 and Paragraphs 42 through 48 and Paragraphs 49 through 55 of  the First, Second and Third Causes of Action as though such have been fully set forth herein.

57.       Plaintiffs allege that a FORGED ASSIGNMENT was recorded in the Official

Records of the Office of the County Recorder for the County of _______________ as Instrument No. _______________.

58.       Plaintiffs seek an Order of the above-entitled court cancelling Instrument No. _______________, in as much as said document contains false information and affects Plaintiffs’ right, title and interest in the Subject Property.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Quiet Title As Against All Defendants)

59.       Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate Paragraphs 1 through 35 of the General Allegations, Paragraphs 35 through 41 and Paragraphs 42 through 48 and Paragraphs 49 through 55 of  the First, Second and Third Causes of Action as though such have been fully set forth herein.

60.       For all the facts alleged herein, Plaintiffs seek an Order quieting title as of

_______________.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory Relief As Against All Defendants)

61.       An actual controversy has arisen.

62.       The parties desire a judicial determine that they may ascertain their respective

right, title and interest in the Subject Property.

63.       A judicial determination is necessary that the parties may  right, title and interest in the Subject Property.

64.       Plaintiffs allege that as a regular and ongoing part of the business of Defendant

DOCX was to have persons sitting around a table signing names as quickly as possible, so that

each person executing documents would sign approximately 2,500 documents per day. Although the persons signing the documents claimed to be a vice president of a particular bank of that document, in fact, the party signing the name was not the person named on the document, as such the signature was a forgery, that the name of the person claiming to be a vice president of a particular financial institution was not a “vice president”, did not have any prior training in finance, never worked for the company they allegedly purported to be a vice president of, and were alleged to be a vice president simultaneously with as many as twenty different banks and/or lending institutions, that the actual signatories of the instruments set forth in Paragraph 12 herein, were intended to and were fraudulently notarized by a variety of notaries in the offices of DOCX in Alpharetta, Georgia,  that for all purposes the intent of Defendant DOCX was to intentionally create fraudulent documents, with forged signatures, so that said documents could be recorded in the Offices of County Recorders through the United States of America, knowing that such documents would forgeries, contained false information, and that the recordation of such documents would affect an interest in real property in violation of law, that on or about, May 7, 2007, that they conveyed a first deed of trust (hereinafter “DEED”) in favor of Option One Mortgage, Inc. with an interest of approximately $815,000, that Option One Mortgage sold interest in the aforementioned DEED to unknown parties as a derivative security, who then repeatedly resold their respective interests, if any, in said DEED on at least six different occasions, that pursuant to California Civil Code section 2932.5, an assignee may effectuate the power of sale provided the assignment is properly acknowledged and recorded. Plaintiffs further allege that due to acts and/or omissions of Defendants, and each of them, that none of the named Defendants herein are holders in due course and do not maintain an interest in the Subject Property, including but, not limited to: there are no lawful records connecting Defendants to this property other that Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation, and the interest of Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation was long ago sold-off to unrelated third parties for which there is no proper “paper trail” to establish the true holder in due course. Plaintiffs allege that as will be seen hereinafter that Defendants, and each of them, resorted to forged instruments in an attempt to create the appearance that Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee of the Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT2, that due to certain acts and/or omissions once the DEED was “assigned” to various parties the DEED was detrimentally affected in a number ways, including but, not limited to: that the power of sale inherent in the DEED was severed, because the subsequent parties were no longer holders in due course as a matter of law,  that on April 3, 2011, on the national program “60 Minutes”, two former employees of DOCX made admissions which entirely support the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 12 and 13, herein. During said program, former employee, Chris Pendley [sic] stated that he personally drafted the name of “Linda Green” on thousands and thousands of assignments, although he was not Linda Green, that he was signing in excess of 2,500 documents per day, and that he was paid the sum of ten ($10.00) per hour to forge the name of “Linda Green” and that he made no inspection of any documents to determine whether the execution of the assignment was lawful, had no training to make an inspection of documents to determine if the assignment was lawful, and was told by his superiors that his execution of the name Linda Green was lawful, on April 3, 2011, Linda Green, a former employee of DOCX, appeared on the aforementioned “60 Minutes” program and stated that she worked in the mailroom of DOCX and eventually signed some documents, that although she was listed as a vice president of several companies, that she had no connection with those companies, and that she was aware that her signature was being used by several other persons on assignments because her name was short and easy to spell, that Linda Green, acting in her capacity as an employee of DOCX allowed her name to forged upon literally thousands of purported assignments, although Linda Green never executed those assignments, never inspected those assignments, and that DOCX simply listed that Linda Green was a vice president at various Banks and lending institutions, however, Linda Green was not lawfully a vice president, and the assertion that Linda Green was a vice president was an artifice. Plaintiffs further allege that Linda Green’s name fraudulent appeared on documents for the following institutions: 11-11-2004 & 06-22-2006 Vice President, Loan Documentation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.; 08-11-2008 & 08-14-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 08-27-2008 Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation; 09-19-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 09-30-2008; Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 09-30-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 10-08-2009 Vice President & Asst. Secretary, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer for Ameriquest Mortgage Corporation; 10-16-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 10-17-2008, 11-20-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 11-20-2008 Vice President, Option One Mortgage Corporation; 12-08-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 12-15-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for HLB Mortgage; 12-24-2008 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 12-26-2008 Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.; 01-13-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Family Lending Services, Inc.; 01-15-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 02-03-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit; 02-05-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for

American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 02-24-2009 Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation;

02-25-2009 Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.; 02-27-2009 Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation;

03-02-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage; 03-04-2009 Vice President, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC by Citi Residential Lending Inc., attorney-in-fact; 03-06-2009 & 03-20-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home

Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 04-15-2009, 04-17-2009, 04-20-2009 Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.; 05-11-2009, 07-06-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 07-14-2009 Vice

President, Bank of America, N.A.; 07-15-2009 Vice President & Asst. Secretary, American

Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer for Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee for, Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. asset-backed pass through certificates, series 2004-R7, under the pooling and servicing agreement dated July 1, 2004; 07-30-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home

Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 08-12-2009 Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation; 08-28-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.; 09-03-2009

Asst. Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation formerly known as Option One Mortgage

Corporation; 09-03-2009 Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage; 09-04-2009 Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage;

09-08-2009 Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.; 09-21-2009 & 09-22-2009 Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc. Plaintiffs further allege that Linda Green was never lawfully the vice president of any entity, more particularly the foregoing listed entities, that Defendant DOCX was a continuing criminal enterprise whose sole function was to create and forge fraudulent assignments which would purport to convey interests in real property and the entities listed in Paragraph 21 hereinabove, were complicate in Defendants’ fraud, that beginning circa 2007 and continuing until sometime in 2010, DOCX produced thousands upon thousands of false and fraudulent assignments which were recorded in the Offices of the County Recorders of the State of California, and several other States in the United States of America as well, allege that during the “60 Minutes” program on April 3, 2011, another former DOCX employee, Savonna Krite [sic] acted as a notary public and notarized that the signatures of Linda Green and others, were valid, however, she admitted that the notarizations were not that of Linda Green. Savonna Krite [sic] further admitted that she was told by officers of DOCX that it was “alright” for her to notarize signatures as being valid. Savonna Krite [sic] also admitted as of the program that she now understands that her notarizations of said assignments were “not alright,” that because the entire company structure of DOCX was to manufacture forged assignments by the thousands per day, without any consideration whatsoever that the information contained on those assignments was valid, and that the notarizations were in fact fraudulent, that no reasonable expectation can be made that any of the assignments executed by DOCX employees were or are valid, that circa July 2008, Defendants, and each of them, utilized the services of DOCX in order to manufacture a fraudulent assignment from Defendant AMERICAN to WELLS FARGO, because WELLS FARGO could not find documents which would demonstrate that it owned an interest in the Plaintiffs’ subject property, that WELLS FARGO never had a lawful interest in the Plaintiffs’ subject property, either in its own capacity or as that as Trustee for the SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2, that they fully tendered all mortgage payments which were

lawfully due under the DEED, and that they are not in default of their payments, having lawfully

tendered all amounts due and owing, that WELLS FARGO made demands for payment as against the DEED, however, Plaintiffs allege that WELLS FARGO was not a lawful holder in due course, that SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2 was not a lawful holder in due course, and that neither party had any lawful right, title and interest in the DEED, that on or about, _______________, Defendant DOCX at the request of Defendants, and each of them, forged an instrument (hereinafter “FORGED ASSIGNMENT”) with the name “Linda Green” which was notarized by “Ellis Simmons,” that on or about, _______________, an unknown employee of DOCX, in the course and scope of their employment, signed the name “Linda Green” and that such document had a notary stamp placed upon the FORGED ASSIGNMENT which purported to be lawfully notarized by “Ellis Simmons,” that the FORGED ASSIGNMENT was then sent by DOCX through the United States Postal Service or transmitted by facsimile over the telephone and telegraph wires of the United States of America to Defendants, and each of them, in order that such FORGED ASSIGNMENT would be recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of the County of _______________, that on or about _______________, that Defendants, and each of them, their employees and/or agents, caused the FORGED ASSIGNMENT which unlawfully affected Plaintiffs’ subject property to be recorded in the Office of the Country Recorder of the County of _______________ as Instrument No. _______________. A true and correct copy of the assignment set forth in Paragraphs 30 – 31, is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, and is incorporated by this reference, that the sole claim of Defendants, and each of them, as to their right, title and/or interest in the Plaintiffs’ Subject Property is the  FORGED ASSIGNMENT, that the FORGED ASSIGNMENT as a matter of law is void and that it did not constitute a conveyance of an interest to Defendants, or to anyone at all, and that the FORGED ASSIGNMENT is a legal nullity, that Defendants, and each of them, are presently relying upon the FORGED ASSIGNMENT and are knowingly and intentionally prosecuting a non-judicial foreclosure based solely upon the recordation of the FORGED ASSIGNMENT, necessitating the instant action, and as such, the Defendants set forth herein have no right, title and interest in the Subject Property, whereas, Defendants contend that all of their acts and/or omissions were lawful and that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee of the Soundview Home Loan Trust 2007-OPT2.

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs Manuel A Madrid and Virginia J. Madrid pray for Judgment as follows:

FOR THE FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION:

1.         For an Order, restraining Defendants, and their agents, employees, officers, attorneys, and representatives from engaging in or performing any of the following acts: (i) proceeding with the non-judicial foreclosure without an Order of this court, (ii) offering, or advertising this property for sale and (ii) attempting to transfer title to this property and or (iii) holding any auction therefore;

2.         For general damages subject to proof at time of trial;

3.         For special damages subject to proof at time of trial;

4.         For punitive damages subject to proof at time of trial;

5.         For costs of suit herein;

6.         For reasonable attorney’s fees provided by contract or statute; and

7.         For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

FOR THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

1.         For general damages according to proof at time of trial;

2.         For special damages according to proof at time of trial;

3.         For costs of suit incurred herein;

4.         For reasonable attorney’s fees provided by contract or statute; and

5.         For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

FOR THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

1.         For an Order cancelling Instrument No. _______________, which was recorded on August in the

Office of the Country Recorder of the County of _______________;

2.         For costs of suit incurred herein;

3.         For reasonable attorney’s fees as provided by contract or statute; and

4.         For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

FOR THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

1.         For an Order quieting title to the Subject Property from _______________;

2.         For costs of suit incurred herein;

3.         For reasonable attorney’s fees subject to proof at time of trial; and

4.         For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

FOR THE SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

1.         For a declaration that Defendants do not have a right, title and interest in the Subject Property;

2.         For costs of suit incurred herein;

3.         For reasonable attorney’s fees subject to proof at time of trial; and

4.         For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

Dated:  _______, 2011                                                LAW OFFICES OF

                                                                                    TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

 

 

 

                                                                                    __________________________________

                                                                                          Timothy L. McCandless, Esq.,

Attorney for Plaintiffs

VERIFICATION

I, Timothy L. McCandless am the attorney of record for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action. The Plaintiffs are either absent from the County of Los Angeles where my office is located, or is otherwise unable to verify this complaint, or the facts are within the knowledge of the undersigned. For this reason, I am making this verification.

I have read the foregoing Complaint and know of its contents. I am informed and believe the matters therein to be true, and on that ground, allege that the matters stated in it are true.  I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed at San Bernardino, California

DATED: __________, 2011

         ____________________________

                         Timothy L. McCandless, Esq.

THE GREAT SECURITIZATION SCAM AND THE GREAT RECESSION

By Neil Garfield

 

            Both the class action lawyers and the AG offices are looking for settlements that will cure the “foreclosure” problem. This is based upon the perceived benefit of getting the foreclosures either litigated or settled, SO THE “MARKET” CAN RESUME “FORWARD” MOTION. But what if the basic transaction was so defective as to be incapable of understanding, much less enforcement?  We ignore the fact that the basic transaction was a lie, that lies are not enforceable and while they could be modified by agreement into enforceable written instruments (completely absent from the current landscape) the inescapable fact is that in order to do so, you will need the signature of borrowers on loans that are based upon fair market values, reality and set-off for the damages inflicted on the homeowners by the Great Securitization Scam.

 

            So we start with the myth that there was a valid legal contract at origination, an assumption that upon examination by a paralegal, much less a first-year law student, is patently untrue.  Thus we proceed with the following ten (10) lies that form the foundation of our impotent financial and economic policies in the Great Recession triggered by the housing crisis:

  1. 1.       VALID MORTGAGE TRANSACTION: There was a loan of money, but not by either the payee, the mortgagee, the trustee or anyone else that is mentioned in the closing papers or the foreclosure papers filed anywhere. That is why the pretenders would rather play with the word “holder” than “creditor.”
  1. 2.       LEGAL MORTGAGE TRANSACTION: Even if the right parties were at the table, the transaction was illegal because of appraisal fraud, underwriting fraud, Securities Fraud and Servicing Fraud.
  1. 3.       LEGAL LOAN: Even if the right parties were at two different tables, the transaction was illegal because of ratings fraud, securities fraud, common law fraud, predatory loan practices and servicing fraud.
  1. 4.       KNOWN CREDITOR: Neither the investor who was the source of funds, nor the investment banker who only committed SOME of those funds to loan transactions, nor the borrower (homeowner) even knew of the existence of each other. After the “reconstituted” bogus mortgage pools that never existed in the first place, payments by insurance, credit de fault swaps, and federal  bailouts, it is at the very least a question of fact to determine the identity of the creditor at any given point in time — i.e., to whom is an obligation owed and how many parties have liability to pay on that transaction either as borrower, guarantors, insurers, or anything else? The dart board approach currently used in foreclosures and mortgage modifications, prepayments and refinancing has generally been frowned upon by the Courts.
  1. 5.       KNOWN OBLIGATION AMOUNT: The amount advanced by the Lender (investor in bogus mortgage bonds) was far in excess of that amount used by intermediaries to fund mortgages — the rest was used to create synthetic derivative trading devices and charge fees every step of the way. Part of the difference between the funding of the residential loans and the amount advanced by the lender (investor) is easily computed by applying the same formula used to compute a yield spread premium that was paid to mortgage brokers under the table. By obscuring the real nature of the loans in the mix that offered (sold forward without ownership by the investment bank with the intent of acquiring he mortgages later) a 6% return promised to an investor could result in a yield spread premium of perhaps 12% if the loan was toxic waste and the nominal rate was 18%. Thus a $900,000 investment was converted into a $300,000 loan with no hope of repayment based upon a wildly inflated appraisal. Payments by servicers, counterparties, guarantors, insurers and bailout agencies were neither credited to the investor nor to the obligation owed to that investor. Since there was no obligor other than the homeowner according to the documents creating the securitization scam infrastructure, the borrower was part of a transaction where he “borrowed” $900,000 but only received $300,000. Third party payments made under expressly and carefully written waivers of subrogation were not applied to the amount owed to the investor and therefore not applied to the amount owed by the borrower. The absence of this information makes the servicer “accounting” a farce.
  1. VALID ACCOUNTING BY ALL PARTIES: Continuing with the facts illuminated in the preceding paragraph, both mortgage closing documents and foreclosure documents are devoid of any reference to the dozens of transactions carried out in the name of, or under agency of, or as constructive trustee of the investor who as lender is obliged to account for the balance due after third party payments.

Foreclosure Trustee duties and obligations

Because of the significant increase in defaults and foreclosures, mortgage servicers need to understand the duties and liabilities the law imposes upon foreclosure trustees.

Litigation based upon trustee error can slow, stop or invalidate foreclosures and impair the servicer’s ability to dispose of properties following foreclosure. When borrowers refinance or pay off during foreclosure, trustees are often responsible for the payoffs and reconveyances. After foreclosure, the trustee is responsible for distribution of surplus funds – the funds in excess of the debt due under the foreclosed deed of trust. All these responsibilities are sources of claims against trustees.

Foreclosure litigation plaintiffs often name and seek to hold lenders and servicers responsible for trustee errors on the theory that the trustee is the agent of the lender and servicer. According to Miller & Starr’s “California Real Estate,” this claim is particularly easy to make when the lender or servicer uses an in-house trustee and especially when the trustee acquires the property by credit bid for the lender or servicer at its own foreclosure sale. This article examines a trustee’s liability for damages under California law for conduct of the foreclosure sale, payoffs, reconveyances and distribution of surplus funds. The scope of a trustee’s duties differs for each of these services, and a breach of one of these duties can subject the trustee, lender and servicer to substantial compensatory damages, punitive damages and even criminal sanctions. Foreclosure sales In the I.E. Associates v. Safeco case, the California Supreme Court limited the scope of the trustee’s duties in conducting foreclosure sales. The issue in that case was whether a trustee breached its duty to a trustor by failing to ascertain the current address of the trustor where the current address was different from the address of record. The trustee did not have actual knowledge of the current address, but through reasonable diligence could have discovered it. The Supreme Court held that the trustee did not have a duty to find the current address. The court found that a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee, such as a trustee of a person or a trustee under a trust agreement. Instead, a foreclosure trustee is merely “a middleman” between the beneficiary and the trustor who only carries out the specific duties that the deed of trust and foreclosure law specifically impose upon it.

The deed of trust and the statute are the exclusive source of the rights, duties and liabilities governing notice of nonjudicial foreclosure sales. Because neither the deed of trust nor the statute required the trustee to search for an address it did not have, the court held that the trustee had no duty to do so. The Stephens v. Hollis case reiterated the rule that a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee: “Just as a panda is not an ordinary bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not an ordinary trustee. ‘A trustee under a deed of trust has neither the powers nor the obligations of a strict trustee. He serves as a kind of common agent for the parties.’”

It is critical to recognize, however, that these rules of limited duty only apply to the trustee’s duty to provide proper notice of the sale. The trustee also has a broad common law duty to conduct a sale that is fair in all respects. In Hatch v. Collins, the court noted that “A trustee has a general duty to conduct the sale ‘fairly, openly, reasonably and with due diligence,’ exercising sound discretion to protect the rights of the mortgagor and others…A breach of the trustee’s duty to conduct an open, fair and honest sale may give rise to a cause of action for professional negligence, breach of an obligation created by statute, or fraud.” Examples of such a breach could be conspiring to “chill the bidding” by overstating the debt, thereby dissuading others from appearing and bidding at the sale. California Civil Code Section 2924h(g) states that it is “unlawful for any person, acting alone or in concert with others, (1) to offer to accept or accept from another any consideration of any type not to bid, or (2) to fix or restrain bidding in any manner at a sale of property conducted pursuant to a power of sale in a deed of trust or mortgage.” The code continues: “In addition to any other remedies, any person committing any act declared unlawful by this subdivision or any act which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any beneficiary, trustor or junior [lien holder] shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one year, or be punished by both that fine and imprisonment.” In addition to imposing criminal penalties, this section also imposes civil liability upon the trustee.

The courts will review foreclosure sale proceedings to make sure they have been fair in all respects. A trustee who violates its contractual duties under the deed of trust or its statutory or common law duties is liable to the trustor or to an affected junior lien holder for such person’s lost equity in the property. This is measured by the difference between the fair market value of the property and the liens senior to the affected person’s interest at the time of the sale. In addition, pursuant to Civil Code Section 3333, the trustee has liability for all other damages proximately caused by its wrongful conduct, whether those damages were foreseeable or not. A willful violation of these duties can subject the trustee to punitive damages under Civil Code Section 3294. Payoffs and reconveyances Civil Code Section 2943(c) requires a beneficiary or its representative, which is frequently the trustee, to provide a payoff statement to an “entitled person” within 21 days after a written request for a payoff demand. An “entitled person” means the trustor, a junior lien holder, their successors or assigns, or an escrow. Failure to provide a timely payoff demand makes the beneficiary or its representative liable to the entitled person for all actual damages such a person may sustain due to a failure to provide a timely payoff demand, plus $300 in statutory damages. Failure to provide an accurate payoff demand can have dire consequences. If the entitled person closes a sale or refinance in reliance upon a payoff demand that understates the payoff, the beneficiary must reconvey its lien. The beneficiary is then left with only an unsecured claim against the entitled person. A trustee who is responsible for such an error could have substantial liability to its beneficiary. After the note and deed of trust are paid off, Civil Code Section 2941 requires the beneficiary to deliver the original note, the deed of trust and a request for reconveyance to the trustee. Within 21 days thereafter, the trustee must record the reconveyance and deliver the original note to the trustor. If the reconveyance has not been recorded within 60 days after the payoff, upon the trustee’s written request, the beneficiary must substitute himself as trustee and record the reconveyance. If the reconveyance is not recorded within 75 days after payoff, any title company may prepare and record a release of the obligation. A person who violates any of these provisions is liable for $500 in statutory damages and all actual damages caused by the violation. These can include damages for emotional distress. A willful violation of these requirements is a misdemeanor which can subject the violator to a $400 fine, plus six months’ imprisonment in the county jail. Surplus funds Civil Code Sections 2924j and 2924k impose upon the trustee a duty to distribute surplus funds that the trustee receives at a sale to lien holders and trustors whose interests are junior to the foreclosed deed of trust. Surplus funds are defined as funds in excess of the debt due to the holder of the foreclosed lien and the costs of the foreclosure sale. As previously referenced in the I. E. Associates and Stephens cases, those courts held that with respect to the conduct of the foreclosure sale, a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee – only a middleman. Further, in Hatch v. Collins, the court held that a breach of the trustee’s duties in the conduct of the sale does not constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty. While no case holds that a trustee is a fiduciary with respect to surplus funds, a trustee’s surplus funds duties closely resemble those of a fiduciary – a fiduciary is one who holds and manages property for the benefit of another. Fiduciaries are held to a higher standard of care than others in discharging their duties. If a trustee has a fiduciary duty in handling surplus funds, a trustee may have a duty to do more than simply follow the statute with respect to giving notice of and distributing the surplus funds. For instance, a trustee may have a duty to take reasonable steps to find an interested party whose address is unknown to the trustee if the trustee has reason to believe such an address can be found. This is particularly so because the trustee can pay for the expense of the investigation from the surplus funds. Also, a trustee as a fiduciary may face greater exposure to punitive damages, which can be awarded for breach of fiduciary duty when coupled with fraud, malice or oppression. Servicers Using In-House Foreclosure Trustees Must Beware in Mortgage Servicing > Foreclosure by John Clark Brown Jr. on Tuesday 19 June 2007 email the content item print the content item comments: 0 Servicing Management, June 2007. Because of the significant increase in defaults and foreclosures, mortgage servicers need to understand the duties and liabilities the law imposes upon foreclosure trustees. Litigation based upon trustee error can slow, stop or invalidate foreclosures and impair the servicer’s ability to dispose of properties following foreclosure. When borrowers refinance or pay off during foreclosure, trustees are often responsible for the payoffs and reconveyances. After foreclosure, the trustee is responsible for distribution of surplus funds – the funds in excess of the debt due under the foreclosed deed of trust. All these responsibilities are sources of claims against trustees. Foreclosure litigation plaintiffs often name and seek to hold lenders and servicers responsible for trustee errors on the theory that the trustee is the agent of the lender and servicer. According to Miller & Starr’s “California Real Estate,” this claim is particularly easy to make when the lender or servicer uses an in-house trustee and especially when the trustee acquires the property by credit bid for the lender or servicer at its own foreclosure sale. This article examines a trustee’s liability for damages under California law for conduct of the foreclosure sale, payoffs, reconveyances and distribution of surplus funds. The scope of a trustee’s duties differs for each of these services, and a breach of one of these duties can subject the trustee, lender and servicer to substantial compensatory damages, punitive damages and even criminal sanctions. Foreclosure sales In the I.E. Associates v. Safeco case, the California Supreme Court limited the scope of the trustee’s duties in conducting foreclosure sales. The issue in that case was whether a trustee breached its duty to a trustor by failing to ascertain the current address of the trustor where the current address was different from the address of record. The trustee did not have actual knowledge of the current address, but through reasonable diligence could have discovered it. The Supreme Court held that the trustee did not have a duty to find the current address. The court found that a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee, such as a trustee of a person or a trustee under a trust agreement. Instead, a foreclosure trustee is merely “a middleman” between the beneficiary and the trustor who only carries out the specific duties that the deed of trust and foreclosure law specifically impose upon it. The deed of trust and the statute are the exclusive source of the rights, duties and liabilities governing notice of nonjudicial foreclosure sales. Because neither the deed of trust nor the statute required the trustee to search for an address it did not have, the court held that the trustee had no duty to do so. The Stephens v. Hollis case reiterated the rule that a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee: “Just as a panda is not an ordinary bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not an ordinary trustee. ‘A trustee under a deed of trust has neither the powers nor the obligations of a strict trustee. He serves as a kind of common agent for the parties.’” It is critical to recognize, however, that these rules of limited duty only apply to the trustee’s duty to provide proper notice of the sale. The trustee also has a broad common law duty to conduct a sale that is fair in all respects. In Hatch v. Collins, the court noted that “A trustee has a general duty to conduct the sale ‘fairly, openly, reasonably and with due diligence,’ exercising sound discretion to protect the rights of the mortgagor and others…A breach of the trustee’s duty to conduct an open, fair and honest sale may give rise to a cause of action for professional negligence, breach of an obligation created by statute, or fraud.” Examples of such a breach could be conspiring to “chill the bidding” by overstating the debt, thereby dissuading others from appearing and bidding at the sale. California Civil Code Section 2924h(g) states that it is “unlawful for any person, acting alone or in concert with others, (1) to offer to accept or accept from another any consideration of any type not to bid, or (2) to fix or restrain bidding in any manner at a sale of property conducted pursuant to a power of sale in a deed of trust or mortgage.” The code continues: “In addition to any other remedies, any person committing any act declared unlawful by this subdivision or any act which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any beneficiary, trustor or junior [lien holder] shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one year, or be punished by both that fine and imprisonment.” In addition to imposing criminal penalties, this section also imposes civil liability upon the trustee. The courts will review foreclosure sale proceedings to make sure they have been fair in all respects. A trustee who violates its contractual duties under the deed of trust or its statutory or common law duties is liable to the trustor or to an affected junior lien holder for such person’s lost equity in the property. This is measured by the difference between the fair market value of the property and the liens senior to the affected person’s interest at the time of the sale. In addition, pursuant to Civil Code Section 3333, the trustee has liability for all other damages proximately caused by its wrongful conduct, whether those damages were foreseeable or not. A willful violation of these duties can subject the trustee to punitive damages under Civil Code Section 3294. Payoffs and reconveyances Civil Code Section 2943(c) requires a beneficiary or its representative, which is frequently the trustee, to provide a payoff statement to an “entitled person” within 21 days after a written request for a payoff demand. An “entitled person” means the trustor, a junior lien holder, their successors or assigns, or an escrow. Failure to provide a timely payoff demand makes the beneficiary or its representative liable to the entitled person for all actual damages such a person may sustain due to a failure to provide a timely payoff demand, plus $300 in statutory damages. Failure to provide an accurate payoff demand can have dire consequences. If the entitled person closes a sale or refinance in reliance upon a payoff demand that understates the payoff, the beneficiary must reconvey its lien. The beneficiary is then left with only an unsecured claim against the entitled person. A trustee who is responsible for such an error could have substantial liability to its beneficiary. After the note and deed of trust are paid off, Civil Code Section 2941 requires the beneficiary to deliver the original note, the deed of trust and a request for reconveyance to the trustee. Within 21 days thereafter, the trustee must record the reconveyance and deliver the original note to the trustor. If the reconveyance has not been recorded within 60 days after the payoff, upon the trustee’s written request, the beneficiary must substitute himself as trustee and record the reconveyance. If the reconveyance is not recorded within 75 days after payoff, any title company may prepare and record a release of the obligation. A person who violates any of these provisions is liable for $500 in statutory damages and all actual damages caused by the violation. These can include damages for emotional distress. A willful violation of these requirements is a misdemeanor which can subject the violator to a $400 fine, plus six months’ imprisonment in the county jail. Surplus funds Civil Code Sections 2924j and 2924k impose upon the trustee a duty to distribute surplus funds that the trustee receives at a sale to lien holders and trustors whose interests are junior to the foreclosed deed of trust. Surplus funds are defined as funds in excess of the debt due to the holder of the foreclosed lien and the costs of the foreclosure sale. As previously referenced in the I. E. Associates and Stephens cases, those courts held that with respect to the conduct of the foreclosure sale, a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee – only a middleman. Further, in Hatch v. Collins, the court held that a breach of the trustee’s duties in the conduct of the sale does not constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty. While no case holds that a trustee is a fiduciary with respect to surplus funds, a trustee’s surplus funds duties closely resemble those of a fiduciary – a fiduciary is one who holds and manages property for the benefit of another. Fiduciaries are held to a higher standard of care than others in discharging their duties. If a trustee has a fiduciary duty in handling surplus funds, a trustee may have a duty to do more than simply follow the statute with respect to giving notice of and distributing the surplus funds. For instance, a trustee may have a duty to take reasonable steps to find an interested party whose address is unknown to the trustee if the trustee has reason to believe such an address can be found. This is particularly so because the trustee can pay for the expense of the investigation from the surplus funds. Also, a trustee as a fiduciary may face greater exposure to punitive damages, which can be awarded for breach of fiduciary duty when coupled with fraud, malice or oppression.

Recording false documents ? and getting the house, the insurence, the tarp, the fdic guarentee, and whatever else the American taxpayer will give the pretender lender

Recently, many California Courts have been dismissing lawsuits filed to stop non-judicial foreclosures, ruling that the non-judicial foreclosure statutes occupy the field and are exclusive as long as they are complied with.  Thus, in the case where a notice of default is recorded and a lawsuit then filed in response to stop the foreclosure since the foreclosing party does not possess the underlying note, all too often the Court will simply dismiss the case and claim “2924 has no requirement to produce the note.”

Thus, these Courts view the statutes that regulate non-judicial foreclosures as all inclusive of all the requirements and remedies in foreclosure proceedings.  Indeed, California Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k provide a comprehensive framework for the regulation of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale contained in a deed of trust. This comprehensive statutory scheme has three purposes: ‘“(1) to provide the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor; (2) to protect the debtor/trustor from wrongful loss of the property; and (3) to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1249–1250 [26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413].)

Notwithstanding, the foreclosure statutes are not exclusive.  If someone commits murder during an auction taking place under Civil Code 2924, that does not automatically mean they are immune from criminal and civil liability.  Perhaps this is where some of these courts are “missing the boat.”

For example, in Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1231 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 900 P.2d 601], the California Supreme Court concluded that a lender who obtained the property with a full credit bid at a foreclosure sale was not precluded from suing a third party who had fraudulently induced it to make the loan. The court concluded that “ ‘the antideficiency laws were not intended to immunize wrongdoers from the consequences of their fraudulent acts’ ” and that, if the court applies a proper measure of damages, “ ‘fraud suits do not frustrate the antideficiency policies because there should be no double recovery for the beneficiary.’ ” (Id. at p. 1238.)

Likewise, in South Bay Building Enterprises, Inc. v. Riviera Lend-Lease, Inc. [*1071]  (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1121 [85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 647], the court held that a junior lienor retains the right to recover damages from the trustee and the beneficiary of the foreclosing lien if there have been material irregularities in the conduct of the foreclosure sale. (See also Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1257–1258; Lo v. Jensen (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1095 [106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443] [a trustee’s sale tainted by fraud may be set aside].)

In looking past the comprehensive statutory framework, these other Courts also considered the policies advanced by the statutory scheme, and whether those policies would be frustrated by other laws.  Recently, in the case of California Golf, L.L.C. v. Cooper, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 153, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 850 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008), the Appellate Court held that the remedies of 2924h were not exclusive.  Of greater importance is that the Appellate Court reversed the lower court and specifically held that provisions in UCC Article 3 were allowed in the foreclosure context:

Considering the policy interests advanced by the statutory scheme governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales, and the policy interests advanced by Commercial Code section 3312, it is clear that allowing a remedy under the latter does not undermine the former. Indeed, the two remedies are complementary and advance the same goals. The first two goals of the nonjudicial foreclosure statutes: (1) to provide the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor and (2) to protect the debtor/trustor from a wrongful loss of the property, are not impacted by the decision that we reach. This case most certainly, however, involves the third policy interest: to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.

This is very significant since it provides further support to lawsuits brought against foreclosing parties lacking the ability toenforce the underlying note, since those laws also arise under Article 3.  Under California Commercial Code 3301, a note may only be enforced if one has actual possession of the note as a holder, or has possession of the note not as a non-holder but with holder rights.

Just like in California Golf, enforcing 3301 operates to protect the debtor/trustor from a wrongful loss of the property.  To the extent that a foreclosing party might argue that such lawsuits disrupt a quick, inexpensive, and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor, the response is that “since there is no enforceable obligation,  the foreclosing entity is not a party/creditor/beneficiary entitled to a quick, inexpensive, and efficient remedy,” but simply a declarant that recorded false documents.

This is primarily because being entitled to foreclose non-judicially under 2924 can only take place “after a breach of the obligation for which that mortgage or transfer is a security.”   Thus, 2924 by its own terms, looks outside of the statute to the actual obligation to see if there was a breach, and if the note is unenforceable under Article 3, there can simply be no breach.  End of story.

Accordingly, if there is no possession of the note or possession was not obtained until after the notice of sale was recorded, it is impossible to trigger 2924, and simple compliance with the notice requirements in 2924 does not suddenly bless the felony of grand theft of the unknown foreclosing entity.  To hold otherwise would create absurd results since it would allow any person or company the right to take another persons’ home by simply recording a false notice of default and notice of sale.

Indeed, such absurdity would allow you to foreclose on your own home again to get it back should you simply record the same false documents.  Thus it is obvious that these courts improperly assume the allegations contained in the notice of default and notice of sale are truthful.   Perhaps these courts simply cannot or choose not to believe such frauds are taking place due to the magnitude and volume of foreclosures in this Country at this time.  One can only image the chaos that would ensue in America if the truth is known that millions of foreclosures took place unlawfully and millions more are now on hold as a result of not having the ability to enforce the underlying obligation pursuant to Article 3.

So if you are in litigation to stop a foreclosure, you can probably expect the Court will want to immediately dismiss your case.  These Courts just cannot understand how the law would allow someone to stay in a home without paying.  Notwithstanding, laws cannot be broken, and Courts are not allowed to join with the foreclosing parties in breaking laws simply because “not paying doesn’t seem right.”

Accordingly, at least for appeal purposes, be sure to argue that 2924 was never triggered since there was never any “breach of the obligation” and that Appellate Courts throughout California have routinely held that other laws do in fact apply in the non-judicial foreclosure process since the policies advanced by the statutory non-judicial foreclosure scheme are not frustrated by these other laws. The recent exposure and discovery of Robosigners and notary fraud has added another dimension to the “exclusive 2924 argument as seen in the 22/20 special aired April 3, 2011.

Scott Pelley reports how problems with mortgage documents are prompting lawsuits and could slow down the weak housing market

  • Play CBS Video Video The next housing shockAs more and more Americans face mortgage foreclosure, banks’ crucial ownership documents for the properties are often unclear and are sometimes even bogus, a condition that’s causing lawsuits and hampering an already weak housing market. Scott Pelley reports.
  • Video Extra: Eviction reprieveFlorida residents AJ and Brenda Boyd spent more than a year trying to renegotiate their mortgage and save their home. At the last moment, questions about who owns their mortgage saved them from eviction.
  • Video Extra: “Save the Dream” eventsBruce Marks, founder and CEO of the nonprofit Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America talks to Scott Pelley about his “Save the Dream” events and how foreclosures are causing a crisis in America.
(CBS News)If there was a question about whether we’re headed for a second housing shock, that was settled last week with news that home prices have fallen a sixth consecutive month. Values are nearly back to levels of the Great Recession. One thing weighing on the economy is the huge number of foreclosed houses.Many are stuck on the market for a reason you wouldn’t expect: banks can’t find the ownership documents.Who really owns your mortgage?
Scott Pelley explains a bizarre aftershock of the U.S. financial collapse: An epidemic of forged and missing mortgage documents.It’s bizarre but, it turns out, Wall Street cut corners when it created those mortgage-backed investments that triggered the financial collapse. Now that banks want to evict people, they’re unwinding these exotic investments to find, that often, the legal documents behind the mortgages aren’t there. Caught in a jam of their own making, some companies appear to be resorting to forgery and phony paperwork to throw people – down on their luck – out of their homes.In the 1930s we had breadlines; venture out before dawn in America today and you’ll find mortgage lines. This past January in Los Angeles, 37,000 homeowners facing foreclosure showed up to an event to beg their bank for lower payments on their mortgage. Some people even slept on the sidewalk to get in line.So many in the country are desperate now that they have to meet in convention centers coast to coast.In February in Miami, 12,000 people showed up to a similar event. The line went down the block and doubled back twice.

Video: The next housing shock
Extra: Eviction reprieve
Extra: “Save the Dream” events

Dale DeFreitas lost her job and now fears her home is next. “It’s very emotional because I just think about it. I don’t wanna lose my home. I really don’t,” she told “60 Minutes” correspondent Scott Pelley.

“It’s your American dream,” he remarked.

“It was. And still is,” she replied.

These convention center events are put on by the non-profit Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America, which helps people figure what they can afford, and then walks them across the hall to bank representatives to ask for lower payments. More than half will get their mortgages adjusted, but the rest discover that they just can’t keep their home.

For many that’s when the real surprise comes in: these same banks have fouled up all of their own paperwork to a historic degree.

“In my mind this is an absolute, intentional fraud,” Lynn Szymoniak, who is fighting foreclosure, told Pelley.

While trying to save her house, she discovered something we did not know: back when Wall Street was using algorithms and computers to engineer those disastrous mortgage-backed securities, it appears they didn’t want old fashioned paperwork slowing down the profits.

“This was back when it was a white hot fevered pitch to move as many of these as possible,” Pelley remarked.

“Exactly. When you could make a whole lotta money through securitization. And every other aspect of it could be done electronically, you know, key strokes. This was the only piece where somebody was supposed to actually go get documents, transfer the documents from one entity to the other. And it looks very much like they just eliminated that stuff all together,” Szymoniak said.

Szymoniak’s mortgage had been bundled with thousands of others into one of those Wall Street securities traded from investor to investor. When the bank took her to court, it first said it had lost her documents, including the critical assignment of mortgage which transfers ownership. But then, there was a courthouse surprise.

“They found all of your paperwork more than a year after they initially said that they had lost it?” Pelley asked.

“Yes,” she replied.

Asked if that seemed suspicious to her, Szymoniak said, “Yes, absolutely. What do you imagine? It fell behind the file cabinet? Where was all of this? ‘We had it, we own it, we lost it.’ And then more recently, everyone is coming in saying, ‘Hey we found it. Isn’t that wonderful?'”

But what the bank may not have known is that Szymoniak is a lawyer and fraud investigator with a specialty in forged documents. She has trained FBI agents.

She told Pelley she asked for copies of those documents.

Asked what she found, Szymoniak told Pelley, “When I looked at the assignment of my mortgage, and this is the assignment: it looked that even the date they put in, which was 10/17/08, was several months after they sued me for foreclosure. So, what they were saying to the court was, ‘We sued her in July of 2008 and we acquired this mortgage in October of 2008.’ It made absolutely no sense.”

Produced by Robert Anderson and Daniel Ruetenik

Now for the pleading

Timothy L. McCandless, Esq. SBN 147715

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

1881 Business Center Drive, Ste. 9A

San Bernardino, CA 92392

Tel:  909/890-9192

Fax: 909/382-9956

Attorney for Plaintiffs

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

COUNTY OF ____________

___________________________________,

And ROES 1 through 5,000,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAND CANYON CORPORATION f/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION; AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2; DOCX, LLC; and PREMIER TRUST DEED SERVICES and all persons unknown claiming any legal or  equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest  in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on Plaintiff’s  title thereto, Does 1 through 10, Inclusive,

Defendants.CASE NO:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR QUIET TITLE, DECLARATORY RELIEF, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNTION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION, CANCELATION OF INSTRUMENT AND FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM:

SLANDER OF TITLE; TORTUOUS

VIOLATION OF STATUTE [Penal

Code § 470(b) – (d); NOTARY FRAUD;

///

///

///

///

Plaintiffs ___________________________ allege herein as follows:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

            1.         Plaintiffs ___________ (hereinafter individually and collectively referred to as “___________”), were and at all times herein mentioned are,  residents of the County of _________, State of California and the lawful owner of a parcel of real property commonly known as: _________________, California _______ and the legal description is:

Parcel No. 1:

A.P.N. No. _________ (hereinafter “Subject Property”).

2.         At all times herein mentioned, SAND CANYON CORPORATION f/k/a OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION (hereinafter SAND CANYON”), is and was, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of California and claims an interest adverse to the right, title and interests of Plaintiff in the Subject Property.

3.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter “AMERICAN”), is and was, a corporation existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, and at all times herein mentioned was conducting ongoing business in the State of California.

4.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee for SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2007-OPT2 (hereinafter referred to as “WELLS FARGO”), is and was, a member of the National Banking Association and makes an adverse claim to the Plaintiff MADRIDS’ right, title and interest in the Subject Property.

5.         At all times herein mentioned, Defendant DOCX, L.L.C. (hereinafter “DOCX”), is and was, a limited liability company existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Georgia, and a subsidiary of Lender Processing Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation.

6.         At all times herein mentioned, __________________, was a company existing by virtue of its relationship as a subsidiary of __________________.

7.         Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES I through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to Plaintiffs’ title, or any cloud on Plaintiffs’ title thereto. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint as required to allege said Doe Defendants’ true names and capacities when such have been fully ascertained. Plaintiffs further allege that Plaintiffs designated as ROES 1 through 5,000, are Plaintiffs who share a commonality with the same Defendants, and as the Plaintiffs listed herein.

8.         Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, were the agent and employee of each of the remaining Defendants.

9.         Plaintiffs allege that each and every defendants, and each of them, allege herein ratified the conduct of each and every other Defendant.

10.       Plaintiffs allege that at all times said Defendants, and each of them, were acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment.

11.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that circa July 2004, DOCX was formed with the specific intent of manufacturing fraudulent documents in order create the false impression that various entities obtained valid, recordable interests in real

properties, when in fact they actually maintained no lawful interest in said properties.

12.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that as a regular and ongoing part of the business of Defendant DOCX was to have persons sitting around a table signing names as quickly as possible, so that each person executing documents would sign approximately 2,500 documents per day. Although the persons signing the documents claimed to be a vice president of a particular bank of that document, in fact, the party signing the name was not the person named on the document, as such the signature was a forgery, that the name of the person claiming to be a vice president of a particular financial institution was not a “vice president”, did not have any prior training in finance, never worked for the company they allegedly purported to be a vice president of, and were alleged to be a vice president simultaneously with as many as twenty different banks and/or lending institutions.

13.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that the actual signatories of the instruments set forth in Paragraph 12 herein, were intended to and were fraudulently notarized by a variety of notaries in the offices of DOCX in Alpharetta, GA.

14.       Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereupon allege that for all purposes the intent of Defendant DOCX was to intentionally create fraudulent documents, with forged signatures, so that said documents could be recorded in the Offices of County Recorders through the United States of America, knowing that such documents would forgeries, contained false information, and that the recordation of such documents would affect an interest in real property in violation of law.

15.       Plaintiffs allege that on or about, ____________, that they conveyed a first deed of  trust (hereinafter “DEED”) in favor of Option One Mortgage, Inc. with an interest of

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Pooling and servicing agreements PSA how it works in Judicial foreclosure states like Florida

THE ROOT OF FORECLOSURE DEFENSE The Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) is the document that actually creates a residential mortgage backed securitized trust and establishes the obligations and authority of the Master Servicer and the Primary Servicer. The PSA is the heart and root of all securitized based foreclosure action defenses. The PSA establishes that mandatory rules and procedures for the sales and transfers of the mortgages and mortgage notes from the originators to the Trust. It is this unbroken chain of assignments and negotiations that creates what is called “The Alphabet Problem.” In order to understand the “Alphabet Problem,” you must keep in mind that the primary purpose of securitization is to make sure the assets (e.g., mortgage notes) are both FDIC and Bankruptcy “remote” from the originator. As a result, the common structures seek to create at least two “true sales” between the originator and the Trust. One of the defenses used by the famous Foreclosure Defender, April Charney is the following: PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT LOAN SERVICING REQUIREMENTS: Plaintiff failed to provide separate Defendants with legitimate and non predatory access to the debt management and relief that must be made available to borrowers, including this Defendant pursuant to and in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission that controls and applies to the subject mortgage loan. Plaintiff’s non-compliance with the conditions precedent to foreclosure imposed on the plaintiff pursuant to the applicable pooling and servicing agreement is an actionable event that makes the filing of this foreclosure premature based on a failure of a contractual and/or equitable condition precedent to foreclosure which denies Plaintiff’s ability to carry out this foreclosure. You therefore have in the most basic securitized structure the originator, the sponsor, the depositor and the Trust. I refer to these parties as the A (originator), B (sponsor), C (depositor) and D (Trust) alphabet players. The other primary but non-designated player in my alphabet game is the Master Document Custodian for the Trust. The MDC is entrusted with the physical custody of all of the “original” notes and mortgages and the assignment, sales and purchase agreements. The MDC must also execute representations and attestations that all of the transfers really and truly occurred “on time” and in the required “order” and that “true sales” occurred at each link in the chain. Section 2.01 of most PSAs includes the mandatory conveyancing rules for the Trust and the representations and warranties. The basic terms of this Section of the standard PSA is set-forth below: 2.01 Conveyance of Mortgage Loans. (a) The Depositor, concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof, hereby sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right, title and interest of the Depositor in and to the Trust Fund, and the Trustee, on behalf of the Trust, hereby accepts the Trust Fund. (b) In connection with the transfer and assignment of each Mortgage Loan, the Depositor has delivered or caused to be delivered to the Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders the following documents or instruments with respect to each Mortgage Loan so assigned: (i) the original Mortgage Note (except for no more than up to 0.02% of the mortgage Notes for which there is a lost note affidavit and the copy of the Mortgage Note) bearing all intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the last endorsee, endorsed “Pay to the order of _____________, without recourse” and signed in the name of the last endorsee. To the extent that there is no room on the face of any Mortgage Note for an endorsement, the endorsement may be contained on an allonge, unless state law does not so allow and the Trustee is advised by the Responsible Party that state law does not so allow. If the Mortgage Loan was acquired by the Responsible Party in a merger, the endorsement must be by “[last endorsee], successor by merger to [name of predecessor]“. If the Mortgage Loan was acquired or originated by the last endorsee while doing business under another name, the endorsement must be by “[last endorsee], formerly known as [previous name]“; A review of all of the recent “standing” and “real party in interest” cases decided by the bankruptcy courts and the state courts in judicial foreclosure states all arise out of the inability of the mortgage servicer or the Trust to “prove up” an unbroken chain of “assignments and transfers” of the mortgage notes and the mortgages from the originators to the sponsors to the depositors to the trust and to the master document custodian for the trust. As stated in the referenced PSA, the parties have represented and warranted that there is “a complete chain of endorsements from the originator to the last endorsee” for the note. And, the Master Document Custodian must file verified reports that it in fact holds such documents with all “intervening” documents that confirm true sales at each link in the chain. The complete inability of the mortgage servicers and the Trusts to produce such unbroken chains of proof along with the original documents is the genesis for all of the recent court rulings. One would think that a simple request to the Master Document Custodian would solve these problems. However, a review of the cases reveals a massive volume of transfers and assignments executed long after the “closing date” for the Trust from the “originator” directly to the “trust.” I refer to these documents as “A to D” transfers and assignments. There are some serious problems with the A to D documents. First, at the time these documents are executed the A party has nothing to sell or transfer since the PSA provides such a sale and transfer occurred years ago. Second, the documents completely circumvent the primary objective of securitization by ignoring the “true sales” to the Sponsor (the B party) and the Depositor (the C party). In a true securitization, you would never have any direct transfers (A to D) from the originator to the trust. Third, these A to D transfers are totally inconsistent with the representations and warranties made in the PSA to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to the holders of the bonds (the “Certificateholders”) issued by the Trust. Fourth, in many cases the A to D documents are executed by parties who are not employed by the originator but who claim to have “signing authority” or some type of “agency authority” from the originator. Finally, in many of these A to D document cases the originator is legally defunct at the time the document is in fact signed or the document is signed with a current date but then states that it has an “effective date” that was one or two years earlier. Hence, we have what I call the Alphabet Problem.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTRCLAIMS RELATED TO POOLING & SERVICING AGREEMENTS 1. Plaintiff failed to comply with the foreclosure prevention loan servicing requirement imposed on Plaintiff pursuant to the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 1701x(c)(5) which requires all private lenders servicing non-federally insured home loans, including the Plaintiff, to advise borrowers, including this separate Defendant, of any home ownership counseling Plaintiff offers together with information about counseling offered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2. Plaintiff cannot legally pursue foreclosure unless and until Plaintiff demonstrates compliance with 12 U.S.C. 1701x(c)(5). 3. Plaintiff failed to provide separate Defendants with legitimate and non predatory access to the debt management and relief that must be made available to borrowers, including this Defendant pursuant to and in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission that controls and applies to the subject mortgage loan. 4. Plaintiff’s non-compliance with the conditions precedent to foreclosure imposed on the plaintiff pursuant to the applicable pooling and servicing agreement is an actionable event that makes the filing of this foreclosure premature based on a failure of a contractual and/or equitable condition precedent to foreclosure which denies Plaintiff’s ability to carry out this foreclosure. 5. The special default loan servicing requirements contained in the subject pooling and servicing agreement are incorporated into the terms of the mortgage contract between the parties as if written therein word for word and the defendants are entitled to rely upon the servicing terms set out in that agreement. 6. Defendants are third party beneficiaries of the Plaintiff’s pooling and servicing agreement and entitled to enforce the special default servicing obligations of the plaintiff specified therein. 7. Plaintiff cannot legally pursue foreclosure unless and until Plaintiff demonstrates compliance with the foreclosure prevention servicing imposed by the subject pooling and servicing agreement under which the plaintiff owns the subject mortgage loan. 8. The section of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) is a public document on file and online at http://www.secinfo.com and the entire pooling and servicing agreement is incorporated herein. 9. The Plaintiff failed, refused or neglected to comply, prior to the commencement of this action, with the servicing obligations specifically imposed on the plaintiff by the PSA in many particulars, including, but not limited to: a. Plaintiff failed to service and administer the subject mortgage loan in compliance with all applicable federal state and local laws. b. Plaintiff failed to service and administer the subject loan in accordance with the customary an usual standards of practice of mortgage lenders and servicers. c. Plaintiff failed to extend to defendants the opportunity and failed to permit a modification, waiver, forbearance or amendment of the terms of the subject loan or to in any way exercise the requisite judgment as is reasonably required pursuant to the PSA. 10. The Plaintiff has no right to pursue this foreclosure because the Plaintiff has failed to provide servicing of this residential mortgage loan in accordance with the controlling servicing requirements prior to filing this foreclosure action. 11. Defendants have a right to receive foreclosure prevention loan servicing from the Plaintiff before the commencement or initiation of this foreclosure action. 12. Defendants are in doubt regarding their rights and status as borrowers under the National Housing Act and also under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Defendants are now subject to this foreclosure action by reason of the above described illegal acts and omissions of the Plaintiff. 13. Defendants are being denied and deprived by Plaintiff of their right to access the required troubled mortgage loan servicing imposed on the plaintiff and applicable to the subject mortgage loan by the National Housing Act and also under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 14. Defendants are being illegally subjected by the Plaintiff to this foreclosure action, being forced to defend the same and they are being charged illegal predatory court costs and related fees, and attorney fees. Defendants are having their credit slandered and negatively affected, all of which constitutes irreparable harm to Defendants for the purpose of injunctive relief. 15. As a proximate result of the Plaintiff’s unlawful actions set forth herein, Defendants continue to suffer the irreparable harm described above for which monetary compensation is inadequate. 18. Defendants have a right to access the foreclosure prevention servicing prescribed by the National Housing Act and under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission which right is being denied to them by the Plaintiff. 16. These acts were wrongful and predatory acts by the plaintiff, through its predecessor in interest, and were intentional and deceptive. 17. There is a substantial likelihood that Defendants will prevail on the merits of the case.

From the Dark side on Wrongful foreclosure

Defending Wrongful Foreclosure Actions in California

Nearly all foreclosure professionals and loan servicers are familiar with the process for a non-judicial foreclosure action in California. A notice of intent to foreclose is followed by a notice of default which is followed by a notice of trustee’s sale. The last step, the actual non-judicial foreclosure sale, usually occurs within approximately 120 days from the filing of the notice of default. For the vast majority of loans, the California non-judicial foreclosure process is an effective and relatively inexpensive method for a servicer to obtain its security. In most non-judicial foreclosures, the only court time and court costs involved are those for the usually uncontested municipal court unlawful detainer which is initiated by the servicer in order to obtain possession from former borrowers who refuse to vacate their former homes.

For a small but seemingly growing number of loans, the non-judicial foreclosure process has become rather judicial. To borrowers who choose to allocate their resources away from debt payment towards fighting a loan servicer’s right to its payments and its security, the nonjudicial foreclosure process is a war of attrition which ranges from the bankruptcy court, to superior court to municipal court. While serial bankruptcy filings are often a frustrating delay to a servicer obtaining possession of its security, the wrongful foreclosure action filed in superior court is potentially the most time consuming weapon in the arsenal of the litigious borrower.

What is a Wrongful Foreclosure Action?

A wrongful foreclosure action is an action filed in superior court by the borrower against the servicer, the holder of the note, and usually the foreclosing trustee. The complaint usually alleges that there was an “illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed of trust.” Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d. 1. The wrongful foreclosure action is often brought prior to the non-judicial foreclosure sale in order to delay the sale, but the action may also be brought after the non-judicial foreclosure sale. In most cases, a wrongful foreclosure action alleges that the amount stated as due and owing in the notice of default is incorrect for one or more of the following reasons: an incorrect interest rate adjustment, incorrect tax impound accounts, misapplied payments, a forbearance agreement which was not adhered to by the servicer, unnecessary forced place insurance, improper accounting for a confirmed chapter 11 or chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. Wrongful foreclosure actions are also brought when the servicers accept partial payments after initiation of the wrongful foreclosure process, then continue with the foreclosure. Companion allegations for emotional distress and punitive damages usually accompany any wrongful foreclosure action.

The causes of action alleged in a wrongful foreclosure action filed in California may include the following: breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 (Unfair Business Practices), quiet title, wrongful foreclosure (violation of Civil Code Section 2924), accounting and/or promissory estoppel.

The reciprocal nature of attorney fees provisions in all real property notes and deeds of trust dictate that any wrongful foreclosure action be taken seriously. Damages available to a borrower in a wrongful foreclosure action are an amount sufficient to compensate for all detriment proximately caused by the servicer or trustee’s wrongful conduct. Civil Code Section 3333. Damages are usually measured by value of the property at the time of the sale in excess of the mortgage and lien against the property. Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d. 1. Additionally, the borrower may also obtain damages for emotional distress in a wrongful foreclosure action. Young v. Bank of America (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 108; Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d. 202. Further, if the borrower can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the servicer or trustee was guilty of fraud, oppression or malice in its wrongful conduct, punitive damages may be awarded.

How Can a Wrongful Foreclosure Action Delay Recovery of the Security?

A wrongful foreclosure suit filed in superior court will not necessarily delay a servicer’s recovery of its security. The companion filings to such a suit (notice of pending action, injunction and/or motion to consolidate) however can delay a servicer’s ultimate recovery. Delay caused by a wrongful foreclosure action can be anywhere from forty-five days to two years.

A notice of pending action (“lis pendens”) is the most common companion to a wrongful foreclosure action. A lis pendens is recorded in the county in which the real property security is located at the time the wrongful foreclosure action is filed. The only requirement for a lis pendens to be recorded is an attorney’s signature that the action which is being noticed actually involves a real property claim. The purpose of the lis pendens is to put all third parties on notice that the borrower and the servicer are litigating over the real property security. Once a lis pendens is recorded, no title insurance company will issue a title insurance policy unless and until the lis pendens is removed. Although the servicer may “bond around” the lis pendens without title insurance, the real property security is virtually inalienable.

A summary procedure for removing a lis pendens is provided in the California Code of Civil Procedure Section 405.3 et seq. This section allows a “mini trial” on the merits of the borrower’s claim. At the “mini trial”, the borrower must establish the probable validity of his/her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 405.32. If the borrower cannot establish his or her claim by a preponderance of evidence, the lis pendens is expunged. The penalty for the borrower who wrongfully records a notice of pending action is that, in most cases, the court directs such a borrower to pay the servicer’s attorneys’ fees. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 405.38.

While a lis pendens can be filed at any time in the foreclosure process, a borrower applies for an injunction prior to the foreclosure sale with the intent of keeping the foreclosure sale at bay until issues in the lawsuit are resolved. The lawsuit can take anywhere from ten to twenty-four months. Generally, an injunction will only be issued if it appears to the court that: (1) the borrower is entitled to the injunction; and (2) that if the injunction is not granted, the borrower will be subject to irreparable harm. Like an action to expunge a lis pendens, a borrower’s application for an injunction is essentially a “mini-trial” on the merits. California Civil Code of Civil Procedure Section 526 et seq.

The issue at stake in nearly all injunctive relief action applications is the amount due and owing on the note and deed of trust. For the injunction hearing, it is imperative that the servicer provide a detailed analysis of the amount it contends is due and owing on the note and deed of trust at issue. If for some reason the servicer is unable to provide a breakdown of the amounts due and owing on the note and deed of trust at issue, or at least provide sufficient information to refute the borrower’s allegations, it is likely the injunction will be issued. In most cases, the injunction will be conditioned upon the borrower’s filing a significant bond and making timely debt payments. Upon occasion, judges who are not particularly enamoured with servicers and who are provided a heart wrenching tale in the borrower’s injunction application will issue minimal bonds and little or no debt service requirements. This worst case scenario translates into a servicer being unable to sell the security and receiving no payments on the underlying debt during the life of the lawsuit. Technically, modifications of injunctions are allowed for a change in law, a change in circumstances, or to prevent injustice. California Civil Code § 533. In reality, judges are loath to modify an injunction after it is issued and prior to a decision on the merits. Once an injunction with little or no debt service or bond is in place, the wrongful foreclosure suit will be a long and expensive process because the borrower has lost all incentive for a quick resolution of the action.

Another way borrowers delay a servicer’s recovery of its security through a wrongful foreclosure action is by consolidating their wrongful foreclosure action with their unlawful detainer action. Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 141. The Asuncion case which is usually relied upon by borrowers for consolidation contains an egregious fact scenario including clear fraud in the inducement of the loan. Judges however, do not limit the application of Asuncion to cases where fraud is alleged by the borrower. In applying Asuncion, a court can allow the unlawful detainer suit to be consolidated with the wrongful foreclosure action if there is a mere similarity of issues in the cases.

If the superior court allows consolidation, a servicer’s right to possession of the real property security will be stayed until a verdict for the servicer is obtained in the wrongful foreclosure action. Courts generally will condition such consolidation on borrower debt service payments. Again, though, the real property security will not be recovered until a final decision on the merits in the wrongful foreclosure action is reached. As discussed above, this can be anywhere from ten months to two years.

SELF-EXAMINATION: What to do when sued for a wrongful foreclosure?

The most important words in defending a wrongful foreclosure action are “critical self-examination”. Before determining strategy for the upcoming (possibly lengthy) lawsuit, it is critical to know if any of the borrower’s allegations of the servicers breach of duty are correct. If the borrower’s allegations are correct and the borrower wins the lawsuit, the servicer will have to unwind (or be precluded from conducting) the foreclosure sale, and pay the borrowers legal bill. Accordingly, the self-examination must be critical and comprehensive.

The necessary self-examination is much more than: Did we apply the payments correctly?… Yes… next question. In addition to reviewing proper payment application, the servicer should review all facets of servicing the loan in question. If we imposed force place insurance, did we have a right to do so? Did we inadvertently charge the escrow account (for excessive amount of taxes, for example)? Did we improperly account for a debtor with a confirmed bankruptcy plan? Did we adjust the interest rate correctly? Did we enter into a forbearance agreement to which we did not adhere? These are the types of questions a servicer needs to ask itself in preparing for a defense of a wrongful foreclosure action.

If, after a careful analysis of the borrower’s complaint, the servicer determines that an error was made, and given that the servicer may be required to pay for the borrower’s attorney, the question then becomes, what is the quickest way out of this lawsuit? For example, can the servicer rescind the sale, clarify negative credit information and get the borrower to dismiss the action? If the borrower appears intransigent and trial is likely, the servicer’s first concern should be to counter the “shifting” of attorney’s fees under the note.

“Offers in compromise” can counteract the shifting of the claims provided for in the note and deed of trust. Cal Code Civ. Proc. Section 998. An offer in compromise is a procedure which allows a servicer to determine the borrower’s likely damages and offer that sum to a borrower to settle the action. If the borrower refuses to settle and ultimately is awarded less than the servicer’s offer in compromise, the borrower will not recover his/her post-offer attorney fees and will be required to pay the servicer’s post-offer attorney fees. California Code Civil Procedure Section 998.

An offer in compromise is only appropriate if the borrower is “in it for the long haul,” is represented by an attorney and is likely to obtain a judgment in its favor. If the borrower is self-represented, an aggressive defense of significant discovery and early dispositive motions may be appropriate. Other areas of weakness in a borrower’s case may be lack of damages and lack of standing. As Munson v. Moore, supra indicates if there is no equity at the time of the alleged wrongful foreclosure sale, the borrower may not have suffered recoverable damages. The borrower’s standing to bring the action may be successfully attacked if the borrower has filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy protection to delay eviction or if the borrower can be declared a vexatious litigant. If a review of the borrower’s origination file uncovers material misrepresentations of fact, a counter-suit for mortgage fraud may be appropriate. The best strategy for defending a wrongful foreclosure action is never delay for delay’s sake.

If the servicer, after an exhaustive self-examination, determines that the borrower’s lawsuit is not justified, the goal shifts from control of damages to obtaining possession and clean title as soon as possible. Usually, the best method for this is the motion to expunge lis pendens. This procedure, as discussed above, is usually a mini-trial on the merits. Oftentimes, after the lis pendens is expunged and the real property security is sold, the borrower’s motivation to litigate is lost. The strategies previously discussed are also available when the borrower’s suit is likely non-meritorious, but they are usually not necessary. If no lis pendens was recorded by the borrower, early aggressive discovery followed by an early summary judgment motion is often the best route available to the servicer for the early resolution of the action.

Conclusion: Can wrongful foreclosure actions be avoided?

All of the preventive actions that an army of lawyers could recommend will not dissuade the borrower who feels wronged by his bank and wants the bank “to pay” from filing a wrongful foreclosure action. Many marginal wrongful foreclosure actions can be avoided, however, if the servicer reviews every communication sent to a borrower, (note adjustment letter, bankruptcy coupon letter, partial payment acceptance letter, etc.); with the following critical question: can this communication be misunderstood by the borrower or can its meaning be twisted by a clever debtor’s lawyer? If the answer to this question is yes, can this letter be written in a manner which more completely protects the servicer’s interest? Additionally, the servicer must truly understand the numbers which comprise the amount due stated on the notice of default and be certain of their accuracy.

California law provides many unique procedural remedies which may be employed in battling a wrongful foreclosure action. Judicious use of these procedures by counsel and close coordination between counsel and client can lessen the pain of defending a wrongful foreclosure action

Now they have to admit it they violated the law and will be liable for Billions

BofA, Wells, Citi see foreclosure probe fines

By Joe Rauch and Clare Baldwin
CHARLOTTE, N.C./NEW YORK | Fri Feb 25, 2011 9:20pm EST
CHARLOTTE, N.C./NEW YORK (Reuters) – Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo — three of the biggest banks in the United States — said they could face fines from a regulatory probe into the industry’s foreclosure practices.
The statements, made in regulatory filings on Friday, are the most direct admission yet from major banks that they could have to pay significant amounts of money to settle probes and lawsuits alleging that they improperly foreclosed on homes.
Bank of America Corp (BAC.N), the largest U.S. bank by assets, said the probe could lead to “material fines” and “significant” legal expenses in 2011.
Wells Fargo & Co (WFC.N), the largest U.S. mortgage lender, said it is likely to face fines or sanctions, such as a foreclosure moratorium or suspension, imposed by federal or state regulators. It said some government agency enforcement action was likely and could include civil money penalties.
Citigroup Inc (C.N) said it could pay fines or set up principal reduction programs.
The biggest U.S. mortgage lenders are being investigated by 50 state attorneys general and U.S. regulators for foreclosing on homes without having proper paperwork in place or without having properly reviewed paperwork before signing it.
The bad documentation threatens to slow down the foreclosure process and invalidate some repossessions.
Sources familiar with discussions among federal authorities have said they could seek as much as $20 billion in total from lenders to settle the foreclosure probe, which began last fall.
Analysts said the acknowledgment of potential foreclosure liabilities highlights the continuing struggles of the largest U.S. banks after the world financial crisis.
“Are they trying? Sure, but this is not an easy fix and these kinds of problems are going to hang around the banks for years,” said Matt McCormick, a portfolio manager with Cincinnati-based Bahl & Gaynor Investment Counsel.
McCormick said he has sold nearly all of his U.S. bank holdings because of concerns over foreclosures and other losses.
Beyond direct fines due to regulators, banks may also end up paying government-controlled mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for the foreclosure delays.
Bank of America said it recorded $230 million in compensatory fees in the fourth quarter that it expects to owe the government mortgage companies.
The bank said its projected costs for settlements for all legal matters it is facing, including mortgage issues, could be $145 million to $1.5 billion beyond what it has already reserved.
Wells Fargo said that in the worst-case scenario, as of the end of 2010, it could have to pay $1.2 billion more than it has set aside to cover legal matters.
Citigroup said it could face up to about $4 billion more in losses from all sorts of lawsuits, including but not limited to those relating to mortgages and foreclosures.
Wells Fargo said in October that it plans to amend 55,000 foreclosure filings nationwide, amid signs that documentation for some foreclosures was incomplete or incorrect. Other banks made similar moves.
Other banks echoed the concern over foreclosures in a wave of annual report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday.
Atlanta-based SunTrust said it expects regulators may issue a consent order, which will require the largest mortgage lenders to fix problems with their foreclosure processes, and potentially levy fines.
Wells Fargo shares closed 3.1 percent higher at $32.40 on the New York Stock Exchange. Bank of America shares closed 1.6 percent higher at $14.20 and Citi shares closed 0.2 percent higher at $4.70, also on the New York Stock Exchange.
(Reporting by Joe Rauch, Clare Baldwin and Maria Aspan; Editing by Gary Hill)

The law of capitalism

The Impact of Citizens United on Judicial Elections. Further why can’t I find a judge willing to follow the law. It is clear that the concerned citizen or dispossessed homeowner has no dog in the fight. The result is clear judges will support the banks the FDIC because there support and bias is now tied to the law of Capitalism. As can be seen in the sweetheart deal that One West Bank gets when they agree to buy Inymac Bank they get 90% buyback guarantee for paper they only pay a fraction of face value. Then we look to see who the major stockholders are and it becomes clear who benefits at the expense of the taxpayer. Oh whops i went to find the major stock holders where on yahoo only to find they are not publicly held that explains a lot.It’s privately held by a “consortium of private investors.” That means there’s no public stock, and presumably no stock symbol. This privacy is presumably why it gets away with being one of only four major mortgage companies who have not signed on to the “Making Home Affordable” Plan, as of 6/30/09.Read more: http://wiki.answers.com Q/OneWest_Bank_Group_LLC_stock_symbol#ixzz1E8b8GmYj
In enforcing its rights under the loans purchased from IndyMac, OneWest Bank has taken a much more aggressive approach to foreclosing on properties.

In Citizens United v. FEC,[1] the United States Supreme Court struck down the long-standing federal ban on corporate independent expenditures in elections.[ii] The transformational effect that unrestricted corporate and union spending will have on elections for legislative and executive offices has been widely denounced.[iii] But the most severe impact of Citizens United may be felt in state judicial elections.

Just last year, the Supreme Court ordered a West Virginia judge disqualified from hearing the case of a campaign supporter who had spent extravagantly to elect the judge. It did so after concluding that, by refusing to step aside from hearing his benefactor’s case, the judge had violated the opposing party’s constitutional right to a fair hearing before an impartial court.[iv] Yet, by opening the door to expanded corporate spending in judicial races, Citizens United is likely to make this type of conflict of interest more common, and to increase pressures on judges who seek to remain independent and impartial.

Equally important, heightened spending in judicial races will almost certainly exacerbate existing public concerns that justice is for sale to the highest bidder. As Justice John Paul Stevens noted in dissent, the Citizens United decision came at a time “when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch.”[v] And after Citizens United, if retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s predictions are correct, “the problem of campaign contributions in judicial elections might get considerably worse and quite soon.”[vi]

This paper examines the damage that runaway spending in judicial elections is having on our state judiciaries, and offers several policy recommendations that states should consider in responding to the threat that outsized campaign spending poses to fair and independent courts. It first summarizes recent trends in judicial election spending and documents the impact that escalating spending is having on public confidence in the courts. Next, the paper highlights seven states in which Citizens United’s impact on judicial campaigns is likely to be significant, and explains why the decision is likely to spur increased special interest spending in judicial elections. The paper concludes with proposals for responding to our increasingly expensive judicial elections: public financing for judicial campaigns; enhanced disclosure and disqualification rules; and replacing judicial elections with merit selection systems in which bipartisan committees nominate the most qualified applicants, governors appoint judges from the nominees, and voters choose whether to retain the judges at the ballot box.
Introduction

Retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recently explained the risks that unlimited campaign spending poses to fair and independent courts — and the likelihood that Citizens United will intensify these risks:

If you’re a litigant appearing before a judge, it makes sense to invest in that judge’s campaign. No states can possibly benefit from having that much money injected into a political judicial campaign. The appearance of bias is high, and it destroys any credibility in the courts.

[After Citizens United], we can anticipate labor unions’ trial lawyers might have the means to win one kind of an election, and that a tobacco company or other corporation might win in another election. If both sides open up their spending, mutually assured destruction is probably the most likely outcome. It would end both judicial impartiality and public perception of impartiality.[vii]

The threat to our state courts is real — and serious. Thirty-nine states use elections to select some or all of their judges.[viii] According to the National Center on State Courts, nearly 9 in 10 — fully 87% — of all state judges run in elections, either to gain a seat on the bench in the first place, or to keep the seat once there.[ix] In a 2001 poll of state and local judges, more than 90% of all elected judges nationwide said they are under pressure to raise money in election years, and almost every elected judge on a state high court — 97% — said they were under a “great deal” or at least some pressure to raise money in the years they faced election.[x]

Corporations and special interests are already major spenders in judicial campaigns. As repeat players in high-stakes litigation, these groups have strong incentives to support judges they believe are likely to favor their interests. This is particularly true on state high courts, where electing a majority or a crucial swing vote can make the difference in litigation involving multi-million dollar claims. As a result, business interests and lawyers account for nearly two-thirds of all contributions to state supreme court candidates. Pro-business groups have a distinct advantage: in 2005-2006, for example, they were responsible for 44% of all contributions to supreme court candidates, compared with 21% for lawyers.[xi] In 2006, pro-business groups were responsible for more than 90% of all spending by interest groups on television advertising in supreme court campaigns.[xii]

This special interest spending has occurred in judicial elections despite the fact that approximately half the states previously banned or sharply restricted corporations from using treasury funds for campaign advocacy. None of these restrictions is permissible after Citizens United. The inevitable result will be increased corporate spending in judicial elections — and increased threats to independent and impartial courts.

HIGH COURTS KNOCKING DOWN PRETENDER SHELL GAME

Posted on February 1, 2011 by Neil Garfield
ONE ON ONE WITH NEIL GARFIELD
COMBO ANALYSIS TITLE AND SECURITIZATION

SEE nj-game-over-standing-required-no-pretender-lenders-allowed-personal-knowledge-required-to-authenticate
SEE ibanez-huge-win-for-borrowers-in-massachusetts-non-judicial-state-high-court
Maybe the Game IS Over
Show me the law! That was the answer I was getting from skeptical lawyers and Judges three years, 2 years ago and even six months ago. Now there are high Courts and trial courts from Coast to Coast that are answering. It isn’t “new law” as the lawyers for the banks are suggesting, and it isn’t about a free house for borrowers.
In plain language this is about the application of law that has governed business conduct for centuries with the consequential effect of (a) preventing intervening parties from avoiding the requirements of due process and getting title issued to a house in which they never had any interest (a free house for pretender lenders) and (b) opening the door to the inner sanctum where the real parties in interest can interact in ways that will settle the mortgage mess (corruption of title and fraud) in a direct manner as best as possible under the circumstances.
Wall Street and those who protect Wall Street in government having nothing left but scare tactics — as if overturning millions of fraudulent transactions and foreclosures would somehow result in in the end of the world or weaken our nation. President Sarkozy answered that ridiculous assertion in sharp words to Jamie Dimon at the Davos conference when he pointed to the wild irresponsible schemes that others have less gently refereed to as criminal fraud. Sarkozy was speaking for the head of every government in the world and every central banker except perhaps a select few who were providing lubricant to Wall Street’s contrivances during the period of 2001-2009.

If our position in the world depends upon protecting those who commit fraud, if our credibility is seen as depending upon maintaining a status quo in which millions go starving and homeless, if the light we shine blinds the eyes of people who wish to see, then we have forsaken our heritage, and forever changed and corrupted the ideal that the United States of America is a nation of laws, in which here, better than anywhere else on Earth, here is where the people are free to pursue truth, justice and prosperity under the watchful eye of a protective government

mass joinder litigation complaint

And the first “meaty” part of the complaint….

5. The fraud perpetrated by the Countrywide Defendants from 2003 through 2007, including by BofA starting no later than 2007, was willful and pervasive. It begin with simple greed and then accelerated when Countrywide founder and CEO Angelo Mozilo (“Mozilo”) discovered that Countrywide could not sustain its business, unless it used its size and large market share in California to systematically create false and inflated property appraisals throughout California. Countrywide then used these false property valuations to induce Plaintiffs and other borrowers into ever-larger loans on increasingly risky terms. As Mozilo knew from no later than 2004, these loans were unsustainable for Countrywide and the borrowers and to a certainty would result in a crash that would destroy the equity invested by Plaintiffs and other Countrywide borrowers.

In other words, Countrywide is alleged to not only have made bad loans, but also to have intentionally inflated appraisals.

6. Hand-in-hand with its fraudulently-obtained mortgages, Mozilo and others at Countrywide hatched a plan to “pool” the foregoing mortgages and sell the pools for inflated value. Rapidly, these two intertwined schemes grew into a brazen plan to disregard underwriting standards and fraudulently inflate property values – county-by-county, city-by-city, person-by-person – in order to take business from legitimate mortgage-providers, and moved on to massive securities fraud hand-in-hand with concealment from, and deception of, Plaintiffs and other mortgagees on an unprecedented scale.

Oh, that’s rich. So not only (it is alleged) did Countrywide bamboozle borrowers, they also bamboozled investors.

9. It is now all too clear that this was the ultimate high-stakes fraudulent investment scheme of the last decade. Couched in banking and securities jargon, the deceptive gamble with consumers’ primary assets – their homes – was nothing more than a financial fraud perpetrated by Defendants and others on a scale never before seen. This scheme led directly to a mortgage meltdown in California that was substantially worse than any economic problems facing the rest of the United States. From 2008 to the present, Californians’ home values decreased by considerably more than most other areas in the United States as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ scheme set forth herein. The Countrywide Defendants’ business premise was to leave the borrowers, including Plaintiffs, holding the bag once Countrywide and its executives had cashed in reaping huge salaries and bonuses and selling Countrywide’s shares based on their inside information, while investors were still buying the increasingly overpriced mortgage pools and before the inevitable dénouement. This massive fraudulent scheme was a disaster both foreseen by Countrywide and waiting to happen. Defendants knew it, and yet Defendants still induced the Plaintiffs into their scheme without telling them.

There’s the base of it all….

24. Defendants have gone to great lengths to avoid producing documents in this litigation because they know that such documents will establish all details of the massive fraud they perpetrated on Plaintiffs and other Californians. PennyMac, the Granada Network and Defendants’ overseas operations are used by Defendants to systematically hide documents. By delaying production of documents, the Defendants are buying time as they (a) accept the benefits of the scheme described herein, (b) cover up their fraud, and (c) make it materially more expensive and difficult for Plaintiffs and their counsel to obtain a just result.

Of course there’s the famous “let’s hide Waldo” game once the gig is pretty much up. After all, if we have to produce the documents, well, our goose might be cooked – and that would be bad.

So what else is presented in here? Oh, all sorts of good stuff. Here’s a sampling:

275. Defendant CT REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC. is a California corporation – corporation number C0570795 – and is a resident of Ventura County, California. Defendant CT REAL ESTATE SERVICES has acted alongside and in concertwith BofA in carrying out the concealment described herein and in continuing to conceal from Plaintiffs, from the California general public, and from regulators the details of the securitization and sale of deeds of trust and mortgages (including those of Plaintiffs herein) that would expose all Defendants herein to liability for sale of mortgages of California citizens – including all Plaintiffs herein – for more than the actual value of the mortgage loans. The sale and particularly the undisclosed sale of mortgage loans in excess of actual value violates California Civil Code, §§ 1709 and 1710, and California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1641 et seq. and other applicable laws.

That sounds like a problem to me……

290. At the time of entering into the notes and deeds of trust referenced herein with respect to each Plaintiff, the Countrywide Defendants were bound and obligated to fully and accurately disclose:

a. Who the true lender and mortgagee were.

b. That to induce a Plaintiff to enter into the mortgage, the Countrywide Defendants caused the appraised value of Plaintiff’s home to be overstated.

c. That to disguise the inflated value of Plaintiff’s home, Countrywide was orchestrating the over-valuation of homes throughout Plaintiff’s community.

d. That to induce a Plaintiff to enter into a mortgage, the Countrywide Defendants disregarded their underwriting requirements, thereby causing Plaintiff to falsely believe that Plaintiff was financially capable of performing Plaintiff’s obligations under the mortgage, when the Countrywide Defendants knew that was untrue. One way they systematically disregarded the underwriting requirements was through the use of the Granada Network, another fact which Defendants systematically failed to disclose to any California borrower.

Ding ding ding ding ding ding!

One of the keys to this mess is that the lenders knew full well that the borrowers could not pay “as agreed”, yet made the loans anyway.

i. The sales would include sales to nominees who were not authorized under law at the time to own a mortgage, including, among others, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., a/k/a MERSCORP, Inc. (“MERS”), which according to its website was created by mortgage banking industry participants to be only a front or nominee to “streamline” the mortgage re-sale and securitization process;

ii. Plaintiff’s true financial condition and the true value of Plaintiff’s home and mortgage would not be disclosed to investors to whom the mortgage would be sold;

iii. Countrywide intended to sell the mortgage together with other mortgages as to which it also intended not to disclose the true financial condition of the borrowers or the true value of their homes or mortgages;

iv. The consideration to be sought from investors would be greater than the actual value of the said notes and deeds of trust;

and

v.The consideration to be sought from investors would be greater than the income stream that could be generated from the instruments even assuming a 0% default rate thereon;

You mean basically everything important about the loans, their quality, who they were going to be sold to, why and how was all bogus? And in addition, the price to be sought from investors exceeded the income stream that could be achieved even if nobody defaulted at all?

Heh, that’s a good gig if you can get it – and if you can find a way to do it legally.

Are there some facts behind this? Oh it appears there are…

The credit losses experienced by Countrywide in 2007 not only were foreseeable by the proposed defendants, they were in fact foreseen at least as early as September 2004. [¶ 33 (Emphasis in original)]

. . .

The credit risk described in the September 2004 warning worsened from September 2004 to August 2007. [¶ 35 (Emphasis in original)]

. . .

By no later than 2006, Mozilo and Sambol were on notice that Countrywide’s exotic loan products might not continue to be saleable into the secondary market, yet this material risk was not disclosed in Countrywide’s periodic filings. [¶ 45]

. . .

Mozilo and Sambol made affirmative misleading public statements in addition to those in the periodic filings that were designed to falsely reassure investors about the nature and quality of Countrywide’s underwriting. [¶ 91]

Oh my. 2004 eh? I seem to remember tAngelo on CNBS making multiple appearances talking about how his company was going to take market share from all these subprime lenders that collapsed, and this was going to be great for his company. Indeed, I remember chortling at the time that I believed he was a lying SOB, and of course the so-called “Fantastic Mainstream Media” lapped it up – and helped support his stock price.

It appears that the intrepid attorneys who filed this action remember that too…. and the pages surrounding 100 in the complaint document a whole bunch of them, including statements in 10Ks and 10Qs that, it is alleged, were flatly false.

And, of course, there’s this one, which I have referred to many times over the last three and a half years:

363. In the January 30, 2007 earnings conference call, Mozilo attempted to distinguish Countrywide from other lenders by stating “we backed away from the subprime area because of our concern over credit quality.” On March 13, 2007, in an interview with Maria Bartiromo on CNBC, Mozilo said that it would be a “mistake” to compare monoline subprime lenders to Countrywide. He then went on to state that the subprime market disruption in the first quarter of 2007 would “be great for Countrywide at the end of the day because all of the irrational competitors will be gone.”

I distinctly remember the cheesy suits and ties, not to mention the sprayed-on-looking tan.

370. In fact, the appraisals were inflated. Countrywide did not utilize quality underwriting processes. Countrywide’s financial condition was not sound, but was a house of cards ready to collapse, as Countrywide well knew, but Plaintiffs did not. Further, Plaintiffs’ mortgages were not refinanced with fixed rate mortgages and neither Agate nor Countrywide ever intended that they would be.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, the entire intent of these loans was not to be a mortgage at all. It was, I allege, more akin to an asset-stripping scheme where the borrower would be effectively forced to come back to the lender after a couple of years when the teaser expired or the inevitable reset or recast occurred and effectively hand over his accumulated “appreciation” in price through yet more fees to be paid to the “lender.”

I believe that for all intents and purposes, from the lender’s point of view, this was nothing more than renting the house, as passing of a clear title to the buyer was never part of what was contemplated by the lender – but of course the borrower wasn’t told this in advance – or at all.

There’s much more in the complaint, but this will do for a start.

Incidentally, the banks tried to get this removed to Federal Court and kill it, and were rebuffed, so it appears that it’s headed to trial. Plaintiff’s Bar 1, Banksters 0 thus far – I will be providing updates on this case as I become aware of them. Southern California (909)890-9192 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909)890-9192 end_of_the_skype_highlighting in Northern California(925)957-9797

joinder cases now forming

Group Seeking Plaintiffs In Massive Lawsuit Against Bank of America (Countrywide) / Chase / Wells Fargo / Citi / Onewest / GMAC

We are currently seeking homeowners in the State of California, to join our legal action against PREDATOR BANKS, for their complicity in the massive mortgage fraud schemes, known as ‘Mortgage Gate’:

The time has finally come! Law suits are exploding all over the country, because … We The People … are now going to fight back. We are going after the following banks:

Bank of America (Countrywide) / Chase / Wells Fargo / Citi / Onewest / GMAC.

Below is the link to the case Stien firm filed last summer. It’s the 117 page Complaint against Bank of America: Ronald, et al vs. Bank of America (Countrywide), Case No. BC409444.

http://www.k2-law.com/editor/user_files/files/Complaint_Ronald_TAC_7-7-10_Conformed.pdf

This case is a ‘joinder’ with currently 1,100 homeowners already onboard. Joinders are different than class actions in that, clients receive only a small share of the winnings in a class action. Eg: $100 out of a $5 Million settlement. In a joinder, however, each Complaint is settled SEPARATELY, according to the damages they directly sustained. And yet, the entire group is represented under one Complaint.

Recently our clients racked up some really great, CONSECUTIVE WINS against B of A. Take a look:

1. Five injunctions.

2. The order of Judge Chaney RESCINDING 9 notices of default (never before done in California legal history).

3. An order “Ordering Bank of America” to submit to discovery. (Heretofore, they had the audacity to refuse furnishing proof that they actually “owned” the property they stole from homeowners.)

4. An order throwing Bank of America’s motion out of Federal Court, because Ronald et al v. Bank of America is not “Preempted by Federal Law.”

5. And COUNTLESS additional orders to stop homes from being sold.

In addition, our attorneys are demanding various damages, deepening upon each unique situation of the homeowner. Those being:

1. Monetary compensation for those already foreclosed upon.
2. Principle reduction to 80% or less than current market value
3. FULL Lien striping

Folks, I’m a legal assistant and former loan modification processor. Like you, I’ve seen it all.

Let me tell you what happened to one of my clients, Mr. Flores, of Orange County, CA. Mr. Flores is a small business owner (“Beach Transmission” … cross street Lampson). He owns a little transmission shop on Beach Boulevard. He has been renting out two units at his shop for well over ten years. Mr. Flores collects $3,600 in rent each month from his two shop tenants. During the entire ten years, the IRS recognized this as certifiable INCOME on his tax returns.

But when Mr. Flores applied for a home-loan modification with Bank of America, they refused to recognize his shop rentals as income (even though the IRS has for years!). As a result, B of A tabulated his income as NEGATIVE $1,500 because they refused to factor in his $3,600 of rental income. Mr. Flores didn’t qualify for the modification, couldn’t keep up the payments, and they sold his house.

To add insult to injury, the B of A rep told me, bold-faced, over the phone that …”Mr. Flores is a high risk mortgagor according to our charts.”

I asked the rep what he meant by ‘charts’ and he said…”Well, we check the SPENDING HABITS of each borrower by age, marital status, number of children, line of work, and income, in that particular neighborhood to see who is most likely to default on a loan, or not.”

We had this person on speaker-phone and our whole office was SPEECHLESS! Were these charts part of the Lehman Brothers’ BETS that they placed against your neighborhood? (You saw the documentary on MSNBC, right?)

In other words, banks have also been foreclosing on you, not based on your income and ability to pay, but on PROBABILITY CHARTS that suggest you’re a dead-beat … based on what your neighbor down the street did.

And that was a day in the life of a loan modification processor, like me. Well, all that is about to change, folks. Just today, my colleagues told me, there is talk on several business blogs that some of the bank CEO’s are about to be indicted and will have to go to prison.

Class Actions or Mass joinder cases Widespread Wrongful Foreclosures, Failure to Reinstate Loans

It is no secret that the United States remains in the throes of one of the worst “mortgage meltdowns” in history. The problem is so widespread that the numbers are almost hard to believe. The consensus is that it will take years for the effects of this economic disaster to be unwound through any process, whether free market, government run or a combination of both. Just days ago, CNBC reported that the monthly foreclosures for January was an ALL TIME HIGH. This story ran simultaneously with the emergence of allegations of widespread “robo-signing” borrowerrs into foreclosure without regard to the actual status of their loan.

In the case of the wrongful foreclosure, the fact pattern generally goes as follows. First, borrower takes out a mortgage on his property and lender takes back a promissory note and deed of trust. Second, the borrower misses one or two payments, or falls behind one or two payments, and then catches up. Third, the lender notifies the borrower that the loan is in default, fails to reinstate the loan, and begins to generate fees and costs that must be paid by the borrower — before the lender will reinstate its loan — including but not limited to: (1) attorneys fees; (2) default interest; (3) late charges; (4) appraisal fees and (5) other costs. The lender goes on to threaten the buyer with foreclosure if the buyer fails to pay all the banks fees and costs, in addition to the principal and interest on the underlying loan this is called reinstatement.

What’s the big deal? These “default” fees and costs are quickly piled on, eroding any equity that the borrower may have slowly built up on the property (in effect paying it to the Bank), draining the borrower’s bank account and leaving the borrower unable to make up the payments or resist foreclosure. On the bank side, it’s a beautifully profitable transaction, they bleed the borrower dry, and then take the property back. Additionally they could not even initiate foreclosure in California till they comply with civil code 2923.5. One problem…..it’s illegal.

The recent case against Bank of America was based on abusive practices such as these, and resulted in a settlement of $108 million, affecting nearly 200,000 borrowers!

In California, borrowers also have the protection of a special statute, California Civil Code Section 2924c. California Civil Code § 2924c applies to any obligation secured by a deed of trust on real property, and permits the trustor, who is in default under the terms of the deed of trust, to cure the default unilaterally, by paying to the beneficiary or the successor in interest:

“(A) all amounts of principal, interest, taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, or advances actually known by the beneficiary to be, and that are, in default and shown by the beneficiary to be, and that are, in default and shown in the notice of default, under the terms of the deed of trust or mortgage and the obligation secured thereby, (B) all amounts in default on recurring obligations not shown in the notice of default, and (C) all reasonable costs and expenses, subject to subdivision (c), which are actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage, and trustee’s or attorney’s fees, subject to subdivision (d), other than the portion of principal as would not then be due had no default occurred…”

If the trustor cures the default pursuant to this section, then “all proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation and deed of trust or mortgage shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force and effect, the same as if the acceleration had not occurred”. Bottom line, if a borrower tenders payment to the lender as required under 2924c, reinstatement is mandatory!

A recently filed a class action in LA Superior Court against Greystone Bank for alleged violations of California Civil Code 2924c. Read Complaint. If you are a borrower that has been: (1) subjected to, or threatened with wrongful foreclosure, or (2) forced to pay improper fees and costs in order to avoid foreclosure, by Greystone Bank or Greystone Servicing Corporation, we would like to talk with you about your situation.

Also, if you have had a wrongful foreclosure experience with any other large bank, other than Greystone Bank or Greystone Servicing Corporation, we would like to talk with you about your experience as well. Call Southern California 909-890-9192 in Northern California 925-957-9797

MERS MEANS QUIET TITLE IN SALT LAKE CITY

Posted on January 17, 2011 by Foreclosureblues

How accurate are property records?
By Tom Harvey
The Salt Lake Tribune
Published: January 16, 2011 04:41PM
Updated: January 16, 2011 01:01AM

Chris Detrick | The Salt Lake Tribune

Walter Keane poses for a portrait at his office Friday January 7, 2011. Keane has filed lawsuit that resulted in homeowners getting title to their property even if they owed someone money because of flaws introduced into the nation’s property recording system by an entity created by the Mortgage Bankers Association.
A Utah court case in which the owner of a Draper townhouse got clear title to the property, even though he still owed $132,000 on it, raises new legal and financial questions about a property-records database created by mortgage bankers.
The award of a title free of liens means that whoever owns the promissory note on the Draper property — likely a group of faraway investors — no longer has the right to foreclose to collect on a delinquent loan. Indeed, the townhouse owner has sold the property and kept the money. Those who own the promissory note probably don’t even know what occurred.
Decisions such as the one 3rd District Judge Glen Iwasaki handed down in the Draper case could have a big impact as the state wends its way through hundreds of lawsuits involving foreclosures, loans on properties for more than they’re worth and predatory lending practices that led Utahns to lose their homes as the real-estate bubble burst.

Quiet title • Last year, the owner of the Draper property contacted attorney Walter T. Keane to help him deal with lenders, though Keane won’t say what the problem was and the owner declined an interview request.
Keane filed what’s called a “quiet title action,” a lawsuit in which the owner seeks clear title to a property free of liens by lenders or others.
In Utah, when you take out a mortgage loan to buy a home, you sign a promissory note held by the lender and a deed of trust that is recorded at the county recorder’s office. The promissory note gives the holder the right to collect payments on the loan. The recording of the deed of trust gives the lender the right to foreclose on the property if you default on the loan.
A trustee appointed by the lender also is recorded with the county and actually holds legal title to your property subject to the conditions of the trust deed.
The lawsuit over the title to the townhouse named Garbett Mortgage and Citibank FSB as the holders of promissory notes as recorded on trust deeds filed with the recorder’s office. Integrated Title Services was listed as trustee of the Garbett Mortgage trust deed, while First American Title was the trustee of the CitiBank trust deed.

Trust deed tag-along • But there also was another entity listed on the trust deeds called the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). The Mortgage Bankers Association, the Washington, D.C.-based trade group that represents major mortgage lenders, created MERS in the mid-1990s.
MERS is a database where promissory note owners are recorded, with MERS itself then listed on trust deeds at county recorder offices as the “beneficiary” of the note instead of the real lenders or note owners.
The new arrangement greased the way for mortgages to be packaged together and sold to investors who were relieved of the need under the traditional system to record the true owner of the promissory notes and to pay the county recording fees, which average around $35. Attorneys charge MERS is largely an instrument to avoid paying fees every time a promissory note is sold and resold and eventually packaged with others and owned by group of investors.
During the latter part of the real-estate boom, hundreds of thousands of subprime loans were packaged and sold using the MERS system. MERS has registered about 31 million loans, the company’s chief executive said in congressional testimony in November. CEO R.K. Arnold also said in a 2009 deposition that the system had saved its members an estimated $2.4 billion that would have gone to county governments.

Who’s the beneficiary? • Under the state’s quiet title laws, Keane said he did not have to name MERS or serve it legal papers in the lawsuit because it was not the legal owner of title to the property. Those were title companies. In addition, attorneys contend, MERS cannot be the “beneficiary” or holder of the promissory note because it readily has admitted it has no financial interest in any notes or mortgages.
Normally, a trustee named in a trust deed has a legal duty in Utah to the entity that holds the promissory note and for fair dealing with the homeowner. But in the townhouse case, First American Title filed a response to the quiet title action saying that it had no idea who had the right to collect payments on the promissory note, nor did it admit to knowing any other basic information about the property.
“The fact of the matter is First American Title doesn’t know who the beneficiary of the trust deed is and basically they disavow any interest in it,” Keane said. “It’s an acknowledgement [the recording system on this property is] a fiction, that they don’t have any real interest in it.”
Garbett Mortgage also told the court it no longer held an interest in the property. Integrated Title never filed a response to the lawsuit but did withdraw as a trustee with the Salt Lake County Recorder’s Office.
“Considering the owner of the property [the title companies who were trustees] failed to dispute the matter, and further considering that the original lender claims no further interest, the court nullified the trust deeds prior to setting any type of trial date,” Keane said.
So in the four months that the process took, the owner was able to gain title and deny the owners of his loan the ability to foreclose on the property for nonpayment. That means the promissory note owned by investors may be worth far less than they paid for it because it is no longer backed by an asset.

Record reliability • MERS spokeswoman Karmelo Lejarde said MERS actually added reliability to the system of county recording offices.
“Prior to the creation of MERS [when servicers routinely held the mortgage lien for the note owner], the information in the public land records was not accurate due to delays in recording assignments or missing assignments that never got recorded,” she said in e-mail that appears to be a boilerplate response to questions about MERS’ role in the nation’s property registration system.
“With the MERS System, mortgage data is more accurate and title information more reliable. The MERS process creates accountability and transparency, helps keep costs low, reduces the risk of errors in record keeping and makes it easier to keep track of the lien if a loan is sold to other banks and investors.”
Gary Ott, the elected Salt Lake County recorder for the past 10 years, disagrees. He characterizes his office as a neutral party that permanently safeguards records, all of which are available for public inspection. In the past, parties were able to record each transaction or lien involving a property so a clear picture emerges of the title history of a property, Ott said, adding that with computerization, the recording is now nearly instantaneous once documents are received by his office.
“You can trust what you see at the recorder’s office because it’s up to this date, everything is in order,” said Ott, “and you can’t see at MERS if it’s in order at all. That’s the scary part, and people’s homes are something you shouldn’t mess with.”

Default judgment • Keane said he’s been able to obtain quiet title in the same manner in two other cases. Another attorney, Abraham Bates, said he recently also won a quiet title action in a similar case in Salt Lake County.
In Bates’ case, a couple who owed $417,000 on a house whose value had dropped way below that also sued for quiet title.
He named the original lender and a title company listed as trustee on the trust deed. Because neither responded to the lawsuit as legally required, the judge granted the couple a default judgment that still must be verified in court, Bates said.
Bates said under Utah laws, it was not necessary to serve MERS legal papers, as it was not in the Draper townhouse case.
“MERS is not the beneficiary of the trust deed,” Bates said. “MERS did not make the mortgage loan.”

New questions • While these decisions stripped the owners of the promissory notes of the ability to foreclose on the property to recoup missed payments, it does not preclude them from suing the people who signed the notes to try to recover lost monies.
But that action would open up a new line of questions about the MERS method of property recording, said Christopher Peterson, a University of Utah law professor who has made a national name for himself recently by questioning the legal foundations of MERS’ appearance in property-recording records and its role in foreclosures.
Under laws adopted by all 50 states, the owner of a “negotiable instrument” such as a promissory note must be in physical possession of the document, said Peterson. Otherwise it would be like someone trying to cash a photocopy of a check instead of the actual check.
“One cannot be a holder of a note unless one is in physical possession of that note,” he said.
But Peterson said evidence is coming out in courts that shows the actual promissory notes or mortgages signed by buyers were not transferred as the notes made their way into the mortgage-backed securities investment pools.
That could mean in these cases that no one is in a position to try to collect because the actual notes are lost or destroyed, potentially making some promissory notes investors think they hold worthless.

Right to foreclose • Bates said he has more than 100 lawsuits pending over MERS-related questions and has hired more attorneys for his firm to handle the increasing load.
State courts have been more favorable than federal courts to homeowners seeking to halt foreclosure proceedings based on questions about MERS’ legal standing under state and federal laws, the attorneys say.
Rulings have gone different ways in different courts. But Bates said he and Peterson are teaming up to appeal a recent ruling by U.S. District Judge Tena Campbell that dismissed a lawsuit claiming MERS did not have the legal right to initiate foreclosure proceedings.
The attorneys are appealing Campell’s ruling as it relates to Utah law to the Utah Supreme Court. A decision will help sort out the issues with MERS over whether it actually can initiate foreclosures even if it does not have any financial interest in the promissory note, Bates said.
A ruling favorable to the homeowner “would be an absolute tsunami in terms of foreclosure in the state of Utah,” he said.
If MERS is not able to start a foreclosure action, “then there will be a brick wall put up over all nonjudicial foreclosures prosecuted in this state,” Bates said.
tharvey@sltrib.com

What is MERS?
The Mortgage Bankers Association created the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, or MERS, in the mid-1990s. It is a database that holds the names of the entities that have a financial interest in a particular mortgage, such as investment funds that bought bundles of mortgages called mortgage-backed securities. MERS is recorded on many property deeds of trust in Utah as the “beneficiary” of a loan taken out on a property even if that loan is sold and resold many times. MERS allows the actual loan owners to avoid paying fees every time a loan is sold.

MERS CEO R.K. Arnold Leaving Company go figure!

Who knows, maybe his resignation has something to do with this article where he admits that they have bifuricated the note from the mortgage and have been doing so for many years with the servicers,

As investors bought more and more loans in the secondary market, many of them began to contract with servicing
companies to handle loan servicing obligations. A servicer is a company that a mortgage loan investor hires to handle
payment processing, tax and insurance escrows, foreclosure and other matters related to the loan or the property. Often, the servicer is the same lender that originated the loan, sold the beneficial ownership in the secondary market and agreed to continue servicing the loan for the new beneficial owner.

For these servicing companies to perform their duties satisfactorily, the note and mortgage were bifurcated. The
investor or its designee held the note and named the servicing company as mortgagee, a structure that became standard. Some servicing companies have grown quite large, and a very active secondary market in servicing contracts has developed as well. Now more than $ 400 billion in servicing contracts trade annually.

A servicing contract is not an interest in real estate. Unlike a mortgage, it has nothing to do with legal title to the
property and is personal property under UCC § 9-106. Even before MERS, servicers had no reason to appear in the
public land records, except to receive the legal process they need to service loans properly.

The bifurcated structure worked fine for a long time, but the sheer volume of transfers between servicing
companies and the resulting need to record assignments caused a heavy drag on the secondary market. The burden
affected lenders, title companies, consumers and even local recorders. Assignment processing for the sale of a relatively modest loan portfolio can take up to six months to complete. Error rates as high as 33% are common. With the active secondary market in servicing contracts, more than four million loans are affected annually. Loan servicing can trade several times before even the first assignment in a chain is recorded, leaving the public land records clogged with unnecessary assignments. Sometimes these assignments are recorded in the wrong sequence, clouding title to the property.

see full article “There is Life on MERS”
MERS CEO R.K. Arnold Leaving Company

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/21/2011 14:23 -0500
Is the biggest fraud in the history of the US housing market about to come unglued? If so, take our prediction of a $100 billion total in future BofA rep and warranty reserves and triple it.
From the WSJ:
The chief executive of the privately-held Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, or MERS, is planning to leave the company and an announcement could come within days, according to people familiar with the matter.

The company has been under fire by Congress and state officials for its role in the mortgage-document crisis. The firm’s board of directors has met in recent days to address the fate of the company and its chief executive, R.K. Arnold, the people said.

Arnold and other MERS executives didn’t respond to requests for comment. A MERS spokeswoman Friday declined comment. Arnold, a former U.S. Army Ranger, has served as the CEO and president of Merscorp Inc., the parent company of MERS, since 1998 and has been with the company since its inception 15 years ago, according to a corporate biography.

MERS was built by Fannie Mae (FNMA), Freddie Mac (FMCC), and several large U.S. banks in 1996 as an electronic registry of land records. That created a parallel database to facilitate the packaging of loans into securities that could be sold and re-sold without being recorded in local county courthouses, reducing costs for banks. The company’s name is listed as the agent for mortgage lenders on more than 65 million home loans.

But the company’s practices have begun to receive heavy scrutiny from state prosecutors and federal regulators, particularly in light of foreclosure-document problems that surfaced last fall. State and federal lawmakers have begun to consider bills that would make it harder for banks to use or foreclose on properties through MERS.

MERS’s legal standing also has been challenged by legal experts because it doesn’t own the underlying debt. Previously, the mortgage and the promissory note weren’t split between different parties.

Critics of the company have raised concerns over whether notes were properly assigned or tracked within the electronic system. Judges have also begun to question the company’s practices of “deputizing” hundreds of bank executives to handle foreclosures by naming them “vice presidents” of MERS.

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Why modify

California Loan Modification Lawyer

(Effective October 11, 2009  The McCandless Firm complies with SB 94)

By now, you may have made your own attempts at loan modification. You now know what we have known: Despite all the government and media hype, the voluntary loan modifications are not the silver bullet to the foreclosure crisis. Even after President Obama introduced the HAMP program, only about 8% of the anticipated 9 million loan modification applications have been considered. Never forget that lenders and loan servicers are in the business of making money for their shareholders, not solving people’s financial problems. Despite the incentives created by the government, loan servicers remain inconsistent, negligent, understaffed, arrogant and just plain indifferent to the financial plight of most folks. If you’ve ever wondered why the bank doesn’t seem to care? Consider that it is the investor, not loan servicer, takes the financial hit when a property is foreclosed. Loan servicers make more money when a borrower falls into foreclosure. Servicers have an incentive to drag out the foreclosure and loan modification process. Despite what the government and the lenders may say, the loan modification or short sale process is not as quick and easy as has been portrayed.

VIOLATIONS CAN GIVE YOU LEVERAGE to secure a “SETTLEMENT”, not a LOAN MODIFICATION.

Whether hiring a lawyer will increase your chances for success a little or a lot depends on whether the lender has done something wrong. This is why Attorney Roberts encourages every client to commission an audit of the original loan documents, review the appraisal and take measure of any agency relationships between the broker, the lender, the appraiser, the escrow and the title companies. Anecdotally, Attorney Roberts believes that your chances of success increase fourfold if there is litigation or bankruptcy. Hiring a lawyer to review your options and handle the process makes sense. Your chances of obtaining a substantial loan modification will be greatly improved if the lender has violated the law…but how will you ever know? A lawyer can help you gain negotiating leverage on your behalf by finding violations of the law or capitalizing on provisions of the bankruptcy code.

FRONT DOOR LOAN MODIFICATIONS

A loan modification can still be secured even where violations do not exist or the borrower chooses to ignore them. In California, SB94 was recently signed into law effectively banning advance fee loan modification services by even lawyers. Attorney Roberts operates in full compliance of the new law. If you hire a lawyer to provide loan modification services rather than to pursue a violation of your rights, special rules now apply and specific disclosures must be made letting you know that you can do the loan modification yourself and avoid fees.

It’s true; you can pursue a loan modification yourself, just as you have the right to represent yourself in court. And to be honest, even with a lawyer, unless a violation has occurred, you are at the mercy of the loan servicer’s interpretation and analysis of your situation. If the servicer loses your paperwork, berates you, keeps you on hold for hours, ignores you, or simply denies the loan modification without explanation…you have NO RECOURSE. You are not entitled to a loan modification and you have no right to sue if denied. Even if the lender ignores the guidelines of the government’s HAMP program, you can’t sue. When you apply for a front door loan modification, you are asking for a break. It is you and not the lender, who seeks to break the mortgage contract. You have no leverage. You cannot force the lender to give you any consideration, whatsoever. Even if you clearly qualify for a loan modification under the printed guidelines of the government HAMP program, if the lender believes that it would make more money in the long run by foreclosing, you can legitimately be denied.

Why pay a lawyer to work on your loan modification? A lawyer adds attention to detail and diligence to the process, as well as a better idea of the location of each loan servicers’ “sweet spot”. Experience and daily contact with the loan servicers provides some advantage as well. The law firm may act as a force to counter act the incompetence built into the lender’s process. Attorney Roberts and his staff simply assume that the loan mod process will be screwed up by the lender, repeatedly. The firm expects that the lenders will lose paperwork, fail to respond and provide conflicting information. The firm is not shocked when a home is improperly sold despite an approval of a loan modification as it happens all the time. The Law Office of The McCandless Firm is there to respond to these constant lender screw ups and bear the brunt of your frustration.

The The McCandless Firm is always prepared to react to the latest bank screw-up or client crisis. One of the favorite tricks of the lenders is to wait to the very last minute before the sale to approve or deny a postponement or a loan modification. This game of chicken may happen every month as the loan modification process drones on. The firm is always ready with a PLAN B if the lender, in its sole discretion, denies the modification. Having the ability to plan and execute a contingency plan, whether it be Chapter 7, 11, 13, a short sale or a federal lawsuit, is truly the firm’s core strength.

A foreclosure relief company or real estate agent is unqualified to provide you with any of this legal insight – but a California loan modification lawyer at the The McCandless Firm has the knowledge and experience to help. California attorney Joseph Arthur “Joe” Roberts can act as your legal counselor and help you get out of the financial situation that you find yourself in. With offices located in Newport Beach, attorney Roberts helps clients throughout California, including Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside County and the surrounding areas.

Loan Modification Attorney in Los Angeles, Orange and Riverside County, California

In California, voluntary loan modification programs of different companies vary. Most loans are owned in pools by “trusts” and not by the servicing agent with whom you deal. The contract between the trust and the servicing agent, called a PSA, limits the number of loans that can be modified in a given pool. Typically, the PSA limits the number of loans that can be modified in a given pool at 5%. However, that restriction is lifted in the event of a bankruptcy or litigation.

Most servicing agents are understaffed, overwhelmed and for the most part…simply don’t care about you. The servicing companies typically make more money off of late fees, costs and penalties when you remain in default. If the property gets foreclosed on, it becomes the trust’s problem, not necessarily the service agent’s. The application process can take months and usually involves rejection or a token change in the loan terms. Amid the flood of modification requests, mistakes frequently get made and the ball gets dropped. In the meantime, the countdown to foreclosure sale continues. Homeowners already under distress get left with little time to act if a modification is not granted. You need to have a backup plan in place in case the lender’s process fails.

Loan modification is driven by income and complicated when there is a second mortgage company involved. If you lack the income to fund whatever plan the lender is willing to give you, you will be denied. Even if the first mortgage company is willing to modify your loan, it doesn’t mean that the second mortgage company will play ball. In the absence of litigation or bankruptcy, the loan modifications have economic limits. A reduction in principal balance is rare. A mortgage holder will not reduce the principal balance below the value of the property. Interest rate adjustments and recapitalization of back payments are more common. However, don’t expect to get an interest only or negative amortization loan. The very best you can hope for is a fixed rate amortized over 30 years at a decent rate based on the current value of the house. Finally, if the lender “cancels” some of your debt, it may still be considered taxable income by the IRS, despite the passage of the limited Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007. Only debt from buying or improving the property is covered by the new law.

How a California Loan Modification Lawyer Can Help

loan modification process can be complex, and it is easy for a lender or servicing agent to take advantage of you. Using an experienced lawyer to assert your rights gets you to the front of the line in this process. The possibility of litigation or bankruptcy may increase your negotiating leverage with your lender. Lenders are forced to get their own lawyers involved in your case, not just an administrative person from the loss mitigation department. We welcome you to contact our firm to discuss your loan, your budget and the benefits of attorney negotiated loan modification.

Contact  loan modification attorney The McCandless Firm today! Northern California 925-957-9797and in Southern California 909-890-9192